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Abstract i
Abstract
A growing number of wireless technologies and providers, as well as users’ increasing need
and desire to be connected and reachable at all times, call for solutions that enable inter-
operation between providers and technologies. Roaming procedures enable wireless access
in areas that are covered by network providers with which the user does not have any prior
arrangements. Handover procedures enable the maintenance of ongoing connections while
a user moves across different wireless access networks.
The goal of this thesis is to model the security challenges imposed on infrastructure-
based wireless access networks by inter-provider and inter-system roaming and handover
procedures, to analyze current solutions in this model, and to develop new security solutions.
In the first two parts of this thesis, the theoretical parts, we present new models for
handover and roaming as well as new security solutions in a technology-independent way:
In part II, the main part of this thesis, we develop a formal model for security-context
transfer on various types of inter-provider handover procedures. As opposed to previous
work [186, 177, 74, 185, 75, 162] our model explicitly captures security-context transfers on
subsequent handover and handover after roaming. We present a thorough threat analysis of
security solutions that are based on security-context transfers during inter-provider hando-
ver and define new security requirements based on this analysis. As state-of-the-art handover
procedures do not meet our requirements, we present a new history-enriched, policy-based
approach to enhance security-context transfers on inter-provider and inter-system handover.
The main advantage of our new approach is that it allows mobile devices and networks to
express policies with respect to whether or not a handover should take place, dependent on
the history of previously used security mechanisms that is included in the security-context
transfer. This protects users and providers from the impact of previously used weak se-
curity mechanisms. Moreover, in our procedures, users and networks can enforce policies
with respect to the security mechanisms used after the current handover. This protects the
handover participants from the impact of future use of weak security mechanisms.
Furthermore, in part I, we model, classify and discuss roaming authentication protocols
for wireless access networks in a technology-independent way. We introduce a new public-
key-based approach for authentication upon roaming. As opposed to previous work on
inter-provider roaming (e.g., [62, 9, 156]), our approach does not require a secure channel
between the home and the foreign network. Moreover, as opposed to other public-key-based
solutions [81, 29], in our approach a mobile device is not required to obtain and validate a
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chain of public-key certificates.
In the third part of this thesis, we analyze the roaming and handover procedures within
and between GSM and UMTS. In particular, we present a man-in-the-middle attack against
the authentication and key agreement based on UMTS-authentication vectors. This attack
is enabled by a vulnerability in the inter-operation of UMTS with GSM. Furthermore, we
discuss whether the inter-system handover procedures between GSM and UMTS meet the
security requirements newly defined in the theoretical part. We show that attacks against
the GSM encryption and a man-in-the-middle attack against the GSM authentication and
key agreement have an impact on the security of a connection between a user and a UMTS
network if a user is handed back and forth between UMTS and GSM.
Finally, in the fourth part, we apply our new security solutions to roaming and handover
between IEEE 802.11 WLANs. In particular, we present a roaming authentication protocol
EAP-TLS-KS that implements the new roaming solution. Furthermore we detail how the
history-enriched, policy-based approach for inter-provider handover can be implemented in
the WLAN context.
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Zusammenfassung
In den letzten Jahren steigt die Zahl der drahtlosen Technologien sowie die der Netzbetrei-
ber kontinuierlich. Gleichzeitig steigen die Erwartungen und das Bedu¨rfniss der Benutzer
jederzeit und u¨berall Netzzugang zu haben und erreichbar zu sein. Handover und Roaming-
prozeduren sind notwendig um die gewu¨nschte Interoperabilita¨t zwischen verschiedenen
Technologien und Netzbetreibern zu gewa¨hrleisten. Roamingprozeduren ermo¨glichen einem
Benutzer drahtlosen Netzzugang in Gegenden, die von Netzbetreibern abgedeckt werden,
mit denen er vorab keine Vereinbarugen getroffen hat. Handoverprozeduren ermo¨glichen ei-
nem Benutzer aktive Verbindungen beim Wechsel von einem Netz zu einem anderen aufrecht
zu erhalten.
Das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, die Sicherheitsprobleme, die durch Handover-
und Roamingprozeduren zwischen verschiedenen Betreibern und Technologien fu¨r infra-
strukturbasierte drahtlose Netze entstehen, zu modelieren, bestehende Lo¨sugen in diesem
Model zu analysieren und neue Sicherheitslo¨sugen zu entwickeln.
In den ersten beiden Teilen dieser Arbeit, den theoretischen Teilen, werden neue tech-
nologieunabha¨ngige Modelle fu¨r Roaming und Handover eingefu¨hrt.
In Teil II, dem Hauptteil der Arbeit, entwickeln wir ein neues formales Modell fu¨r Sicher-
heitskontexttransfer fu¨r verschiedene Typen von Handoverprozeduren zwischen verschiede-
nen Anbietern. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Arbeiten auf diesem Gebiet [186, 177, 74, 185,
75, 162] werden im neuen Modell sowohl aufeinanderfolgende Handover als auch Hando-
verprozeduren, die nach einem initialen Roaming stattfinden, explizit betrachtet. Die Be-
drohungen, die von solchen Handoverprozeduren mit Sicherheitskontexttransfer ausgehen,
werden ausfu¨hrlich analysiert. Als Resultat dieser Analyse werden neue Sicherheitsanfor-
derungen definiert. Herko¨mmliche Handoverprozeduren erfu¨llen diese neuen Anforderugne
nicht. In dieser Arbeit wird daher ein neuer Ansatz entwickelt. Der gro¨ßte Vorteil dieses
Ansatzes ist, dass er Benutztern und Netzbetreibern ermo¨glicht, in Abha¨ngigkeit von der
Geschichte eines Sicherheitskontexts Policies zu definieren, auf deren Basis dann wa¨hrend
des Handovers entschieden wird, ob das Handover aus Sicherheitsgru¨nden abgelehnt wer-
den muss oder durchgefu¨hrt werden kann. Die Geschichtsabha¨ngigkeit der Policies schu¨tzt
Benutzer und Netzbetreiber vor Angriffen, die durch die Benutzung eines schwachen Sicher-
heitsmechanismus vor einem Handover enstehen ko¨nnen. Zusa¨tzlich ko¨nnen Benutzer und
Netzbetreiber ihre Policies bezu¨glich der Sicherheitsmechanismen, die unmittelbar nach ei-
nem Handover benutzt werden, durchsetzen und werden dadurch vor Angriffen geschu¨tzt,
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die auf der Benutzung schwacher Sicherheitsmechanismen nach einem Handover beruhen.
Daru¨ber hinaus werden in Teil I der Arbeit Authentisierungs- und Schlu¨sselvereinba-
rungsprotokolle fu¨r Roaming modelliert, klassifiziert und diskutiert und ein neuer Ansatz
fu¨r public-key-basiertes Roaming zwischen verschiedenen Netzbetreibern entwickelt. Im Ge-
gensatz zu anderen Arbeiten auf diesem Gebiet (z.B. [62, 9, 156]), beno¨tigt unser Ansatz
keinen sicheren Kanal zwischen dem Heimnetz und einem Fremdnetz. Ausserdem muss in
unserem Ansatz ein mobiles Endgera¨t keinerlei Ketten von Zertifikaten konstruieren und
auswerten, was ein Vorteil gegenu¨ber anderen public-key-basierten Ansa¨tzen (z.B. [81, 29])
ist.
Im dritten Teil werden die Roaming- und Handoverprozeduren zwischen GSM
und UMTS analysiert. Speziell stellen wir einen Man-in-the-middle-Angriff auf das
Authentisierungs- und Schlu¨sselvereinbarungsprotokoll fu¨r Roaming in UMTS vor. Dieser
Angriff beruht auf einer Schwa¨che, deren Ursache in der Interoperabilita¨t mit GSM liegt.
Zusa¨tzlich diskutieren wir, inwieweit die Handoverprozeduren zwischen GSM und UMTS
den Sicherheitsanforderungen, die wir im theoretischen Teil entwickelt haben, erfu¨llen. Wir
zeigen, dass bestimmte Angriffe gegen die GSM-Verschlu¨sslungsmechanismen und ein Man-
in-the-middle-Angriff auf GSM Auswirkugen auf die Sicherheit eines UMTS-Benutzers ha-
ben, wenn dieser zwischen GSM und UMTS hin und her wechselt.
Schliesslich werden im vierten Teil der Arbeit die neuen Roaming- und Handoverlo¨sun-
gen auf drahtlose lokale Netze nach IEEE 802.11 angewandt. Wir stellen ein neues Roaming-
protokoll EAP-TLS-KS vor und beschreiben, wie der neue geschichts- und policy-basierte
Sicherheitskontexttransfer im Fall drahtloser lokaler Netze implementiert werden kann.
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Introduction
The goal of this thesis is to model the security challenges imposed on infrastructure-based
wireless access networks by roaming and handover procedures between different network
providers and across different technologies, to analyze current solutions within this model,
and to develop new security solutions.
Roaming, Handover and Security
In recent years, wireless technology has become an integral part of state-of-the-art network-
ing and the use of various wireless devices has become part of our everyday life: in August
2005 85% of Germans carried cell phones [86], most PDAs currently have a wireless inter-
face, and it is almost impossible to buy a new laptop that does not come with a built-in
radio. Mobile phone operators offer mobile telephony and data services to their customers,
companies and universities allow their employees or students to access the local networks
wirelessly, hotspot operators offer internet connectivity in public areas such as airports and
coffee shops, and in more and more private homes, computers, printers and fax machines
are connected wirelessly. Some of the most well-known and most widely used wireless access
technologies are the mobile telecommunication standards GSM, UMTS, and CDMA2000,
the data service enhancement of GSM called GPRS, as well as the local area networking
technologies IEEE 802.11 and Bluetooth.
A growing number of technologies and providers as well as the user’s increasing need
and desire to be connected and reachable at all times, call for solutions which allow for the
inter-operation of the different technologies and providers.
Roaming and handover procedures are two forms of inter-operation that aim to support
user mobility across different providers and technologies. Before we proceed, we must briefly
explain these terms.
In a mobile phone network, a user typically subscribes to one mobile phone operator, for
example T-Mobiler 1. This subscription allows him to place and receive phone calls over
the T-Mobiler network in a certain geographical area, like Germany. To support the mobil-
ity of its subscribers, T-Mobiler enters into roaming agreements with other mobile phone
operators. If T-Mobiler and, e.g., the France Te´le´com network Oranger 2 have a roaming
agreement, a T-Mobiler subscriber can place and receive phone calls while in France using
the Oranger network. Thus the roaming agreement between the two operators and the
1T-Mobiler is a registered trademark of Deutsche Telekom AG.
2Oranger is a registered trademark of France Te´le´com.
2 Introduction
associated roaming procedure allows the user to access the Oranger network without prior
subscription to this network operator. This network access includes being able to receive
incoming phone calls as well as being able to place phone calls. On the network side, roam-
ing thus includes updating the location information for a roaming user, as well as re-routing
incoming user traffic to the user’s new point of network attachment.
With roaming service alone, the call a traveling user places while still in Germany will
drop as soon as the user crosses the border and the T-Mobiler network is no longer available.
Here, handover procedures come in. If T-Mobiler and Oranger had a handover agreement,
then the associated handover procedure would allow the user to continue his phone call
without interruption over the Oranger network as soon as the T-Mobiler network is no
longer reachable. On the network side, a handover procedure thus requires incoming and
outgoing traffic on an ongoing connection to be re-routed to the user’s new point of network
attachment without causing an interruption. This places tight efficiency requirements on
handover procedures, which may also result in different re-routing paths than occur in the
roaming case.
While best known from mobile phone networks, inter-provider roaming and handover
procedures have found their place in other commercial wireless access networks, such as
the wireless LAN networks of hotspot providers. Non-commercial inter-provider roaming
scenarios include roaming between university or company-owned WLAN networks that are
administered by different entities.
Previously, wireless devices were equipped with one technology only, thus limiting inter-
operation to providers supporting the same technology. A recent trend, however, is to
integrate more than one wireless communication interface in a single mobile device (see,
e.g., [32]), thus allowing the user to benefit from the advantages of different networking
technologies. For example, a user with a PDA supporting both GPRS and 802.11 cannot
only use a local area network with its high data rates, but may also benefit from the
large coverage area of a GPRS network. Inter-system roaming procedures allow users pre-
registered for a network of one network technology to use a network of another technology
without prior registration for the latter one. Inter-system handover procedures allow such
users to maintain an ongoing connection while changing from one access network technology
to another.
With the advantages of mobility support and the technical challenges of supporting han-
dover and roaming come just as many challenges in providing secure solutions for roaming
and handover between different technologies and providers. Currently, most providers re-
strict the use of their networks to pre-registered users. Through the pre-registration process,
the user and a dedicated provider establish a trust relationship and exchange credentials
such as cryptographic keys, which enable a secured network access. The network for which
a user is pre-registered is typically referred to as his home network. Any other network is
called a foreign network.
The security challenge on inter-provider roaming is enabling a mobile device and a for-
eign network to authenticate each other, negotiating security mechanisms, and establishing
cryptographic keys to secure the network access without any prior direct trust relationship.
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The additional security challenge on inter-system roaming is to enable the usage of the same
credentials on authentication across different access technologies.
In order to offer continuous use of services, handover procedures have to be fast for
several reasons. First, real-time services like voice or video connections are sensitive to
short disruptions. Second, users are sensitive to disruptions. Third and finally, during a
handover procedure a user typically moves out of the range of his currently serving network
such that a handover procedure has to be completed before the user looses connection to
his original point of network attachment. The security challenge on inter-provider handover
is to enable a secure network access fast enough to allow for uninterrupted use of ongoing
connections. This secure access includes (indirect or direct) mutual authentication between
a mobile device and the destination network as well as establishing cryptographic keys and
negotiating cryptographic mechanisms to use after handover.
Different providers and users have varying requirements, and different technologies have
varying security capabilities (e.g., encryption or authentication methods, key sizes). Conse-
quently, handover and roaming across different technologies and providers means crossing
domains that are not equally well protected. This arises the question, how the security
policies of providers and users during handover and roaming should be taken into account.
In this thesis we model the security challenges imposed on infrastructure-based wireless
access networks by roaming and handover procedures between different network providers
and across different technologies. We analyze current solutions within this model, and
develop new security solutions.
In particular, we develop a new approach for public-key cryptography-based inter-
provider roaming and suggest a new roaming authentication protocol EAP-TLS that im-
plements the new approach in the context of WLANs. We present the first formal model
for subsequent context transfers on inter-provider and inter-system handover. We provide a
thorough threat analysis of inter-provider and inter-system handover procedures from which
we derive new security requirements. We develop a new security solution for inter-provider
and inter-system handover that enhances state-of-the-art security-context-transfer-based
solutions and meets the newly defined security requirements. We exemplify this new han-
dover approach in the context of wireless local area networks. Moreover, as a case study
for inter-system handover, we present the first comprehensive security analysis of the han-
dover and roaming procedures standardized for the inter-operation of GSM and UMTS and
compare them to the security requirements and design goals we derived. We show that
these procedures are vulnerable to a variety of attacks and present security solutions that
can be used on top of the current security architectures of GSM and UMTS. The above
summarized contributions of this thesis are detailed in the following.
Contributions
Roaming
  The classification, modeling, and discussion of current security solutions for both
inter-provider and inter-system roaming. As opposed to other overviews on roaming
procedures, such as [178, 24], our description is independent of any particular wire-
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less access technology. Roaming procedures are classified according to the amount
of control a home network retains and according to where the cryptographic keys
that protect the network access after successful authentication are generated. Other
technology-independent work on roaming procedures (e.g., [29, 156]) does not address
how the security mechanisms used between a foreign network and mobile device should
be negotiated. As roaming typically requires the home network’s authorization, it is
in the home network’s interest that the mobile device and the foreign network ade-
quately secure their connection. We explicitly address this problem and show that the
home network of a mobile device should actively participate in the security-mechanism
negotiation.
  The development of a new approach to public-key-based inter-provider roaming. Our
approach enables a home network to control each roaming instance. By means of
secret-sharing techniques this approach solves the two most common shortcomings
of state-of-the-art roaming solutions. First, as opposed to [156, 18, 189, 9, 87], it
does not require the transfer of secret session-key material from the home network to
the network to which a mobile device roams. Second, as opposed to other solutions
that use public-key certificates to authenticate the network to the mobile device (e.g.,
[29, 81]), the new approach spares a mobile device from any certificate validation.
  The development and security analysis of EAP-TLS-KS, a protocol that enhances
EAP-TLS to support the new secret-sharing approach for inter-provider roaming be-
tween IEEE 802.11i protected WLANs. This part of the thesis is joint work with S.
Wetzel and J. Cordasco and has been published in [121].
  A security analysis of the roaming procedures between GSM and UMTS. The most
important result of the analysis is that UMTS networks that inter-operate with GSM
are vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. This part of the thesis is joint work
with S. Wetzel and has been published in [122]. After publication, this attack was
discussed by the standardization organization 3GPP [3] and included in the vulnera-
bility and enhancement study [2]. EAP-TLS-KS is a public-key-based approach and,
consequently, cannot be used to enhance GSM-UMTS inter-operation without major
changes to the standardized security architectures of these wireless technologies. The
solution we have suggested in [122] is specifically designed to be applicable on top of
the standardized symmetric-key-based architectures.
Handover
  The classification, modeling, and discussion of current security solutions for inter-
provider and inter-system handover procedures. Security solutions are classified into
methods that use a full (roaming) authentication and key agreement between a net-
work and a mobile device prior to or during handover and methods that use security-
context transfer. Solutions that use security-context transfer (SCT) reuse already
established cryptographic keys to derive and transfer new keys to the destination
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network. The security-context transfer implicitly authenticates the mobile device to
the destination network. We discuss these security solutions and their applicability
for technologies supporting different types of handover procedures. As opposed to
previous work on security-context transfer solutions for inter-provider roaming (e.g.,
[186, 177, 74, 185, 55, 162]), we explicitly model the subsequent context transfer arising
from several subsequent handover.
  A detailed analysis of potential threats against security-context transfer methods on
inter-provider as well as inter-system handover. In this threat analysis, we describe
various attacks that can be enabled by security-context transfer in combination with
weaknesses in one of the previously serving networks or the currently serving one.
Some of these attacks arise from the dependencies of the cryptographic keys used
before and after handover. Some arise from weaknesses in the methods used to ne-
gotiate security mechanisms, and others are mainly enabled by weaknesses in the
used security mechanisms themselves. Although the use of security-context trans-
fer to accelerate inter-provider and inter-system handover is widely discussed (e.g.,
[186, 177, 74, 185, 129, 55, 75, 162]), the inherent threats of SCT have not been ade-
quately treated in literature yet [75, 111]. We close this gap by our detailed analysis.
  A new history-enriched, policy-based approach to inter-provider and inter-system han-
dover that explicitly addresses subsequent handover, as well as handover of roaming
users. This new approach protects against attacks arising from the use of weak secu-
rity mechanisms before handover by guaranteeing forward secrecy of the transferred
keys. Attacks enabled by the use of weak mechanisms after handover, are prevented by
enforcing the mobile device’s, the handover controlling network’s, and the destination
network’s policy upon the security-mechanism negotiation and protecting the negoti-
ation against bidding-down attacks. By adequately protecting the handover message
exchange between the mobile device and the networks, attacks that use manipula-
tion or interception of handover-related message are prevented. Our new approach
enhances security-context transfer with a key history that contains information on
how the cryptographic keys in the security context were generated and how keys de-
rived from them were used so far. This approach enables users and providers to base
their handover decisions on the history of the transferred cryptographic keys. Con-
sequently, users as well as providers can prevent critical handover situations and yet
inter-operate with providers and users that support untrusted security mechanisms.
The ability to reject a handover on a per-case basis allows users and providers to
protect against a third set of attacks. Handover decisions are thus more flexible and
respect the security policies of both users and providers. This part of the thesis is
joint work with S. Wetzel and will be published in [124].
  The development and analysis of the history-enriched, policy-based security-context
transfer approach applied to IEEE 802.11 WLANs. We show how our new security-
context transfer approach can be integrated into the context transfer protocol sug-
gested in [111]. Moreover, we show how the concepts underlying our new roaming
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solution EAP-TLS-KS can be used to generate fresh cryptographic keys between a
foreign network and a mobile device during handover.
  A security analysis of the inter-system handover procedures between GSM and UMTS.
In particular, we detail how GSM vulnerabilities like weak encryption mechanisms or
fake base stations can spread to UMTS by means of handover procedures. This part
of the thesis has been published together with S. Wetzel in [123]. These vulnerabilities
were discussed by 3GPP in [3] and lead to some new recommendations for GSM opera-
tors [4]. The solutions we presented in [123] built on the existing security architectures
for GSM and UMTS. However, our history-enriched, policy-based solutions could be
used to enhance the inter-operation between GSM and UMTS requiring changes to
the inter-provider communication only.
Outline. The remainder of this thesis is organized in four parts. In the first two parts,
theoretical in nature, we model wireless access networks, roaming, and handover and develop
and analyze our new solutions in a technology independent way. In the last two parts, our
new solutions are applied to inter-provider roaming and handover in WLANs and inter-
system handover between GSM and UMTS.
We model wireless access networks in Chapter 1 and roaming in Chapter 2 of Part I.
The handover model is presented in Part II. This part starts off with a model of different
types of handover procedures, the security challenge, and a discussion of potential security
solutions in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we analyze the potential threats arising from security
solutions based on security-context transfer. We present our own history-enriched, policy-
based security-context transfer in Chapter 5. Part II ends with an extension of our inter-
provider solution to the inter-system handover case and an overview on other related issues.
In Part III, we study inter-provider and inter-system roaming and handover between
GSM and UMTS. Chapter 7 briefly describes the system model and the security architec-
tures of GSM and UMTS, including inter-provider roaming within GSM and UMTS. The
inter-system roaming procedures are described and analyzed in Chapter 8. The inter-system
handover procedures are described and analyzed in Chapter 9.
Finally, in Part IV, we apply our new roaming and handover solutions to the WLAN case.
We start with a brief overview on the WLAN system model and the new security architecture
802.11i for WLAN in Chapter 10. In Chapter 11, we present our new secret-sharing-based
roaming solution EAP-TLS-KS. The adaption of the history-enriched, policy-based security-
context transfer solution and our new key-agreement method using secret-sharing techniques
is presented in Chapter 12. The thesis ends with a Conclusion.
Each part in this thesis begins with a brief overview of how this part is related to other
parts. Each chapter begins with an introduction that motivates its content, details the
contributions of the chapter, and provides a chapter outline. Each chapter ends with a
detailed discussion of the related work and a conclusion that summarizes the content of the
chapter and provides input for future directions of research.
Reading Instructions. The second part of this thesis requires many of the terms intro-
duced in Part I and can thus not easily be read outside this context. However, Part III
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and Part IV are written to be self-contained such that they can be read without deeper
understanding of the theoretical background provided in Part I and II.
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Wireless Access Networks and
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Part I in the General Context
In Chapter 1, we model wireless access networks with respect to their system
and security architecture. In Chapter 2, we model and classify roaming
authentication and key-agreement protocols between wireless access networks.
Moreover, we introduce a new approach to public-key-based inter-provider
roaming in Section 2.2. Part I founds the bases for Part II, in which we model
inter-provider handover procedures for mobile devices. In Chapter 11, we
detail the new roaming approach introduced in Section 2.2 in the context of
WLANs. The notations and terms introduced in Part I are used throughout
the remainder of this work.
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Chapter 1
System Model and Security Model
Wireless networks come in two different forms: infrastructure-based networks and
infrastructure-less networks, so called ad hoc networks. In an ad hoc network, mobile
devices interconnect without the help of a fixed infrastructure. This means that the mobile
devices detect each other, establish connections, and route traffic between themselves. In an
infrastructure-based network, these tasks are left to a fixed, wired or wireless infrastructure.
Throughout this work, we focus on infrastructure-based wireless access networks.
In this chapter, we model infrastructure-based wireless networks (referred to as wire-
less access networks in the remainder of this work) as to their components and security
architecture in a technology-independent way. We identify the entities user, mobile device,
network provider, home network provider, and service provider, as well as the components
of wireless access networks, and describe their relationships. Furthermore, we determine
the security goals of users and providers in a wireless access network and model the security
mechanisms used to protect them.
In particular, we define mutual authentication and key-agreement protocols between a
mobile device and its home network, key-establishment processes by which data-protection
keys are derived from master session keys, as well as encryption and integrity-protection
mechanisms. We model the security-related part of the establishment of a connection be-
tween a mobile device and its home network.
Our model is based on the components and security architectures of GSM, UMTS, IEEE
802.11, and CDMA2000 [62, 9, 91, 93, 153], but it also complies to the security architectures
of Bluetooth and IEEE 802.16 [96, 100]. The goal of our model is to found the basis of our
futher enhancements to roaming and handover procedures.
In addition to the general model, we describe various methods a mobile device and its
home network can use to negotiate security mechanisms based on their security policies.
State-of-the-art technologies use very simple negotiation methods (see Method 1 to Method 3
in Section 1.3) that do not enable users or providers to express preferences with respect to
the security mechanisms they allow to be used. This contradicts the observation that users
and providers typically deem different security mechanisms to provide different protection
levels and aim to use security mechanisms that provide as high a protection level as possible.
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We present and discuss one already existing negotiation method that take the preferences
of both users and providers into account (see Method 4 in Section 1.3). This method was
previously suggested in the context of reconciliation of security policies in general [179] and
builds on the assumption that the preferences of one negotiating party outweighs the other.
Furthermore, we introduce a new negotiation method that takes the preferences of both
parties with equal weights into account and is resistant against some manipulations by the
negotiating parties (see Method 5 in Section 1.3).
Outline. In Section 1.1, we describe the components of a wireless access network. Sec-
tion 1.2 starts with the specification of the security goals of wireless access network providers
and users in Section 1.2.1. We then model the pre-registration process between a user and
his home provider and the security mechanisms used between the two in order to protect
their security goals in Section 1.2.2. In Section 1.2.3, we summarize our assumptions on
the security policies of users and providers. In Section 1.2.4, we describe how the different
security mechanisms are used between a mobile device and its home network on connection
establishment. Finally, in Section 1.3, we model existing and introduce new methods to
negotiate security mechanisms between a mobile device and its home network.
1.1 System Model
In a wireless infrastructure network, a mobile device (MD) like a mobile phone or a laptop
connects to a fixed network access point (NAP) over a radio connection. Examples for
network access points are base transceiver stations in wireless phone networks or access
points in a wireless LAN. Every NAP has a transmission range. A mobile device can
connect to a NAP only if it is in the NAP’s range. In the simplest case, a wireless access
network consists of only one network access point that is itself connected to a wired network.
A single network access point can cover only the area of its own transmission range.1 To
be able to cover a wider area, more than one network access point has to be used. These
network access points themselves are connected, either over radio or wired, to a backbone
network.
In some wireless technologies, this backbone network is hierarchically structured. Several
network access points are connected to a more central network component, several of these
are connected to an even more central network component, and so on. Mobile phone
networks are typical examples for infrastructure networks with a hierarchical backbone.
Figure 1.1 illustrates a GSM network as an example for a wireless network with a hierarchical
backbone.
In other wireless technologies, the backbone network is flat. For example, in an IEEE
802.11 WLAN, several network access points can be directly interconnected by a LAN
technology like Ethernet and connected to the Internet via a router. This is illustrated in
Figure 1.2.
1Depending on the wireless technology and the environment in which it is used, the coverage area of a
network access point can range from several meters up to several dozen kilometers (e.g., 3-35 km in GSM,
10-200m in WLAN).
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Figure 1.1: GSM Network with a Hierarchical Backbone
For the remainder of this work, the detailed structure of the backbone network is not
taken into account. A wireless access network can therefore simply be described by Fig-
ure 1.3. A wireless access network consists of several network access points that are
connected to a common backbone network. This backbone network itself can be connected
to other wired networks, like a local area network, the Internet, or the PSTN.2
A wireless access technology typically specifies only the first two layers of the ISO/OSI
reference model, namely the physical (PHYS) layer and the medium access control (MAC)
layer. It allows for the integration of different network layers and often even different MAC
and PHYS layers on the backbone network. The network access points (NAPs) act as
a bridge between the wireless MAC layer and the MAC layer of the backbone network.
Figure 1.4 illustrates this.
A wireless access network is operated by a network provider. A provider is a public
or private entity that offers connectivity to a mobile device via a wireless access network.
One widespread type of network providers are commercial providers like operators of mobile
phone networks or WLAN hotspot providers. But providers can also be non-commercial,
like companies or universities that offer wireless network access in addition to wired access
to their employees or students and staff.
Another type of non-commercial provider is non-profit organizations that offer free wire-
less access to everyone in public places like libraries, parks, or coffee shops. An example for
a network like this is the freely available wireless LAN network the Bryant Park Restoration
2Public Switched Telephone Network.
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Figure 1.3: System Model of a Wireless Access Network
Corporation offers in New York City [42]. On a larger scale, the city of San Francisco is
currently planning to offer free WLAN access to all its citizens. The Major of San Francisco
even called wireless access a “fundamental right” [22]. Although these freely accessible net-
works exist, they are not the focus of this work. Instead, we only consider commercial and
non-commercial network providers that want to restrict access to their network to a certain
set of users.
Every user is pre-registered for one wireless access network, his home network operated
by one provider, his home provider. In the registration process, a user and the network
provider establish a trust relationship and exchange credentials and cryptographic keys. The
registration of a user is with respect to a certain identity that represents the pre-registered
user upon future network access. Examples for an identity like this are a username assigned
to a user by its home provider, a worldwide unique identifier like an the International
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) used in GSM and UMTS networks or an identifier of
the form “user@domainname”. Other examples are IP or MAC addresses. The credential
for a user is issued for the user’s pre-registration identity. In the following we will refer to
the pre-registration identity as the user’s identity. Depending on the type of credential and
pre-registration identity issued for a user, the pre-registration may be independent of or be
bound to a certain MD. Credentials issued for the user can be stored on a particular MD or
be usable on any MD. In the following we do not differentiate between these two cases, that
is, we assume that each pre-registered user is issued a credential and uses this credential in
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Figure 1.4: Wireless Access Network Components in the ISO/OSI Model
connection with one particular MD. As a consequence we do not differentiate between a pre-
registered user and its (pre-registered) MD. In particular, we are not interested in securing
the interface between users and MDs and do not differentiate between the pre-registered
user, using his MD, the owner of MD, or a person that is authorized by the pre-registered
user to use his MD.
A user uses his MD to connect to a wireless network in order to use a service. For
example, a user may access the network in order to connect to a local resource in the
backbone of the wireless access network, like a printer. Other examples of services are
placing and receiving phone calls or establishing IP-connectivity. The services a user can
use via a wireless access network are provided by service providers.
Figure 1.5 illustrates different entities—the user, the home network provider, the foreign
network provider, the service provider, the user’s mobile device, and the wireless access
network—as well as their relations to each other. A service provider can coincide with the
home network provider (e.g., access to a local printer, IP-connectivity, voice calls) or be
different from the home provider (e.g., location-based services).
1.2 Security Model
1.2.1 Security Goals and their Protection
This section describes the security goals of providers and users of a wireless access net-
work and compares them to the ones typically postulated for wired networks. Aside from
anonymity (Section 1.2.1.4), the security goals are the same for wired and wireless access
networks. However, the broadcast nature of a wireless access network and the easy acces-
sibility of the air interface make it easier to violate and harder to protect these goals.
1.2.1.1 Authentication and Authorization
Protect against unauthorized users: The provider of a wireless access network wants
to restrict access to its network to a certain set of authorized users.
In commercial wireless access networks like mobile phone networks or wireless hotspot
networks, only those users who pay for the service should be able to access the network.
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Likewise, a company’s wireless access network should only be accessible by employees or a
certain group of employees. Networks are protected from unauthorized users by an authen-
tication procedure. By means of this procedure, the user proves his identity to the network.
Once the user is identified, the network can determine whether the user is authorized to
access the network.
In a wired network, devices like personal computers or terminals are connected to the
network via sockets. These sockets and devices are physically protected by the buildings and
rooms they are in. Access to the network thus requires physical access to the sockets and/or
the user devices connected to the sockets. This physical protection is missing in wireless
access networks: everyone has physical access to the air interface. In the “classical” case of a
wired network, a user authenticates himself to the network via a fix device that is connected
to the network. Mobile devices like laptops are more and more commonly used to access
wired networks. Lately, the problem of authenticating users with their own mobile device
when it is plugged into a socket of the wired network has become more widely recognized
[19].
Protect against unauthorized networks: A user wants to be protected from accessing
unauthorized networks.
An attacker can try to make a mobile device connect to a “fake” network access point
that is controlled by the attacker. Once a mobile device is connected to a fake network
access point, the data confidentiality of user data and of user-related data like its identity
can be violated.
To protect against unauthorized networks, the network is authenticated by the mobile
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device and the mobile device checks its authorization to offer network access to the user.
Examples for wireless access network technologies in which a missing network authentication
allows for fake network access points are GSM and WLANs. The corresponding attack for
GSM is briefly described in Section 9.4.1.2, while the attack on UAM-protected WLANs
can be found in [178].3
In a wired network, the physical location of the network access device or sockets already
give the user some confidence in the identity of the network he is currently accessing. In the
wireless case, everyone has physical access to the air interface and can broadcast beacons4
and try to make mobile devices connect to fake network access points.5 With respect to
network authentication, a wireless access network has more similarities to accessing a wired
network from a remote machine than from a machine that is directly connected to the
network in question. On remote network access, a user also has to make sure he is accessing
the network he intends to access before sending any sensitive user data over the network.
A mechanism that supports both user and network authentication is called a mutual au-
thentication mechanism. Most current wireless access technologies support mutual authen-
tication between user and home network.
1.2.1.2 Confidentiality
Protect the confidentiality of data and control traffic: Users and providers want
to protect the confidentiality of the data and control traffic on the air interface between a
mobile device and a network access point.
In wireless access networks there are two different types of traffic exchanged between
a mobile device and the network: data traffic and control traffic. Control traffic is all the
information exchanged between a mobile device and the network concerning the establish-
ment and control of a connection and the management of the network. This includes, for
example, authentication traffic and traffic related to the negotiation of security mechanisms.
On the other hand, data traffic is the traffic sent and received by a mobile device as the
result of the usage of a service. An example of data traffic is the voice data of a phone call
placed or received over a mobile phone network. Another example is IP traffic related to a
TCP6 session established over the wireless access network between the mobile device and a
corresponding node at some location on the Internet.
3The Universal Access Method (UAM) is the currently most authentication method used by hotspot
provider [18].
4Control messages informing all mobile devices within the range of a NAP of its presence, possibly along
with additional status or configuration information.
5Depending on the network technology, faking a network access point can be more or less costly: while
a WLAN access point can be purchased starting from US
 
30, a GSM base station is hardly affordable for
an attacker operating on his own. Moreover, broadcasting on the technology-dependent frequencies without
anyone noticing can be hard to do if the corresponding frequencies are regulated. For example, this is the
case for mobile phone technologies.
6Transmission Control Protocol.
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In mobile phone networks, different channels are used for data traffic and control traffic.
In packet-switched networks, control and data traffic is exchanged over the same channel. In
a wireless network all traffic between a mobile device and a network access point is broadcast
on the air interface. An attacker with a network analyzer can thus easily intercept all traffic
going back and forth between a network access point and associated mobile devices. To
protect against an unauthorized third party getting access to control and data traffic on the
air interface, the traffic is typically encrypted. Encrypting the control traffic protects, for
example, the confidentiality of connection parameters and commands to switch the channel.
It is important to note that some wireless access technologies do not support encryption
of control traffic and only encrypt data traffic on the air interface [62, 9]. Encrypting data
traffic on the air interface does not protect the confidentiality of the end-to-end connection
between a user and a corresponding node. For example, if the voice data of a phone call
is encrypted on the air interface, the plaintext of the voice data is available everywhere
on the backbone network and the PSTN. End-to-end protection, if desired, thus has to be
implemented on a higher layer and between the end points of the voice connection. Yet
the encryption of the air interface protects the user data while it is particularly easy to
intercept. Moreover, encrypting user data includes protecting the information contained
in the header of higher-layer protocols and thus prevents traffic analysis for these higher
layers. If, for example, data traffic is encrypted on the MAC layer, then the source and
destination addresses and the payload of an IP packet are encrypted. Another advantage
of encryption on the MAC layer is that independent of any higher-layer protocol, all data
traffic is encrypted and not just the traffic on top of a certain protocol.
It is important to note that in order to be able to encrypt traffic between a mobile
device and the network, the network and the mobile device have to negotiate an encryption
mechanism and agree upon an encryption key. As long as the encryption mechanism and
the encryption key are not “in place,” encryption is not possible.
1.2.1.3 Integrity Protection
Protect against manipulations of user and control traffic: Users and providers want
to notice any manipulation, such as deletion, insertion, or reordering of user and control
traffic on the air interface between a mobile device and a network access point.
An attacker that is able to change the control traffic between a mobile device and the
network can interfere with the establishment and maintenance of the connection between
a mobile device and the network. Unauthorized changes to control and data traffic also
violate the authenticity of traffic sent by the network to the mobile device and vice-versa.
If an attacker can make unauthorized changes, the mobile device and the network cannot
be sure that they communicate with each other. It is important to note, that encrypting
data or signaling traffic does not protect integrity as the network and the mobile device do
not have any means of detecting whether decrypted plaintext is correct.
In order to protect against manipulations, user and control traffic on the air interface is
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integrity-protected.7 Integrity protection mechanisms cannot prevent alteration or insertion
of traffic, but they can help the mobile device, or the network, to notice manipulations like
this and react by discarding the traffic or even dropping the connection.
1.2.1.4 Anonymity
Protection of the confidentiality of the user identity: Users want to protect their
identity from being revealed to anyone else but authorized networks.
This goal is postulated for some wireless access networks and refers to the confidentiality
of the user’s identity on the air interface. A user’s identity should not be revealed to anyone
but authorized networks (in some cases even to no one else but the home network) in order
to protect the user from being localized and traced by an attacker intercepting traffic on the
air interface. To anyone else, only the fact that some mobile device is currently connected
to a given wireless access network should be revealed. It should be impossible to relate
this MD to the pre-registered identity of the user or relate MD’s current connection to any
previous one.
Protecting the confidentiality of a user’s identity is difficult. The wireless access network
has to obtain the user’s identity in order to authenticate the user. Yet the user’s identity
should not be sent over the radio interface in the clear. Encrypting the user’s identity, on the
other hand, is only possible if the encryption key and mechanism already have been agreed
upon. Nevertheless, in order to know which key and mechanism to use, the network has to
gain knowledge of the user’s identity. Although the anonymity problem is out of scope of
this work, it should be noted that recently some interesting solutions have been suggested
for anonymity on inter-provider roaming (e.g., [21, 188]). These are briefly discussed in
Section 2.4.4.
1.2.2 Security Mechanisms
As motivated in the last section, wireless access networks should use a mutual authentication
protocol to protect the network from unauthorized users and the user from unauthorized
networks. This mutual authentication is based on secret and public information bound to a
(pre-registered) user’s identity or a home provider’s identity. A user and his home provider
exchange these credentials in a registration process.
The traffic on the air interface between a user and the network should be integrity-
protected and encrypted. For this purpose, the network and the mobile device have to
agree upon encryption and integrity-protection keys and mechanisms.
In this section, the terms registration process, authentication protocol, encryption mech-
anism, integrity-protection mechanism, key agreement, and key establishment are defined.
These definitions are in accordance with those in [120]. In addition, the components involved
in these security mechanisms in a wireless network are identified.
7Note that older mobile phone technologies often do not support integrity protection, and some newer
technologies only protect control traffic against manipulations.
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1.2.2.1 Registration Process
Each user has a dedicated relationship with one wireless access network provider, its home
provider. In a registration process, the home provider and the user exchange credentials
(i.e., secret or public information bound to the user’s identity and to the identity of the
home network). As we assume a one-to-one relation ship between a pre-registered user
and his mobile device, we will in the following speak of the credential issued for a pre-
registered mobile device. The pre-shared credentials allow HN and the mobile device of a
pre-registered user to mutually authenticate each other when the pre-registered MD requests
access to HN. Depending on the credential type, the mutual authentication between MD
and HN may require interaction with the user, as, e.g., in the case of a username/password
combination, where the password is kept in the user’s mind, rather than being stored on
his mobile device. To simplify notations we will however omit this fact throughout the rest
of this work and simply speak of a mutual authentication between a mobile device and its
home network.
On the network side the credentials are stored in data base called Security Center (SC)
here. The most widely used credential types in wireless access networks are:
1. Shared secret key: A (long-term) secret key is shared between the MD and the
security center of HN (SCHN). MD stores its HN’s identity along with the shared key
and SCHN stores the user’s identity along with the shared key.
2. Public-key certificates: MD and HN are each in possession of a public/secret key
pair. Both have public key certificates for their own public keys. The certificate of
MD is issued for the user’s identity. These certificates are signed by a Certification
Authority (CA) with a secret key of CA. MD and SCHN store the public key certificate
corresponding to CA’s private signature key.
3. Public-key certificates mixed with a username/password combination: The
home network has a public/secret-key pair and a certificate signed by a CA. MD stores
the public-key certificate corresponding to CA’s private signature key. The home
provider issues a username (as user identity) and password for the pre-registered user
and stores this combination securely in SCHN.
8
The registration process itself can differ greatly depending on the type of home provider.
For example, a user may be identified by means of a passport, sign a contract and receive
hardware, or install software on his MD as in the case of a user subscribing to a mobile phone
operator. Registering may, however, also consist of walking into the system administrator’s
office of a company, being identified, and then entering a preliminary password into the
system administrator’s console or being handed a chip card with a public-key certificate
and the corresponding private key. In other application areas, a user may pre-register
with a network provider over a web-interface using, for example, his credit card number as
credential. Whatever form the actual registration process takes, the result of the registration
8Passwords are typically not stored in the clear. Instead, hash values of the passwords are stored.
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is that MD and its HN have established credentials that subsequently allow them to mutually
authenticate each other using a common authentication protocol.
The registration may additionally include an exchange of security policies regarding the
security mechanisms to be used to secure the network access between MD and its HN. It
may also include a registration for certain services offered by the home provider or other
service providers over the home network. In the case of a commercial home provider, the
user and the provider also agree upon charging and billing issues during the registration
process.
In the remainder of this work, we refer to the user or his MD as being pre-registered to
its home provider. We prefer this term over subscribed, as the latter is often associated with
a commercial context. To additionally avoid confusion with the common usage of registered
in the sense of being associated or having established a connection with a network, we use
the term pre-registered.
1.2.2.2 Authentication Protocol
The authentication protocol terminates in a network component that is typically referred
to as the authentication server (AS). An AS controls the access to a network for one or
more NAPs.9 The authentication server needs access to user-related secret and public
information that is securely stored in SC. An authentication protocol between MD and the
authentication server of its HN (ASHN) is based on one of the credential types introduced
in Section1.2.2.1 and has the following properties:
Definition 1.2.1 A mutual authentication protocol (a) between MD and ASHN is
a protocol between MD and ASHN whereby MD and ASHN are mutually assured of each other’s
identity based on the credentials established during the registration process. Additionally,
they are mutually assured that the other party has actually participated in the protocol.
It is important to note that two different authentication protocols specified for the same
wireless access technology may be based on different types of credentials.
1.2.2.3 Key Agreement
In state-of-the-art wireless access network, symmetric encryption and integrity-protection
mechanisms are used. These mechanisms require secret keys shared between the mobile
device and the network. The keys have to be agreed upon directly or they must be derived
from a secret master key agreed upon in a key-agreement protocol.
Definition 1.2.2 A key-agreement protocol (ka) between MD and ASHN is a pro-
tocol between MD and ASHN whereby a shared master key K becomes available only to MD
9In some wireless access networks, the functionality of an authentication server is implemented in the
NAP.
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and ASHN. This key is derived as a function of information ideally
10 contributed by each
party such that no party can predetermine the resulting value.
In many wireless technologies, authentication and key-agreement protocols are implemented
as a unit and cannot be executed independently from each other. However, to be generic
enough to capture future wireless technologies, we here consider that a and ka may be
implemented independently. Thus MD and AS may agree upon new keys without authen-
ticating each other. Vice-versa, MD and ASHN may newly authenticate each other without
changing the keys previously agreed upon. The time since the last authentication and the
lifetime of keys may thus differ.
1.2.2.4 Encryption Mechanism
In wireless access networks, the encryption and integrity-protection mechanisms are of-
ten implemented in the network access points. In some technologies, the encryption and
integrity-protection endpoint (EIPE) is a network component to which more than one net-
work access point are directly connected. This is, for example, the case in UMTS networks.
Throughout this work, the EIPE is treated as a separate network component. We treat the
case that the EIPEs coincide with the NAPs separately whenever necessary. If the NAPs
in a wireless network are connected over a radio connection to the backbone network (as
in many mobile telecommunication technologies), implementing the EIPE within a more
central network component becomes a necessity, as otherwise the air interface between a
NAP and the backbone becomes a serious threat to the confidentiality and the integrity of
user and control traffic.
The encryption used in state-of-the-art wireless access network is typically a symmetric
cipher.
Definition 1.2.3 Let n ∈ N and b ∈ N ∪ {∞}. A symmetric cipher on the alphabet
{0, 1} is a pair of functions (E,D), E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}b 7→ {0, 1}b and D : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}b 7→ {0, 1}b such that EEK (·) := E(EK , ·) is invertible for every EK ∈ {0, 1}
n and
DEK (·) := D(EK , ·) = E
−1
EK
. n is called the key length of the symmetric cipher. If b ∈ N,
b is called the block length of the symmetric cipher and the symmetric cipher itself is
called a block cipher. If b = ∞ the cipher is called a stream cipher.
The mode of operation of a block cipher defines how subsequent plaintext blocks are en-
crypted. The simplest mode of operation is the so-called Electronic Code Book (ECB),
where subsequent plaintext blocks are independently encrypted by the block cipher. Other
modes of operation encrypt subsequent blocks dependent on previously encrypted blocks.
Common examples (see [120] for details) are the Cipher-Block Chaining Mode (CBC), the
Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB), and the Output Feedback Mode (OFB).
10Some current key-agreement protocols do not fulfill this ideal property. Nevertheless, they are referred
to as key-agreement protocols in the remainder of this work.
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In most wireless technologies to date, symmetric stream ciphers are used. These ciphers
can be interpreted as block ciphers with infinite block length. Stream ciphers encrypt
plaintext of arbitrary length bit by bit, thus producing a stream of ciphertext bits.
Throughout this work, the term encryption mechanism is used in the following sense
(see [120]):
Definition 1.2.4 An encryption mechanism (em) is a symmetric block cipher together
with a mode of operation or a symmetric stream cipher.
In particular we assume that encryption mechanisms are symmetric.
1.2.2.5 Integrity-Protection Mechanism
Wireless technologies typically use a Message Authentication Code to protect the integrity
of traffic between a mobile device and the network (e.g., UMTS, CDMA2000, TKIP part of
802.11i [9, 153, 93]). The integrity-protection endpoint on the network side coincides with
the encryption endpoint and can thus either be implemented in the network access point
or in a more central network component that serves more then one NAP. Some wireless
technologies use an encrypted Modification Detection Code (MDC) for integrity protection
and thus provide encryption and integrity protection in one (e.g., WLAN with WEP, CCMP
part of 802.11i [93]).
The following definitions are taken from [120] and slightly modified to fit our notations.
Definition 1.2.5 A message authentication code (MAC) is a family of hash functions hIK
parameterized by a secret Integrity Key (IK) with the following properties:
1. Given a key IK and a message x, hIK (x) is easy to compute.
10
2. hIK maps an input x of arbitrary finite bit-length to an output hIK (x) of fixed bit-length
n.
3. Given message/MAC-value pairs (xi, hIK (xi)) (i ≥ 0), but not IK , it is computation-
ally infeasible10 to compute any other message/MAC-value pair (x, hIK (x)).
Definition 1.2.6 A modification detection code (MDC) is a hash function10 that is pre-
image resistant (i.e., it is computationally infeasible to compute x from h(x)) and 2nd
pre-image resistant (i.e., given (x, h(x)) it is computationally infeasible to compute x ′ with
h(x′) = h(x)) and collision resistant (i.e., it is computationally infeasible to compute two
pairs (x, h(x)) and (x′, h(x′)) with h(x) = h(x′)).
A MAC or MDC alone is not sufficient to detect a replay of previously recorded and
correctly integrity-protected messages. This type of message insertion requires a special
treatment, e.g., an additional counter or time stamp included in all messages. Throughout
this work, the term integrity-protection mechanism is used in the following sense:
10The precise definitions of these terms can be found in [120].
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Definition 1.2.7 An integrity-protection mechanism (im) is either a MAC or a MDC
together with an encryption mechanism em.11
Wireless technologies that support integrity protection either protect control traffic only
(e.g., UMTS, GPRS, CDMA2000) or both control traffic and data traffic (e.g., 802.11i-
protected WLANs).
1.2.2.6 Key Transfer and Key Establishment
If AS and EIPE do not coincide the master key K agreed upon in the key-agreement protocol
has to be transferred from the authentication server to the EIPE.
Definition 1.2.8 A key-transfer process (kt) is a process whereby the master session
key K is securely transferred from AS to EIPE.
In some wireless technologies, the master session key generated during the key agreement is
directly used for data protection. In other technologies, the data protection keys are derived
in a key-establishment process from the master session key. Both possibilities are captured
in the following definition:
Definition 1.2.9 A key-establishment process (ke) between EIPE and MD is a pro-
cess whereby a secret data session key pair, here denoted by (EK , IK ), becomes available
to MD and EIPE. The pair (EK , IK ) is derived as a function of the master key K and
optionally of other information contributed by MD and/or EIPE. If (EK , IK ) is derived
from K without additional information, the key-establishment process is called static. If
additional information is contributed by MD and/or EIPE to derive (EK , IK ) from K, the
key-establishment process is called dynamic.
For most wireless access technologies, more than one encryption and integrity-protection
mechanism is standardized and used. These mechanisms may differ in their key length.
We assume here that the key-establishment process generates encryption and integrity-
protection keys of the right length for the selected encryption and integrity-protection
mechanism.
Figure 1.6 and Figure 1.7 illustrate the security mechanisms and their endpoints on the
network side in a wireless access network in case EIPE and NAP coincide and in case EIPE
and NAP are different.
1.2.2.7 Security Mechanisms and the ISO/OSI Model
If the EIPE coincides with the NAP, the key establishment, encryption, and integrity pro-
tection are implemented on the MAC layer. In the other case, the encryption and integrity
protection have to be implemented above the MAC layer. In case the encryption is imple-
mented on the network layer or above, the wireless technology is potentially vulnerable to
11In the second case the integrity-protection key IK coincides with the encryption key EK and includes
replay protection.
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address spoofing, as in this case higher-layer identifiers like an IP address of a mobile device
might be revealed to an attacker eavesdropping on the air interface. If the encryption is im-
plemented on the MAC layer, these higher-layer identifiers are encrypted along with the rest
of the traffic. This is one of the advantages of implementing the encryption and integrity
protection in the network access point. The authentication protocol, the key agreement,
and the key transfer are typically implemented above the MAC layer, often even above the
network layer, and in rare cases on the application layer. Figures 1.8 and 1.9 illustrate the
relationship between the security mechanisms and the ISO/OSI layers on which they are
typically implemented.
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1.2.3 Security Policies
Throughout this work, we assume that for each wireless access technology, there are tech-
nology specific sets
A = Set of authentication protocols12
KA = Set of key-agreement protocols
KE = Set of key-establishment processes
EM = Set of encryption mechanisms
IM = Set of integrity-protection mechanisms
and a set SS of security-mechanism combinations that is a subset of the Cartesian product
of the above sets:
SS ⊆ A×KA×KE ×EM × IM.
The elements ss of SS are referred to as security suites.13 The set SS of security suites
is the set of all technologically possible and standard-wise allowed combinations of security
mechanisms for the given technology. We assume that this set is known to every network
provider and every user. Similarly, we define the set CS of cipher suites cs as
CS := {(ke, em, im) | ∃(a, ka) ∈ A×KA such that (a, ka, ke, em, im) ∈ SS}.
A network provider may choose to implement and use only a subset of SS in the network
he operates. This reflects the assumption that different providers may have different security
policies. One provider might choose to allow only a specific security suite which he deems
to guarantee adequate protection. Another one might implement and allow for the use of
all standardized security suites.
A provider’s policy with respect to the security suites he allows to be used in his net-
work N is expressed by a subset SSN−allow ⊂ SS. SSN−allow includes all combinations
of authentication protocols, key-agreement protocols, key-establishment processes and en-
cryption and integrity-protection mechanisms network the provider allows to be used. The
network components of a provider’s network support more than the allowed security suites
as network component manufacturers will typically produce standard conform components
that support all standardized security suites.
On the other hand, each mobile device has a certain set of security suites it supports.
These security suites can come with the mobile device, with additional hardware the user
receives from the home provider during the registration process, or as software the user
installs on his mobile device. From the supported security suites, the user chooses a certain
12Note that each authentication protocol is based on a certain type of credentials. The technology-specific
set of authentication protocols thus indirectly defines a technology-specific set of credential types.
13As a convention, we denote sets with capital letters and elements of a set with small letters (e.g, the set
of authentication protocols A consists of elements a).
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subset he allows to be used.14 This subset is denoted by SSMD−allow. It reflects the
assumption that every user wants to achieve a minimal security level and disallows the
security suites that he deems not to guarantee his minimal security level.
The security-policy expressions SSMD−allow and SSHN−allow alone do not indicate any
preferences of a user or a network provider on the security suites they allow. These sets only
express which security suites the provider or the user deems to guarantee a certain minimal
security level he requires. Although this is the way security policies are expressed in many
current wireless access networks (e.g., GSM, UMTS, CDMA2000 and 802.11i), ignoring the
preferences of users and providers seems unnecessarily restricting: both the user and the
network provider can prefer certain security suites above others and yet allow all of them.
Consequently, the goal of users and providers is to negotiate the most preferred security
suite they both support. We assume that the providers and the users each have a preference
order ≤HN and ≤MD on their security-policies expressions SSMD−allow or SSHN−allow. We
assume here that these preference orders are total:
Definition 1.2.10 A total preference order on a set S is a relation ≤ on S with the
properties
1. (Antisymmetry) If s1, s1 ∈ S and s1 ≤ s2 and s2 ≤ s1 then s1 = s2
2. (Totalness) If s1, s2 ∈ S then s1 ≤ s2 or s2 ≤ s1
3. (Transitivity) If s1, s2, s3 ∈ S and s1 ≤ s2 and s2 ≤ s3, then s1 ≤ s3.
Note that in order to be able to establish a secure connection between them, MD and HN
have to allow for at least one common security suite. MD and HN have to ensure this during
pre-registration, as otherwise MD cannot access HN.
1.2.4 Connection Establishment
On connection establishment, MD and NAPHN first establish a radio link, which may include
the allocation of a channel or other local wireless resources, possibly including a minimum
level of service or bandwidth. We refer to this part of the connection establishment as MD
associates with HN. Similarly, we use the term MD disassociates from HN if a mobile device
drops the radio link established with its currently serving NAP.15
Figure 1.10 illustrates the operational security-related phases of a connection establish-
ment between a mobile device and its home network following a successful association. MD
and the AS first negotiate the security suite to use. They then execute the authentication
14In some wireless access networks, users cannot configure the security suites they are willing to use. In
this case, the users’ policies are ignored by the technology. Other technologies allow users to set any policy
they want and consequently open up to vulnerabilities introduced by careless or uneducated users.
15In some wireless technologies, MD informs its currently serving NAP before it drops the radio link in
order to allow for immediate reallocation of the wireless resources reserved for MD. Consequently, depending
on the wireless technology in question, the disassociation process may involve more than dropping the radio
link.
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protocol a and the key-agreement protocol ka. During key agreement, both sides agree
upon a master session key K. The master session key is then transferred to the EIPE.
The EIPE and MD use the dynamic or static key-establishment process ke to derive the
encryption key EK and the integrity-protection key IK from K. In case of a dynamic key
establishment process, ke is a protocol with MD and EIPE as participants. In case of a
static key establishment, no messages are exchanged between MD and EIPE during ke.
This is illustrated by the dashed arrow for ke in Figure 1.10. As soon as EK and IK are
established, they are used to encrypt and integrity-protect the (data and/or control) traffic
between MD and EIPE.
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Figure 1.10: Connection Establishment (See Page 1 for Notations Used in Figures)
1.3 Security-Mechanism Negotiation
The security architecture of current wireless technologies (and current security protocols
like IPsec, SSL, etc. in general) typically allow for the negotiation of one of several differ-
ent security suites, leaving the final choice of the security suite to the users and network
providers. Offering several alternative security suites has many advantages. First, it makes
the technology break-through resilient: if an efficient attack against one of the security
mechanisms in a security suite is found, this security suite can be avoided. The only change
required to protect against newly found attacks is setting new policies. Second, new se-
curity mechanisms can easily be defined and integrated in the original architecture. This
facilitates the upgrade of equipment and allows for the easy replacement of old mechanisms.
Last but not least, as cryptographical strength typically trades with efficiency, alternative
security suites can represent different points on an efficiency-security trade-off curve. Thus
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offering different alternatives allows users and providers to choose how much efficiency they
are willing to trade for specific cryptographical strengths.
Determining the cryptographical strength of a security mechanism is not an easy task.
Some criteria to determine the strength of, for example, an encryption mechanism, are the
key length, the amount of time thus far invested by researchers in analyzing the cipher,
excluding certain well-known attacks and so on. Although some security mechanisms can
be ordered according to their cryptographical strength in a way that will be accepted by
any cryptographer, it is usually impossible to determine such a globally accepted “security
level” for a security mechanism. Consequently, differences in the protection level of security
mechanisms in fact have to be assumed to be subjective rather then objective. A user’s
or provider’s security suite policy not only expresses which point on an efficiency-security
trade-off curve he prefers, but also his subjective estimation of the cryptographical strength
of the mechanism itself.
To select a security suite to use, the network and mobile device have to negotiate with
each other. Various negotiation methods can be used. The negotiation can, for example,
be completely predetermined, i.e., fixed during the pre-registration process, and lead to
the selection of the same security suite on every connection establishment. It can also be
dynamic, such that changes in the policy of the user or the network provider can be an-
ticipated. The negotiation method can or cannot respect the network provider’s preference
order on his policy SSHN−allow and the user’s preferences on the security suites SSMD−allow
he allows to be used.
In the following sections, we describe five negotiation mechanisms (Method 1 to
Method 5), discuss their advantages and disadvantages, and put them into the context
of currently used and recently suggested negotiation methods. Method 1 to Method 3 de-
scribe state-of-the-art solutions. Method 4 adapts a mechanism suggested by Wang et al.
in [179] for policy reconciliation in general to negotiating a security suite on connection
establishment in a wireless access network. Finally, with Method 5 we present a new nego-
tiation method, that takes the security policies as well as the preferences of MD and HN
equally into account. We discuss in how far Method 5 is resistant against manipulation by
the negotiating parties.
1.3.1 Related Work
The problem of security-mechanism negotiation on connection establishment in a wireless
access network is a special sub-case of the general problem of security-policy reconciliation
(sometimes also referred to as security-policy composition) which is an extensive field of
research in itself. This field is concerned with three major problems: The first problem
is specifying policy languages that is specifying a common syntax to represent policy in-
formation. The second one is specifying semantics for a policy language, such that policy
statements are interpreted in the same way by all entities using the policy language. Finally,
the third problem is composing or reconciling security policies.
Early work on security-policy languages (e.g., KeyNote [35], SPKI [58, 59], Binder [51]
or SD3 [99]) focuses on access policy compliance testing for access requests rather than
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policy reconciliation [113]. Recent work on policy reconciliation includes Wang et al.’s
policy reconciliation with the help of a graphical tree representation of policies [179], the
Dynamic Cryptographic Context Management (DCCM) [25, 26, 54] that extends the IPsec
Security Policy System (SPS) described in [183], as well as the Ismene project [113]. While
these works detail policy representations as well as semantics of special policy languages, we
concentrate here on the negotiation only and express policies as a set of multi-dimensional
vectors as in [54] or [183]. This is also the common practice in current wireless access
technology standards.
Of the above mentioned work on policy reconciliation, only [179] considers preference
orders on policy rules. The authors assume these preference orders to be partial and define
the composition of two partial orders to a composite partial order in several different ways.
The reconciliation mechanism they suggest then takes two policies and preference orders
as input, computes the composite policy as a set of all policy rules that are compliant to
both input policies, computes the composite preference order, and outputs one of the most
preferred security suites according to the composite preference order. We describe how this
approach can be used to negotiate a security suite between MD and HN in Method 4.
A deficit of this policy reconciliation mechanism, as well as of the others that do not
respect preferences at all, is that it assumes the negotiating parties to be honest. As long as
no preferences are considered, this assumption is reasonable. Yet as soon as preferences are
taken into account, each of the negotiating parties can try to manipulate the negotiation to
his advantage. Thus, if one party sends its complete policy along with its preferences to the
other party, then the second party can enforce his preferences on the first one. Exchanging
the security policies and doing the reconciliation on both sides does not solve the problem,
as one party will always receive the policy of the other party before the other one receives
his. Each party can therefore wait until it receives the policy of the other party and adapt
its own policy to the received one before sending it to the other party.16
The new negotiation mechanism Method 5 presented below partly solves this negotiation
problem at the expense of several round-trip message exchanges between the negotiating
parties. In each step of the negotiation protocol, each party only reveals one security suite it
allows for. Method 5 makes the policy reconciliation in [179] less vulnerable to manipulation
and yet always finds a pareto-optimal security suite whenever a common suite exists.17
1.3.2 Negotiation without Preferences
The negotiation methods described in this section ignore the existence of any preference
orders on allowed mechanisms and assume that HN and MD only either allow or disallow a
security suite.
Method 1. During the registration process MD makes its complete policy SSMD−allow
16It is important to note that during the security-mechanism negotiation, a mobile device and a network
do not share any session-key material yet and have not authenticated each other. Thus, fair negotiation
mechanisms that use encrypted commitments cannot be used for this purpose straight forwardly.
17A security suite ss is pareto-optimal with respect to the preference orders of MD and HN if and only if
there is no security suite ss∗ HN and MD both prefer over ss.
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known to HN and vice-versa. Both parties agree upon one of the security suites they both
allow to be used and create a database entry for the other party containing this security
suite. On connection establishment, HN looks up the database entry for MD and reads the
stored security suite. MD looks up its entry for HN and HN and MD subsequently use this
security suite as described in Section 1.2.4.
The advantage of this simple method is its efficiency, as no negotiation messages have
to be exchanged between the two parties during the connection establishment. Yet this
method is completely inflexible. It does not allow either of the parties to change their policies
without informing the other party. In particular, neither party can upgrade their equipment
to support new security mechanisms and use them without prior off-line announcement.
Similarly, neither party can easily react to newly found security holes in mechanisms they
previously allowed without having to contact the other party first.
Method 2. Some of the missing flexibility of Method 1 can be gained by storing more
than one alternative security suite in the corresponding database. HN then sends a choice
of these alternative suites to MD, which chooses from the security suites offered by the
network and sends back its choice to HN. In this negotiation method, HN can delete certain
security suites from the database if it no longer supports them. Similarly, MD can avoid
choosing certain mechanisms it previously supported during the time of registration, but
no longer supports, by not choosing them if offered by HN. In this case, the storage of the
security suites allowed for by MD during the time of registration ensures that the home
network only offers allowable security suites to the mobile device. This reduces the amount
of data exchanged during the negotiation. Nevertheless, fixing the set of possible choices
makes it impossible for MD and HN to upgrade their policies to include new security suites
without changing the database entries on the network side.
Method 3. To additionally gain this second type of flexibility, HN and MD do not store
any information about the other’s policies, but they negotiate from scratch during the
connection establishment. In this case, the home network sends its current SSHN−allow to
MD during connection establishment, and MD chooses a mechanism from the intersection
of its current SSMD−allow and sends its choice back to HN. To free MD from having to
determine a security suite both allow, this method can be used in the other direction just
as well. MD sends its current policy SSMD−allow to HN and HN determines a security suite
they both allow and sends its choice back to MD. This is the way security mechanisms
are negotiated in current wireless access technologies like GSM, UMTS, CDMA2000, IEEE
802.11i, as well as some security protocols like TLS or SSH.
As long as no preferences are considered, it is irrelevant whether MD or HN picks the
security suite to use from the set of mechanisms they both support, as all allowed security
suites are assumed to be equally well-accepted by the two parties. If the preferences of users
and network providers are respected, which of the security suites MD and HN support is
negotiated becomes important. This raises the question of who should finally decide upon
which mechanism to use and how he should do so. Moreover, as soon as different preferences
and security levels are considered, the question of whether a third person can “bid down”
the negotiation between MD and HN arises. By interfering with the negotiation messages,
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a third person could make HN and MD choose the lowest-level security suite they have
in common. This problem is addressed in Section 1.3.4, while the question of who should
control the negotiation and how he should do so is discussed in the next section. Note that
a bidding-down attack is not possible if the policies used are pre-stored, as in Method 1
above.
1.3.3 Negotiation with Preferences
In this section, we assume that users and network providers have preference orders on their
security policies SSMD−allow and SSHN−allow. Providers and users are eager to prevail their
preferences.
Implementing a negotiation mechanism that respects the preferences of the negotiating
parties is particularly hard, as there are many possible different notions of a good choice.
One intuitive notion of a desirable choice of a security suite is pareto-optimality. A security
suite is pareto-optimal if there is no other security suite both the user and the home provider
allow and which both would prefer. But, is a negotiation method that finds a pareto-optimal
security suite really desirable? Assume the user is very careless about the policies he sets and
more or less randomly chooses a security suite that is cryptographically quite weak, while
the network provider, for example, a company, is very restrictive but has this particular
security suite at the lowest end of its security suite policy. Then the user’s mobile device
and the network will negotiate this low-level suite, although the user would not mind setting
his policies in another way. This example demonstrates that the notion of what is desirable,
as well as the symmetry of a negotiation mechanism, has to be carefully chosen to fit the
area of application.
A negotiation method requires specifying how the preference orders of the negotiating
parties are to be composed to a composite (partial) preference order and defining a nego-
tiation mechanism that maximizes the composite partial preference order. A negotiation
method is called communication efficient, if there is no other negotiation mechanism that
leads to the same output on the same input but needs fewer messages to be exchanged
between the negotiating parties.
As long as the negotiating parties are assumed to act honestly and respect the preferences
of the other party during negotiation, efficiency is easy to achieve, as one party can simply
send its policy to the other party. The second party then matches the policies according
to some predefined agreed-upon negotiation rules and sends the result back to the first
party. However, if the negotiating parties are greedy and respect their own preferences
only, revealing the complete policy to the other party at once opens up the negotiation
to adaptive behavior of the other party. Thus smaller commitments, possibly even single
security suites, have to be exchanged in the security-mechanism-negotiation messages such
that the parties reveal their preferences step by step and no one party obtains all the
information on the security policy of the other party at once.
Method 4. Asymmetric negotiation mechanisms implement a biased negotiation and thus
assume the preference order of one of the negotiating parties, without loss of generality,
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party A, outweighs that of the other party B. Asymmetric negotiation is suitable for
application scenarios in which one of the participants takes a higher financial or personal
risk than the other as, for example, in the above-sketched scenario.
Definition 1.3.1 Asymmetric Composition: Let ≤A be a preference order of A on
SSA−allow and ≤B be the preference order of B on SSB−allow. Then the asymmetric
composition (biased in favor of A) of the two preference orders to the composite prefer-
ence order ≤asym on SSA−allow ∩ SSB−allow is in the asymmetric case defined as: for all
ss, ss∗ ∈ SSA−allow ∩ SSB−allow,
ss ≤asym ss
∗ iff (ss <A ss
∗) ∨ (ss =A ss
∗ ∧ ss ≤B ss
∗).
This definition of optimality reflects that a security suite that is allowed by A and B and that
is as highly valuated by A as possible should be chosen. In case there are several security
suites supported by both, and A prefers them equally well, one of the mechanisms B prefers
most amongst them is chosen. It is important to note that the composite preference order
resulting from asymmetric composition is a total order.
A negotiation mechanism to implement this composite preference order can be defined as
follows. B sends its security-policy expression SSB−allow ordered according to its preference
order to A. A determines the elements ssmax of max≤B max≤A{SSA−allow ∩ SSB−allow},
chooses an arbitrary one, and informs B of its choice. Obviously, B cannot manipulate
this negotiation mechanism without restricting SSB−allow and thus risking a failed negoti-
ation.18 A dynamic negotiation mechanism requires at least two message exchanges such
that Method 4 is communication efficient. For an efficient algorithm to compute an optimal
security suite for the above-defined asymmetric composition, see [179].
Method 5. Let A and B be the negotiating parties, k ∈ N be the number of security
suites in A’s security-policy expression SSA−allow, and l ∈ N be the number of security
suites in B’s security-policy expression SSB−allow. Let ssA1 ≤A ssA2 , . . . ,≤A ssAk and
ssB1 ≤B ssB2 , . . . ,≤B ssBl be A’s and B’s security policies ordered and numbered according
to their preference orders.
Definition 1.3.2 Pareto-Optimal Composition: Let ≤A be the preference order of A
on SSA−allow and ≤B be the preference order of B on SSB−allow. Then we define the pareto-
optimal composition of the two preference orders on the intersection SSA−allow ∩SSB−allow
as follows: for all ss, ss∗ ∈ SSA−allow ∩ SSB−allow:
ss ≤par ss
∗ iff ss ≤A ss
∗ and ss ≤B ss
∗.
18It is important to note that we do not take learning effects of subsequent connection establishments into
account here. In fact, any negotiation mechanism seems to be manipulatable over time.
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With this composition method, a security suite is pareto-optimal if and only if it is
maximal under the composite preference order. It is important to note that ≤par is only a
partial order on SSA−allow ∩ SSB−allow.
Definition 1.3.3 A partial order on a set S is a relation ≤ on S with the properties
1. (Antisymmetry) If s1, s1 ∈ S and s1 ≤ s2 and s2 ≤ s1 then s1 = s2
2. (Reflexivity) If s ∈ S then s ≤ s
3. (Transitivity) If s1, s2, s3 ∈ S and s1 ≤ s2 and s2 ≤ s3, then s1 ≤ s3.
The following negotiation mechanism implements the pareto-optimal composite prefer-
ence order and outputs a pareto-optimal security suite whenever a common security suite
exists. If there is no such suite, the negotiation mechanism exits with a failure message.19
We define SSA := {ssA1 , . . . , ssAk}, SS
i
A := {ssAk−i+1 , . . . , ssAk}, SSB :=
{ssB1 , . . . , ssBl} and SS
i
B := {ssBl−i+2 , . . . , ssBl}. Furthermore, we initialize the boolean
variables mA,mB , lastA, and lastB with 0. During the negotiation, A and B exchange
messages containing the next security suite (ssA or ssB) of their ordered policy starting
with their most preferred one, the boolean mA (mB) indicating whether a match occurred
on A’s side (B’s side) and a boolean lastA (lastB) by which they indicated whether the
current security suite is the last in A’s policy (B’s policy) or not. Upon receipt of the next
security suite from A, B checks whether the received ssA is in SSB . Similarly, upon receipt
of ssB from B, A checks whether ssB ∈ SSA.
20 Figure 1.11 illustrates the message flow for
Method 5. A and B send these messages back and forth between them, until one of them
finds a match and the other party confirms this match with a match confirmation message,
or until one of them has committed to the least preferred security suite in his policy and
no match was found (indicated by a failure message).
How A determines whether or not a match occurred in step i (P iA) and which message
to return to B is illustrated in Figure 1.12. Upon receiving (ssB ,mB, lastB) from B, A first
checks whether mB = 1, that is, whether B indicates a match. If this is the case, A sends a
match confirmation message back to B. If this is not the case, A checks whether lastB = 1,
that is whether B indicates that the current commitment is its last one. If this is the case,
A checks whether ssB ∈ SSA. If this is the case, A sets mA = 1. If A does not find a match,
it sends a failure message back to B. If lastB = 0, A checks whether it reached the end
of its own policy (i = k). If this is the case, A sets lastA = 1. A sets ssA := ssAk−i+1. A
sends (ssA,mA, lastB) back to B. Upon receiving (ssA,mA, lastB), B proceeds in exactly
the same way, exchanging A with B in Figure 1.12.
19The presented mechanism, in fact maximizes the sum of the ranks assigned by A and B to their security
suites corresponding to their preferences.
20In this negotiation method, A compares ssBi with ssA1 , . . . , ssAi and B compares ssAi with
ssB1 , . . . ssBi−1 such that only A and not both parties compare the security suites with the same index.
This is where the asymmetry in SSA and SSB comes from.
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Figure 1.11: Message Exchange between A and B upon Method 5
Example. Assume A has the ordered security suite policy ss1 ≤A ss2 ≤A ss3 and B has
the ordered security suite policy ss2 ≤B ss5 ≤B ss3 ≤B ss1. In the first step, A sends ss3
to B. B answers with ss1. A next commits ss2, B answers with ss3 and mB = 1, as ss3 is
one of the cipher suites A has already committed to allow. A confirms the reception of the
match and A and B subsequently use ss3. Obviously, ss3 is a pareto-optimal security suite
for the given preference orders of A and B. It is interesting to note that ss1 in this situation
is also a pareto-optimal solution, although intuitively ss3 is a much better choice then ss1.
This shows that pareto-optimality as optimization metric could still lead to choices that
intuitively would not be considered optimal.
Discussion. It is interesting to note that in the two-party case, either no common security
suite exists or a common pareto-optimal security suite exists. Otherwise, for every common
security suite ss, there would be a common security suite ss∗1 that A and B prefer over
ss. As ss∗1 cannot be pareto-optimal, there is another security suite ss
∗
2 that is preferred
by A and B and so on. As there is only a finite number of security suites, this leads to a
contradiction.
If the negotiating parties act according to the protocol, the above negotiation protocol
always finds a pareto-optimal solution or exits with a failure message if there is no common
security suite. This is due to the fact that A and B start their negotiation from their
most preferred security suites. Assume ss is the output of the negotiation protocol and
the output is not pareto-optimal. Then, there is a ss′ that is supported by both A and B,
with ss ≤A ss
′ and ss <B ss
′. In this case, B would have committed ss′ to A in an earlier
step than ss and thus ss′ would have been chosen as the output. Thus, if the negotiation
protocol does not exit with a failure message, a pareto-optimal solution is found. On the
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Figure 1.12: A’s Decision in Step i of Method 5 (P iA in Figure 1.11)
other hand, if the protocol exits with a failure message, then A and B obviously do not
have a security suite in common.
As long as A and B know nothing about each other’s policies and preference orders,
they gain nothing from changing their policies or the preference order on their policies on
the current run of the negotiation mechanism.
On the first execution of the above negotiation mechanism between them, A and B learn
part of each other’s security policy expression and the preference order on this part. If ss∗
is the result of the negotiation mechanisms and A and B stick to the protocol, A learns all
ssBi with ssBi ≥B ss
∗ and B learns all ssAj with ssAj ≥A ss
∗.
Assume that on a second run of the protocol, A tries to get B to negotiate a cipher suite
ssAj ≥A ss
∗ with B (this is the only realistic goal A can have). Assume, furthermore, that
for this purpose, A deletes ss∗ from its policies. As A knows nothing about the security
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suites ssBr ≤ ss
∗, A gains nothing from committing security suites other than the ones it
prefers most to B. B can observe the missing ss∗ in the negotiation and may either react
in rejecting the negotiation all together or may react by deleting all ssAj ≥A ss
∗ from its
policy (B knows these from the first negotiation). Thus B can ensure that A gains nothing
from deleting ss∗ from its policy.
Although this negotiation method is surprisingly resistant against some kind of manipu-
lation, it cannot resist attacks that aim to learn only during the first runs of the negotiation
(letting the negotiation fail) and then using the obtained knowledge to enforce the security
suite to use: If A changes its policy on the first run of the negotiation to a set of security
suites he can be quite certain that B does not support, then A can make the negotiation
fail. A failing negotiation means, that A gains knowledge of B’s complete policy. A can thus
pick the maximal security suite of B’s policy under its own preference order and redefine its
own policy to have this security suite in the first place and mechanisms B does not support
in all other places. A and B will then negotiate A’s best choice. This type of manipulation
can partly be prevented by allowing security policies to change over time only by reordering
or deletion.
1.3.4 Protecting Against Bidding Down
Unauthorized changes to the messages exchanged between the negotiating parties are a
threat to any dynamic security-mechanism negotiation. An attacker that can, for example,
change SSMD−allow sent from MD to HN in Method 4 could change SSMD−allow to include
only the lowest level security suite MD allows for. HN would thus have to choose this
lowest-level security suite or reject the connection altogether. Bidding down attacks like
this are well known, for example, for GSM [89] and SSL v.2.0 [174]. One possible solution
to this problem is integrity-protecting the negotiation messages. Unfortunately, at the
time of negotiation, the parties have not yet agreed upon keys or mechanisms for integrity
protection yet. In SSL, as well as UMTS, this problem is solved by replaying the received
SSMD−allow at the end of the authentication and key agreement protocols in an integrity-
protected message. Consequently, an attacker can only change SSMD−allow without MD’s
notice if he can forge the integrity protection. This solution only works if the technology
does not support any weak integrity-protection mechanisms and, in particular, if integrity
protection is mandatory.
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Chapter 2
Roaming
The goal of state-of-the-art inter-provider roaming procedures is to provide network access
to users in a wider coverage area than the one offered by a single provider, with as little
extra effort for the user as possible. For this purpose, network providers enter into roaming
agreements with each other. Users are required to register with only one provider, their home
provider. In the registration process, the user and his home provider exchange credentials
and agree upon a roaming profile that includes a roaming region for the user. The credentials
established with his home provider enable the user not only to access the network operated
by its home provider, but also the ones operated by those roaming partners of its home
provider in the user’s roaming region.
Roaming support can be offered by commercial providers, e.g., two mobile phone oper-
ators or two WLAN Hotspot providers, or by non-commercial providers, e.g., the WLAN
networks of two companies or two departments of a university. In the commercial case, a
user and his home provider agree upon roaming charges in the registration process. The
user receives only one bill from his home provider, which charges MD and reimburses FN
for service provisioning. The home provider and the foreign provider agree upon charging
issues in their roaming agreement.
A recent trend is to integrate more than one wireless interface into a single mobile device.
This allows users to benefit from the advantages of different technologies, depending on
which one is available at their current location. Similar to the inter-provider case, a user
should be able to access different networks of different technologies and optionally different
providers with only one subscription and, in the commercial case, only one bill.
The main security challenge in roaming across providers and technologies is that upon
roaming, a foreign network and a mobile device have to authenticate each other and agree
upon cryptographic keys for encryption and integrity protection without sharing any pre-
established credentials.
This chapter includes two main contributions. The first one is a formal, technology-
independent model of roaming procedures in general and the second one is the introduction
of a new approach to public-key-based inter-provider roaming. In the following paragraphs
we detail these two contributions.
40 Chapter 2. Roaming
We model, categorize, and discuss roaming authentication and key-agreement protocols
for wireless access networks. For the modeling, we analyzed the most widely spread stan-
dardized roaming procedures, namely the inter-provider roaming procedures in the mobile
phone networks GSM, CDMA2000, UMTS, and the roaming protocols designed for roam-
ing across GSM-UMTS, GSM-WLAN, GSM-GPRS, UMTS-WLAN and UMTS-CDMA2000
[62, 9, 153, 88, 12]. Our modeling is furthermore based on recent suggestions to enhance the
standardized roaming procedures (e.g., [85, 141]) and other suggestions for inter-provider
roaming, (e.g., [29, 156, 44, 43, 189, 167, 65, 178, 24, 23, 19, 118, 81, 131, 98]).
None of the aforementioned work addresses the problem of security-mechanism negoti-
ation during handover. We explicitly address this problem. We show that in some roaming
scenarios it is in HN’s interest to influence the choice of security suite used between FN and
a roaming MD. We introduce and discuss various negotiation methods that can be used to
negotiate the security suite and that enforces policies of HN, FN and MD.
Most of the aforementioned work offers a security solution for roaming for a particular
technology or between a particular pair of technologies. Instead, we take a technology-
independent viewpoint here. Other more general work, like [29, 81, 156], is restricted to
a certain credential type. We model and discuss roaming protocols based on all types
of credentials. In particular, we classify roaming protocols according to the amount of
control they leave to the home provider to accommodate changes in roaming agreements
and roaming profiles, the amount of interaction required between MD, FN and HN, as well
as the knowledge of confidential information gained by each party. Moreover, we defined the
following design goals for security solutions upon roaming: an ideal roaming authentication
and key-agreement protocol should minimize the authentication traffic required between a
foreign network and the home provider as well as between a foreign network and a mobile
device, it should allow for easy handling of changes in roaming profiles and agreements, and
derive cryptographic keys in the foreign network, where they are used.
While some state-of-the-art roaming authentication protocols are specifically designed
to minimize the amount of traffic required between FN and HN (e.g. [156]) none of them
currently supports key derivation in the foreign network. We here present a new technology-
independent approach for public-key-based inter-provider roaming that addresses this short-
coming of other solutions. In our approach, secret-sharing techniques are used to facilitate
inter-provider roaming within or across different technologies. In particular, we show that
this technique potentially minimizes the number of messages required to be exchanged be-
tween a foreign provider and the home provider, allows for the derivation of cryptographic
keys in the foreign network, and allows for the easy handling of changes in roaming profiles
and agreements by engaging the home provider in every roaming instance [121].
In addition to the two main contributions detailed above, we briefly discuss some issues
that are related to inter-provider roaming but considered largely out of scope of this work.
One these issues is intra-provider roaming, the second one is accounting, and the third one
is the protection of the confidentiality of a mobile device’s identity upon roaming.
Finally, we discuss a future direction of research, namely roaming mediators. State-
of-the-art roaming procedures are based on pairwise roaming agreements between network
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providers, which results in an overall number of roaming agreements that is quadratic in the
number of network providers. The introduction of roaming mediators to the scene reduces
the number of roaming agreements, as each provider has a single agreement with a roaming
mediator. The roaming mediators, in turn, may have pairwise roaming agreements with
each other. Roaming agreements between two providers are then setup with help of the
roaming mediators on the fly.
Outline. In Section 2.1, we first describe the relationships between a user and its home
provider, as well as between a home provider and its roaming partners. We then define
roaming authentication and key-agreement protocols, discuss our assumptions on roaming
security policies, and describe different roaming security-mechanism negotiation methods.
We proceed with a classification of current roaming protocols. In Section 2.2, we present
our key-splitting approach for inter-provider roaming. Roaming across different wireless
access technologies is discussed in Section 2.3. Finally, we briefly summarize some related
research issues (Section 2.4) and complete this chapter with an extensive related-work sec-
tion (Section 2.5).
2.1 Inter-Provider Roaming - Modeling and Classification
2.1.1 Roaming Agreements and Registering for Roaming
In state-of-the art roaming, a network provider has a roaming agreement with other net-
work providers, its roaming partners. In such a roaming agreement, two providers agree
upon which services roaming users should be able to use1 and optionally agree upon the
authentication and key agreement procedures, as well as the cipher suites to be used. In
the commercial case, the roaming agreement additionally fixes charging and billing issues,
as well as legal terms between the providers. A roaming agreement is typically valid with
respect to two particular networks, each operated by one of the providers. When entering
a pairwise roaming agreement, two network providers establish a trust relationship and
exchange credentials.
On the user’s side, a user and his home provider fix the user’s roaming profile during
registration. The roaming profile includes a set of foreign networks as well as the services
a user will be able to use upon roaming. During the registration, the user and its home
provider may additionally exchange information on their roaming security policies and store
these on the user’s MD and in SC. In the commercial case, a user and his home provider
also fix the roaming charges during the registration.
2.1.2 Security Mechanisms
One of the security challenges upon roaming is that FN and MD have to mutually authenti-
cate each other without any prior established trust relationship. Consequently, the mutual
1E.g., two mobile phone network operators may enter a roaming agreement with regard to voice services
but not with regard to GPRS service.
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authentication between FN and MD differs from the mutual authentication between a mo-
bile device and its HN modeled and defined in the last chapter (see Section 1.2.2.2) in an
important way: MD and HN authenticate each other with respect to individual identities.
The credentials HN and MD exchange during registration allow them to uniquely identify
each other and then verify the binding between their identities and the credentials, thus
authenticating each other. As opposed to this, upon roaming, MD and FN are not assured
of each other’s identity, but rather of HN’s authorization of the roaming instance.2 Upon
roaming, FN has to prove to MD that it is authorized by HN to offer service to MD. MD
has to prove to FN that it is authorized by HN to use FN’s services. In case of commer-
cial network providers, HN’s authorization of the roaming instance assures FN that HN is
willing to reimburse FN for service provisioning. A roaming authentication protocol can be
defined in the following way:
Definition 2.1.1 A mutual roaming authentication (ra) between MD and ASFN
is a protocol between MD, ASFN, and optionally ASHN, whereby MD and ASFN are assured
of the home provider’s authorization of the roaming instance based on a particular set of
credentials established between MD and ASHN and optionally also based on ASFN’s prior
interaction with ASHN.
Aside from the authentication itself, ASFN and MD have to agree upon a master session
key upon roaming, such that they can derive encryption and integrity protection keys in
order to protect data and control traffic between MD and EIPEFN. The roaming key-
agreement may additionally involve ASHN.
Definition 2.1.2 A roaming key-agreement protocol (rka) between MD and ASFN
is a protocol between MD, ASFN, and optionally ASHN, whereby a shared master key K is
established between MD and ASFN. This key is derived as a function of information ideally
contributed by each party such that no party can predetermine the resulting value.
After a successful key-agreement, ASFN uses a key-transfer mechanism kt (see Def. 1.2.8)
to transfer the master key K to EIPEFN.
MD and EIPEFN use a key-establishment process ke (see Def. 1.2.9) to derive the data-
protection keys (EK, IK) from the master key K. MD and EIPEFN subsequently use
these keys as input to an encryption mechanism em (Def. 1.2.4) or an integrity-protection
mechanism im (Def. 1.2.7) to protect their MAC layer connection.
During connection establishment upon roaming, MD and FN have to negotiate the
roaming authentication protocol ra, the roaming key-agreement protocol rka, and the cipher
suite (ke, em, im) to use. This security-suite negotiation may require HN’s engagement.
2We speak of a roaming instance whenever MD tries access a foreign network, i.e., whenever MD roams
to FN.
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2.1.3 Security Policies
Throughout this work we assume that for each wireless access technology, there are tech-
nology specific sets RA and RKA of roaming authentication protocols ra and roaming
key-agreement protocols rka. Each roaming authentication protocol is based on a certain
credential type. Two roaming authentication protocols designed for the same technology
may be based on different credential types.
In addition, we assume that there is a technology-specific set of roaming security suites
RSS that is a subset of the Cartesian product of RA,RKA, and the technology-specific
sets of key-establishment, encryption and integrity-protection mechanisms, KE, EM and
IM (see Section 1.2.3):
RSS ⊆ RA×RKA×KE ×EM × IM.
The elements rss of RSS are referred to as roaming security suites here. The set RSS
is the set of all technologically possible and standard-wise allowed combinations of security
mechanisms for the given technology. We assume here that this set is known to every
network provider and every user.
MD and each network have policies with respect to the roaming security suites they
allow to be used. If MD requests access to its HN, only HN’s and MD’s policies have to be
taken into account. On roaming to FN, current solutions only take policies of FN and MD
into account. This may, however, not be sufficient. As HN’s authorization of the roaming
instance is assured to MD and FN, HN may be held responsible for attacks against the
security goals of MD or FN. In particular, for example, in the commercial case, HN may
have to reimburse FN for service provisioning even if the roaming authentication between
MD and FN was broken and an unauthorized party got access to FN on behalf of MD.
Nevertheless, whether or not HN is held responsible for attacks like this depends on the
roaming agreement between HN and FN, in particular on the legal terms HN and FN agreed
upon. On the other hand, HN may give its pre-registered users guarantees regarding their
level of protection upon roaming to FN. For example, HN may give MD guarantees on a
secure roaming authentication or on a certain level of MAC layer protection.
We therefore assume that not only MD and FN have roaming policies with respect to the
security suites to be used upon roaming, but also HN. MD, HN and FN express these policies
by pre-defining subsets of RSS. We denote these policy expressions by RSSMD−allow,
RSSHN−allow, and RSSFN−allow. They specify which security suites MD, FN, and HN
allow to be used if MD roams to FN.3 Optionally, MD, HN, and FN may have a preference
order ≤MD, ≤FN or ≤HN on their roaming policies.
In the remainder of this work, we use the notation (R)SS = SS ∪ RSS to denote the
elements of (R)SS with (r)ss. Similarly, we denote the elements of A ∪ RA with (r)a
3To be precise, we assume that MD has the same roaming security policy for each foreign network of
the same technology. Similarly, the home provider has the same roaming security policy for each foreign
network that supports the same technology.
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and the elements of KA ∪ RKA with (r)ka. Furthermore we denote the policy expression
RSSX−allow ∪ SSX−allow with (R)SSX−allow.
2.1.4 Security-Mechanism Negotiation
Upon roaming, MD and FN have to negotiate a security suite they both allow. In state-of-
the-art roaming procedures MD’s and FN’s policies are typically taken into account, while
HN’s policy is not enforced. MD and FN then negotiate a security suite as described in
Method 6.
Method 6: MD and FN negotiate a security suite by replacing HN with FN,
SSMD−allow with RSSMD−allow, and SSHN−allow with RSSFN−allow in Method 3 described
in Section 1.3.
Method 6 does not take any preferences of MD or FN on the security suites they allow
to be used into account. As detailed in Section 1.3 this contradicts the observation that
user’s and providers typically deem different security suites to offer different security levels.
If MD and FN additionally want to take their respective preferences into account, they can
use Method 4 or Method 5 with the same replacements mentioned above (see Method 6).
The fact that current roaming procedures do not enforce HN’s policy with respect to
the security mechanisms allowed to be used upon roaming becomes a threat to HN as soon
as HN may is held responsible, e.g., for service theft attacks against FN by means of certain
terms in the roaming agreement. In this case it is crucial for HN to enforce its policy upon
with respect to the security mechanisms used upon roaming.
If HN’s policies are to be respected upon roaming, either HN can be engaged in the
negotiation protocol itself or certain policies may be fixed in the roaming agreement and
as part of the roaming plan for MD. This leads to a trade-off between fast negotiation and
HN’s flexibility in setting policies. In the following we briefly describe three new security-
mechanism negotiation methods that respect HN’s policies. The first one (Method 7) does
not take any preferences of MD, FN or HN into account. Method 8 takes preferences of
MD, FN, and HN into account. In both of these methods, HN is not engaged into the
negotiation online. HN reveals its policy (and in case of Method 8 also its preferences) to
MD and FN. In Method 8 HN is engaged into the negotiation online and can is therefore
more flexible with respect to changing its policy. In all of the three methods HN has to
trust at least FN or MD to respect its policy. However, FN (MD) alone cannot manipulate
the negotiation result in a way that it does not comply to HN’s policy without MD (FN)
detecting this manipulation.
Method 7: If no preferences are to be respected and HN is not to be engaged in
the negotiation online, HN can reveal its policy expression RSSHN−allow to MD in the pre-
registration and to FN in the roaming agreement. Both MD and FN then use the intersection
of their own policy expressions with HN’s, rather than solely their own expressions. MD
and FN can then use Method 3 of Section 1.3 to negotiate a security suite. Note that in this
case, HN has to trust MD and FN to respect its policy. Nevertheless, revealing its policy to
both parties ensures that both parties would have to ignore HN’s policies in order to choose
a mechanism HN does not allow to be used.
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Method 8: If the preferences of MD, HN, and FN are to be taken into account and
HN is not to be engaged in the negotiation online, then MD and HN (HN and FN) can
reconcile their policies during registration (on entering a roaming agreement). The policy
reconciliation mechanism respects their preferences with the desired weights and helps the
two parties derive a total preference order on the intersection of their policies. An example
for a composition of two total preference orders that outputs a total composite preference
order is the asymmetric composition defined in Definition 1.3.1.4 MD can then store the
reconciled policy expression together with the combined preference order. The same holds
for FN. Upon roaming, MD and FN use the stored reconciled policy expressions and com-
posed total preference orders to negotiate the security suite to use, for example, with the
help of Method 4 or Method 5 of Section 1.3.
Method 9: In order to gain more flexibility for HN with respect to changing policies,
HN can be engaged online in the negotiation. This is particularly easy to achieve if HN
is required to be online during the roaming authentication and key-agreement protocols
anyway. How the security-suite negotiation between HN, MD, and FN can efficiently be
integrated into the connection establishment largely depends on how HN is engaged in the
authentication and can only be further discussed for each particular roaming protocol. To
give just one example, MD could send FN its roaming policy expression RSSFN−allow in a
first step. FN could then compute the intersection of MD’s and its own RSSMD−allow and
forward the intersection together with a request for authentication information to HN. HN
could then pick one of the suites in the received intersection and command FN and MD to
use this security suite. In order to prevent FN from changing the selected security suite,
HN has to add an authentication token to the selected suite, that can be verified by MD.
2.1.5 Classification of Roaming Authentication and Key Agreement Pro-
tocols
The authentication protocol, the key agreement, and the security-mechanism negotiation
on roaming can be implemented in many different ways. In this section, we detail some
distinguishing properties of roaming authentication and key-agreement protocols, discuss
their advantages and disadvantages, determine the possible property combinations, and
classify existing roaming solutions according to their properties.
Public-Key-Based versus Non-Public-Key-Based. Roaming authentication and
key-agreement protocols can be based on public-key certificates or can be non-public-key-
based. In general, public-key-based authentication protocols have the advantage of allowing
two parties to mutually authenticate each other without requiring any prior trust relation-
ship between them. As such, public-key-based methods seem to be the method of choice
for authentication upon roaming. However, they raise several difficulties.
4The pareto-optimal composition (see Definition 1.3.2) cannot be used here, as it outputs only a partial
order.
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For once, many current wireless access technologies do not support public-key certifi-
cates. Furthermore, if MD and ASFN authenticate each other based on individual certifi-
cates, both have to validate these certificates during the authentication. The validation
includes verifying CA’s signature on the certificates, and checking their revocation status.
Even if we assume that MD’s and FN’s certificate have been signed by a CA both trust
directly (which enables them to easily verify CA’s signature), MD and ASFN still have to
check the revocation status of each other’s certificates. This is particularly difficult for
MD, as MD has to check FN’s certificate in order to get network access but needs network
access in order to access remote resources for status checking. If MD does not trust the
CA that issued FN’s certificate directly, this task becomes even more difficult: MD has to
obtain a chain of certificates with a trusted certificate as root and validate each certificate
in this chain in order to validate FN’s certificate. Recently it has been suggested (e.g.,
[29]) that upon roaming, MD should delegate the validation of FN’s certificate to a trusted
third party. In this case, MD has to be sure of the revocation status of the certificate of
the trusted third party only. However, this method causes additional authentication traffic
between MD and the trusted third party (forwarded by FN), and thus increases the overall
load on the backbone network, potentially delaying the authentication. Additionally, this
solution does not address a second problem arising from the use of individual certificates
for MD and FN.
All relevant information regarding the roaming profile (e.g., the roaming region) of a
MD has to be encapsulated in MD’s certificate, for example, in the form of attributes.
Consequently, if the roaming profile of MD changes, a new certificate has to be issued for
MD. Similarly, all relevant information on the roaming agreement between FN and HN
has to be encapsulated in FN’s certificate. Using public-key certificates without online
engagement of HN in the authentication on roaming can thus not easily accommodate
changes in roaming plans and roaming agreements.
To avoid the above shortcomings some public-key-based authentication protocols that
engage HN online have been suggested. In the most extreme case (as, e.g., in [189]) ASHN
and MD mutually authenticate each other based on individual certificates and agree upon a
master key, while FN only forwards the authentication traffic between them. HN then uses
the credentials pre-established with FN to securely transfer this master key to FN. MD and
FN mutually assure each other of their authorization indirectly by proving possession of the
master key to each other. In this case, MD has to validate HN’s certificate only. Moreover,
the information on a roaming plan and a roaming agreement is available and under full and
timely control of HN. In other cases of roaming authentication (e.g., [121]), HN engages in
the authentication in a different way and rather assists FN and MD in authenticating each
other, than authenticating both parties itself.
Online/Oﬄine Engagement of HN. State-of-the-art non-public-key-based authenti-
cation and key-agreement protocols as well as some public-key-based ones require HN’s
engagement in the roaming authentication (e.g [156, 62, 9]). HN’s interaction can either
be oﬄine before the actual authentication or online during the actual authentication. In
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the oﬄine case, HN typically provides FN with some security-related information with the
help of which MD and FN can authenticate each other. Oﬄine engagement of HN generally
trades an efficient authentication protocol (no round-trip message exchanges with HN dur-
ing authentication) against the freshness of HN’s authorization of the roaming instance. In
some roaming protocols, the first of a certain number of authentications between FN and
MD requires HN’s online engagement while the subsequent ones involve only FN and MD.
A method like this tries to minimize round-trip message exchanges to HN and yet guarantee
the freshness of HN’s authorization.
Note that some public-key-based protocols designed for roaming use public-key-based
authentication to authenticate FN to MD, yet use a non-public-key-based method to au-
thenticate MD to FN.
Key Derivation by HN or FN. In any public-key-based or non-public-key-based au-
thentication and key-agreement protocols, MD and FN have to establish a master key K.
From K, they subsequently derive the integrity and encryption key to protect their connec-
tion. If ASHN is involved in the roaming authentication, the master key K can be derived
by HN or by FN. If HN derives K, HN may derive K oﬄine before the actual roaming
authentication or online, during the authentication. If HN derives K (oﬄine or online), HN
has to establish a secure channel to FN in order to transfer K to FN. In case FN derives
K, HN may or may not be able to derive K itself as well and thus may or may not get
knowledge of K. As only FN and MD are required to have knowledge of K, it is desirable
for a roaming protocol to derive K in FN and not in HN. Note that even if FN derives K,
HN and FN may still require a secure channel between them, as HN may have to transfer
secret information contributing to the key to FN during or before the authentication.
Design Goals for Roaming Authentication. From the above discussion, we derive
the following general design goals for roaming authentication and key-agreement proto-
cols. Ideally, roaming authentication and key-agreement protocols should minimize the
authentication traffic between ASFN and ASHN. They should be able to easily and timely
accommodate changes in the roaming profile of a mobile device as well as changes in roaming
agreements between two providers. In particular, roaming agreements and roaming profiles
should be easy to revoke and the revocation should be effective as isochronous as possible.
The same holds true for new roaming agreements or new extensions of the roaming profiles
of MD. The master key K agreed upon between ASFN and MD should be derived by ASFN
to avoid unnecessary key transfers.
In the following three subsections, we describe three types of roaming authentication and
key-agreement that we distinguish according to their properties as summarized in Table,2.1.
5HN neither online nor oﬄine involved.
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Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
HN online +/-/◦5 + +/-
FN derives K + - +/-
HN derives K - + -/+
HN knows K - + -/+/+
Sec. chan. req. - + -/+
p-k-based + - +/-
Table 2.1: Types of Roaming Procedures
2.1.5.1 Type 1 Roaming Procedures
In Type 1 roaming procedures MD and FN mutually authenticate each other based on indi-
vidual public-key certificates. MD and FN are required to validate each other’s certificates
during authentication. The information needed for certificate validation is provided by HN
or a trusted third party before, during, or after the authentication. MD and FN negotiate
the security suite to use without interacting with HN. HN can try to ensure its policies of-
fline by revealing its policies to MD in the pre-registration process and to FN upon entering
the roaming agreement.
The advantage of this procedure type is that FN generates the master key K itself and
HN does not get knowledge of K. In particular, no secure channel for key transfer from
HN to FN is required. Another advantage of a method like this is that it does not require
any traffic on the backbone network other than traffic related to the revocation status
of certificates. On the other hand, as any pubic-key-based method that uses individual
certificates for each FN, this method cannot easily handle changes in roaming plans or
roaming agreements which makes it inflexible. In addition, as discussed earlier, it requires
particularly adapted solutions to enable MD to validate the certificate presented by FN.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the security-mechanism negotiation as well as authentication and
key agreement upon roaming to FN in this case. For simplicity, the possibly required
certificate revocation status checks before, during, or after authentication are not illustrated.
The roaming authentication protocol ra and the key-agreement protocol rka are pro-
tocols between ASFN and MD. ASFN and MD authenticate each other based on individual
public-key certificates. In the key-agreement protocol, the master key K is generated in
ASFN and MD. ASFN transfers K to EIPEFN using a key-transfer mechanism kt. ASHN does
not gain any knowledge on K and no secure channel between ASHN and ASFN is required.
ASHN is, if at all, only engaged in the authentication by providing information about the
revocation status of certificates. For this purpose, ASFN and MD may contact ASHN before,
during, or immediately after the authentication. ASHN may thus be online or oﬄine or not
at all engaged in each roaming authentication. See Table 2.1 for the properties of Type 1
procedures.
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MD
kt
ra, rka
security−mechanism negotiation
derive K derive KPSfrag replacements
EIPEFN ASFN
Figure 2.1: Type 1 Roaming Procedures (See page xxi for Notations Used in Figures)
2.1.5.2 Type 2 Roaming Procedures
A Type 2 roaming procedure can either be public-key-based or non-public-key-based. ASFN
forwards all authentication and key-agreement protocol messages between MD and ASHN.
Consequently, ASHN’s engagement in the roaming procedure is online. MD and ASHN au-
thenticate each other based on their pre-established credentials.6 ASHN and MD agree upon
a master key K and ASHN transfers this master key to ASFN after successful authentication.
FN and MD subsequently assure each other of HN’s authorization by proving their knowl-
edge of the master key K to each other. ASHN and ASFN use the credentials established as
part of their roaming agreement to establish a secure channel for the key transfer kt∗. The
necessity of a secure channel is one of the disadvantages of this type of roaming protocol.
Another disadvantage is that ASFN has to forward all authentication traffic between MD
and ASHN. This results in a major load on the backbone network connecting ASHN and
ASFN. The advantage of this method is that HN can easily control each roaming instance
and timely react to changes in the roaming profile of MD or changes in the roaming agree-
ment with FN. Moreover, HN can actively take part in the security-mechanism negotiation
and allow or forbid the use of certain encryption and integrity-protection mechanisms after
authentication. Figure 2.2 illustrates this type of roaming procedure.
MD
kt*
kt
ra, rka ra, rka
derive K derive K
PSfrag replacements
EIPEFN ASFN ASHN/SCHN
Figure 2.2: Type 2 Roaming Procedure
6FN does not have to support or even know the actual authentication protocol used between ASHN and
MD.
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The security-mechanism negotiation can be implemented in many different ways. We
only give one example here: MD sends RSSMD−allow to HN. HN computes the intersection
of RSSHN−allow with RSSMD−allow and sends the intersection (together with the result
of the authentication) to FN. FN then selects one of the mechanisms in the intersection
and acknowledges its choice to MD. Note that this is not sufficient to ensure that HN’s
policies are in fact respected. In particular, FN could intercept RSSMD−allow and choose
one of the mechanisms allowed by MD and itself, but not HN. If HN takes the financial
or non-financial risk during roaming, HN will want to prevent FN from doing this. For
example, HN could acknowledge RSSHN−allow to MD in an authenticated way using the
pre-established credentials. As a consequence, HN still cannot be sure that its policy is
respected, but FN and MD would have to cooperate in order to use a security suite HN
does not allow.
2.1.5.3 Type 3 Roaming Procedures
While Type 1 and Type 2 procedures are the extremes, Type 3 covers all methods in between
the first tow. Type 3 roaming procedures require HN’s online or oﬄine interaction for
more than just providing information on the revocation status of certificates; rather Type 3
procedures split the load of the authentication between HN and FN. Type 3 procedures
can be public-key-based or not and may require HN to be online or not. In some of them,
HN will generate the master key and transfer it to FN, thus requiring a secure channel
between HN and FN. In others FN will derive the master key itself, while requiring some
secret input of HN to do so. In yet others, FN may be able to derive the master key
without HN’s interaction. It is important to note that in most Type 3 procedures suggested
so far, MD communicates with ASFN only. In some protocols suggested for authentication
across different technologies in wireless overlay networks7 (e.g., [45, 169]), MD is required
to communicate with both ASHN and ASFN simultaneously. Figure 2.3 illustrates a Type 3
procedure.
For Type 3 roaming procedures, no general statements on when or how to negotiate
security mechanisms can be made.
2.2 Enhancing Roaming Protocols by Means of Secret-
Sharing
State-of-the-art public-key-based roaming protocols are either of Type 1 or are public-key-
based Type 2 procedures. As discussed before, the shortcomings of the former approach
are problems regarding certificate validation on the mobile station side as well as costly
handling of roaming plan changes. The shortcomings of the latter approach include the
requirement for a secure channel between ASFN and ASHN, as well as a large amount of
round-trip message exchanges between ASFN and ASHN during authentication. The key
7A network is said to overlay another network if its cells overlay the coverage area of the other network
completely.
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Figure 2.3: Type 3 Roaming Procedures
idea of using secret sharing in this setting is to address these shortcomings by replacing the
individual certificates for FNs by means of a suitable key splitting between HN and FNs in
combination with issuing a certificate for HN only. In more detail, this works as follows:
Every HN is issued one roaming certificate. Assuming HN has a pairwise roaming
agreement with l foreign networks FN1, . . . FNl, HN splits its secret roaming key R into l
different pairs of shares (RHNi ,RFNi) by means of individual (2, 2) secret-sharing schemes
8
with RHNi 6= RHNj and RFNi 6= RFNj for i 6= j. HN then distributes RFNi to FNi.
9 Unlike
with other secret-sharing applications, in our approach, HN keeps copies of RHNi as well as
the secret roaming key R. This not only allows HN to use the secret roaming key should
MD want to access HN directly, but it also enables HN to issue suitable shares to new
roaming partners. By construction, R can be recovered from a collection of shares, if and
only if this collection includes a pair (RHNi ,RFNi) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. In particular,
R cannot be reconstructed from any pair (RHNi ,RFNj ) (with i 6= j) or any collection of
shares of foreign networks only. Constructing key pairs with (RHNi ,RFNi) 6= (RHNj ,RFNj )
for i 6= j is necessary in order to allow for unique identification of FNi upon successful
authentication.
Authenticating FN by MD using public-key certificates generally involves related oper-
ations by both FN and HN, such as decryptions or generating signatures. By introducing
the mechanism of key splitting, these operations need to be adapted accordingly. In par-
ticular, these operations are now split between HN and FN using distributed decryption or
distributed signature generation (see, for example, [40] distributed signatures and [71] ad-
ditional applications of distributed cryptosystems). Note that the key splitting guarantees
8See [120] for the definition of a (2, 2) secret-sharing scheme.
9In standard secret-sharing notation, this corresponds to implementing the access structure Γ =
{{HN}, {{HN1, FN1}, . . . , {{HNl, FNl}} as an iterative threshold scheme of type (1, l)[(2, 2), . . . , (2, 2)]. Un-
like in the conventional secret-sharing setting, in our approach the HNi (i = 1, . . . , l), in fact, do not represent
distinct share holders, but the respective shares are all held by HN.
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that FNi can only be successfully authenticated by MD if HN uses its part RHNi of the pair
of shares generated for FNi. On successful completion of the authentication, HN can thus
be sure that the identity FNi claimed is correct. This indirectly authenticates FNi to HN.
Upon roaming to FN in this new framework, MD now always uses the pre-installed cer-
tificate of its HN regardless of FN’s identity. Consequently, MD does not have to validate
any certificate. In particular, HN’s participation in a successful authentication automat-
ically confirms the use of a valid roaming key.10 Aside from simplifying the handling of
certificates considerably, the new key-splitting approach may entail additional advantages
over state-of-the-art solutions. These advantages potentially includes a reduction of the
number of round-trip message exchanges between MD and HN. Similarly, it may eliminate
the need for a secure channel between FN and HN which, for example, is used to transfer
a master key from HN to FN, due to the fact that the key splitting allows FN to use its
share to derive the master key from information secured by HN’s share. In Section 11.2 of
Chapter 11, we detail the EAP-TLS-KS protocol which implements our new key-splitting
approach based on EAP-TLS, and thus enhances WLAN inter-provider roaming. As we
will show, EAP-TLS-KS shows all of the above advantages over state-of-the-art roaming
solutions.
In summary, the roaming approach sketched here, potentially leads to a roaming authen-
tication and key-agreement protocol of Type 3 that is public-key-based and requires ASHN’s
online engagement while minimizing the number of round-trips between ASHN and ASFN.
It allows ASFN to derive the master key itself and does not require a secure channel. ASHN
may derive the master key itself, but it is not required to do so. This corresponds to column
11 in Table 2.1. With EAP-TLS-KS, we provided an example roaming authentication and
key-agreement protocol that exhibits the claimed potential properties of our approach.
2.3 Roaming Across Different Access Technologies
Early generations of wireless devices were equipped with one technology only, limiting inter-
operation to providers supporting the same technology. The goal of inter-system roaming
support is to enable users to access different networks of different technologies with only
one registration process with their home provider and, in the commercial case, only one
bill.
As explained before roaming authentication and key-agreement protocols are based on
a certain type of credentials. In some wireless technologies, only one particular type of cre-
dential is used. For other technologies, roaming authentication and key-agreement protocols
based on various credential types are specified. In order to allow MD to roam across differ-
ent technologies, a home provider has to provide MD with a set of credentials of the right
type for at least one roaming authentication and key-agreement protocol for each available
technology. A single set of credentials may, however, be sufficient if each candidate technol-
ogy supports an authentication and key-agreement protocol based on this set of credentials.
10In order to avoid an impersonation attack, it is mandatory for HN to immediately notify all of its MDs
of the revocation of the current roaming certificate due to compromise and distribute a new one.
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A home provider may want to issue only one set of credentials to its pre-registered users
and use this to authenticate the user wherever he may roam. This is the case if a network
provider has already invested in an expensive authentication infrastructure and wants to
reuse it while entering new roaming agreements with network providers that offer different
technologies or while building up a network for another technology itself. Additionally, a
network provider may simply avoid troubling his users to obtain an additional set of cre-
dentials in order to be able to use a new technology but rather enable him to reuse the
one he already has. This may call for new roaming authentication procedures to enable
roaming across technologies based on one set of pre-established credentials with the home
provider.11
2.3.1 Roaming Agreements, Registering for Roaming and Security Mech-
anisms
In order to be able to roam across different technologies, a user registers for a certain set of
technologies with his home provider.12 The home provider assigns one or more credentials
for the user such that the user obtains a suitable set of credentials for at least one (roaming)
authentication and key-agreement protocol for each technology for which he registers. The
same type of credentials may be usable by different technologies such that the number of
technologies may exceed the number of credential types assigned for the user.
During the registration, a user and his home provider furthermore select a set of foreign
networks to which MD may roam for each technology. This set may be indirectly defined,
for example, by a geographical roaming region. MD and its home provider furthermore
determine the set of services MD may use upon roaming for each technology and optionally
also exchange information on their roaming policies. In case of commercial providers, MD
and the home network additionally agree upon the roaming charges. While set during pre-
registration, the roaming region or other parts of MD’s roaming profiles may be changed by
the user over time. For example, a user may be able to change his profile making a phone
call or making changes to his profile using a web-interface.
The home provider enters into roaming agreements with foreign providers that offer the
same and different access technologies, as described in Section 2.1.1.
Roaming authentication and key-agreement protocols for users roaming between differ-
ent technologies can be defined in exactly the same way as in the inter-provider case pre-
viously described (see Definition 2.1.1). FN may support a technology the home provider
does not support. ASHN here only stands for an authentication server operated by the home
provider that does not necessarily act as the authentication server if MD accesses a network
operated by the home provider. ASHN—if engaged in the authentication and key agreement
at all—supports the home provider back-end of the roaming protocols for FN’s technology.
The same holds for the roaming key-agreement protocol that in the inter-system roaming
11The EAP-Method EAP-SIM [88] for SIM-card-based authentication and key agreement in WLANs is an
example for a protocol that was specifically designed to enable roaming across different technologies based
on the same set of credentials, namely the secret key shared between MD and its GSM operator.
12Note that the home provider may itself operate networks supporting some of these technologies only.
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case can be defined as in Definition 2.1.2. The only difference in the inter-provider case
previously described is that MD may roam to a technology its home network may not
support.
2.3.2 Security Policies
A mobile device roaming across different technologies has to specify a roaming policy for
each technology it supports. We denote the technology-specific set of authentication pro-
tocols with RA, the technology-specific set of key agreement protocols with RKA, and
the technology-specific sets of key-establishment processes, encryption mechanisms, and
integrity-protection mechanisms with KE, EM , and IM respectively. The set of roaming
security suites RSS for this technology is then a subset of the Cartesian product of the sets
of technology-specific security mechanisms:
RSS ⊂ RA×KA×KE ×EM × IM
This set specifies all technologically possible and standard-wise allowed combinations of
security mechanisms for the given technology. We call the elements rss of RSS roaming
security suites. MD specifies a subset RSSMD−allow of RSS that includes all roaming
security suites MD allows to be used upon roaming to this technology. Similarly, each FN
expresses its policy with respect to the roaming security suites it allows to be used by a
subset RSSFN−allow ⊂ RSS. Finally, the home provider specifies RSSHN−allow ⊂ RSS for
each technology it has a roaming agreement with a foreign provider for. The home provider
may have to set policies for technologies, in particular for cipher suites, he does not support
himself. Other than that, the policies described here do not differ from the ones described
in the inter-provider case.
Roaming protocols designed for roaming across different technologies can be classified
in the same way as in the inter-provider case. Our key-splitting approach can easily be gen-
eralized to roaming across different technologies that all support public-key-based roaming
authentication without any changes.
2.4 Related Issues and Future Directions of Research
2.4.1 Location Update
Upon roaming, MD is often required to be reachable in the same way as if it was connected
to its home network (e.g., in the mobile phone case, a roaming mobile device should be
reachable for incoming phone calls). This requires MD or FN to acknowledge MD’s current
location to HN via a so-called location update procedure after or during authentication.
While location update procedures within one technology are relatively easy to achieve,
location updates upon roaming across different technologies may be difficult. In particular,
a mobile device may use different MAC layer identifiers across different technologies or may
change, e.g., its IP address, which makes mappings between different identifiers necessary. A
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standard example for location update procedures on the network layer in IP-based networks
is Mobile IP [142]. Location update procedures are out of scope of this work.
2.4.2 Intra-Provider Roaming
To avoid frequent authentication and key agreement between users that move within the
same network of one provider, some wireless technologies support fast re-authentication
mechanisms. If MD was recently authenticated and agreed upon keys with the network
and subsequently tries to re-connect to the network, for example, via a new NAP, MD
may request fast re-authentication within a certain time period. A mechanism like this
is usually based on the master key that was most recently agreed upon between MD and
the visited network. If MDs are to be reachable by third parties upon roaming, the fast
re-authentication causes the same location update as any full authentication. In case FN
operates more than one ASFN, the master key may have to be transferred from one ASFN to
another in order to allow for fast re-authentication. Fast re-authentication mechanisms are,
for example, standardized for GSM, UMTS, and WLAN [62, 9, 93]; more recent suggestions
in the WLAN context are [129, 137]. In the rest of this work, we concentrate on roaming
between different providers and technologies rather then on intra-provider roaming.
2.4.3 Accounting
In the commercial case, additional security issues arise from accounting. As HN reimburses
FN for service provisioning, FN has to prove to HN that one of HN’s MDs has indeed
used a certain service for a certain amount of time. Accounting can be handled oﬄine
or online. Oﬄine accounting is used in older mobile phone technologies. For example, in
GSM, so-called Call Detail Records (CDRs) are generated by a visited network13 about any
chargeable event. These CDRs include information about the user’s identity, the service he
used, the duration of the service usage, and MD’s location during service use.14 FN collects
these CDRs and presents them in a clearing phase to HN. CDRs do not prove MD’s service
use to HN, but they provide HN and MD with all available information on the service
use, thus allowing MD to repudiate the service usage. Nevertheless, more recently the risk
of fraud through malicious service providers has been acknowledged (e.g., [163]) and the
integration of non-reputable (online and oﬄine) accounting schemes has been suggested
(e.g., [90]) in the mobile phone context.
A detailed discussion of accounting schemes and their usage in wireless access networks
in general is out of scope of this work.
2.4.4 Anonymity
State-of-the-art wireless access networks either do not protect MD’s long-term identity (e.g.,
802.11) or do protect its confidentiality, but only on the air interface (e.g., UMTS, GSM,
13the foreign or the home network
14The location is provided in the form of the Cell-ID of the serving BTS.
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CDMA). In particular, the long-term identity of MD is not kept secret from foreign providers
to which MD roams. For accounting reasons, the home network needs to get knowledge of a
mobile device’s long-term identity, but not the foreign provider. Recently, several solutions
to this problem have been suggested (e.g., [21, 188]). However, anonymity issues are out of
scope of this work.
2.4.5 Roaming Mediators
As providers aim to offer global coverage for their users, pairwise roaming agreements be-
come infeasible. Instead, so-called roaming mediators (e.g., [15, 49, 166, 29]) come into play.
Roaming mediators come in two different functionalities: roaming brokers and delegates.
Roaming brokers simply sell packages of roaming partners to a provider. In the commercial
case, they additionally take care of clearance and billing between the providers. As opposed
to this, roaming delegates handle all security- and mobility-related issues on behalf of a
provider, such that the wireless access network provider only provides the physical access
network, while everything else is left to the roaming delegate.
2.4.5.1 Roaming Brokers
For providers that aim to offer world-wide coverage to their customers, entering into pairwise
roaming agreements with a couple of network providers, e.g., in every country is quite work-
intensive. Roaming brokers facilitate the development of these agreements. A network
provider does not enter into pairwise (mostly bilateral) roaming agreements, but rather
buys a package of roaming parters from a broker or obtains a package of roaming partners.
In the case of commercial network providers, the roaming broker is responsible for charging
and clearance between the providers.
On roaming, the broker may additionally act as proxy for authentication data requests.
Instead of engaging only HN into the authentication on roaming, the broker is involved
and forwards authentication traffic between HN and FN. In this case, the broker and HN,
as well as the broker and FN, have pre-established credentials they can use to establish a
secure channel. If HN and FN have to exchange confidential information during the mutual
authentication between MD and FN, these secure channels may be used. It is important to
note that in this case, all confidential information is accessible by the broker in the clear.
If the broker does not act as proxy on roaming and the roaming procedure requires a
secure channel between HN and FN, then HN and FN have to be enabled by the broker to
establish such a secure channel directly. As a future direction of research, the key-splitting
approach and other approaches could be extended to support roaming brokers such that no
secret information becomes available within the broker and yet no secure channel between
FN and HN has to be established. The use of roaming brokers has been described in
[15, 49, 166] for mobile phone networks, and in [29] in a more general, public-key-based
context.15 However, through the remainder of this work, we consider pairwise roaming
agreements only.
15Roaming brokers are referred to as Roaming Service Providers (RSPs) in [29].
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2.4.5.2 Roaming Delegates
Offering global or wide-area coverage is particularly difficult for providers who, themselves,
only cover a small area. In addition to finding suitable roaming partners and entering into
pairwise roaming agreements with them, some small providers will want to delegate all
related security issues to a third party. In the commercial case, they will additionally want
to delegate the charing and billing for their own as well as foreign mobile devices. This
functionality is offered by what we call roaming delegates.
A user does not register with a particular network provider, but rather with the roaming
delegate that may itself not operate any access networks at all. The roaming delegate
performs all tasks of a home provider, though. All user-related information, including the
roaming plan and the exchanged credentials, are stored by the roaming delegate. Upon
roaming, the roaming delegate plays the same role as the home network does when pairwise
roaming agreements are used. Roaming between different roaming delegates then requires
pairwise roaming agreements between the roaming delegates.
Roaming delegates have not been extensively explored in current literature. The authors
of [154] take a first step in this direction within the scope of the IST16 project TORRENT.
2.5 Related Work
Mobile Telecommunication Standards. The standardized solutions for inter-provider
roaming between different mobile operators supporting the same technology such as two
GSM, two UMTS, or two CDMA2000 providers are based on a secret key shared between
MD and its home network. The authentication and key agreement requires HNs online
engagement on the first of a home provider set number of authentication instances [62, 9,
153]. Subsequent authentications do not then require HN’s engagement any longer. The
master key is derived in the home provider and has to be transferred to ASFN by means
of a secure channel. The home network is not engaged in the cipher-suite negotiation.
The roaming authentication and key-agreement protocols used in mobile telecommunication
networks are of Type 3 and correspond to the columns six and 12 of Table 2.1 in Section 2.1.5.
We will discuss the details of GSM and UMTS inter-provider roaming in Chapter 7.
Patiyoo et al. in [141] suggest reusing the GSM roaming protocols to implement authen-
tication and key agreement upon roaming in wireless ATM17 networks.
Roaming across WLANs. In the WLAN context, many different inter-provider roam-
ing security procedures have been proposed. We will discuss these solutions in detail in
Chapter 11, where we present our own key-splitting-based roaming authentication and key-
agreement protocol for WLAN. At this point, we only mention three WLAN roaming solu-
tions to demonstrate how diverse state-of-the-art solutions are.
Most public WLAN access providers currently use the web-based Universal Access
Method (UAM), a method which is also recommended as the best current practice for
16Information Society Technologies.
17Asynchronous Transfer Mode.
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inter-provider roaming by the Wi-Fi Alliance [18]. In UAM, a user is authenticated based
on a username/password combination in a Type 1 protocol. The properties of UAM corre-
spond to the first column in Table 2.1. Other web-based roaming protocols, like the ones of
Bahl et al. or Appenzeller et al. [23, 19], have the same properties.
WLANs that support the new 802.11i security architecture can be set up to support
any EAP-Method in combination with a RADIUS server proxy hierarchy [189] on roaming.
The roaming authentication and key-agreement protocol based on this setting is then a
Type 2 protocol. All EAP-Method-specific authentication traffic is forwarded to the home
provider. The home provider’s authentication server authenticates MD in the same way as
if MD requested service to it. Depending on the EAP-Method used the authentication can
then be public-key-based or be non-public-key-based.
Salagrelli et al. in [156] propose a symmetric-key-based Type 3 roaming authentication
protocol that requires ASHN to be online in each authentication and requires a secure channel
between ASHN and ASFN to transfer the secret master key.
Roaming across Mobile Telecommunications Technologies.
GSM-UMTS. GSM and UMTS are telecommunication standards in which the authenti-
cation and key-agreement protocols are based on a shared secret key and home-provider-
defined authentication and key-generation algorithms. The secret key and the algorithms
are stored on a smart card, called SIM in GSM and USIM in UMTS. To facilitate the
transition from GSM to UMTS mobile devices that support both radio interfaces and are
equipped with either type of smart cards, should be able to access both network types.
The UMTS standard (see [9]) therefore defines several different authentication and key-
agreement protocols for SIM holders roaming to UMTS or USIM holders roaming to GSM.
We will discuss all of these procedures in detail in Chapter 8.
UMTS-CDMA2000. Kim et al. in [105] explore how roaming of UMTS subscribers to
CDMA2000 networks and vice-versa could be implemented. The authors argue that due
to major differences in the authentication protocols standardized for these technologies,
MDs have to be issued separate credentials for each technology. The home provider of a
subscriber is then required to support an authentication server for each technology type.
Roaming across WLAN and Mobile Telecommunication Networks. In order to
minimize the cost to offer complementary WLAN access, a recent goal of mobile phone
operators is to develop roaming authentication and key-agreement protocols that enable
their subscribers to reuse their credentials on accessing WLAN. Examples for authentication
protocols like this are the EAP-Methods EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA that are described in
[87, 16, 30, 106]. Similar solutions are described in [157] by Salkintzis et al. (for WLAN-
GPRS roaming) and by Buddhikot et al. in [43] (for WLAN-CDMA2000 roaming). The
basic idea of these protocols is to make the SIM or USIM card used in GSM/GPRS or
UMTS reusable in the wireless LAN context. The 3GPP standard [12] specifies the use of
EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA.
Chen et al. in [45] suggest a PEAP-based solution in which a UMTS subscriber is
authenticated based on its USIM or any other credential type while it authenticates the
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WLAN provider based on its public-key certificate. This certificate is provided to MD over
the UMTS interface by its currently serving UMTS provider.
While the above solutions require the WLAN provider to support mobile telecommuni-
cation network type authentication, the authors of [98] suggest a WLAN-centered approach.
Here, the GPRS provider is required to operate a WLAN-type authentication server and
subscribers to a GSM/GPRS provider are issued separate WLAN credentials. Upon roam-
ing authentication, all authentication traffic is forwarded to the home provider (Type 2
protocol). Similar suggestions include the use of a regular EAP-TLS implementation with
a separate set of credentials for mobile subscribers that roam to WLAN [101]. In this case,
the mobile operator’s authentication server has to support EAP-TLS-based authentication
and the local authentication server ASFN forwards all authentication traffic to the home
provider.
Tseng et al. [169] propose an authentication protocol for MDs equipped with UMTS
credentials. In this protocol, MD communicates with its UMTS home provider over the
UMTS air interface and with the WLAN authentication server over the WLAN interface
simultaneously. The protocol is based on the UMTS credentials, as well as a hash chain
shared between the UMTS and the WLAN provider at some time before the authentication
takes place. The UMTS provider generates the master key subsequently used to protect
the WLAN air interface. As opposed to the other protocols described so far, MD transfers
this master key to the WLAN provider encrypted with the help of a key issued by its home
provider for this purpose. Unfortunately, this protocol does not seem to scale, as a UMTS
provider has to allocate a different hash chain root for each MD and each WLAN provider.
The authors extend this approach in [168] to a public-key-based protocol to support non-
repudiation.
Technology-Independent Solutions. In [156], Salgarelli et al. suggest a general roam-
ing authentication framework based on the Needham-Schroeder authentication [132]. The
protocol splits the actions taken by one side of the original protocol between the home and
the foreign provider in a way that reduces the number of round-trip message exchanges
required between ASHN and ASFN to one. The suggested roaming protocol is of Type 3, is
based on a secret key shared between MD and its home provider, and requires HN’s online
engagement in each authentication. The master key is derived in ASHN and a secure channel
is required to transfer this key to ASFN.
In [29], Bayarou et al. suggest a public-key-based approach for roaming users that ex-
plicitly addresses the problems regarding the validation of individual certificates on a mobile
device. In particular, MDs delegate the validation of a foreign provider’s certificate to a
trusted server. However, the authors do not address how changes in roaming profiles or
roaming agreements are to be handled. This Type 1 roaming solution supports the first
and the third columns of Table 2.1. HN is either not engaged in certificate validations or
is engaged and online. Gu et al. [81] also suggest a public-key-based solution, but they do
not address the aforementioned inherent problems of such solutions.
In [131], Molva et al. propose a roaming authentication and key-agreement protocol that
is based on a secret key shared between MD and HN. It involves HN in each authentication.
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The master key is derived in ASFN. The protocol nevertheless requires a secure channel
between ASHN and ASFN. It requires only one round-trip of message exchanges between
ASHN and ASFN, thus minimizing the overhead on the backbone network
The IST project SHAMAN specifies a system architecture that allows for roaming across
different technologies [72] and specifies design goals for roaming authentication and key-
agreement protocols. In particular, the authors argue in favor of using a single set of
credentials across different technologies.
In [109], Lin et al. propose an authentication and key-agreement protocol based on a
secret key shared between MD and its home provider. Additionally, public-key cryptography
is used to protect MD’s permanent identity. In this protocol, ASHN is required to be online
and derives and transfers the secret master key to ASFN
Related Secret-Sharing Applications. The use of key-splitting to facilitate revocation
of certificates used by users for signing or encryption purposes has been described in [38].
We make use of this idea in the sense that key-splitting of a roaming key makes roaming
agreements easy to revoke.
Geer and Yung suggest alternative applications of threshold cryptography in [71]. Al-
though this work does not address inter-provider roaming, this paper inspired our work.
2.6 Conclusion
Public-key-based methods, in principle, have the advantage that a foreign network and MD
can authenticate each other without the involvement of MD’s HN. However, most roaming
scenarios, particularly commercial ones, require that every instance of roaming be controlled
by HN. Therefore, most public-key-based methods and all non-public-key-based methods
suggested for roaming to date require that the mutual authentication involves HN. HN
authenticates MD and assures FN of MD’s authorization to roam to FN. Similarly, HN
authenticates FN and assures MD of FN’s authorization to offer service to MD.
Furthermore, in authentication methods that require HN’s interaction, the crypto-
graphic keys used for MAC layer protection (between MD and FN) following a success-
ful authentication are typically generated by HN. This requires HN to establish a secure
channel to FN in order to allow for a secure transfer of these cryptographic keys.
Another common shortcoming of public-key-based authentication methods for roaming
users is that MD must check the validity and revocation status of certificates during network
authentication before actually having network access.
In this chapter, we have modeled and classified roaming authentication and key agree-
ment protocols and introduced a new secret-sharing-based approach to inter-provider and
inter-system roaming. Our public-key-based approach requires HN interaction on each
roaming instance, allows FN to derive the cryptographic key material itself, and allows a
timely accommodation of changes in roaming agreements and roaming profiles. Our new
approach supports pairwise roaming agreements between wireless access network providers.
This is the type of agreements used to date by mobile phone operators and wireless inter-
net service providers. An interesting future direction of research might be to extend our
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approach to newly evolving types of handover agreements arising from the introduction of
roaming brokers and delegates to scene.
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Part II
Handover
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Part II in the General Context
Part II is the main part of the thesis. In Chapter 3, we model inter-provider
handover procedures based on Part I. Handover of mobile devices from their
home network to other networks are modeled based on the security model
presented in Chapter 1 and handover of mobile devices from a foreign
network—to which they initially roamed—to other networks are modeled
based on the roaming model presented in Chapter 2. In Chapter 4, we analyze
the threats imposed on mobile devices and wireless access networks by
inter-provider handover procedures that use security-context transfer and
derive new security requirements. In Chapter 9 of Part III, we analyze the
intra-system and inter-system handover procedures between GSM and UMTS
networks based on the newly derived security requirements. In Chapter 5, we
present the new history-enriched, policy-based approach to inter-provider
handover. This approach is further detailed in the WLAN context in
Chapter 12 of Part IV. In Chapter 6 we extend the new handover approach to
inter-system handover.
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Chapter 3
Inter-Provider Handover—Model
Procedures and Security Solutions
In a wireless access network, a mobile device is connected to a NAP by means of a radio link.
This network access point has a transmission range that is usually referred to as a cell. A
handover procedure generally allows a user to move from one cell to another without loss or
even disruption of the services he currently uses. During a handover procedure the mobile
device of the user switches from a (MAC layer) connection with one NAP (the source NAP)
to another one (the destination NAP). On the network side, a handover procedure makes
the re-routing of incoming and outgoing data traffic over the destination NAP necessary.
In the simplest case, a handover takes place within the network of one network provider.
The source and the destination NAP belong to the same wireless access network and are
connected to the same backbone. This type of handover is referred to as intra-provider
handover. Intra-provider handover are implemented in all current mobile communications
networks and have lately also been specified for IEEE 802.11 WLANs [60, 11, 91, 93].
The coverage of a single wireless access network provider is usually restricted to a cer-
tain geographical area. Handover procedures between different providers (inter-provider
handover) aim to offer seamless services to users in a wider coverage area than the one
offered by the home provider.1 On an inter-provider handover, the source and the destina-
tion NAP belong to different wireless access networks, the source network (SRC) and the
destination network (DEST) of the handover procedure. Consequently, they are connected
to different backbone networks. However, these two backbone networks are required to be
interconnected in order to allow for the re-routing of data traffic. Handover procedures be-
tween different providers, though widely discussed, as for example in [162, 177, 27, 184, 152],
are currently very rare. One of the few examples for already standardized inter-provider
handover is the handover procedures between a GSM provider and a UMTS provider [11].
Inter-provider handover are expected to be regulated via handover agreements between net-
work providers that regulate the mobility management, security-related issues, and in the
1Some authors (e.g., [29, 177]) prefer the terms inter-domain and intra-domain handover and use them
in the same way as we use the terms inter-provider and intra-provider handover.
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case of commercial providers, the terms for accounting and billing. Handover agreements
are expected to play a similar role in the wireless network access provider world as roam-
ing agreements do nowadays in mobile communications networks [1]. Users then register
for handover to a certain set of foreign providers (e.g., providers in a certain geographical
region) as part of the registration process with their home providers.
Upon inter-provider handover, a mobile device starts to use a service while it is connected
to a certain network access point. This network access point is called the anchor NAP of the
handover procedure. We call the network the anchor NAP belongs to, the Anchor Network
(AN) and the provider that operates the anchor network, the anchor provider. A handover
from AN as SRC network to another network DEST is referred to as first-order handover
here. A first-order handover can take place within the network of one provider or between
two different providers. Moreover, the two networks AN=SRC and DEST can support the
same or different technologies (inter-system handover). A handover from the destination
network DEST1 of a first-order handover to yet another network DEST2 is referred to as
second-order handover and so on. Handover of an order greater than one are also-called
subsequent handover. Subsequent handover can in particular differ from first-order handover
in the mobility management on the network side. The re-routing of traffic to the destination
NAP can be handled by the source network of the handover, by the home network of the
mobile device, or by the anchor network.
The anchor network on an inter-provider handover may be the home network of the
mobile device. However, as more and more roaming procedures between different providers
and wireless network technologies evolve, handover procedures of a mobile device from a
foreign network to another network become of greater interest. Consequently, the anchor
network may either be HN or any FN that has a roaming agreement with HN.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the order and anchor type of a handover and clarifies the numbering
we use throughout the remainder of this work.
Handover with HN as anchor: 
Handover with FN as anchor: 
Second−order handover Third−order handover 
First−order handover Second−order handover Third−order handover 
Anchor Network (AN)
HN
First−order handover Roaming
PSfrag replacements
DEST1 = SRC2
DEST1 = SRC2HN = SRC1
FN = SRC1 DEST2 = SRC3
DEST2 = SRC3
DEST3 = SRC4
DEST3 = SRC4
Figure 3.1: Order and Anchor Type of a Handover
The security challenge on inter-provider handover is that MD and the destination net-
work have to mutually authenticate each other, negotiate a cipher suite to use after han-
dover, and establish a master session key without causing a disruption of any ongoing
connections.
In this chapter, we model various types of first-order and subsequent inter-provider
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handover procedures within the same technology. Inter-system handover are subsequently
studied in Chapter 6. Our model is based on handover procedures used in state-of-the-art
wireless access networks, as well as other recently published work. In particular, the mod-
eling is based on the procedures used in UMTS [11], GSM [60], CDMA2000 [13], and IEEE
WLAN [91, 92], as well as the procedures modeled and described in [182, 127, 135, 17, 176].
The derived model procedures are not only an aggregated summary of current work in
the field. For once, the model procedures are described in a technology-independent way.
As a consequence, they are more general than the aforementioned work. More impor-
tantly, previous work on inter-provider handover does not differentiate between first-order
and higher-order handover. Consequently, subsequent inter-provider handover procedures
are not explicitly addressed by previous work. By introducing the anchor network and
the subsequently serving source and destination networks, our model explicitly addresses
subsequent handover and handover after roaming.
Furthermore, we describe the security challenge imposed by first-order and subsequent
inter-provider handover and briefly summarize and discuss state-of-the-art approaches to
address this challenge. The first approach is based on an authentication and key agreement
between MD and DESTk during handover, e.g., the same protocols as used upon roaming of
MD to DESTk. We discuss this approach mainly to motivate the need for other solutions.
The second approach generalizes the so-called pre-authentication method suggested in [137]
for intra-provider handover in WLAN and adopted for the new security architecture 802.11i
[93] to the inter-provider case. The third approach, Security-Context Transfer (SCT) with
key derivation, generalizes the solutions currently used to support intra-provider handover,
e.g., in GSM [60], UMTS [11], CDMA2000 [13], and adapted to WLAN ([129, 185]) to the
inter-provider case. In this approach, the master session key used after handover is derived
from previously used master session keys. Although the use of SCT with key derivation has
previously been suggested in the inter-provider context by [162, 75, 186, 27, 177], none of this
previous work explicitly addresses subsequent handover or distinguishes between handover
with HN and FN as anchor. The fourth security solution finally combines the second solution
with the efficiency advantages of the third and uses SCT with key agreement. As opposed
to SCT with key derivation, the master key used after handover is agreed upon based on
the credentials exchanged between MD and HN as part of the pre-registration process and
is not derived from any previously used master session keys.
In a brief discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the above four security
solutions, we identify methods using security-context transfers during handover as the most
promising approach to meet the efficiency requirements that seamless handover impose.
Outline. In Section 3.1, different types of handover procedures are modeled. This is
followed by a description of the security challenge on inter-provider handover in Section 3.2
and a brief discussion on different solutions in Section 3.2.1 to Section 3.2.4. Section 3.3.1
details the relation between our model procedures and the aforementioned work in this
field. In Section 3.3.2, we provide a more detailed treatment of the related work on security
solutions for inter-provider handover.
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3.1 Model Procedures
A handover procedure consists of several phases. In the first phase, a handover reason is
detected. The obvious reason to initiate a handover procedure for a mobile device is that
MD moves out of the transmission range of the currently serving NAP. This handover reason
is a so-called imperative reason (see [187]), as the handover must take place in order not
to loose connectivity. Other handover reasons are so-called alternative handover reasons.
An alternative handover reason indicates that a handover is desirable but not required for
a seamless use of service. An alternative handover reason, for example, occurs if a mobile
device moves into the range of a network access point that is preferable to the current one
because of a stronger signal while the currently serving NAP is still available. Another
alternative reason to initiate handover is load balancing: MD is in the transmission range
of more than one NAP (cell intersection or overlay) and the currently serving NAP is
overloaded. A third example for an alternative handover reason is somewhat opposite to
load balancing: a mobile device aims to be connected to the closest network access point
to save battery power by reducing the necessary control power (see [184]).
The detection of a handover reason is based on a so-called handover algorithm. An
overview on basic handover algorithms can be found in [83]. A handover algorithm takes
collected measurement data as input and outputs whether or not a handover should take
place. This measurement data typically includes the currently received signal strength, the
current load on the serving NAP, the signal to interference ration, the bit-error rate, the
carrier interference ration, etc. [187]. Throughout the remainder of this work, the actual
handover algorithm is of no interest. We just assume that at some point a handover reason
is detected by some specific handover algorithm.
Once a handover reason is detected, a new NAP, the destination NAP is selected in
the second phase of a handover procedure. The choice of the destination NAP typically
depends on the signal strength of the NAPs and whether these NAPs have the free capacity
to serve MD after handover. We do not further specify the non-security-related part of this
decision process in this work.
In the third and last phase, the execution phase, MD disassociates from its currently
serving NAP, the source NAP of the handover, and connects to the destination NAP. The
execution phase also includes the mobility management on the network side that guarantees
the re-routing of incoming and outgoing data traffic over the new network access point.
Handover procedures can be classified into mobile-initiated, network-initiated and
mobile-assisted handover procedures. In a mobile-initiated handover procedure, MD detects
handover reasons, while in the network-initiated case, the currently serving network detects
handover reasons. In a mobile-assisted handover procedure, MD provides the network with
measurement data on the reception level of surrounding NAPs. The network processes this
measurement data in order to determine handover reasons. Depending on who selects the
destination network and initiates the execution of the handover, handover procedures are
further classified into mobile-controlled and network-controlled handover (see [116]). For a
detailed discussion of network-controlled versus mobile-controlled handover procedures, we
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refer to [184]. It is, however, important to note that security issues are not addressed in
[184].
Independent of the type of initiation and the control type, handover procedures are
further classified into hard and soft procedures.2 In hard handover procedures, MD can
only be connected to one NAP at a time. In the execution phase, MD consequently first
disassociates from the source NAP before it associates with the destination NAP, thus
causing a disruption of the incoming and outgoing data traffic. In order to provide seamless
use of service, hard handover procedures have to be fast, such that the disruption does not
result in a disruption of the services used. In contrast, in a soft handover procedure MD,
associates with several NAPs at a time. In the execution phase, MD is first connected to
the destination NAP only, then connected to both the source and the destination NAP for
some time before it disconnects from the source NAP. Soft handover procedures have the
advantage that data traffic to and from the mobile device can be sent to and received from
both the source and the destination NAP, as long as the mobile device is connected to both
of them. Consequently, soft handover procedures can easily support uninterrupted service
use. Hard handover procedures are, for example, standardized for GSM and IEEE 802.11
[60, 91, 93], while soft handover procedures are standardized for UMTS and CDMA2000
[11, 13].
In this section, we present a new model for the various types of inter-provider handover
procedures that explicitly models subsequent handover. In particular, we model hard and
soft mobile-assisted, network-initiated handover procedures based on [60, 11, 17, 13], as
well as hard and soft mobile-initiated, mobile-controlled handover procedures based on
[176, 182, 127]. To facilitate the reference to the modeled handover procedure types we,
throughout the remainder of this work refer to mobile-assisted, network-controlled handover
procedures simply as network-initiated handover procedures and to mobile-initiated, mobile-
controlled procedures simply as mobile-initiated handover procedures. In both the network-
initiated and the mobile-initiated cases, we start by modeling first-order handover from HN
to a foreign network (FN). Then, we model subsequent handover with HN as the anchor
network. Each case ends with the modeling of first-order and subsequent handover with
FN as the anchor network.
Figure 3.2 illustrates an inter-provider handover in general. A mobile device is currently
associated with one of the network access points of some source network SRC and uses a
service. When a handover reason is detected, the mobile device moves out of the coverage
range of SRC and the mobile device is handed over to some DEST. SRC and DEST support
the same technology but are operated by different network providers.
2Some authors (e.g., [184, 116]) use the terms make-before-break to denote a soft handover and break-
before-make to denote hard handover.
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Figure 3.2: Inter-Provider Handover Scenario
3.1.1 Hard and Soft Network-Initiated Handover
3.1.1.1 First-Order Handover with HN as Anchor
Figure 3.3 models a network-initiated first-order handover procedure of MD from its HN
to some DEST. In a network-initiated handover, the network collects measurement data
related to the quality of the link layer connection between MD and the currently serving
NAP. This measurement data typically includes the currently received signal strength, the
current load on the serving NAP, the signal to interference ration, the bit-error rate, the
carrier interference ration, etc. [187].3
While the network may measure parts of the data itself, MD can also assist in this
task (mobile-assisted handover). In this case, the mobile device measures its reception level
of the surrounding network access points, including the currently serving one. It sends
measurement reports to HN and the HN processes these reports.
Based on the collected and processed measurement data, HN detects a handover reason.
The detection of a handover reason is based on a so-called handover algorithm. An overview
on basic handover algorithms can be found in [83]. A handover algorithm takes the collected
measurement data as input and outputs whether or not a handover should take place.
Throughout the remainder of this work, the actual handover algorithm is of no interest. We
3The measurement data may also include some estimate on the current location of the mobile device. If
the network component collecting the measurement data has knowledge of the network topologies of its own
and the surrounding networks, then knowing the location of the mobile device means knowing whether or
not the mobile device is in the transmission range of other network access points of the home network or
foreign networks.
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Figure 3.3: First-Order Network-Initiated Handover Procedure with HN as Anchor
just assume that HN at some point detects a handover reason using some provider-specific
handover algorithm.
HN subsequently uses the collected measurement data to generate an ordered list L =
{DEST1, . . . ,DESTn} of candidate destination networks for handover.4 We do not make
any assumptions about the algorithm HN uses to determine the list of candidate networks
here. We only assume the existence of such an algorithm. As long as MD receives a NAP
belonging to HN with sufficient quality and with free capacity, HN itself will be DEST1 in
L and HN initiates an intra-provider handover. However, in this chapter we concentrate on
inter-provider handover. Intra-provider handover will briefly be discussed in Section 6.3. In
this section, we assume that all destination networks in L are foreign networks. HN chooses
the candidate destination network DEST1 in L and sends a handover request to it. This
handover request includes the identities of MD, its HN and DEST1. It may also include a
list of allowed subsequent handover destinations and other security-related information.
Upon receiving a handover request, DEST1 decides whether or not to accept the han-
dover request and answers accordingly with a positive or negative handover response.
If DEST1’s handover response is positive, HN sends a handover command to the mobile
device commanding handover to DEST1. If the handover response of DEST1 is negative, HN
tries the candidate destination network DEST2 from its list until it receives a positive answer
from the i-th candidate network DESTi in L. HN then selects DESTi as the next destination
network DEST and sends a handover command to MD including DEST = DESTi’s identity.
If none of the destination networks in L sends a positive handover response, a handover is
4This list also specifies the network access points in these candidate destination networks.
72 Chapter 3. Handover—Model Procedures and Security Solutions
not possible and HN has to drop the connection.
In the case of a hard handover procedure, MD disassociates from HN as soon as it re-
ceives a handover command to a destination network DEST. In a hard handover procedure,
HN typically keeps resources (for example, a channel) allocated for MD until it receives a
handover complete message from the destination network, indicating successful handover.
MD can fall back to its old NAP in HN if it is still in its range. As soon as MD has suc-
cessfully associated with DEST, DEST sends a handover complete message to HN. If the
association fails, MD tries to re-associate with HN.
In the case of a soft handover procedure, MD upon reception of a handover command
first associates with DEST. MD disassociates from HN if and only if it has successfully
associated with DEST.
In order to model as technology-independent as possible, we do not further specify which
components within HN or DEST control the handover procedure.
In the following section, we generalize the above handover procedure to subsequent
handover and handover after roaming.
3.1.1.2 k-th-order Handover with HN as Anchor
A mobile device has established a connection with its HN and started to use a service of some
service provider. MD has subsequently been handed over from HN = SRC1 to a destination
network DEST1 by means of the first-order handover procedure described in the last section.
After k−1 subsequent handover from SRCi (2 ≤ i ≤ k−1) to DESTi (2 ≤ i ≤ k−1), MD is
connected to the destination network DESTk−1 of the (k− 1)-st-order handover. DESTk−1
is the source network SRCk of the k-th-order handover. A new authentication between HN
and MD resets the handover chain to HN = SRC1.
We distinguish between two control types for subsequent handover procedures with HN
as anchor: HN-controlled handover and SRC-controlled handover. These control types
reflect different types of handover agreements between the wireless access networks.
HN-Controlled Subsequent Handover. In an HN-controlled k-th-order handover, the
source network SRCk determines that a handover reason occurred and informs HN. HN
selects the candidate destination network and initiates and authorizes the actual handover.
MD accepts handover commands that originate from its HN only. A handover to DESTk
can take place if HN and DESTk have a handover agreement. It is HN that assures DESTk
that MD is authorized to be handed over to DESTk. In the case of commercial providers,
HN’s authorization provides DESTk with the guarantee that HN will reimburse DESTk for
its service provisioning.
Figure 3.4 details an HN-controlled k-th-order handover procedure. The source network
SRCk of a k-th-order handover sends a handover indication to HN as soon as it detects
a handover reason. SRCk includes the necessary measurement data in the indication to
give HN the power to process it. HN proceeds as in the first-order handover case with
the generation of a list of candidate destination networks and sends handover requests
to them. Upon receiving a positive handover response from one of them, HN sends a
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handover command to SRCk including the identity of the selected DESTk. SRCk forwards
the handover command to MD.
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Figure 3.4: HN-Controlled Subsequent Handover
In the case of HN-controlled handover, the handover agreement between two providers
P1 and P2 consists of two parts, one that regulates handover of P1 pre-registered MDs to
P2 (HN = P1, DEST = P2) and one that regulates handover of P2 pre-registered MDs to
P1 (HN = P2, DEST = P1).
SRC-Controlled Subsequent Handover. In SRC-controlled k-th-order handover, the
source network SRCk determines the handover reason, selects the candidate destination
network, and initiates and authorizes the actual handover. A handover of MD from SRCk
to DESTk can take place if SRCk and DESTk have a handover agreement. Note that in
the case of an SRC-controlled handover, the handover agreement between two providers
regulates handover of any MD from SRCk to DESTk such that the agreement is not re-
stricted to their respective pre-registered MDs. The HN of MD is only involved in the
k-th-order handover procedure if it is the source or destination network. Consequently,
HN delegates the control of a second-order handover to DEST1 = SRC2, SRC2 delegates
control of a third-order handover to DEST2 = SRC3, and so on. MD is assured of SRCk’s
authorization of the handover as soon as it receives a handover command message from
SRCk. Similarly, SRCk’s authorization of the handover is assured to DESTk in the form
of a handover request. In the case of commercial network providers, SRCk’s authorization
includes its guarantee to reimburse DESTk for service provisioning. For a mobile device, a
SRC-controlled handover implies transitive trust in the network providers: MD trusts HN’s
authorization by means of the initial authentication between MD and HN. Subsequently,
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MD trusts handover commands received from HN = SRC1, DEST1 = SRC2 and so on.
An SRC-controlled subsequent handover procedure can be described by replacing HN
with SRCk in Figure 3.3. In the SRC-controlled case, SRCk determines the list of candidate
destination networks itself. SRCk sends a handover request for MD to the candidate des-
tination networks and commands MD to associate with DESTk upon receiving a positive
handover response from a destination network.
3.1.1.3 FN as Anchor
On inter-provider handover after roaming, MD first roams to a foreign network FN and
starts to use a service via FN. The last authentication and key agreement has taken place
while MD was connected to FN. If a handover reason is detected by FN, a first-order inter-
provider handover with FN as anchor is initiated. The selection of the destination network
and the initiation of the first-order handover itself can be controlled either by FN or by HN.
HN-Controlled Handover. In the HN-controlled case, HN selects the destination net-
work, and initiates and authorizes the actual handover. An HN-controlled first-order han-
dover with FN as anchor can be described by replacing SRCk with FN in Figure 3.4.
FN-Controlled Handover. In the FN-controlled case, FN selects the destination net-
work, and initiates and authorizes the actual first-order handover. An FN-controlled first-
order handover with FN as anchor can be illustrated by replacing HN with FN in Figure 3.3.
FN-Controlled Subsequent Handover. Subsequent handover with FN as anchor re-
sult in a chain of subsequently serving networks: FN = AN = SRC1,DEST1 = SRC2, . . . .
A full (roaming) authentication between MD and FN or between MD and any other FN or
HN resets the handover chain.
Subsequent handover with FN as anchor can be SRC-controlled, HN-controlled, or FN-
controlled. Subsequent FN-controlled procedures with FN as anchor can be described by
replacing HN with FN in Figure 3.4. In this control type, FN selects each subsequent
destination network, and initiates and authorizes the actual subsequent handover.
HN-Controlled Subsequent Handover. Subsequent HN-controlled handover with FN
as anchor are the same as subsequent handover with HN as anchor and can be described by
the same procedure (see Figure 3.4). In this case, the source network SRC1 of a first-order
handover is FN. HN selects the destination network DESTk of a subsequent handover, and
initiates and authorizes the actual handover.
SRC-Controlled Subsequent Handover. Subsequent SRC-controlled handover with
FN as anchor are executed in exactly the same way as subsequent SRC-controlled handover
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with HN as anchor and can be modeled by replacing HN with SRCk in Figure 3.4. SRCk se-
lects the destination network DESTk of a subsequent handover, and initiates and authorizes
the actual handover.
3.1.1.4 Summary and Generalized Procedure:
In summary, we distinguish three different types of handover control: HN-controlled han-
dover procedures, SRC-controlled handover procedures, and AN-controlled handover pro-
cedures.
HN-Controlled Handover. In an HN-controlled handover, HN selects the destination
network and initiates and authorizes each k-th-order handover (k ≥ 1).
SRC-Controlled Handover. In an SRC-controlled handover, the source network SRCk
of a k-th-order (k ≥ 1) handover selects the destination network DESTk and initiates and
authorizes the actual handover. Consequently, HN delegates the control of a first-order
handover to AN (where AN is HN or any FN that has a roaming agreement with HN). AN
= SRC1 delegates the control of a second-order handover to DEST1 = SRC2 and so on.
AN-Controlled Handover. In an AN-controlled handover, all k-th-order handover (k ≥
1) are controlled by AN. AN selects the destination network DESTk and initiates and
authorizes the actual handover. Consequently, in an AN-controlled handover, HN controls
subsequent handover with HN as anchor and FN controls subsequent handover with FN as
anchor.
Throughout the rest of this work, we assume that all handover procedures specified for a
wireless technology are of exactly one control type. That is, we do not study the effect of
the subsequent use of handover procedures of different control types.
The different control and anchor types can be summarized by the general network-
initiated handover procedure illustrated in Figure 3.5. In this figure, HCN stands for Han-
dover Controlling Network and is to be replaced by SRC, HN, or AN, depending on who
controls the handover.
3.1.2 Hard and Soft Mobile-Initiated Handover
3.1.2.1 HN as Anchor—First-Order Handover
In the mobile-initiated case, MD detects a handover reason and selects the destination
network. There are two different approaches to notify HN of the upcoming handover. Either
MD sends a notification message to HN before it associates with the destination network
or DEST sends a notification message to HN after MD associates with it. Figures 3.6 and
3.7 illustrate these two cases.
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Figure 3.5: General Network-Initiated Handover Procedure
In both cases, the handover procedure is initiated when MD detects a handover reason.
MD measures the signal strength and other quality-of-service indicating parameters of its
currently serving NAP, as well as other available NAPs. As a result, MD generates an
ordered list of candidate destination networks by an algorithm we do not further specify
here. HN can assist MD in generating the list of candidate networks. For example, HN may
send a list of candidate destination networks to MD at any time before a handover reason
is detected.
In case MD notifies HN of the upcoming handover (Figure 3.6), MD sends a handover-
indication message to HN including the selected DEST’s identity right after selecting DEST
from the list of candidate destination networks. HN decides whether or not to allow the
handover and indicates its authorization to DEST in the form of a handover-indication
message that includes the identity of MD.
In the case of a hard handover procedure, MD then disassociates from HN and tries to
associate with DEST. After successful association, MD sends a handover request to DEST
and DEST answers with a handover-response message indicating its decision to MD.
In the case of a soft handover procedure, MD disassociates from HN only after receiving
a positive handover response from DEST.
In the soft and hard handover cases, MD sends a handover request to the next destination
network in its list if the handover response of DEST is negative. If none of the candidate
networks in L sends a positive handover response, no handover is possible and MD drops
the connection with HN.
In case HN is notified by DEST (Figure 3.7), MD tries to associate with the first desti-
nation network of its list of candidates. MD then sends a handover-indication message to
DEST. If DEST is not willing to accept the handover, it immediately sends back a negative
handover response to MD. Otherwise, DEST forwards MD’s handover indication to HN.
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Figure 3.6: Mobile-Initiated, HN as Anchor, First-Order, HN Notified by MD
HN replies positively or negatively in its handover-request message to DEST and DEST in
turn sends its handover response to MD.
In a hard handover procedure, MD disassociates from HN before associating with DEST.
In a soft handover procedure, MD disassociates from HN only after receiving a positive
handover response from DEST.
3.1.2.2 HN as Anchor—Subsequent Handover
As in the network-initiated case, subsequent handover with HN as anchor network can
either be controlled by HN, in which case HN is engaged in every handover procedure, or
be SRC-controlled. In the latter case, a subsequent handover procedure can be illustrated
by replacing HN with SRCk in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.6.
In an HN-controlled handover, DESTk sends an additional handover indication to HN,
to which HN replies with a positive or negative handover request.
3.1.2.3 FN as Anchor—Subsequent Handover
As in the network-initiated case, a subsequent handover with FN as anchor can either
be HN-controlled, FN-controlled, or SRC-controlled. The source network SRCk forwards
MD’s handover notification to HCN or DESTk notifies HCN after MD and DESTk have
associated.
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3.1.2.4 Generalized Mobile-Initiated Procedures
As in the network-initiated case, all of the aforementioned procedure types can be described
in a general way as illustrated in Figures 3.8 and 3.9. HCN is to be replaced by HN, SRC,
or AN, depending on who controls the handover.
Both types of mobile-initiated inter-provider handover procedures have previously been
suggested for first-order inter-provider handover. Oyoqui et al. in [135] present a handover
procedure in which HN is notified by MD, while Mishra et al. in [127] and Xhafa et al.
in [182] use handover procedures in which HN is notified by DEST. However, none of the
previous work generalizes the procedures to the subsequent handover case and identifies the
possible handover control types.
3.2 The Security Challenge and Solutions
The security challenge on a k-th-order handover procedure is that MD and DESTk have
to be mutually assured of HCN’s timely authorization of the handover instance, negotiate
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Figure 3.8: Mobile-Initiated k-th-order Handover, HCN Notified by DESTk
a cipher suite csk = (kek, emk, imk) to be used after handover, and establish a master
session key Kk from which they can derive data-protection keys IK k and EK k to protect
the connection between MD and EIPEDESTk .
As such, the security challenges upon handover and roaming are very similar, with the
exception that HCN authorizes handover instances while roaming instances are authorized
by HN. However, handover procedures have to additionally fulfill very tight efficiency re-
quirements, arising from the following facts:
1. Services, in particular real-time services like voice connections or video streaming,
are sensitive to disruptions such that services have to be reestablished after longer
disruptions. Providing seamless real-time services is the most promising application
of handover procedures.
2. Users are sensitive to short disruptions of the services they use. While disruptions
of services like an HTTP connection can be acceptable for a user, disruptions of
voice connections and music or video streaming are not acceptable and are critical
for user acceptance of these services. For handover procedures of, for example, voice
connections, the ITU advises a disruption time5 of less then 50 ms [69].
3. In order to provide seamless service use, a handover procedure has to be completed
before MD leaves the cell of NAPSRCk . How fast a handover procedure for a given
5Here, disruption time refers to the time between the last frame received over the source NAP and the first
frame received over the destination NAP. A disruption like this only occurs on hard handover procedures.
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Figure 3.9: Mobile-Initiated k-th-order Handover, HCN Notified by MD
wireless technology has to be thus also depends on the size of the cells and their
intersections, as well as the speed with which MD moves through the cells.
These efficiency requirements call for solutions of the security challenge on inter-provider
handover that minimize the introduced service disruption (hard handover) as well as the
overall handover latency6 (hard and soft handover procedures).
In the following sections, we present and discuss four different security solutions. The
first one is based on a new run of an authentication and key agreement between MD and
DESTk during handover and is discussed mainly to motivate the need for new solutions.
The second one generalizes the so-called pre-authentication method suggested in [137] for
intra-provider handover in WLAN to the inter-provider case.7 The third solution, Security-
Context Transfer (SCT) with key derivation, generalizes the solutions currently used to
support intra-provider handover in GSM [60], UMTS [11], CDMA2000 [13], and WLAN
[129, 185] to the inter-provider case. Although the use of SCT with key derivation has pre-
viously been suggested in the inter-provider context by [162, 75, 186, 27, 177], none of this
previous work explicitly addresses subsequent handover or distinguishes between handover
with HN and FN as anchor. Consequently, none of them identifies and discusses the dif-
ferences between HN-controlled, AN-controlled, and SRC-controlled subsequent handover
that we present here. Finally, the fourth security solution combines the second solution with
6The overall handover latency is the time between the detection of a handover reason and the completion
of the handover.
7This solution was included in the new security architecture IEEE 802.11i [93] for WLAN.
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the efficiency advantages of the third and uses SCT with key agreement, and generalizing
previous intra-provider solutions ([93, 136]) in a way that, to the best of our knowledge,
has not been suggested so far.
3.2.1 Full Authentication Between MD and DESTk via NAPDESTk
MD and DESTk negotiate a security suite, authenticate each other, and agree upon a master
session key in the same way as upon roaming before the mobility management redirects data
traffic to MD over NAPDESTk .
Figure 3.10 illustrates how this solution can be integrated into a network-initiated han-
dover procedure. On association during handover, MD and DESTk negotiate the security
suite to use and then mutually authenticate each other by means of the negotiated authen-
tication protocol (r)ak, agree upon a master session key Kk by means of the key agreement
(r)kak, establish fresh data-protection keys by means of kek, and subsequently use the
agreed-upon encryption and integrity-protection mechanisms emk and imk to protect data
and control traffic exchanged between them. In the remainder of this section, we refer to
this sequence of protocols and processes as MD and DESTk establish a new secure connec-
tion. Note that in this security solution, it is HN that authorizes the handover as part of
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Figure 3.10: Full Authentication via DESTk in the Network-Initiated Case
the initial authentication. However, the selection of the next destination network DESTk
of a k-th-order handover and the initiation of the actual handover can either be controlled
by HN, AN, or SRCk.
Upon a mobile-initiated handover, the establishment of a new secure connection can be
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integrated into the association between MD and DESTk the same way as detailed for the
network-initiated case. Therefore, we do not explicitly detail the mobile-initiated case here.
In case a technology supports hard handover procedures only, the establishment of the
new secure connection via NAPDESTk has to take place after MD has disassociated from
SRCk. Consequently, the time required to establish a new secure connection causes a
service disruption. As mentioned above, disruptions of real-time traffic are recommended
to stay below 50 ms. However, authentication protocols of state-of-the-art wireless access
technologies require several seconds. For example, in GSM, MD is required to be able to
send an authentication response no more than one second after receiving an authentication
request [61]. A GSM authentication and key agreement thus takes more than one second to
complete. As a consequence, the above method is commonly assumed to be too inefficient
to support seamless use of real-time services in combination with hard handover procedures
(see, e.g., [27, 177, 162]).
In case a technology supports soft handover procedures, MD can be associated with
NAPSRCk and NAPDESTk at the same time. Consequently, on soft handover, the establish-
ment of a new secure connection can take place via NAPDESTk before MD disassociates from
NAPSRCk such that it does not add to the disruption time. Even in the soft handover case,
a secure connection has to be established as long as MD is in the intersection of the cells
of NAPDESTk and NAPSRCk . Consequently, the intersection between the cells of NAPDESTk
and NAPSRCk has to be sufficiently large and MD has to move sufficiently slow through the
intersection.
As cell sizes and intersections differ greatly between wireless technologies, providers, and
even environmental circumstances, a general statement on the relation between the size of
the cell intersection, the velocity of MD, and the overall handover delay, is not possible.8
Whenever the establishment of a new secure connection in the above described way is
possible, the connection between MD and DESTk after handover is protected in exactly the
same way as on roaming to DESTk. The security of the new connection does not depend
at all on the security of the connection before handover. The HN has as much control over
each handover instance as the initial authentication and key agreement allow for and as
much influence on the security-suite negotiation as upon roaming.
The only new security threats imposed by handover procedures that use a full authen-
tication over NAPDESTk compared to roaming and accessing HN are new Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks that exploit the handover messages and handover-specific behavior of MD,
DEST, HCN, and SRC.
9
In summary, establishing a new security context via NAPDESTk is a good choice to
secure soft inter-provider handover in case MDs can be expected to move with low velocity.
However, in some use cases, like, mobile and video telephony, or video streaming in public
transportation or cars, MDs move at relatively high speed. In order to guarantee seamless
8For example, assume MD takes a path of length 100 m through the intersection of two UMTS cells
operated by different providers and MD moves at 100 km/h, then MD stays in the cell intersection for only
3.6 s.
9The attacks are described in more detail in Section 4.3 (A*-26-A*-27).
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handover for these use cases, careful planning of cell intersection sizes is required in order
to guarantee large enough cell intersections for successful soft handover. Large intersections
of cells imply employment of more network access points. Whether or not the increase in
equipment cost and network topology planning is worth the complete independence of the
security mechanisms has to be carefully decided.
In addition, some current wireless technologies (e.g., GSM, IEEE 802.11 [60, 92]) do not
support soft handover procedures and consequently cannot support seamless service use if
the establishment of a new security context via NAPDESTk is used.
3.2.2 Pre-Authentication Between MD and DESTk via NAPSRCk
A second method that uses a full authentication and key agreement is to run these protocols
between MD and DESTk via NAPSRCk . In this case, SRCk forwards all traffic related to
security suite negotiation, authentication, and key agreement between MD and DESTk,
at some time before the handover execution. A pre-authentication like this one can be
just in time, that is, right before HCN sends a handover request to DESTk. However, it
can also take place pro-actively, before a handover reason is detected. A pro-active pre-
authentication has the advantage that it does not add to the overall latency of the handover.
In order to allow for pro-active pre-authentication, upcoming handover events have to be
predicted and candidate destination networks have to be determined in advance. Although
this problem is out of scope of this thesis, we will briefly discuss it in Section 6.4. Figure 3.11
exemplifies how this pre-establishment of a new security context can be integrated in a
network-initiated handover procedure. Note that in this security solution, HN authorizes
the handover by means of the initial authentication between MD and DESTk. However,
the selection of DESTk and the initiation of the actual handover may be controlled by HN,
AN, or DESTk.
In the mobile-initiated case, pre-authentication-based establishment of a new security
context can be integrated into the procedure in the same way as on network-initiated han-
dover. We, therefore, again do not detail the mobile-initiated case here.
The pre-authentication-based solution is limited by the following factors. First, SRCk
has to forward all traffic related to security-suite negotiation and authentication and key
agreement between DESTk and MD. This traffic has to be encapsulatable in messages
exchanged between SRCk and MD. This can be difficult if the authentication and key-
agreement protocols for a technology are implemented below a common network layer,
i.e., as part of the MAC layer (see Section 1.2.2.7). The authentication and key-agreement
protocols may then have to be adapted in order to support pre-authentication via SRCk.
Second, the execution of the authentication and key-agreement protocols have to be
possible without causing the currently used data-protection keys to be replaced by the new
ones immediately. Only this guarantees that the keys used before and after handover do
not coincide.
Third, in case the pre-authentication is to be carried out just in time, the cell intersection
has to be large enough to allow for a pre-authentication before MD leaves the cell. The
required size of the intersection again depends on the velocity of MD, as well as the path
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Figure 3.11: Pre-Authentication via NAPSRCk in the Network-Initiated Case
it takes through the intersection. The implications of this restriction have already been
discussed in the last section.
Furthermore, carrying out the pre-authentication before a handover reason is detected
may result in many unnecessary authentications that put an unnecessary load on both
networks, as well as on MD. This problem has recently been addressed by integrating
mechanisms that more precisely predict the NAP for the next handover using movement
patterns of users (e.g., [138], [103], [102], [129]).
In summary, pre-authentication via SRCk is only applicable if the authentication and
key agreement can be tunneled between MD and DESTk over NAPSRCk . Whether or not this
is possible has to be determined for each technology. It is, however, important to note that
in many current wireless technologies authentication and key agreement are implemented
below the network layer, or at least involve the MAC layer which makes a tunneling over
SRCk difficult. Consequently, pre-authentication via SRCk may be a viable solution as new
technologies evolve, but cannot easily be used if current technologies, such as GSM, UMTS,
CDMA2000, WLAN, or Bluetooth, are involved.
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3.2.3 Security-Context Transfer with Key Derivation
The advantage of the two solutions discussed so far is that the data-protection keys used
to protect the data and control traffic before and after handover are derived from different
master keys. Knowledge of the master key used before handover does not reveal any infor-
mation on the master key used after handover and vice-versa.10 The master key used after
handover is as strong as if it was established upon roaming to DESTk. The security suite to
use are negotiated in the same way as on roaming. Consequently, HN has as much influence
over each handover instance and on the choice of the security suite as the respective roaming
procedures allow for.
As opposed to the two solutions discussed so far, in a solution based on SCT with key
derivation, MD and DESTk are not assured of each other’s authorization by a new, full run
of a authentication protocol and do not agree upon a new master key Kk by means of a
new run of a roaming key agreement. Instead, MD and DESTk are assured of each other’s
authorization indirectly: HCN provides DESTk with a master key Kk derived from some
previously used master session key by transferring Kk to DESTk in a security context during
handover. MD derives this master key in the same way. By proof of possession of the same
master key Kk, MD and DESTk are assured of HCN’s authorization of the handover.
Note that in this chapter we do not further specify what information is included in the
security context Sk transferred on a k-th order handover, except the fact that a master key
Kk is part of the context.
SCT with key derivation is used to accelerate intra-provider handover in mobile phone
networks (see, e.g., [60, 11]) and has recently been suggested, in the WLAN context as well
[129, 185]. In other recent work [162, 75, 186, 27, 177], SCT with key derivation has been
generalized to the inter-provider and even to the inter-system handover case. However,
some of the above-mentioned work [186, 27, 129, 185] concentrates on a specific technology
and none of the aforementioned work explicitly addresses the subsequent handover problem.
We close this gap by explicitly generalizing SCT with key derivation to the three identi-
fied subsequent handover control types: HN-controlled, AN-controlled, and SRC-controlled
handover. The relation between our SCT model and related work on SCT is further detailed
in Section 3.3.2.
We start by modeling SCT with key derivation for first-order network-initiated handover
with HN as anchor network and then proceed with subsequent handover including first-order
and subsequent handover with FN as anchor, i.e., handover after roaming.
It is interesting to note that in the context transfer case, the differences between hard and
soft handover do not play any role. In both cases, the security-context transfer is executed
in exactly the same way. It is, therefore, sufficient to study only one type of procedure. We
describe the hard handover cases, as SCT to date is the most promising solution to provide
seamless handover in wireless technologies supporting only hard handover.
10To be more precise, the master keys used before and after handover do not reveal any more information
on each other than the master keys used on two subsequent roaming instances.
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3.2.3.1 The Network-Initiated Case—First-Order with HN as Anchor
Prior to a first-order handover with HN as anchor network, MD and HN establish a con-
nection as described in Figure 1.10. During the connection establishment, MD and HN ne-
gotiate the security suite (a0, ka0, ke0, em0, im0) to use, authenticate each other by means
of the authentication protocol a0, and agree upon the master session key K0 by means of
ka0. From K0 they derive and establish data-protection keys IK 0 and EK 0 by means of
the negotiated key-establishment process ke0. They use the keys EK 0 and IK 0 as input to
the encryption mechanism em0 and the integrity-protection mechanism im0 to secure the
control and data traffic between MD and EIPEHN.
The security suite and the master session key agreed upon between HN and MD is
referred to as the initial security context throughout the remainder of this work.
Definition 3.2.1 The initial security context S0 consists of the master session key K0
and the initial security suite ss0:
S0 = (K0, a0, ka0, ke0, em0, im0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ss0
)
For the security-context transfer with key derivation, MD and HN additionally have
to negotiate a key-derivation function kd0. MD and HN can either fix kd0 during the
pre-registration process or negotiate kd0 during connection establishment along with the
security suite ss0.
11 The key-derivation function kd0 takes the master key K0 and optionally
other secret or public information as input. It outputs a master key K1 that, in the intra-
system case we discuss here, is of the same length as K0. Upon handover, HN transfers a
security context S1 to DEST that includes the derived master session key K1. We do not
specify any further content of S1 at this point K1 is the main component of state-of-the-art
SCT-based solutions.
Additionally, a cipher suite cs1 to use after handover must be negotiated. This ci-
pher suite consists of a key-establishment process ke1, as well as encryption and integrity-
protection mechanisms em1 and im1. The security mechanisms em1 and im1 are used in
connection with keys IK 1 and EK 1 derived from K1 with the help of ke1.
As K1 is derived from K0, which has already been used to derive the data-protection
keys EK 0 and IK 0, the security of the connection between HN and MD before handover
and the security of the connection between MD and DEST after handover depend on each
other. We will study the impact of SCT with key derivation in detail in the next chapter. It
is, however, important to note at this point that the cipher suite negotiation upon handover
should not only involve MD and DEST, but also HN.
We integrate four optional security-mechanism negotiation phases into our network-
initiated handover procedure model. This phases will be used to integrate our new security-
mechanism negotiation methods suggested in Chapter 5. In state-of-the-art handover solu-
11In previously suggested SCT-based solutions (e.g., [129, 162]), MD and HN do not negotiate kd0 but
agree upon a particular key-derivation function during pre-registration. We ad the additional optional
negotiation into our model to gain more flexibility.
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tions MD and DESTk negotiate the cipher suite to use after handover during association
and without interaction with HCN or SRCk.
In the negotiation phase (1), HN and MD may exchange information about what security
mechanisms they are willing to allow to be used after handover. In the negotiation phase
(2), HN and DEST exchange policy information and in negotiation phase (3), MD and HN
negotiate again dependent on the result of (2). Finally, in negotiation phase (4), MD and
DEST negotiate the security mechanisms to use after handover. Note that these negotiation
phases in the simplest case consist of single messages which can then be integrated with other
messages, like the handover command, the handover request, or the handover response. In
Section 5.1.1.5, we suggest several new security-mechanism negotiation methods.
Figure 3.12 describes a network-initiated first-order handover procedure with SCT of
MD from HN to DEST. After detecting a handover reason and generating an ordered list
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Figure 3.12: First-Order Network-Initiated Handover with HN as Anchor Network
L of candidate destination networks, HN sends a handover request to the first candidate
destination network DEST1. The handover request includes the identities of MD, HN, and
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DEST1, as well as the security context S1.
Upon receipt of the handover request, DEST1 decides whether to accept or refuse the
handover request. During this decision process, DEST1 checks, e.g., whether it has the
free capacity to serve MD or whether it is still in good standing with MD’s HN. DEST1
answers HN with a positive or negative handover response. If the handover response of
DEST1 is positive, HN and DEST1 enter the security-mechanism negotiation phase (2). If
the negotiation fails or the handover response of DEST1 was negative in the first place, HN
restarts the selection process with the next candidate destination network DEST2 in L.
If the negotiation with a destination network DESTi was successful, HN finally selects
DESTi as the destination network for the first-order handover (DESTi = DEST) and sends
a handover command to MD commanding handover to DEST. By sending the handover
command, HN implicitly assures MD of its authorization of the handover.
If none of the candidate destination networks sends a positive handover response, or all
negotiations fail, no inter-provider handover is possible and HN drops the connection with
MD.
After receipt of a handover command, MD and HN may again negotiate on the cipher
suite to use after handover. In case this negotiation fails, HN has to go back to the selection
phase and again select the next destination network in its ordered list L.
If the negotiation is successful, MD disassociates from HN. MD and DEST associate
with each other. They use the negotiated key-establishment process ke1 to establish the
data-protection keys EK 1 and IK 1 for the master session key K1. Note that the possession
of the same master session key K1 indirectly assures MD and DEST of HN’s authorization
of the handover. MD derives K1 from K0 by means of the key-derivation function kd0, while
DEST receives K1 as part of the security context S1 included in the handover request.
After successful association and key establishment, DEST sends the handover complete
message to HN. Upon receipt of this message, HN releases the resources reserved for MD.
In the case of successful handover, MD and EIPEDEST use the negotiated mechanisms
em1 and im1 to encrypt and integrity-protect data and control traffic between them.
3.2.3.2 The Network-Initiated Case—k-th-order Handover
A k-th-order handover procedure with SCT with key derivation, (1 ≤ k ≤ h) is illustrated
in Figure 3.13. This procedure model comprises first-order and subsequent handover with
HN or FN as anchor. MD and AN establish connection at some time before the k-th-order
handover procedure (1 ≤ k ≤ h) and establish the initial security context
S0 = ((r)a0, (r)ka0, ke0, em0, im0).
Later, MD is subsequently handed over from AN = SRC1 to DEST1, from DEST1 =
SRC2 to DEST2 and so on, until finally, MD is handed over to DESTk−1 = SRCk on the
(k−1)-st-order handover. Now, before the k-th handover, MD is connected to SRCk. SRCk
and MD use the security mechanisms emk−1 and imk−1 to protect data and control traffic
and derive the encryption key EK k−1 and IK k−1 from the master key Kk−1. If k ≤ 2,
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Figure 3.13: Network-Initiated Handover in the General Case
SRCk has received this master key Kk−1 during the (k − 1)-st-order handover included in
the security context Sk−1. If k = 1, SRC1 is AN and is in possession of K0 as a result of
(r)ak0.
If in this situation SRCk detects a handover reason, it sends a handover indication
message including the measurement data obtained from MD to HCN. HCN derives Kk and
generates the security context Sk. As will be detailed below, depending on the type of
handover control, the master key Kk can be derived from K0 or from Kk−1.
HCN sends a handover request including Sk to the first candidate destination network
DEST1k.
Upon receipt of the handover request, DEST1k decides whether to accept or refuse the
handover request and sends its handover response back to HCN. In the case of a positive
response, HCN and DEST1k enter the negotiation phase (2). In case the negotiation fails,
HCN restarts the selection process and sends a handover request to DEST2k.
If the negotiation with some DESTik is positive, HCN selects DEST
i
k as destination
network DESTk and sends a handover command to SRCk which forwards it to MD. The
handover command includes the identity of DESTk. Optionally, MD and HCN now enter
the negotiation phase (3).
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After receipt of the handover command, MD disassociates from SRCk and associates
with DESTik = DESTk. MD and DESTk optionally enter the last negotiation phase (4) on
the cipher suite to use after handover.
In the following sections, we briefly discuss the different handover control types.
HN-Controlled Handover. On HN-controlled subsequent handover, HN has full con-
trol over each handover instance. HN selects the next candidate destination network, and
initiates and authorizes the actual handover. DESTk receives a handover request from MD’s
HN. DESTk verifies the origin of a handover request as being a network with which it has a
handover agreement. DESTk is thereby assured of HN’s authorization of the handover in-
stance. In case of commercial providers, HN reimburses DESTk for the service provisioning
to its pre-registered MDs.
HN includes Kk in the security-context transfer. HN may generate Kk either from
Kk−1 or from K0. In the first case, HN computes Kk = kd0(Kk−1, []), where [] stands
for other optional inputs we do not further specify here. We will discuss key-derivation
functions in detail in Chapter 5. In the second case, Kk = kd0(K0, []). The former key
derivation has the advantage that only one master key Kk−1 at a time has to be stored
by MD, as opposed to two keys in the second case (K0 for the derivation of future master
keys and Kk−1 as the currently used master key). However, the second key-derivation
method has the advantage that depending on the properties of kd0, SRCk may not gain
any information on Kk.
12 If the first method is used by HN, SRCk can derive Kk from
Kk−1 and consequently unnecessarily obtain Kk. As will be detailed in Chapter 4, SRCk
could exploit this knowledge to impersonate MD to DESTk. We therefore assume that HN
derives Kk from K0 on HN-controlled handover.
In order to be able to derive the sequence of master keys, HN has to get into the posses-
sion of the initial master key K0. In case HN is the anchor network of the handover chain,
HN gets knowledge of the initial master key K0 during the initial (roaming) authentica-
tion and key agreement (see Chapter 2). If the anchor network is a foreign network, then
whether or not HN gets to know K0 during the initial authentication depends on the chosen
roaming key-agreement protocol. If HN does not get to know K0 during authentication,
FN has to transfer K0 along with the handover indication to HN over a secure channel on
the first-order handover from FN to DEST1.
AN-Controlled Handover. AN-controlled handover can be implemented in almost the
same way as HN-controlled handover. The main difference in the AN-controlled case lies in
the fact that the next destination network DESTk of a k-th-order handover is selected by
AN, which in turn may be HN or FN, and it is AN that initiates and authorizes the handover.
In case of commercial networks, HN reimburses AN and AN reimburses all subsequently
serving networks. AN derives the master key Kk and transfers it in the handover request
to DESTk. AN may derive Kk from K0 or from Kk−1. With the argument given above,
12We will show in Section 6.1 that this has an additional advantage on inter-system handover, as different
technologies typically require different master key lengths.
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we assume AN derives Kk from K0. As opposed to HN, AN gets to know K0 during any
type of initial roaming authentication protocol, such that no additional transfer of K0 is
necessary.
SRC-Controlled Handover. On SRC-controlled subsequent handover, HN delegates
the handover decision and grants authorization to AN during authentication. AN subse-
quently delegates the handover control and authorization to DEST1 = SRC2 and so on.
Handover is possible only if SRCk and DESTk have a handover agreement. This agreement
is not only valid for their own respective pre-registered users, but also for other MDs that
are currently connected to SRCk. In case of commercial networks, HN reimburses AN, AN
reimburses DEST1, DEST1 reimburses DEST2 and so on for service provisioning to MD.
On a k-th-order handover, SRCk sends a handover request to DESTk and DESTk verifies
that it originates from a SRCk with which it has a handover agreement. If this is the case,
DESTk assumes the handover request as being authorized by SRCk. SRCk includes the
security context with the master key Kk in the handover request.
SRCk derives the master key Kk from the previously used master key Kk−1 with the
help of a key-derivation function kdk−1. SRCk and MD negotiate kdk−1 as part of the
cipher-suite negotiation on the (k − 1)-st-order handover.
An obvious disadvantage of this key-derivation method is that SRCi (0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1)
gains knowledge of the master keys Ki+1, . . . ,Kk if no additional secret input parameters
to the key-derivation functions are used. Each subsequently serving network consequently
not only has to trust its predecessor, but all previously serving networks with which they
possibly do not have any handover agreement or any other type of prior trust relationship.
The same holds true for MD, as it is assured of AN’s authorization by HN to offer service
to MD during the initial authentication, but has to transitively trust all of the subsequently
serving networks.
An HN-assisted (or AN-assisted), SRC-controlled subsequent handover could be used
to thwart this threat. HN (or AN) sends a list of allowed handover destination networks to
MD during authentication. Upon subsequent SRC-controlled handover, MD verifies that
DESTi is included in the list of allowed destination networks. This ensures that handover
only take place if HN and SRCk, as well as HN and DESTk and SRCk and DESTk, have
handover agreements. As opposed to this on purely SRC-controlled handover, HN and
DESTk do not necessarily have to have a handover agreement.
In any type of handover control, SCT with key derivation makes the protection of
the connection before handover dependent on the protection of the connection after han-
dover and vice-versa. For a handover procedure within the network of one provider, a
key-derivation approach is acceptable as long as the EIPEs of the network support the
same security mechanisms.13 For inter-provider handover procedures, however, SCT with
key derivation calls for answers to the following questions:
13If the EIPEs of a network support different security mechanisms, the intra-provider case is identical
with inter-system handover within the same provider. This will be shown and explained in more detail in
Section 6.1.
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1. To what extent can DESTk trust the AN’s authentication of MD?
2. To what extent can DESTk trust the intractability of the master key received from
HCN?
3. To what extent can MD trust the intractability of the derived master key?
4. How should DESTk and MD negotiate the cipher suite to use after handover and how
can the policies of previously serving networks be respected during this negotiation?
Although SCT with key derivation has recently been extensively studied (e.g., [186, 177,
74, 185, 129, 55, 75, 162]), satisfying answers to the above questions are not easily found.
The threats arising from the dependency of the keys have not been adequately treated in
literature so far and are often underestimated (see [75, 111]). We will close this gap in
Chapter 4 and give an extensive threat analysis for SCT with key derivation.
SCT with key derivation does not add to the disruption time on hard handover. Con-
sequently, SCT-based solutions are the method of choice to support seamless handover
procedures in case the two aforementioned methods cannot be applied. In particular, SCT
with key derivation has to be used if seamless hard inter-provider handover is to be offered,
or high velocity of MDs has to be expected.
3.2.3.3 Differences in the Mobile-Initiated Case
SCT with key derivation is very similar for mobile-initiated and network-initiated handover.
For all types of handover control, HCN generates the security context on mobile-initiated
handover in the same way as on network-initiated handover. The two main differences
are that the negotiation of the cipher suite to use after handover takes place at different
points in the procedure and that in case HCN is notified by DESTk of the mobile-initiated
handover, DESTk pulls the security context from HCN, while in case HCN is notified by
MD, HCN pushes the security context to DESTk.
As in the network-initiated case, the security-context transfer on hard and soft handover
is very similar. We therefore describe hard handover procedures only.
HCN Notified by DESTk. The security-context transfer for a k-th-order mobile-
initiated handover where HCN is notified by DESTk is illustrated in Figure 3.14.
As opposed to the network-initiated case, HCN transfers the security context Sk to
DESTk in the handover request following HCN’s handover decision. HCN is assured by the
handover indication that MD in fact indicated handover to DESTk.
In Figure 3.14, we identify three phases in which MD, DESTk, and HCN can negotiate
the cipher suite to be used after handover. In phase (1), MD and DESTk negotiate as part
of the association process. In phase (2), HCN and DESTk negotiate and in phase (3), MD
and DESTk may again negotiate again depending on the results of the previous negotiation
phases.
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Figure 3.14: SCT on Mobile-Initiated k-th-order Handover, HCN Notified by DESTk
HCN Notified by MD. Security-context transfer for a k-th-order mobile-initiated han-
dover where HCN is notified by MD is illustrated in Figure 3.15.
HCN is notified by MD with the help of SRCk’s forwarding of the handover indication.
HCN transfers the security context Sk in the handover request to DESTk.
We identify three possible phases during the procedure in which MD, DESTk, SRCk,
and HCN can negotiate the cipher suite to use after handover. In phase (1), MD and SRCk
can negotiate before a handover reason is detected. In phase (2), HCN and DESTk can
negotiate right after HCN sends the handover request to DESTk. In phase (3), MD and
DESTk can negotiate after or as part of DESTk’s handover response.
3.2.3.4 Post-Authentication After SCT with Key Derivation
As we will detail in Chapter 4, SCT with key derivation brings up various threats for MD
SRCk, DESTk, HN and AN. One way to reduce the risk taken by related master keys is
using a post-authentication after handover. The purpose of this post-authentication is to
mutually authenticate MD and DESTk based on an authentication protocol and agree upon
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Figure 3.15: SCT on Mobile-Initiated k-th-order Handover, HCN Notified by MD
new keys between DESTk and MD by means of a roaming key agreement as soon as the
handover is successfully completed. A post-authentication is possible only if the destination
technology supports a change of data-protection keys during an ongoing service use.
In case post-authentication is used, the master session key transferred on a k-th-order
handover only depends on the master key newly generated between MD and SRCk after the
(k−1)-st-order handover. Consequently, k-th-order handover with SCT with key derivation
and post-authentication do not differ from first-order handover of the same type.14
Whenever SCT with key derivation is used, a post-authentication should at least take
place as soon as MD is in the so-called idle or dormant mode (see [116] for precise definition),
14In the case of HN-controlled handover, an authentication mechanism by which HN does not get to
know the master session key and SRCk has to send the newly generated key to HN along with the handover
indication. In the case of AN-controlled handover, SRCk has to transfer the newly generated key to AN along
with the handover indication. Consequently, post-authentication seems to be most suitable in connection
with SRC-controlled or HN-assisted handover.
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i.e., as soon as soon as MD is still associated with the source network but no longer uses
any service.
3.2.4 SCT with Key Agreement
The first two security solutions presented are based on a full roaming authentication and
key agreement and thus have the advantage that new independent keys are used after
handover. However, SCT with key derivation is clearly more efficient than these solutions,
as it requires fewer round-trip message exchanges between MD, DESTk, and, depending on
the authentication type, HN. This efficiency advantage makes SCT attractive for all types
of handover procedures. A mixed method combines the advantages of newly agreed-upon
keys with the efficiency of a context transfer: a new master key Kk is agreed upon based on
the credentials exchanged between MD and HN. The HCN then transfers a security context
Sk to DESTk upon handover that includes public or secret information on Kk (i.e., Kk
itself, some random number by means of which DESTk can compute Kk, or the like).
The message exchange on a handover using SCT with key agreement is the same as in the
case of SCT with key derivation. The two differences are the way the master session key Kk
is generated and the fact that the handover participants have to negotiate a key-agreement
method (rather then a key-derivation method) to use to agree upon Kk.
15
In this section we briefly introduce two key-agreement methods that generalize state-of-
the-art intra-provider handover security solutions.
In the first key-agreement method, MD and SRCk run a key-agreement protocol before
a handover reason is detected. By means of this key-agreement protocol, MD and SRCk
agree upon a new master session key Kk in the same way as if MD was roaming to SRCk.
Instead of using this master key right away, Kk is transferred to DESTk upon handover.
For this purpose, HCN has to obtain possession of Kk.
In the HN-controlled case, HN generates the security context Sk and includes the fresh
key Kk in Sk. HN gets knowledge of the new key in one of two ways: either HN is involved
in the roaming key-agreement protocol, as it goes back to HN anyway or because HN is the
anchor network of the handover, or SRCk sends the fresh master key Kk in the handover
request to HN.
In an AN-controlled handover with HN as anchor, the same argument holds true. In
an AN-controlled handover with FN as anchor, SRCk has to provide AN with the newly
generated master key Kk.
In a SRC-controlled handover, SRCk is in possession of the master key Kk anyway.
SRC-controlled handover is the control type of choice for this variant of SCT with key
agreement, as it minimizes the number of key transfers necessary.
Figure 3.16 illustrates how the new roaming key agreement (r)kak can take place between
MD and SRCk before a handover is even detected.
The new key agreement takes place between SRCk and MD at any time before the
15In case authentication and key agreement are implemented together, a pair (r)ak, (r)kak of authentica-
tion and key-agreement protocols has to be negotiated.
96 Chapter 3. Handover—Model Procedures and Security Solutions
.
.
.
.
.
.
AN
.
.
.
data protected by
data protected by
k−1 previous handovers
MD
negotiation (1)
security−mechanism 
measurement
handover
reason
handover
reason
detect detect
PSfrag replacements
SRCk
em0, im0
emk−1, imk−1
(r)kak
Figure 3.16: Network-Initiated Handover with SCT with Key Agreement and Authentica-
tion During Ongoing Connection
handover execution and possibly even before the detection of a handover reason. As a user
may start to use a service immediately after the initial authentication, the additional key
agreement may have to be executed during an ongoing service use. This restricts the use of
SCT with this key agreement to technologies that support roaming key agreement during
an ongoing use of service.
To circumvent this restriction, we introduce a second example for SCT with key agree-
ment. The initial roaming key-agreement protocol can be changed such that several inde-
pendent keys are generated at a time. The number of subsequent handover is then restricted
to the number of independent keys generated. A counter has to keep track of the number
of subsequent handover. It is important to note that this variant differs from the first key-
agreement method described above in that all subsequently used master keys are generated
by the AN or by HN, depending on where the master key is generated upon roaming. In
case HN does not generate the master session keys and an HN-controlled handover is to be
implemented, the anchor network, if different from HN, has to transfer all master session
keys to HN in the first handover request. In the case of a SRC-controlled handover, each
source network SRCk has to transfer all yet unused master keys to DESTk in the secu-
rity context of the k-th-order handover. Consequently, AN-control seems to be the best
handover control type for this version of SCT with key agreement.
Figure 3.17 illustrates the generation of multiple master keys.16 The handover procedure
16Figure 3.17 comprises network-initiated and mobile-initiated handover procedures.
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itself, including the security-mechanism negotiation, is the same as in the case of SCT with
key derivation. The difference lies only in the way the subsequently used master keys are
generated.
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Figure 3.17: Multiple Initial Key Generation for SCT with Key Agreement
Using SCT with key derivation on a mobile-initiated handover differs in the same way
from SCT with key derivation as in the network-initiated case. We therefore refrain from
detailing the mobile-initiated case.
The data-protection keys used after handover are derived from freshly generated master
keys. An attacker in possession of the keys used before handover can therefore not use
this knowledge to break the keys used after handover. The connection between MD and
DESTk after handover is as well-protected as a newly established connection between MD
and SRCk. The roaming key-agreement used may, however, be a protocol that DESTk
does not support itself. Consequently, the connection between MD and DESTk may not be
protected in the same way as a newly established connection between DESTk and MD. It is
also important to note that although independent keys are used before and after handover,
in our procedure, the master key used after handover becomes known to SRCk, as well as
HCN. In order to avoid this in the first-order handover case, Wang et al. in [177] suggest
using the transferred master key to authenticate a Diffie-Hellman key exchange [53] between
MD and DESTk after handover. The key generated by the Diffie-Hellman exchange is then
used to derive the data-protection keys and not the transferred master key. However, the
authors fail to notice that by means of its knowledge of the master key SRCk can mount a
man-in-the-middle attack against the key exchange, thus determining the master key used
between MD and DESTk. Wang et al.’s solution requires SRCk to perform an active attack
in order to obtain the master key, but it does not protect against disclosure of the master
and data-protection keys to SRCk.
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Any SCT with key agreement calls for answers to the following questions:
1. To what extent can DESTk trust the AN’s authentication of MD?
2. To what extent can DESTk trust the intractability of Kk?
3. How and when should MD and DESTk negotiate the cipher suite (and possibly also
the key-agreement protocol kak) to use after handover and to what extent should the
previously serving networks and HCN be involved in the negotiation?
We will discuss the threats arising from SCT with key agreement in Section 4.4.
3.3 Related Work
3.3.1 Handover Procedures
In [184], Zdarsky et al. give an overview on existing handover procedures and current trends.
Moreover, the authors compare the advantages and disadvantages of mobile-initiated and
network-initiated handover procedures. However, security issues are not addressed.
Zhang et al. [187] give an overview on the criteria by which in current wireless access
technologies handover reasons are detected and candidate destination NAPs are determined.
Network-initiated handover procedures are specified for GSM, UMTS, and CDMA2000
in [60, 11, 13]. Although these procedures are specified for intra-provider handover, our
generalization to the inter-provider handover case is straightforward and also complies with
the procedure described in [17].
Handover between different WLANs are currently standardized as part of 802.11f [92].
The procedure currently followed by most WLAN cards is described by Mishra et al. in
[127]. This procedure corresponds to the mobile-initiated procedure we have modeled, in
which HCN is notified by DESTk. It is, however, important to note that in [127] only
intra-provider handover are considered.
Mobile-initiated handover procedures where HCN is notified by DESTk are also de-
scribed by Wang et al. [176] (requested transfer scheme signaling), Xhafa et al. [182], and
Oyoqui et al. [135]. The authors of these papers consider first-order handover after roaming,
but they do not address subsequent handover.
Mobile-initiated handover where HCN is notified by MD are, for example, specified in
Wang et al. in [176] and referred to as active transfer scheme signaling. Again, the authors
only address handover after roaming, but not subsequent handover.
3.3.2 Security Solutions
The pre-authentication method and the SCT with key agreement we have presented in this
chapter are generalizations of the pre-authentication method used in 802.11i [93], as well as
the predictive authentication method suggested by [136]. The pre-authentication method of
[93] corresponds to executing a new run of the key-agreement protocol while still connected
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to SRCk. In [93], only intra-provider handover are considered. We generalize this approach
to inter-provider handover in two different ways: the pre-authentication with DESTk over
SRCk and the SCT with key agreement by means of a new run of the key-agreement protocol
between SRCk and MD.
The predictive authentication method presented by Pack et al. in [136] is generalized to
generating multiple keys during the initial roaming key agreement with AN. It is interesting
to note that in order to accelerate the handover execution, Pack et al. suggest distributing
the multiple master keys to the destination access point before a handover reason is detected,
rather than using context transfer during handover. To select the candidate network access
points, they suggest an algorithm to determine a Frequent Handover Region (FHR).
On intra-provider handover within the mobile telecommunication technologies GSM,
UMTS, and CDMA2000, the data-protection keys coincide with the master key generated
during the roaming key agreement [60, 11, 13]. Upon handover, these data-protection keys
are, without any modification, transferred to the next network access point (i.e., ke = id
and kd = id). The cipher suite used may, however, change. The impact of this SCT strategy
is discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
Security-context transfer has recently been discussed for inter-provider and even inter-
system handover [186, 177, 74, 185, 75, 162]. While [75, 74, 176] concentrate on how SCT
could be integrated and used to accellerate handover and on defining security requirements
for SCT, some of this work [177, 162, 185, 186] makes concrete suggestions on how the
security context could be generated and what information it should include. However, none
of the work explicitly addresses subsequent handover. We will discuss the above SCT-based
solutions in more detail in the Related Work section at the end of the next chapter.
SCT is also under research in the SEAMOBY working group of the IETF, where re-
quirements and contents of the transfer are still under discussion [79]. The main result of
this group so far is the Context Transfer Protocol [111], which specifies context transfer
between two access routers whenever a user’s mobility makes a quick re-establishment of
ongoing sessions necessary. However, the protocol focuses on the actual transfer messages
rather than on their content. In particular, suggestions for the content of security-related
context information are not included in [111].
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced a new formal model for various types of inter-provider
handover procedures. As opposed to prior work, we have distinguished between first-order
and subsequent handover procedures and have identified and described three new handover
control types. We have modeled the security challenges arising from inter-provider handover
and have presented four different approaches to address these challenges. These approaches
generalize the solutions that are currently used to secure intra-provider handover or were
previously suggested for first-order inter-provider handover to our newly modeled inter-
provider subsequent handover procedures.
An interesting topic for future research would be to develop new accounting schemes
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and business models for subsequent inter-provider handover for each handover control type
defined in our new formal model.
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Chapter 4
Threat Analysis for
Security-Context Transfer on
Inter-Provider Handover within
the Same Technology
The impact of SCT on handover across administrative boundaries is not very well under-
stood yet [75, 111]. SCT has widely been identified as the most promising security solution
to meet the efficiency requirements imposed by inter-provider handover procedures (e.g.,
[186, 177, 74, 185, 129, 55, 75, 162]). However, much of the previous work on this sub-
ject does not address the impact of SCT on the security goals of users and providers and
does not specify any security requirement for SCT. The need for a thorough threat analysis
for SCT on handover was previously stated in [75, 111], and first steps to specify security
requirements were taken in [162, 176, 177]. However, none of the previous work explicitly
addresses the problems arising from subsequent inter-provider handover. In particular, sub-
sequent context transfers with key derivation make the protection of the connection after
handover dependent on the protection of each connection between MD and a previously
serving network. Moreover, previous work fails to meet the interest of previously serving
networks in the negotiation of the cipher suite to use after handover. Instead, it is implic-
itly assumed that all network providers offer the same level of protection and that MD and
DESTk will try to maintain the protection level upon handover. This assumption, however,
is unrealistic, as different providers will typically support different security mechanisms and,
depending on the type of handover agreement, different providers will take different risks if
weak mechanisms are used after handover.
In this chapter, we present a threat analysis of the two different SCT types modeled in
Section 3.2.3 and Section 3.2.4 of the last chapter. From this analysis, we derive new security
requirements for both forms of SCT. In Chapter 5, we present new handover procedures that
use SCT and meet (most of) the newly defined requirements.
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We begin our threat analysis by identifying potential attack goals of an attacker, namely
violating the confidentiality of the air interface between MD and a wireless access network,
violating the integrity protection between MD and a wireless access network, mounting
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against MDs or networks, and conducting service theft
against a network on behalf of a victim MD. We describe different attack scenarios specifying
the context in which an attacker could try to achieve the above attack goals. Finally, we
describe several attacks for each attack scenario.
In particular, we show how an attacker can try to exploit weaknesses in the message
exchange on handover execution in order to mount impersonation and DoS attacks against
MDs and networks. Furthermore, an attacker can exploit weaknesses in the detection of
handover reasons and the selection of candidate destination networks in order to mount DoS
and impersonation attacks. In addition, we show how an attacker can exploit weaknesses
introduced by the key relations (SCT with key derivation) in combination with weaknesses
in the initial security suite or the cipher suite used between MD and a previously serving
network in order to mount attacks against the confidentiality and integrity protection or to
mount service theft attacks. We also show how an attacker can exploit bidding down attacks
against the initial security-suite negotiation, as well as against the cipher-suite negotiation
on a previous handover, in order to mount various attacks.
In our threat analysis we use two equivalent ways to describe the attacks identified for
each attack scenario. On of them makes use of so-called attack trees [158]. Attack trees
provide a formal but very intuitive method of describing the security of a system based on
varying attacks starting from root attack scenario down to the initial steps an attacker has to
achieve in order to mount an attack in the root scenario. The second way to describe attacks
identifies recurring modules an attacker can combine in order to mount more sophisticated
attacks. Once recurring attack modules are identified and all attacks are described with
their help, protection mechanisms can more easily be evaluated. If each attack requires the
use of at least one attack module and the protection mechanisms applied protect against
all attack modules, the system is secure against all identified attack. However, identifying
attack modules from scratch is not an easy task. It is by far easier and more intuitive to first
construct attack trees, then identify recurring attack modules and then design protection
mechanisms that protect against the identified attack modules, thus making use of the
advantages of each description method.
We use attack trees in order to describe potential attacks against a first-order handover
with HN as anchor for each attack scenario. We then identify recurring attack modules
(subtrees) in these trees and described each identified attack with the help of these attack
modules. We then generalize the modules identified for first-order handover with HN as
anchor to modules for k-th-order handover (k ≥ 1) with FN or HN as anchor and describe
attacks against a general k-th order procedure with the help of the generalized modules.
We show that more sophisticated impersonation attacks can be mounted against subsequent
handover. This is due to the fact that an attacker cannot only try to impersonate MD to
the anchor network and the destination network (and vice-versa), but he can also try to
exploit the handover procedure in order to impersonate MD to any of the previously serving
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networks (and vice-versa).
From the threat analysis, we derive requirements and make recommendations to enhance
SCT on inter-provider handover. We show that a handover procedure that meets these
requirements is secure against most of the identified attack modules and, consequently,
against most of the attacks.1 In Chapter 5, we present our new history-enriched, policy-
based handover procedures that meet the newly defined requirements.
Outline. In Section 4.1, we introduce our notations for attack trees. In Section 4.2, we
analyze the threats arising from first-order inter-provider handover with HN as anchor in
the case that SCT is used with key derivation. This threat analysis is generalized to the
k-th order handover case with an arbitrary anchor network in Section 4.3. We describe the
differences on SCT with key agreement in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, we detail how our
contributions in this chapter relate to previous work in the field. Finally, we conclude with
a summary of the contributions of this chapter in Section 4.6.
4.1 Attack Trees
Attack trees provide a formal method of describing the security of systems based on varying
attacks. Attacks against a system are represented in a tree structure. The root of an attack
tree describes the goal the attacker wants to achieve in certain scenario. The children of
a node represent different ways to achieve the parent node. Each node in the tree thus
becomes a subgoal for an attacker that wants to achieve the goal in the scenario at the
root of the tree. There are AND and OR nodes. OR nodes represent different alternatives
to achieve the parent node. AND nodes represent different steps that have to be taken in
combination to achieve the parent node. AND and OR nodes can appear as children of the
same parent node. Moreover, several pairs (or larger collections) of AND nodes can appear
as children of the same parent node. Attack trees are described in [158].
Read from the bottom to the top, each branch in an attack tree that contains only
OR nodes can be interpreted as a sequence of steps an attacker has to perform in order to
achieve the root goal in the attack scenario. Branches that contain AND nodes have to be
bundled together to form a complete attack achieving the root goal in the scenario.
Figures 4.1 to 4.6 summarize the notations used for attack trees here. Root attack
scenarios are represented by squares with cut-off corners. Regular subgoals, that is subgoals
that do not reappear in other trees, are represented by boxes. Subgoals that reappear in
other trees (reappearing subgoals) are represented by ellipses. In order to enhance readability,
the subtrees starting at these subgoals are described in separate trees. Only subtrees that
are independent of all other subtrees within an attack tree can be described separately.
Otherwise, extracting a subtree destroys the structure of the attack tree. In Figure 4.4, the
nodes B and C are alternatives to achieve the (sub)goal A. B and C are represented as
children of A connected to A by solid lines. This is the notation used for OR nodes here.
1Our requirements do not address protection against DoS attacks and attacks that are solely based on
compromising the memory or communication between network components within a network.
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In Figure 4.5, the nodes B and C are different steps that have to be taken in combination
to achieve A. B and C are again children of A, and they are are connected to A by dashed
lines or lines. We use this notation for B and C are AND nodes here. Finally, Figure 4.6
demonstrates how AND and OR nodes can lead to one and the same subgoal. In this figure,
A can either be achieved by B and C in combination or by D alone.
Figure 4.1: Root Attack
Scenario
Figure 4.2: Regular Sub-
goal
Figure 4.3: Reappearing
Subgoal
A
B C
Figure 4.4: B OR C
A
B C
Figure 4.5: B AND C
A
B C D
Figure 4.6: (B AND C) OR D
We cannot prove that any of our attack trees is complete. However, the use of attack
trees makes it easy to check whether a given attack was considered or not and additional
attacks can easily be added into a tree over time.
4.2 First-Order Handover with HN as Anchor and SCT with
Key Derivation
4.2.1 Root Attack Scenarios
In this section, we describe the root attack scenarios we consider for an inter-provider first-
order handover with HN as anchor. These attack scenarios themselves are independent
of the initiation type of the handover procedure, in other words, they are the same for
network-initiated and mobile-initiated handover. However, the attack trees for each root
scenario differ for network-initiated and mobile-initiated handover procedures.
In the first five scenarios the goal of an attacker is to violate the confidentiality of data
and control traffic sent or received by a victim MD.
In the first scenario, an attacker intercepts and records encrypted data or control traffic
on the air interface between MD and HN before a handover takes place. Some time later,
MD is handed over from HN to an authorized destination network DEST. The attacker tries
to exploit this handover procedure to gain access to the plaintext of previously recorded
traffic. This Root Attack Scenario (RAS) can be summarized as:
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RAS-1 An attacker recovers the plaintext of encrypted data or control traffic he intercepts
and records on the air interface between MD and HN after a handover of MD from HN to
an authorized DEST takes place.
The second scenario is restricted to hard handover procedures. A MD is about to be
handed over from HN to some destination network DEST. HN sends the handover command
to MD, and MD disassociates from HN and tries to associate to DEST. An attacker tries
to prevent the handover of MD by simulating a handover failure, impersonates HN to MD
when MD tries to re-associate with (fall back to) HN, and then tries to recover the plaintext
of data or control traffic sent by MD:
RAS-2 An attacker recovers the plaintext of data or control traffic sent by MD by imper-
sonating HN to MD on a simulated handover failure.
In the third scenario, MD is handed over from HN to an authorized destination network
DEST. An attacker intercepts data or control traffic on the air interface between MD and
DEST after handover (as opposed to intercepting the traffic between MD and HN before
handover in RAS-1). He tries to exploit the handover procedure to recover the plaintext of
the intercepted encrypted traffic after handover.
RAS-3 An attacker recovers the plaintext of data or control traffic exchanged between MD
and an authorized DEST after a handover of MD from HN to DEST takes place.
In addition, we study two other scenarios in which also the recovery of plaintext of confi-
dential traffic is the goal of the attacker. Unlike in RAS-2, where the attacker impersonates
a NAP of HN, here the attacker tries to recover the plaintext of data or control traffic of an
ongoing connection by impersonating a destination NAP to MD on a handover procedure.
In the first scenario, the attacker impersonates an authorized NAP on an actual handover.
In the second scenario, he simulates a handover to a fake NAPDEST.
RAS-4 An attacker gains access to the plaintext of data or control traffic sent by MD by
impersonating NAPDEST on an actual handover of MD from HN to DEST.
RAS-5 An attacker gains access to the plaintext of data or control traffic sent by MD by
simulating a handover from HN to DEST and impersonating NAPDEST to MD.
In the scenarios described so far, the goal of the attacker is to violate the confidentiality
of data or control traffic. In the next scenario he aims to violate the integrity of data or
control traffic. The root attack scenario we consider here is the following: after or while
MD is handed over from HN to an authorized DEST, an attacker tries to manipulate data
or control traffic exchanged between MD and DEST.
RAS-6 An attacker manipulates data or control traffic between MD and an authorized
DEST after or during handover.
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Note that an attacker may be able to decrypt data or signaling traffic exchanged between
MD and HN before handover due to knowledge he gained during or after handover (see
RAS-1). However, an attacker cannot use any knowledge gained during or after handover
in order to manipulate traffic exchanged between HN and MD before handover.
Another possible goal of an attacker is service theft. An attacker tries to gain access to
the network of HN or DEST and to use services on behalf of a victim MD. In commercial
networks, the victim MD ends up paying for the service used by the attacker. In non-
commercial networks, using a service on behalf of MD may result in unauthorized access
to confidential data and the ability to cause damage to accessible resources without being
traceable. We consider the following two root attack scenarios in which service theft is the
goal of an attack:
RAS-7 An attacker tries to gain access to HN’s network on behalf of a victim MD ex-
ploiting an actual handover procedure (service theft against HN).
RAS-8 An attacker tries to gain access to DEST’s network on behalf of a victim MD on
an actual handover of MD from HN to DEST (service theft against DEST).
Wireless networks are particularly vulnerable to DoS attacks. An attacker can easily
jam MDs or network access points. It can send out false requests and other traffic to keep
the network access points and other network components busy. We consider three DoS
scenarios here, one for each of the participants of a first-order handover procedure with HN
as anchor: MD, HN, and DEST.
RAS-9 An attacker prevents a legitimate MD from continuously using HN’s or DEST’s
service by interfering with the handover procedure (denial of service attack against MD).
RAS-10 An attacker uses the handover procedure to block resources, like a channel allo-
cated for MD, in HN (denial of service attack against HN).
RAS-11 An attacker uses the handover procedure to overload an authorized DEST (denial
of service attack against DEST).
Note that attacks based on stolen or cloned MDs are not considered here. Stolen or cloned
MDs have to be ruled out during the initial authentication between MD and AN. Once
they are connected to a network, they can be handed over from one network to another, as
they are assumed to be authorized by the handover controlling network due to the initial
authentication.
4.2.2 Attack Tree for Root Attack Scenario RAS-1
In this section, an attack tree for the first of the identified root attack scenarios RAS-1 is
described and discussed for a network-initiated first-order handover procedure. The purpose
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of this example tree is to motivate how we obtained the attack modules and attacks described
in the next sections in a methodical way. Attack trees for the other root attack scenarios
can be found in AppendixA.
It is important to note that the leaves in our attack trees themselves are attack modules
against the network components or protection mechanisms used in between MD and HN
before handover or between MD and DEST after handover. The attack tree notation thus
provides means to determine how far an attacker that can mount one or more of these
attack modules can get in achieving the attack goal in the root scenario. Attack trees thus
allow for a “what if” argumentation. Whether or not an attacker can mount the attack
modules described as the leaves of the attack trees has to be analyzed for each wireless
access technology separately.
The full tree for the root attack scenario RAS-1 does not fit on one page and is therefore
split into several smaller figures, namely Figures 4.7 to 4.12. Splitting the tree into several
subtrees has the additional advantage that subgoals reappearing in more than one attack
tree can be described once and can then easily be referred to.
Figure 4.7 reads from the top to the bottom as follows: data or control traffic is encrypted
with the encryption mechanism em0 and the encryption key EK 0. In order to recover the
plaintext of encrypted traffic, the attacker either has to find some means to recover the
encryption key EK 0 or has to be able to recover the plaintext without the encryption key.
In compliance with [120], the second alternative is referred to as partially break em0.
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Figure 4.7: Root Attack Scenario RAS-1
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Definition 4.2.1 An attacker can partially break the encryption mechanism em if and
only if he can recover the plaintext of data encrypted with em without being able to recover
the encryption key.
The attacker can recover EK 0 with or without the knowledge of K0. How the attacker can
recover EK 0 without knowledge of K0 is illustrated in Figure 4.8. The attacker can recover
Recovers EK_0 without 
knowledge of K_0
Totally breaks em_0
Compromises EIPE_HN 
and reads EK_0 from 
memory
Manipulates choice 
of em_0 to weak encryption 
mechanism
Breaks weak em_0 
after manipulation
Breaks em_0 
without manipulating
 em_0 choice before
Manipulates em_0 
negotiation to an 
element of a specific 
set of weak encryption 
mechanisms
Figure 4.8: Subgoal “Recover EK 0 without Knowledge of K0.”
EK 0 without knowledge of K0 by totally breaking em0.
Definition 4.2.2 An attacker can totally break the encryption mechanism em if and
only if he can recover the encryption key EK by cryptoanalyzing em.
An example for cryptanalysis of an encryption mechanism is a ciphertext-only attack by
which the attacker can recover the encryption key from the intercepted and recorded cipher-
text. Other examples for cryptanalysis are known-plaintext attacks, or chosen-ciphertext
attacks. While a ciphertext-only attack can be mounted by an attacker by simply intercept-
ing and recording encrypted traffic on the air interface, other cryptanalysis attacks require
the attacker to take additional steps to mount an attack. How and whether these attacks
succeed highly depends on the actual encryption mechanism used and, consequently, cannot
be studied on the abstraction level of this model. A cryptanalysis is generally easier the
more traffic encrypted with the same key can be obtained. The lifetime of an encryption
key should therefore be restricted.
The attacker can try to break whatever encryption mechanism em0 HN and MD agree
upon. Alternatively, the attacker can try to manipulate the encryption-mechanism nego-
tiation between MD and HN and then try to break the negotiated mechanism. How an
attacker can manipulate the security-mechanism negotiation has been briefly discussed in
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Section 1.3.4. In particular, it depends on how HN and MD protect their negotiation against
bidding down.
To recover EK 0 with knowledge of K0 (see Figure 4.7), the attacker must be able to
recover K0 and must be able to reconstruct EK 0 from K0 by means of reconstructing the
key-establishment process ke0. How the attacker can reconstruct ke0 depends on whether
the key-establishment process is static or dynamic (see Definition 1.2.9) and is illustrated
in Figure 4.9. In the case of a static key-establishment protocol ke0, the key establishment
Reconstructs 
ke_0
Recovers traffic 
of dynamic ke_0 ke_0 static
Intercepts ke_0 
traffic between 
EIPE_HN and MD
Impersonates 
 EIPE_HN on 
ke_0 traffic
Figure 4.9: Subgoal “Reconstruct ke0.”
depends on the secret master key K0 only. In the static case, reconstructing the key-
establishment process ke0 is consequently equivalent to knowing the long-term key K0. In
the dynamic case, the attacker has to recover the ke0 traffic between MD and HN’s NAP
in order to derive EK 0 from K0. Both cases are covered in the following definition:
Definition 4.2.3 An attacker can reconstruct ke if he can recover EK and IK from K.
If ke is static, an attacker can reconstruct ke if and only if he knows ke. If ke is dynamic,
the attacker additionally has to recover the ke-related part of the control traffic between
MD and NAP in order to be able to derive the data-protection keys EK and IK from the
master session key K.
In Figure 4.7, the attacker can recover K0 without knowledge of EK 0 and IK0 in two
ways: either with or without knowledge of K1. The latter case is described in Figure 4.10.
To recover K0 in this case, the attacker can try to compromise EIPEHN and read K0 from
its memory. The attacker could also compromise ASHN and read K0 from its memory.
Alternatively, the attacker can try to recover the plaintext of key-transfer kt of K0 from
ASHN to EIPEHN (see Definition 1.2.8). In case the key-derivation function kd0 is the
identity, the key K0 itself is transferred in the security context to ASDEST . In this case,
the attacker can also try to recover the plaintext of the S1-transfer in order to recover K0.
Alternatively, the attacker can try to break a0 (in both directions) and mount a (two sided)
man-in-the-middle attack (MiM) against ka0.
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Figure 4.10: Subgoal “Recover K0 without Knowledge of EK 0, IK 0, and K1.”
Definition 4.2.4 An attack can break a0 in both directions iff he can impersonate MD to
AN and AN to MD throughout the complete message exchanges related to a0.
Definition 4.2.5 An attacker can mount a two sided man-in-the-middle attack
against ka0 iff he can impersonate MD to AN and AN to MD throughout the ka0-related
message exchange and can get into possession of master session keys K0 and K
∗
0 , where
MD believes that it agreed upon K0 with AN and AN believes it agreed upon K
∗
0 with MD.
To recover K0 with knowledge of K1 (see Figure 4.7), the attacker must recover K1 and
must be able to invert kd0. To recover K1 in this case, the attacker can either be with or
without knowledge of EK 1 and IK 1. The latter case is described in Figure 4.11. In order
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Figure 4.11: Subgoal “Recover K1 without Knowledge of EK 1, IK 1, and K0.”
to recover K1 without exploiting any knowledge of other keys, the attacker either must
compromise the network components in which K1 is stored or must recover the plaintext
of a message in which K1 is transferred from one network component to another, i.e., the
transfer of S1 from ASHN to ASDEST or transfer of K1 from ASDEST to EIPEDEST. To recover
K1 with knowledge of EK 1 and IK1 (see Figure 4.7), the attacker must recover EK 1 and
IK 1 and must be able to recover K1 from the two data-protection keys:
Definition 4.2.6 An attacker can totally break ke if and only if he can recover K from
the knowledge of EK and IK .
The attacker has two alternatives to recover the encryption key EK 1 without knowledge
of K1. He can either intercept traffic encrypted with em1 and totally break em1, or he
112 Chapter 4. Threat Analysis for Security-Context Transfer
can compromise the memory of the encryption end point in DEST and read EK 1 from
there. Figure 4.12 describes how an attacker can totally break em1. The attacker can either
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Figure 4.12: Subgoal “Totally Break em1 without EK 0 and without Disabling em0.”
try to break whatever em1 the networks and MD negotiate in the security-mechanism
negotiation phases, or he can try to manipulate the choice of em1 and then try to break
the resulting mechanism. To manipulate the choice of em1, the attacker can manipulate
the negotiation between HN and DEST to an element of a specific set of weak encryption
mechanisms.2 Another possibility is to manipulate the selection of DEST and make HN
choose a destination network that supports weak encryption mechanisms only. In order to
manipulate the selection, the attacker can either jam the NAPs of specific available DESTs
leaving only a particular choice to HN, or he can amplify the signal of a particular NAPDEST
such that its signal is the strongest received and ends up up front in HN’s list of candidate
destination networks.
Similarly the attacker has two alternatives to recover the integrity-protection key IK 1
without knowledge of K1. He can either intercept traffic integrity-protected with im1 and
totally break im1, or he can compromise the memory of the integrity end point in DEST
and read IK 1 from there.
Definition 4.2.7 An attacker can totally break the integrity-protection mechanism im
if he can recover IK from intercepted traffic integrity-protected with im and IK .
2Note that in this situation the attacker cannot manipulate the negotiation phases between HN and MD,
as he does not know the encryption key EK 0.
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Figure 4.13 describes how an attacker can totally break im1 without knowledge of EK 0 and
without disabling em0.
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Figure 4.13: Subgoal “Totally Break im1 without EK 0 and without Disabling em0.”
4.2.3 Attack Modules
With the help of the attack trees described in the last section and the ones described
in AppendixA, we identified recurring Basic Attack Modules (BAMs), as well as Attack
Modules (AMs) that combine the basic attacks to more sophisticated modules. An attacker
can combine these attack modules with actions specific to the root attack scenario and the
handover initiation type in order to mount attacks targeted to reach his goal in one of the
root attack scenarios RAS-1 to RAS-10. While identifying attacks for a root attack scenario
is easier using the attack tree notation, identifying recurring attack modules makes it easier
to define requirements for the protection against the identified attacks. This is the reason
why we change from one form of representation to another. Moreover, as new security
solutions for wireless access networks evolve, small changes to our security model may be
required. The modular description of the attacks allows for replacing single attack modules
with new ones and for deleting particular attack modules without requiring changes to the
threat analysis as a whole.
According to our model of the security mechanisms used in HN and DEST, the master
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and data-protection keys are derived in the following way: K0 is computed during the last
key agreement ka0 between MD and ASHN. EK 0 and IK 0 are derived from K0 by the static
or dynamic key-establishment protocol ke0 between MD and EIPEHN. K1 is derived from
K0 by means of the key-derivation function kd0. EK 1 and IK 1 are generated from K1 by
the static or dynamic key-establishment protocol ke1 between MD and EIPEDEST. This
translates to basic relations between the keys used before and after handover. An attacker
can try to exploit these key relations to perform the basic attack modules described in the
following. Note that at the end of Appendix A we show how we identified the basic attack
modules in the attack trees.
BAM-1 An attacker in possession of EK 0 and IK 0 can recover K0 if he can totally break
the key-establishment process ke0 (see Def. 4.2.6).
BAM-2 An attacker in possession of K0 can recover K1 if he knows kd0 (and all other
optional input to kd0).
BAM-3 An attacker in possession of K1 can recover EK 1 and IK 1 if he knows the static
key-establishment process ke0 or if he can reconstruct the key-establishment traffic of the
dynamic key-establishment process ke0 (see Def. 4.2.3).
BAM-4 An attacker in possession of EK 1 and IK 1 can recover K1 if he can totally break
the key-establishment process ke1 (see Def. 4.2.6).
BAM-5 An attacker in possession of K1 can recover K0 if he can invert the key-derivation
function kd0.
BAM-6 An attacker in possession of K0 can recover EK 0 and IK 0 if he knows the static
key-establishment process ke0 or he can reconstruct the key-establishment traffic of a dy-
namic key-establishment process ke0 (see Def. 4.2.3).
An attacker can get into possession of EK 0 and IK 0 (respectively EK 1 and IK 1) without
exploiting the key relations by exploiting vulnerabilities of HN (respectively DEST).
BAM-7 An attacker can recover EK 0 and IK 0 without exploiting the basic key relations
by any of the following alternatives:
(a) totally breaking em0 and im0 (see Def. 4.2.7 and Def. 4.2.2).
(b) bidding down the em0 and im0 negotiation and then trying to totally break the negotiated
em0 and im0.
(c) compromising the memory of EIPEHN in which EK 0 and IK 0 are stored.
(d) breaking a0 and mounting a man-in-the-middle attack against ka0.
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BAM-8 An attacker can recover K0 without exploiting the basic key relations by any of
the following alternatives:
(a) recovering the plaintext of the K0 transfer from ASHN to EIPEHN.
(b) compromising the memory of EIPEHN in which K0 is stored.
(c) compromising the memory of ASHN in which K0 is stored.
BAM-9 An attacker can recover K1 without exploiting the basic key relations by any of
the following alternatives:
(a) recovering the plaintext of the K1 transfer from ASHN to EIPEHN.
(b) compromising the memory of EIPEHN in which K1 is stored.
(c) compromising the memory of ASHN in which K1 is stored.
(d) recovering the plaintext of the S1 transfer from HN to DEST during the handover pro-
cedure.
BAM-10 An attacker can recover EK 1 and IK 1 without exploiting the basic key relations
by any of the following alternatives:
(a) totally breaking em1 and im1 (see Def. 4.2.7 and Def. 4.2.2).
(b) bidding down the em1 and im1 negotiation and then trying to totally break the negotiated
em1 and im1.
(c) compromising the memory of EIPEDEST in which EK 1 and IK 1 are stored.
An attacker can combine the above basic attack modules to build the following attack
modules:
AM-1 An attacker can recover EK 0 and IK 0 by BAM-7. He can then use BAM-1 to
recover K0, use BAM-2 to recover K1, and finally recover EK 1 and IK 1 by exploiting
BAM-3.
AM-2 An attacker can recover K0 by BAM-8. He can then use BAM-2 to recover K1 and
can therefore recover EK 1 and IK 1 by exploiting BAM-3.
AM-3 An attacker can recover K1 by BAM-9. He can then use BAM-3 to recover EK 1
and IK 1.
AM-4 An attacker can recover EK 1 and IK 1 by BAM-10. He can then use the basic key
relation BAM-10 to recover K1, use BAM-5 to recover K0, and finally recover EK 0 and
IK 0 by exploiting BAM-6.
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AM-5 An attacker can recover K1 by BAM-9. He can then use BAM-5 to recover K0 and
can therefore recover EK 0 and IK 0 by exploiting BAM-6.
AM-6 An attacker can recover K0 by BAM-8. He can then use BAM-6 to recover EK 0
and IK 0.
Figure 4.14 summarizes the BAMs and AMs we consider.
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Figure 4.14: Summary of BAMs and AMs for First-Order Handover with HN as Anchor
The attack modules BAM-1 to BAM-6 exploit the ways the various keys used before
and after handover are related. In addition, an attacker can also use a bidding-down attack
against the negotiation of the cipher suite cs1 as a module for more sophisticated attacks.
AM-7 An attacker bids down the negotiation of em1 and im1.
It is important to note that, although the attack trees themselves differ dependent on the
handover initiation type, the attack modules we identify in this section can be used as
modules for attacks against procedures of any initiation type. In the next section we use
the identified attack modules to describe attacks against a network-initiated procedure.
4.2.4 Attacks against a Network-Initiated Procedure
An attacker can combine the above attack modules and other steps specific to the root attack
scenario in order to try to achieve the attack goal in the root scenario. In this section, we
summarize the attacks against a first-order network-initiated handover procedure with HN
as anchor.
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Attacks in RAS-1.
A-1 An attacker can use AM-4 to recover EK 0 after a handover of MD from HN to DEST
has taken place and thus recover the plaintext of intercepted and recorded traffic.
A-2 An attacker can use AM-5 to recover EK 0 after a handover of MD from HN to DEST
has taken place and thus recover the plaintext of intercepted and recorded traffic.
Attacks in RAS-2.
A-3 An attacker waits until the SCT from HN to DEST takes place and then uses AM-5
to recover IK 0 and EK 0. He jams NAPDEST such that MD and NAPDEST cannot associate.
When MD tries to re-associate with NAPHN, he jams the real NAPHN and impersonates
NAPHN and EIPEHN with the help the of the recovered data-protection keys.
A-4 In a variant of A-3, the attacker disables em0 and im0 before handover and thus does
not have to recover the data-protection keys in order to be able to successfully impersonate
NAPHN in the above scenario.
In A-3, the attacker gains access to the plaintext of data and control traffic exchanged
between MD and HN because a handover to DEST is initiated. As opposed to this, in A-4
the attacker already has access to the plaintext and prevents a handover after which he
might not have access to the plaintext of data and control traffic any more.
A-5 An attacker can also try to conduct AM-6 to recover EK 0 and IK 0 or try to recover
EK 0 and IK 0 directly by BAM-7. As in the last attack, he then has access to the plaintext
of data and control traffic exchanged between HN and MD. He can then proceed as above to
prevent a handover by simulating a handover failure.
Attacks in RAS-3.
A-6 An attacker can try to use AM-2 to recover EK 1.
A-7 An attacker can try to use AM-1 to recover EK 1.
A-8 An attacker can use AM-7 and then try to totally break em1 to recover EK 1.
Attacks in RAS-4.
A-9 An attacker recovers EK 0 and IK 0 with the help of BAM-7. He then intercepts the
control traffic exchanged between MD and HN. On intercepting a handover command to
NAPDEST, he uses AM-1 to recover EK 1 and IK 1. He then jams the real NAPDEST and
impersonates NAPDEST and EIPEDEST to MD with the help of the recovered data-protection
keys when MD tries to associate.
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A-10 An attacker recovers K0 using BAM-8 before handover. He then intercepts the
control traffic exchanged between MD and HN. On intercepting a handover command to
NAPDEST, he uses AM-2 to recover EK 1 and IK 1 and proceeds as in A-9.
A-11 An attacker bids down the em1, im1 negotiation (AM-7) until em1 and im1 are
disabled. He then jams the real NAPDEST and impersonates NAPDEST to MD.
A-12 An attacker waits until HN transfers the security context to DEST and then recovers
IK 1 and EK 1 by AM-3. He then proceeds as in A-9.
Note that in A-12, the attacker has to get knowledge of DEST without having access to
the key. This is possible if HN does not encrypt control traffic (in this case, the attacker
can intercept the plaintext of the handover command). If HN encrypts control traffic, the
attacker can try to guess DEST from MDs location.
A-13 An attacker breaks the initial authentication protocol a0 and mounts a man-in-the-
middle attack against MD and HN and thus gets hold of master keys K0 and K0∗, where
MD believes that it agreed upon K0 with HN and HN believes it agreed upon K
∗
0 with MD.
Then the attacker can successfully impersonate MD to HN and HN to MD. If now MD and
the attacker move, and HN can no longer serve the attacker, the attacker can use AM-2 to
generate the data-protection keys that enable him to impersonate DEST to MD and MD to
DEST.
Attacks in RAS-5.
A-14 An attacker recovers EK 0 and IK 0 with the help of BAM-7 and uses them to fake a
handover command to MD. Additionally, he uses AM-1 to recover EK 1 and IK 1 according
to the DEST identity he included in the fake handover command. He then impersonates
NAPDEST and EIPEDEST to MD with the help of the recovered data-protection keys when MD
tries to associate to NAPDEST.
A-15 An attacker recovers EK 0 and IK 0 with the help of AM-6. He then uses EK 0 and
IK 0 to fake a handover command and uses AM-2 to generate EK 1 and IK 1 according to
the DEST identity he included in the fake handover command. He then proceeds as in A-14.
A-16 An attacker disables em0 and im0 and sends a fake handover command to MD. He
uses AM-2 to recover K0 and generate EK 1 and IK 1. He then proceeds as in A-14.
Attacks in RAS-6.
A-17 An attacker can try to recover K0 using BAM-8 and then use AM-2 to recover IK 1.
A-18 An attacker can try to use AM-1 to recover EK 0 and IK 0 and therefore derive IK 1.
A-19 An attacker can try to use AM-7 and then try to totally break im1 to recover IK 1.
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Attacks in RAS-7.
A-20 This attack is restricted to hard handover procedures in which HN waits for MD to
fall back for a certain time after MD has disassociated from HN. An attacker has managed
to recover EK 0 and IK 0 by BAM-7 or by AM-6 or by AM-5 and to suppress the handover
complete message. He then impersonates MD to HN within the fall-back time.
A-21 In case the attacker managed to disable em0 and im0 during the initial negotia-
tion, it is sufficient that the attacker suppresses the handover complete message in order to
impersonate MD to HN in the scenario of A-20.
Attacks in RAS-8.
A-22 An attacker can try to disable em1 and im1 by bidding them down to no encryption
and no integrity protection (AM-7). He can then jam the real MD and impersonate MD to
NAPDEST and EIPEDEST.
A-23 An attacker can try to use AM-1 or AM-2 to recover IK 1 and EK 1. He can also get
into the possession of IK 1 and EK 1 by recovering K1 before MD and NAPDEST associate
or even read EK 1 and IK 1 from EIPEDEST’s memory. With the help of the data-protection
keys and by jamming the real MD, he can then impersonate MD to NAPDEST an EIPEDEST.
A-24 If an attacker has managed to disable em0 and im0 and to impersonate MD to HN,
then he can try to bid down the em1, im1 negotiation to disable em1 and im1.
If A-24 is successful, an initial service theft against HN leads to a service theft against
DEST.
A-25 If an attacker can recover EK 0 and IK 0 or K0 and manages to impersonate MD to
HN before handover, then he can use AM-1 respectively AM-2 to recover EK 1 and IK 1 and
can thus continue to impersonate MD to DEST.
Attacks in RAS-9.
A-26 An attacker can try to jam the association between MD and DEST. He can try
to make HN detect a handover reason, although there is none, and then let the ongoing
connection drop. He can replay an old handover command to MD. Alternatively, he can
jam the security-suite negotiation between MD and HN or MD and DEST, or he can try to
bid down the negotiation such that it fails.
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Attack Module Used in Attack
AM-1 A-7 A-9 A-14, A-18, A-23, A-25
AM-2 A-6, A-10, A-15, A-16, A-13, A-17, A-23, A-25
AM-3 A-12
AM-4 A-1
AM-5 A-2, A-3, A-20
AM-6 A-5, A-15, A-20
BAM-7 A-5, A-9, A-14, A-20
BAM-8 A-10, A-17
BAM-10 A-8
AM-7 A-8, A-11, A-19, A-22
Attacker disables em0, im0 A-4, A-21, A-24
Attacker mounts MiM against ka0 A-13
Attacker breaks a0 A-13
Attacker fakes handover request A-29
Attacker fakes handover command A-14, A-15, A-16, A-26
Table 4.1: Overview on Attacks and Attack Modules
Attacks in RAS-10.
A-27 This attack only applies to hard handover: An attacker can try to make HN reserve
resources for MD longer than necessary by suppressing the handover-complete message sent
to HN by DEST.
A-28 An attacker can try to make HN discover a handover reason although there is none.
In order to do this, the attacker can impersonate NAPDEST or amplify the signal of an
existing network access point.
Attacks in RAS-11.
A-29 An attacker can try to send fake handover requests to DEST in order to use up
sources in DEST. He can furthermore engage DEST in the security-mechanism negotiation.
Table 4.1 gives an overview on which of the attacks A-1 to A-25 make use of which
attack modules.3
To avoid repetition, we refrain from giving a detailed description of the potential attacks
against mobile-initiated first-order handover procedures with HN as anchor at this point.
We will instead point out the differences on mobile-initiated procedures after describing the
general case of a k-th-order (k ≥ 1) handover with HN or FN as anchor in Section 4.3.4.
3The Denial of Service (DoS) attacks A-26 to A-29 are considered part of the general DoS protection of
a wireless network, which is out of the scope of this work.
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4.2.5 Requirements and Recommendations for SCT with Key Derivation
In this section, we define requirements to secure a first-order handover procedure with HN as
anchor. Requirements R-1 to R-4 address security problems that arise from the use of weak
security mechanisms between MD and HN before a first-order handover. Requirements R-5
and R-6 address problems arising from the use of weak mechanisms after a first-order han-
dover. The requirements R-7 and R-8 protect the handover procedure messages themselves
and prevent attacks arising from faked handover requests and handover commands.
Additionally, we specify recommendations on what further measures wireless networks
should use to protect themselves. These recommendations cannot be addressed by the
handover procedure itself (see RC-1, RC-2).
We will first define and motivate the new security requirements and then show how these
requirements address the attacks identified in the last section. In particular we show that a
handover procedure with SCT that meets our requirements is protected against the attack
modules listed on the right side of Table 4.1 and thus against the attacks A-1 to A-25.
Due to a first order handover, DEST may suffer from the use of a disabled em0 or
im0, a broken initial authentication or key agreement, a key-establishment process ke0 that
is vulnerable to BAM-1, or a key-derivation function kd0 that is vulnerable to BAM-2 or
BAM-5. It is therefore crucial for DEST to base its handover decision on the initial security
suite ss0, as well as the key-derivation function kd0, by which K1 was derived and we
require:
R-1 DEST shall base its decision on whether to accept or refuse a given handover request
on (1) the cipher suite cs0 = (ke0, em0, im0) previously used between MD and HN; (2)
the initial authentication protocol a0; (3) the initial key-agreement protocol ka0; and (4) the
key-derivation function kd0.
This allows DEST to protect itself by refusing handover if it deems one of the mechanisms
used before handover to be too weak. For example, DEST can refuse handover if “no
encryption” and “no integrity protection” was used between MD and HN before handover
and protect itself against A-4, A-21, and A-24.
By means of R-1, DEST can detect the use of a key-derivation function it does not deem
to provide an adequate security level. As opposed to this, requirements R-2 and R-3 specify
what properties a key-derivation function should ideally have.
R-2 Knowledge of a master session key K1, used between MD and DEST after handover,
shall not reveal any information on any previously used master session key K0 to anyone
except MD and HN.
In order to protect against attacks using the basic attack module BAM-2, we require:
R-3 Knowledge of a previously used master session key K0 shall not reveal any information
on K1 to anyone except MD and DEST.
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Requirements R-2 and R-3 specify properties of a good choice of a key-derivation function,
while R-1 allows DEST to protect itself even if HN and MD choose to use a key-derivation
function DEST does not trust.
R-4 The security context shall include information on the lifetime of the initial master
session key K0.
This, for example, allows DEST to have considerations on the key lifetime be part of its
handover decision. It furthermore allows HN to pass on its restrictions on key lifetimes to
DESTk.
It is crucial for HN to influence the selection of mechanisms to be used after handover
as otherwise it may suffer from impersonation attacks due to the use of a weak cipher suite
cs1. The use of a weak or (partially or totally) breakable cipher suite after handover, for
example, is necessary in order to mount the impersonation attacks A-11 and A-22 against
DEST and MD as well as the attack A-1 against the confidentiality of the air interface
before handover. Moreover, a reconstructible ke1 may lead to A-12.
R-5 The negotiation of the cipher suite cs1 = (em1, im1, ke1) shall enforce compliance
with policies set by MD, DEST, and HN.
We identified “bidding down” of the negotiation of the cipher suite cs1 as a basic attack
module that can be used to mount the attacks A-8, A-11, A-19, A-22, and A-24. In order
to protect against these attacks, we require:
R-6 The negotiation of the cipher suite cs1 = (em1, im1, ke1) shall be protected against
bidding-down attacks.
In order to protect DEST from fake handover requests as used in A-29 and from recovery
of the transferred key K1 (BAM-9 used in A-2 to A-4, A-12, and A-20), we require:
R-7 The security-context transfer of related keys between HN and DEST shall be encrypted
and integrity-protected (including replay protection) and shall provide a proof of its origin
(HN) to DEST.
In order to protect MD from fake handover commands as used in A-14, A-15, A-16, and
A-26 we require:
R-8 The handover command sent from HN to MD shall be integrity-protected (including
replay protection) and provide a proof of its origin (HN) to MD.
DEST may suffer from attacks that make use of the basic attack modules BAM-8 and (c) of
BAM-7. These basic attack modules make use of vulnerabilities of the network components
and unprotected communication between network components in HN. The handover pro-
cedure itself cannot protect against these basic attack modules. A key-derivation method
that meets R-3 prevents attacks that use BAM-8 as module in AM-2. The only identified
attack that uses BAM-8 or BAM-7 directly is A-5, from which HN, but not DEST, suffers.
With an eye on the potentially evolving attacks, we recommend:
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RC-1 A destination network shall carefully consider entering a handover agreement with
HN that does not protect the memory of its EIPEHN and/or ASHN against unauthorized
access (including physical access), that does not protect the confidentiality and integrity of
key transfers from ASHN to EIPEHN, or that keeps K0 in EIPEHN’s memory longer than
necessary.
In particular, DEST shall not enter into handover agreements with HN if R-3 is not met
and RC-1 cannot be ensured.
RC-2 HN shall carefully consider entering handover agreements with destination networks
that do not protect the memory of their EIPEDEST and/or ASDEST against unauthorized
access (including physical access) that do not protect the confidentiality and integrity of key
transfers from ASDEST to EIPEDEST, or that keep K1 in EIPEDEST’s memory longer than
necessary.
In particular, HN shall not enter agreements with DESTs that do not meet RC-2 if it could
be held responsible for the impersonation attack A-12. Note that the other attacks with
impact on HN that make use of the alternatives (a), (b), or (c) in BAM-9 or (c) in BAM-10
can be made impossible by the use of a key-derivation function kd0 that meets R-2.
In order to prevent an attacker from exploiting HN’s channel reservation for a denial
of service attack by suppressing the handover-complete message (see A-27), HN has to
carefully set fall-back times on hard handover. However, this and other measures to protect
the handover participants against DoS attacks are considered out of scope of this work.
As illustrated in Table 4.1 above, all of the attacks A-1 to A-25 make use of at least one
of the following:
(a) one of the attack modules AM-1 to AM-6;
(b) one of the basic attack modules BAM-7, BAM-8, or BAM-10 directly;
(c) disable em0 and im0;
(d) mount a man-in-the-middle attack against the key-agreement protocol ka0;
(e) break the initial authentication protocol a0;
(f) fake a handover request;
(g) fake a handover command.
In order to protect against A-1 to A-25, and any other attacks built from these modules,
it is therefore sufficient to protect against (a) – (g).
The attack modules AM-1 to AM-6 each make use of at least two BAMs. In order to
protect against an AM, it is therefore sufficient to protect against one of the two BAMs it
uses.
Table 4.2 illustrates, how our requirements protect against the basic attack modules, as
well as the other modules listed above.
124 Chapter 4. Threat Analysis for Security-Context Transfer
Attack Module Adressed by
BAM-1 (AM-1) R-1 DEST bases its decision on ke0
BAM-2 (AM-1, AM-2) R-3
BAM-3 not addressed4
BAM-4 (AM-4) R-5 Policies of HCN during ke1 negotiation en-
forced
BAM-5 (AM-4, AM-5) R-2
BAM-6 not addressed4
BAM-7 (AM-1) R-1 DEST bases its decision on em0, im0
BAM-8 (AM-2, AM-6) RC-1
BAM-9 (AM-3, AM-5) RC-2 and R-7
BAM-10 (AM-4) R-5 Policies of HCN during em1 and im1 nego-
tiation enforced
AM-7 R-6
Attacker disables em0 im0 R-1
Attacker breaks a0 R-1
Attacker mounts MiM against ka0 R-1
Attacker fakes handover command R-8 and R-1
Attacker fakes handover request R-7 and R-1
Attacker fakes handover indication R-8 and R-1
Table 4.2: Attack Modules and Requirements
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A first-order handover procedure that meets the above requirements is secure against
the attacks A-1 to A-26. In the next chapter, we present our history-enriched, policy-based
approach that meets R-1, R-2, and R-4 to R-8 in whole and R-3 in part.
4.3 k-th-order Handover with HN or FN as Anchor and SCT
with Key Derivation
In this section, we generalize the root attack scenarios, attack modules, attacks, and re-
quirements from first-order handover with HN as anchor to the general case of a k-th-order
(k ≥ 1) handover with HN or FN as anchor. We proceed as in the first-order case and
start by describing the root attack scenarios of an attacker. As in the first-order handover
case, the attack root attack scenarios are independent of the initiation type of the handover.
However, as we will see later on, some of the attacks an attacker can mount in order to
achieve his goal in one of the root attack scenarios depend on the type of the handover
initiation.
4.3.1 Root Attack Scenarios
The root attack scenarios described for the first-order handover with HN as anchor can
easily be generalized to the case of a k-th-order handover from a source network SRCk to
a destination network DESTk with HN or FN as anchor. Differences mainly arise from
the fact that an attacker can try to exploit a k-th-order handover procedure in order to
mount attacks against any of the previously serving networks SRCj (1 ≤ j ≤ k). It is also
important to note that the root attack scenarios as well as the attacks themselves can be
described independently from the anchor type of the handover procedure.
RAS*-1 An attacker recovers the plaintext of encrypted data or control traffic he inter-
cepted and recorded on the air interface between MD and SRCj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ k after a
k-th-order handover of MD from SRCk to DESTk has taken place (violates confidentiality
goals of MD and SRCj 1 ≤ j ≤ k).
RAS*-2 An attacker recovers the plaintext of data or control traffic sent by MD by im-
personating SRCk on a simulated handover failure (violates confidentiality goals of MD and
SRCk).
RAS*-3 An attacker recovers the plaintext of data or control traffic exchanged between
MD and an authorized DESTk after a handover of MD from HN to DESTk taken place
(violates confidentiality goals of MD and DESTk).
RAS*-4 An attacker gains access to the plaintext of data or control traffic sent by MD by
impersonating DESTk to MD on an actual handover of MD from SRCk to DESTk.
4BAM-3 and BAM-6 are not used in any of the attacks on their own.
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RAS*-5 An attacker gains access to the plaintext of data or control traffic sent by MD by
simulating a handover from SRCk to DESTk and impersonating DESTk to MD.
RAS*-6 An attacker manipulates data or control traffic between MD and an authorized
DESTk after handover (violates integrity goal of MD and DESTk).
RAS*-7 An attacker tries to gain access to SRCk’s network on behalf of a victim MD
exploiting an actual handover procedure of MD from SRCk to DESTk.
RAS*-8 An attacker tries to gain access to DESTk’s network on behalf of a victim MD
exploiting an actual handover procedure of the victim MD from SRCk to DESTk.
RAS*-9 An attacker prevents a legitimate MD to continuously use SRCk’s or DESTk’s
service by interfering with the handover procedure (DoS against MD).
RAS*-10 An attacker uses the handover procedure to block resources in SRCk (DoS
against SRCk).
RAS*-11 An attacker exploits the handover procedure to overload DESTk (DoS against
DESTk).
4.3.2 Attack Modules
In this section, we generalize the attack modules described for first-order handover proce-
dures with HN as anchor to attack modules against a k-th-order handover (k ≥ 1) with HN
or FN as anchor. As before we denote the anchor network (HN or FN) with AN. Although
the attacks against a handover procedure differ with the initiation type, we identified only
attack parts as modules that are independent of the initiation type of the handover proce-
dure. In the k-th-order handover, the use of any weak security mechanisms between MD
and any of the previously serving networks AN(= SRC1),SRC2, . . . ,SRCk, or the Handover
Controlling Network (HCN) are potential threats to the participants of a handover proce-
dure. As described in Section 3.2.3.2, we assume that HCN generates the master key Kk
transferred in the security context on a k-th-order handover from K0 (AN-controlled case,
HN-controlled case) or Kk−1 (SRC-controlled case):
Ki = kdi−1(Ki−1, [optional other parameters]) (4.1)
in the SRC-controlled case and
Ki = kd0(K0, [optional other parameters]) (4.2)
in the HN-controlled and AN-controlled cases.
The initial master session key K0 agreed upon between MD and AN has been generated
during the initial authentication (r)a0 by means of the (roaming) key-agreement protocol
(r)ka0.
The way HCN derives Ki from Ki−1 and the way the data-protection keys are derived
from the master keys lead to the following basic attack modules:
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BAM*-1 For 0 ≤ i ≤ k, an attacker in possession of EK i and IK i can recover Ki if he
can totally break the key-establishment process kei (see Def. 4.2.6).
BAM*-2 An attacker in possession of Kj , j ≤ k can recover Kk if
(i) he knows kdj+1, . . . , kdk−1 and can therefore subsequently compute Kj , . . . Kk (SRC-
controlled case).
(ii) he knows and can invert kd0 to obtain K0 from Kj and can therefore compute Kk
from K0 (HN-controlled case, AN-controlled case).
BAM*-3 An attacker in possession of Kk can recover Kj, 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 if
(i) he knows and can invert kdj+1, . . . , kdk−1 and can therefore compute Kk−1, . . . ,Kj.
(SRC-controlled case)
(ii) he knows and can invert kd0 to obtain K0 from Kk and can therefore compute Kj
from K0. (HN-controlled case, AN-controlled case)
BAM*-4 For 0 ≤ i ≤ k, an attacker in possession of Ki can recover EK i and IK i if he
knows the static key-establishment process kei or if he can reconstruct the key-establishment
traffic of the dynamic key-establishment process kei (see Def. 4.2.3).
An attacker can get into possession of EK i and IK i without exploiting the key relations
by exploiting vulnerabilities of mechanisms used between MD and DESTi or a missing
protection of keys by DESTi.
BAM*-5 An attacker can recover EK i and IK i (0 ≤ i ≤ k) without exploiting the key
relations by any of the following alternatives:
(a) totally breaking emi and imi (see Def. 4.2.7 and Def. 4.2.2).
(b) bidding down the emi and imi negotiation and then trying to totally break the negotiated
emi and imi.
(c) compromising the memory of EIPEDESTi in which EK i and IK i are stored.
BAM*-6 An attacker can recover Ki (1 ≤ i ≤ k) without exploiting the basic key relations
by any of the following alternatives:
(a) recovering the plaintext of the Ki transfer from ASDESTi to EIPEDESTi.
(b) compromising the memory of EIPEDESTi in which Ki is stored.
(c) compromising the memory of ASDESTi in which Ki is stored.
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(d) compromising the memory of ASHCN in which Ki is stored.
(e) recovering the plaintext of the Si transfer from HCN to DESTi during the handover
procedure.
BAM*-7 An attacker can recover K0 without exploiting the basic key relations by any of
the following alternatives:
(a) recovering the plaintext of the K0 transfer from ASAN to EIPEAN.
(b) (if HN generates K0 during (r)ka0) compromising the memory of ASHN.
(c) (if HN generates K0 during (r)ka0) recovering the plaintext of the K0 transfer from HN
to AN.
(d) compromising the memory of EIPEAN in which K0 is stored.
(e) breaks a0 and mounts MiM against ka0.
An attacker can combine the above basic attack modules to build the following attack
modules:
AM*-1 An attacker can recover EK j and IK j for some 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 by BAM*-5. He
can then use BAM*-1 to recover Kj, use BAM*-2 to recover Kk, and finally recover EK k
and IK k by means of BAM*-4.
AM*-2 An attacker can recover Kj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ k− 1 by BAM*-6 or recover K0 by
BAM*-7. He can then use BAM*-2 to recover Kk and can therefore recover EK k and IK k
by means of BAM*-4.
AM*-3 An attacker can recover Kk by BAM*-6. He can then use BAM*-4 to recover
EK k and IK k.
AM*-4 An attacker can recover EK k and IK k by BAM*-5. He can then use the basic
attack module BAM*-1 to recover Kk, use BAM*-3 to recover Kj, and finally recover EK j
and IK j by means of BAM*-4.
AM*-5 An attacker can recover Kk by BAM*-6. He can then use BAM*-3 to recover Kj
and can therefore recover EK j and IK j by means of BAM*-4.
AM*-6 An attacker can recover Kj by BAM*-6. He can then use BAM*-4 to recover
EK i and IK i.
Figure 4.15 gives an overview on the attack modules described so far. New attacks due to
handover procedures cannot only arise from the security-context transfer of related keys,
but also from the way the cipher suite to use after handover is negotiated. We identified
the following additional attack module:
AM*-7 An attacker can bid down the emk and imk negotiation if he can recover EK k−1
and IK k−1 by BAM*-5 or if he can disable emk−1 and imk−1.
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Figure 4.15: Summary of BAMs and AMs on k-th-order Handover
4.3.3 Attacks against a Network-Initiated Procedure
An attacker can combine the above attack modules and other steps specific to the root
attack scenario to try to achieve his goals in the scenario.
Attacks in RAS*-1.
A*-1 An attacker can use AM*-4 to recover EK j from EK k and IK k after a handover of
MD from SRCk to DESTk has taken place and thus recover the plaintext of intercepted and
recorded traffic.
A*-2 An attacker can use AM*-5 to recover EK j from Kk after a handover of MD from
SRCk to DESTk has taken place and thus recover the plaintext of intercepted and recorded
traffic.
Attacks in RAS*-2.
A*-3 An attacker waits until the security-context transfer (including Kk) from HCN
to DESTk takes place and then uses AM*-5 to recover IK k−1 and EK k−1. He jams
NAPDESTk such that MD and NAPDESTk cannot associate. When MD tries to re-associate
with NAPSRCk , he jams the real NAPSRCk and impersonates NAPSRCk and EIPESRCk with
the help of the recovered data-protection keys to MD.
A*-4 In a variant of the above attack, the attacker disables emk−1 and imk−1 before
handover and thus does not have to recover the data-protection keys in order to be able to
successfully impersonate NAPSRCk and EIPESRCk in the above scenario.
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In A*-3, the attacker gains access to the plaintext of data and control traffic exchanged
between MD and SRCk because a handover to DESTk is initiated. As opposed to this, in
A*-4 the attacker already has access to the plaintext and prevents a handover after which
he might not have access to the plaintext of data and control traffic any more.
A*-5 An attacker can also try to conduct AM*-6 to recover EK k−1 and IK k−1 or try
to recover EK k−1 and IK k−1 directly by BAM*-5. He can also try to recover EK k−1 and
IK k−1 by AM*-2 or AM*-1. As in the last attack, he then has access to the plaintext of
data and control traffic exchanged between SRCk and MD. He can then proceed as in A*-3
in order to prevent a handover by simulating a handover failure.
Attacks in RAS*-3.
A*-6 An attacker can use AM*-2 to recover EK k.
A*-7 An attacker can use AM*-1 to recover EK k.
A*-8 An attacker can use AM*-7 and then try to totally break emk to recover EK k.
Attacks in RAS*-4.
A*-9 An attacker recovers EK k−1 and IK k−1 with the help of BAM*-5. He then intercepts
the control traffic exchanged between MD and SRCk. On intercepting a handover command
to NAPDESTk , he uses AM*-1 to recover EK k and IK k. He then jams the real NAPDESTk
and impersonates NAPDESTk and EIPEDESTk when MD tries to associate.
A*-10 An attacker recovers Kj using BAM*-6 before handover. He then intercepts the
control traffic exchanged between MD and SRCk. On intercepting a handover command to
NAPDESTk , he uses AM*-2 to recover EK k and IK k and proceeds in the same way as in
A*-9.
A*-11 An attacker bids down the emk, imk negotiation (AM*-7) until emk and imk are
disabled. He then intercepts the control traffic exchanged between MD and SRCk. On inter-
cepting a handover command to NAPDESTk , he jams the real NAPDESTk and impersonates
NAPDESTk to MD.
A*-12 An attacker waits until HCN transfers the security context to DESTk and then
recovers IK k and EK k by AM*-3. He then proceeds as in A*-9.
Note that in A*-12, the attacker has to get knowledge of DESTk without having access to
the data-protection keys. This is possible if SRCk does not encrypt control traffic (in this
case, the attacker can intercept the plaintext of the handover command). If SRCk encrypts
control traffic, the attacker can try to guess DESTk from MD’s location.
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A*-13 Assume an attacker breaks a0 and mounts a a man-in-the-middle attack against
ka0 to get into possession of K0 and K
∗
0 and thus gets hold of master keys Kk−1 and K
∗
k−1,
where MD believes that it agreed upon Kk−1 with SRCk and SRCk believes it agreed upon
K∗k−1 with MD. Then the attacker can successfully impersonate MD to SRCk and SRCk
to MD. If now MD and the attacker move, and SRCk can no longer serve the attacker,
the attacker tries to use AM*-2 to generate the data-protection keys that enable him to
impersonate DESTk to MD and MD to DESTk.
Attacks in RAS*-5.
A*-14 An attacker recovers EK k−1 and IK k−1 with the help of BAM*-5 and uses them
to fake a handover command to MD. Additionally, he uses AM*-1 to recover EK k and
IK k according to the DESTk identity he included in the fake handover command. He then
impersonates NAPDESTk and EIPESRCk to MD when it tries to associate with it.
A*-15 An attacker recovers EK k−1 and IK k−1 with the help of AM*-6 or AM*-2 or
AM*-1. He then uses EK k−1 and IK k−1 to fake a handover command and uses AM*-2 to
generate EK k and IK k according to the NAPDESTk identity he included in the fake handover
command. He then proceeds as in A*-14.
A*-16 An attacker disables emk−1 and imk−1 and sends a fake handover command to
MD. He uses AM*-2 to recover Kj and generate EK k and IK k. He then proceeds as above.
Attacks in RAS*-6.
A*-17 An attacker can recover Kj using BAM*-6 and then use AM*-2 to recover IK k.
A*-18 An attacker can use AM*-1 to recover EK j and IK j and therefore derive IK k.
A*-19 An attacker can use AM*-7 and then try to totally break imk to recover IK k.
Attacks in RAS*-7.
A*-20 This attack is restricted to hard handover procedures in which SRCk waits for
MD to fall back for a certain time after MD has disassociated from SRCk. An attack
recovers EK k−1 and IK k−1 by BAM*-5 or by AM*-6, or AM*-5, or AM*-2, or AM*-1.
He suppresses the handover-complete message and impersonates MD to SRCk during the
fall-back time.
A*-21 In case the attacker manages to disable emk−1 and imk−1 during the negotiation,
it is sufficient that the attacker suppresses the handover-complete message in order to im-
personate MD to SRCk.
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Attacks in RAS*-8.
A*-22 An attacker can try to disable emk and imk by bidding them down to no encryption
and no integrity protection (AM*-7). He can then jam the real MD and impersonate MD
to DESTk with it.
A*-23 An attacker can try to use AM*-1 or AM*-2 to recover IK k and EK k. He can
also get into the possession of IK k and EK k by recovering Kk before MD and NAPDESTk
associate or even read EK k and IK k from EIPEDESTk ’s memory. With the help of the data-
protection keys and with the help of jamming the real MD, he can then impersonate MD to
DESTk.
A*-24 If an attacker manages to disable emk−1 and imk−1 and manages to impersonate
MD to SRCk, he can then try to bid down the emk, imk negotiation to disable emk and imk.
If A*-24 is successful, an initial service theft against SRCk leads to a service theft against
DESTk.
A*-25 If an attacker can recover EK k−1 and IK k−1 or Kk−1 and manages to impersonate
MD to SRCk before handover, then he can use AM*-1 or AM*-2 to recover EK k and IK k
and can thus continue to impersonate MD to DESTk.
Attacks in RAS*-9.
A*-26 An attacker can jam the association between MD and DESTk, he can make SRCk
detect a handover reason although there is none and then let the ongoing connection drop.
He can replay an old handover command to MD, jam the security suite negotiation between
MD and SRCk or MD and DEST
k, or bid down the negotiation to fail.
Attacks in RAS*-11.
A*-27 An attacker sends fake handover requests to DESTk in order to use up resources
in DESTk. He can furthermore engage DESTk in the security-mechanism negotiation.
Attacks in RAS*-10. The next attack only applies to hard handover procedures.
A*-28 An attacker makes SRCk reserve resources for MD longer than necessary by sup-
pressing the handover-complete message sent from DESTk to SRCk.
A*-29 An attacker can make SRCk discover a handover reason although there is none. In
order to achieve this, the attacker can impersonate the network access point of a destination
network with which HCN has a handover agreement, or amplify the signal of an existing
network access point.
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4.3.4 Attacks against a Mobile-Initiated Procedure
In order to avoid unnecessary repetitions, we analyze SCT for both types of mobile-initiated
handover procedures at once. We detail the case that HCN is notified by MD over SRCk and
note the changes for the case that HCN is notified by MD over DESTk within parentheses.
Moreover, we describe the first-order and the subsequent handover case at once and do
not explicitly distinguish between HN or FN as anchor, that is, we describe the k-th-order
(k ≥ 1) handover case with an arbitrary AN.
As already mentioned, we described the root attack scenarios and attack modules in-
dependent of the handover initiation type. Moreover, some of the attacks described in the
last section, namely A*-1 to A*-8, A*-13, A*-17 to A*-25, and A*-28 are not specific to the
type of the handover initiation and are thus to be considered for the mobile-initiated case
as well. However, the attacks A*-9 to A*-12, A*-14 to A*-16, A*-26, A*-27, and A*-29 are
specific to network-initiated handover procedures, as they exploit messages specific to this
procedure type.
The attacks A*-9 to A*-12, A*-26, A*-27, and A*-29 can easily be adapted to the
mobile-initiated case in the following way:
A*-mob-9 An attacker recovers EK j and IK j with the help of BAM*-5. He then in-
tercepts the control traffic exchanged between MD and SRCk. On intercepting a handover-
indication message sent from MD to HCN over SRCk (over DESTk), indicating handover
to NAPDESTk , he uses AM*-1 to recover EK k and IK k. He then jams the real NAPDESTk
and impersonates NAPDESTk and EIPESRCk when MD tries to associate.
A*-mob-10 An attacker recovers Kj using BAM*-6 before handover. He then intercepts
the control traffic exchanged between MD and SRCk. On intercepting a handover-indication
message sent from MD to HCN over SRCk (over DESTk) indicating handover to NAPDESTk ,
he uses AM*-2 to recover EK k and IK k and proceeds in the same way as in A*-mob-9.
A*-mob-11 An attacker bids down the emk, imk negotiation (AM*-7) until emk and imk
are disabled. He then intercepts the control traffic exchanged between MD and SRCk. On
intercepting a handover-indicating message sent from MD to HCN over SRCk (over DESTk)
indicating handover to NAPDESTk , he jams the real NAPDESTk and impersonates NAPDESTk
to MD.
A*-mob-12 An attacker waits until HCN transfers the security context to DESTk and
then recovers IK k and EK k by AM*-3. He then proceeds as in A*-mob-9. Note that in
A*-mob-12 the attacker has to get knowledge of DESTk without having access to the data-
protection keys. This is possible if MD does not encrypt control traffic (in this case, the
attacker can intercept the plaintext of the handover indication message). If MD encrypts
control traffic, the attacker can try to guess DESTk from MD’s location.
A*-mob-26 An attacker can try to jam the association between MD and DESTk, he
can try to make MD detect a handover reason although there is none, he can jam the
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security-suite negotiation between MD and SRCk or MD and DEST
k, or he can bid down
the negotiation to fail.
A*-mob-27 An attacker can try to send a fake handover indication to SRCk in order to
keep SRCk or HCN busy.
5 An attacher can engage DESTk in a fake security-mechanism
negotiation or send fake handover request messages to DESTk in order to keep DESTk or
HCN busy.6
A*-mob-29 An attacker can try to make MD discover a handover reason although there
is none. In order to achieve this, the attacker can impersonate the network access point of
a destination network with which HCN has a handover agreement, or amplify the signal of
an existing network access point.
The attacks A*-14 to A*-16 cannot be adapted to the mobile-initiated case, as they
make use of a fake handover-command message, which is specific to a network-initiated
handover procedure. Consequently, in the mobile-initiated case, an attacker cannot simulate
a handover procedure to MD on behalf of HCN and thus cannot violate the confidentiality
in the root attack scenario RAS*-5.
However, in the mobile-initiated case, an attacker can try to simulate a handover pro-
cedure to HCN on behalf of a victim MD. We therefore consider the following additional
root attack scenario:
RAS*-12 An attacker tries to gain access to DESTk by simulating a handover from SRCk
to DESTk.
An attacker can try conduct service theft in this additional root attack scenario by one of
the following three attacks.
A*-mob-14 An attacker recovers EK k−1 and IK k−1 with the help of BAM*-5 and uses
them to send a fake handover indication message on behalf of MD to HCN over SRCk (over
DESTk). Additionally, he uses AM*-1 to recover EK k and IK k according to the DESTk
identity he included in the fake handover-indication (handover-request) message. He then
impersonates NAPDESTk and EIPESRCk to MD when it tries to associate to it.
A*-mob-15 An attacker recovers EK k−1 and IK k−1 with the help of AM*-6 or AM*-2
or AM*-1. He then uses EK k−1 and IK k−1 to send a fake handover-indication message to
SRCk on behalf of MD (over DESTk) and uses AM*-2 to generate EK k and IK k according
to the NAPDESTk identity he included in the fake handover-indication (request) message. He
then proceeds as in A*-mob-14.
A*-mob-16 An attacker disables emk−1 and imk−1 and sends a fake handover indication
message on behalf of MD to SRCk (over DESTk). He uses AM*-2 to recover Kj and
generate EK k and IK k. He then proceeds as in A*-mob-14.
5This is specific to a mobile-initiated procedure in which HCN is notified over SRCk.
6This is specific to a mobile-initiated procedure in which HCN is notified over DESTk.
4.3 k-th-order Handover—SCT with Key Derivation 135
Attack Module Used in Attack
AM*-1 A*-7, A*-9, A*-mob-9, A*-14, A*-mob-14,
A*-15, A*-18, A*-20, A*-23, A*-25
AM*-2 A*-6, A*-10, A*-mob-10, A*-15, A*-mob-15,
A*-16, A*-mob-16, A*-13, A*-17, A*-23, A*-25
AM*-3 A*-12, A*-mob-12
AM*-4 A*-1
AM*-5 A*-2, A*-3, A*-20
AM*-6 for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 A*-5, A*-15, A*-mob-15, A*-20
BAM*-5 (0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1) A*-5, A*-9, A*-mob-9, A*-14, A*-mob-14,
A*-20
BAM*-6 A*-10, A*-mob-10, A*-17
BAM*-5 (i = k) A*-8
AM*-7 A*-8, A*-11, A*-mob-11, A*-19, A*-22
Attacker disables emk−1, imk−1 A*-4, A*-21, A*-24
Attacker mounts MiM7against ka0 A*-13
Attacker breaks a0 A*-13
Attacker fakes handover request A*-27 A*-mob-29
Attacker fakes handover command A*-14, A*-15, A*-16, A*-26
Attacker fakes handover indication A*-mob-14, A*-15, A*-mob-16
Table 4.3: Overview on Attacks and Attack Modules
Table 4.3 illustrates which attacks against a network-initiated or mobile-initiated procedure
use which attack modules.
4.3.5 Requirements and Recommendations to Enhance SCT with Key
Derivation
In this section, we generalize the requirements defined for a first-order handover with HN
as anchor to the general case of a k-th-order handover with FN or HN as anchor. We
differentiate between SRC-controlled, HN-controlled, and AN-controlled handover only if
necessary.
Requirements R*-1 to R*-4 address security problems that arise from the use of weak
security mechanisms between MD and any previously serving network SRCj (1 ≤ j ≤ k).
Requirements R*-5 and R*-6 address problems arising from the use of weak mechanisms
after the k-th-order handover. The requirements R*-7 and R*-8 protect the handover
procedure messages themselves and prevent attacks arising from fake handover requests
and commands.
In addition to the security requirements for a k-th-order handover procedure we, as in
the first-order case, define recommendations (RC*-1 and RC*-2) on how DESTk and HCN
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should decide on whether or not to enter a handover agreement with each other. These
recommendations cannot be addressed by a handover procedure alone. Protection against
DoS attacks (like, for example, A*-26 to A*-27) is out of the scope of this work.
We first define and motivate the new requirements and then show how they address
each of the attacks identified in the previous section.
Any of the key-establishment protocols kej (0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1) used to establish data-
protection keys between MD and SRCj may be vulnerable to the basic attack module
BAM*-1 and thereby contribute to enable, for example, A*-7.
Any of the previously used encryption and integrity-protection mechanisms may be
partially or totally breakable and therefore vulnerable to the basic attack module BAM*-5.
This module is used in the attacks A*-7, A*-9, A*-mob-9 A*-14, and A*-mob-14. The
attacks A*-4, A*-16, and A*-mob-16 require emk−1 and imk−1 to be disabled. If any of
the previously used key-derivation functions kdj (0 ≤ j ≤ k− 1) are vulnerable to the basic
attack module BAM*-2 or BAM*-3, this enables the attacks A*-1 to A*-3, A*-6, A*-7,
A*-9, A*-14, A*-15, A*-17, A*-18, A*-20, A*-23, and A*-25.
A broken initial authentication can be used to mount A*-13. A*-13 additionally requires
that the initial key-agreement protocol ka0 is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. It
is therefore crucial for DESTk to be able to base its decision on whether to accept or refuse
a given handover request on the initial security suite (r)ss0, the cipher suites used so far,
and the key-derivation function that was used to derive kd0. Consequently, we require:
R*-1 DESTk shall base its decision on whether to accept or refuse a given handover request
on (1) the cipher suites cs0 = (ke0, em0, im0), . . . , csk−1 = (kek−1, emk−1, imk−1) previ-
ously used between MD and any of the previously serving networks; (2) the initial roaming
authentication protocol (r)a0; (3) the initial roaming key-agreement protocol (r)ka0; and (4)
the key-derivation method that was used to derive the transferred master session key kdk.
This, for example, allows DESTk to refuse a handover command if no encryption and
integrity protection was used between SRCk and MD.
In order to protect previous source networks and HCN from the use of a key-derivation
function that is vulnerable to BAM*-3, we require:
R*-2 Knowledge of a master session key Kk (used by MD and DESTk after handover)
shall not reveal any information on any previously used master session key Kj (0 ≤ j ≤
k − 1).
This protects, for example, against the attacks A*-1, A*-2, A*-3, and A*-20.
In order to protect DESTk from the use of a key-derivation function that is vulnerable
to BAM*-2, we require:
R*-3 Knowledge of a previously used master session key Kj (0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1) shall not
reveal any information on Kk to anyone except MD and DESTk.
This protects, for example, against the attacks A*-6, A*-7, A*-9, A*-15, A*-17, A*-18,
A*-20, A*-23, and A*-25.
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Requirements R*-2 and R*-3 define the properties a key-derivation function should have,
while R*-1 allows DESTk to refuse handover requests if MD and HCN used a key-derivation
function DESTk is suspicious about.
R*-4 The security-context transfer shall include information on the lifetime of the initial
master session key K0
This, for example, allows DESTk to have considerations on the key lifetime as part of its
handover decision. It furthermore allows HCN to pass on its restrictions on key lifetimes to
DESTk.
It is crucial for HCN to influence the selection of the cipher suite to be used by MD and
DESTk after handover, as otherwise it may suffer from impersonation attacks (see A*-11,
A*-22) due to the use of weak encryption and integrity-protection mechanisms em1 and
im1. The use of a weak ke1 may lead to A*-12. We therefore require:
R*-5 The negotiation of the cipher suite csk = (emk, imk, kek) (and optionally kdk)
shall enforce compliance with policies set by HCN, MD, and DESTk.
We identified bidding-down attacks against the negotiation of csk as one of the basic attack
modules. This module is required in the attacks A*-8, A*-11, A*-19, and A*-22. In order
to protect against these attacks, we require:
R*-6 The negotiation of the cipher suite csk (and optionally kdk) shall be protected against
bidding-down attacks.
In order to protect DESTk from fake handover requests as used in A*-27 and from recovery
of the transferred key Kk during transfer (BAM*-6 (for i = k) used in A*-2 to A*-4, A*-12,
and A*-20) and in order to allow DESTk to verify HCN’s authorization of the handover,
we require:
R*-7 The security-context transfer between HCN and DESTk on a k-th-order handover
shall be encrypted and integrity-protected (including replay protection) and shall provide a
proof of its origin (HCN) to DESTk.
In order to protect MD from fake handover-command messages (in the network-initiated
case) as used in A*-14, A*-15, A*-16, or A*-26 and protect HN from fake handover-
indication messages (in the mobile-initiated case) as required for the attacks A*-mob-14,
A*-mob-15, A*-mob-16, and A*-mob-26 we require the handover command or the handover-
indication message to be integrity-protected.
R*-8 In the network-initiated case, the handover-command message shall be integrity-
protected (including replay protection) and provide a proof of its origin (HCN) to MD. In
the mobile-initiated case, the handover-indication message sent from MD to HCN over SRCk
(over DESTk) shall be integrity-protected (including replay protection) and provide a proof
of its origin (MD) to HCN.
138 Chapter 4. Threat Analysis for Security-Context Transfer
DESTk may suffer from attacks that make use of the basic attack module BAM*-6 and
(c) of BAM*-5. These basic attack modules make use of vulnerabilities of the network
components and unprotected communication between network components in previously
serving networks or HCN. A handover procedure cannot protect against these basic attack
modules themselves. However, a key-derivation method that meets R*-3 prevents attacks
that use BAM*-6 of BAM*-5 as module in combination with AM*-2. The only identified
attack that uses BAM*-6 or BAM*-5 directly is A*-5, from which SRCj (1 ≤ j ≤ k) but
not DESTk suffers. With an eye on the potentially evolving attacks, we recommend:
RC*-1 A destination network shall carefully consider entering a handover agreement with
HCN if HCN does not protect the memory of its ASHCN against unauthorized access (in-
cluding physical access). DEST shall also carefully consider entering a handover agreement
with HCN if other handover partners of HCN do not protect the memory of their authentica-
tion servers and encryption and integrity-protection endpoints against unauthorized access
or do not protect the confidentiality and integrity of key transfers between their network
components.
In particular, DESTk should not enter such handover agreements if R*-3 is not met by the
key-derivation method applied.
RC*-2 A HCN shall carefully consider entering into handover agreements with destina-
tion networks that do not protect the memory of their EIPEDEST and/or ASDEST against
unauthorized access (including physical access) that do not protect the integrity and confi-
dentiality of key transfers from ASDEST to EIPEDEST, or that keep K in EIPEDEST’s memory
longer then necessary.
In particular, HCN shall not enter agreements with DESTs of this kind if it could be held
responsible for the impersonation attack A*-12. Note that other attacks with impact of
HCN that make use of any of the above vulnerabilities in DESTk can all be prevented by
the use of a key-derivation function that meets R*-2.
In order to avoid an attacker to exploit a source network’s channel reservation for a
denial of service attack by suppressing the handover-complete message, we recommend that
fall-back times on hard handover procedures be carefully set by all source networks. This,
and other ways to thwart DoS attacks (A*-26 to A*-27), is, however, out of scope of this
work.
A subsequent handover procedure that meets the above requirements is protected against
the attacks A*-1 to A*-25 (network-initiated case) or A*-1 to A*-8, A*-mob-9 to A*-mob-16,
and A*-17 to A*-25 (mobile-initiated case). As illustrated in Table 4.3, each of these attacks
makes use of one of the attack modules listed on the left side of the table. Consequently, it
is sufficient to protect against these attack modules. Table 4.4 shows how the above-defined
requirements address the attack modules listed on the left side of Table 4.3.
8In all of the identified attacks, BAM*-4 is used in combination with one of the other attack modules.
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Attack Module Adressed by
BAM*-1 (0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1) (AM*-1) R*-1 DESTk bases its decision on all kej (0 ≤
j ≤ k − 1)
BAM*-2 (AM*-1, AM*-2) R*-3
BAM*-4 for (i = k) not addressed8
BAM*-1 for (== k) (AM*-4) R*-5 policies of HCN during kek negotiation en-
forced
BAM*-3 (AM*-4, AM*-5) R*-2
BAM*-5 (AM*-1) R*-1 DEST bases its decision on emj , imj (0 ≤
j ≤ k − 1)
BAM*-6 for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 (AM*-2, AM*-6) RC*-1
BAM*-6 for i = k (AM*-3, AM*-5) RC*-2 and R*-7
BAM*-5 for i = k (AM*-4) R*-5 policies of HCN during em1 and im1 nego-
tiation enforced
AM*-7 R*-6
Attacker disables emk−1, imk−1 R*-1
Attacker breaks a0 R*-1
Attacker mounts MiM against ka0 R*-1
Attacker fakes handover command R*-8 and R*-1
Attacker fakes handover request R*-7 and R*-1
Attacker fakes handover initiation R*-8 and R*-1
Table 4.4: Basic Attack Modules and Requirements
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4.4 Differences on SCT with Key Agreement
Most naturally, the root attack scenarios RAS*-1 to RAS*-10 are the same in both the
case of SCT with key agreement and the case of SCT with key derivation. However, the
key agreement protects against some of the potential attacks that occur in SCT with key
derivation.
In particular, the basic attack modules BAM*-1, BAM*-4, and BAM*-5 are exactly
the same for SCT with key agreement as for SCT with key derivation. However, BAM*-6
differs in case of SRC-controlled handover with a key agreement that generates multiple
initial keys: in this case, Ki can be recovered from any previous security-context transfer
Sj, (1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1) as each of them includes the keys Kj . . . Kn. In case HCN is HN or AN,
BAM*-6 is the same as in the case of SCT with key derivation.
The basic attack modules BAM*-2 and BAM*-3 are specific to the key-derivation case.
In the case of key agreement, no key relations between previously used and future master
session keys can be exploited by an attacker. As a consequence, only the attack modules
AM*-3, AM*-6, and AM*-7 can be exploited by an attacker in the case of SCT with key
agreement.
These attack modules can be used as modules for A*-4, A*-8, A*-11 (A*-mob-11), A*-12
(A*-mob-12), A*-19, A*-21, A*-22, A*-24, A*-26 (A*-mob-26), A*-28, A*-29 ( A*-mob-27),
and A*-27 ( A*-mob-29). The attacks A*-5 and A*-20 can be used in connection with
BAM*-4. All of the other attacks described in Section 4.3 exploit the relation between the
master keys and are therefore specific to SCT with key derivation.
In Section 3.2.4, we introduced two possible ways to agree upon fresh keys to transfer
in the security context. One way is to execute a new run of a roaming key-agreement
protocol via SRCk before handover. The second possibility is to generate multiple keys
during the initial roaming authentication and key agreement between MD and AN. However,
as any key-agreement protocol that derives a fresh master session key Kk based on the
credentials exchanged between MD and HN could be used on this type of SCT, we describe
the requirements more generally.
Due to using a key agreement, the requirements R*-2, R*-3 and R*-4 become obsolete.
Instead, we introduce the new requirement R’-2. The requirements R*-5, R*-6, and R*-8, as
well as the recommendations RC*-1 and RC*-2, defined for subsequent handover, however,
have to be met by SCT with key agreement. The requirements R*-1 and R*-7 can be
somewhat relaxed:
R’-1 DESTk shall base its decision on whether to accept or refuse a given handover request
on (1) the last authentication protocol used between MD and any previously serving network;
(2) the key-agreement protocol used to agree upon the master session key Kk; and (3) the
cipher suite used between MD and HCN during the negotiation of csk.
The use of a weak cipher suite between HCN and MD during the negotiation of csk may
be exploited for bidding-down attacks. Weaknesses in any other cipher suites used between
MD and any previously serving networks are without consequence for DESTk as MD and
DESTk use a fresh master key.
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R’-2 The key-agreement protocol used to agree upon the master session key Kk shall not
reveal any information on Kk to anyone but MD and DESTk.
R’-7 The security-context transfer between HCN and DESTk on a k-th-order handover
shall be integrity-protected (including replay protection) and shall provide a proof of its
origin (HCN) to DESTk. Furthermore, the security-context transfer shall be encrypted in
case it includes any confidential information.
In the two key-agreement methods described previously (see Section 3.2.4) the security
context includes confidential information. However, in Section 5.3, we introduce a key-
agreement method that does not require any secret information to be transferred from
HCN to DESTk.
A handover procedure that uses SCT with key agreement and meets the here-defined
requirements is protected against all attacks (except the DoS attacks) identified for this
type of SCT. The requirements address the attacks in the same way as in the SCT with
key-derivation case.
4.5 Related Work
SCT has recently been discussed in the context of first-order inter-provider handover [74,
75, 111, 162, 176, 177, 186].
This previous work defines security requirements equivalent to R-2, R-8, and R-7, but
it is restricted to first-order handover only. Similarly, [176, 177] consider R-3 for first-order
handover only. In contrast, the first-order requirements R-1, R-6, R-5, or R-4 are neither
defined nor addressed in previous work. The authors of [74, 75, 111, 176] concentrate on
how SCT potentially allows for faster inter-provider handover, but they address only R-7
and R-8. It is only in [162, 177, 186] that the first-order variant of R-2 is addressed and
only Wang et al. [177] also address R-3 in the first-order variant.
Soltwisch et al. [162] suggest deriving K0 from K1 by adding a random number r1 to
K0. Upon transfer to MD, r1 is integrity-protected but sent in the clear. By construction,
SRC (DEST) and any attacker that obtained knowledge of K0 (K1) can thus easily obtain
K1 (K0) by intercepting r1. Consequently, this key-derivation method neither meets R-2
nor R-3.
Zhang et al. [186] suggest deriving K1 by means of a pseudo-random function with K0
and a random number r1 as input. As in [162], r1 is transferred to MD in the clear. However,
the use of the pseudo-random function as a key-derivation function guarantees that R-2 is
partially met. R-3 is not adressed.
Wang et al. [177] suggest deriving K1 in the same way as in [162]. However, the currently
serving network transfers K1 to MD encrypted with an encryption key EK 0 shared between
SRC and MD. This key-derivation method meets R-2. However, an attacker that gained
knowledge of EK 0 can intercept and decrypt the key transfer and thus obtain K1. It is,
in our opinion, not a good solution to transfer the future master key to MD protected by
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the old data-protection keys. Furthermore, by construction, the source network in their
handover procedure gains knowledge of K1. In order to meet R-3, Wang et al. suggest
using the transferred master key K1 to authenticate a Diffie-Hellman key-exchange between
MD and DEST after handover and derive data-protection keys for use after handover from
the exchanged key. However, the authors fail to notice that by knowledge of K0, the source
network (or any attacker with knowledge of K0) can mount a man-in-the-middle attack
against the key-exchange. Consequently, R-3 cannot be met by this method.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a threat analysis for all modeled SCT types and all
modeled handover procedures and defined new security requirements. A handover procedure
that meets these requirements is protected against all but the Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
identified in the threat analysis.
The need for a thorough threat analysis for SCT on handover was previously stated
in [75, 111]. First steps to specify security requirements for SCT on handover were taken
in [162, 176, 177]. Our work exceeds this previous work in (1) explicitly modeling threats
arising from subsequent context transfers, i.e., modeling the impact of weak security mecha-
nisms used between MD and any previously serving network; (2) describing concrete attack
scenarios for first-order as well as higher-order handover using our security model for wire-
less networks; (3) exploring the impact of the key relationships arising from SCT with key
derivation; (4) recognizing the importance of a cipher-suite negotiation that enforces com-
pliance with policies set by HCN, as well as MD and DESTk; and (5) the protection of this
cipher-suite negotiation against bidding down.
Although in our threat analysis we consider DoS attacks, we do not make any suggestions
on how to prevent these attacks. This is an interesting topic for future research.
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Chapter 5
New History-Enriched
Policy-Based SCT for
Inter-Provider Handover
In this chapter, we present network-initiated and mobile-initiated handover procedures with
SCT and key derivation for all handover control types that meet the requirements R*-1 to
R*-8 defined in Section 4.3, except for R*-3 which is only met in part [124]. Moreover, we
present handover procedures with SCT and key agreement that meet all the requirements
defined in Section 4.4. The new components of these procedures are a context history, key-
derivation and key-agreement methods, as well as a specification of policies and handover
agreements. The handover procedures themselves include various new methods to negotiate
the cipher suite to be used after handover.
The context history in our new approach not only protects all participants in a handover
procedure from attacks arising from the use of any sort of weak mechanisms before this
handover, but it also enables the inter-operation of providers supporting different security
levels.
The security context is enriched with a context history and a threshold on the lifetime
of the transferred master session key set by HCN. The context history includes information
on the initial security suite. In the case of SCT with key derivation, the history additionally
includes information on all previously used cipher suites, as well as the lifetime of the initial
master session key (R*-4). The context history enables DESTk to base its decision on
whether to accept or refuse a handover request on previously used security mechanisms
(R*-1, R’-1).
Furthermore, in our approach DESTk, HCN and MD set handover policies on the cipher
suites they allow to be used after handover dependent on the context history. We present
various methods to negotiate the cipher suite to be used by MD and DESTk after handover.
All of these methods enforce the choice of the cipher suite to comply with policies set by
HCN, MD, and DESTk, and consequently meet R*-5. This protects against attacks arising
from the use of weak security mechanisms after handover. Furthermore, we show how each
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of these negotiation methods can be protected against bidding-down attacks (R*-6).
In our network-initiated handover procedures, the handover-command message sent from
HCN to MD is integrity-protected and in our mobile-initiated handover procedures, the
handover-indication message is integrity-protected (R*-8). The security-context transfer
from HCN to DESTk is sent over an encrypted and authenticated channel (R*-7). In the
case of SCT with key derivation, the key-derivation functions used fully meet R*-2 and
meet R*-3 in part.
The HEPB-based approach for SCT with key-derivation is joint work with S. Wetzel
and will partly be published in [124].
Moreover, we show that the two key-agreement methods for SCT discussed so far (see
Section 3.2.4) meet R’-2 only in part. Therefore, we introduce a new key-agreement method
by means of which a master session key can be agreed upon between MD and DESTk
during HN-controlled handover. This key-agreement method does not even reveal any
information on Kk to HN and thus meets R’-2. The method makes use of a secret-sharing
approach similar to the one introduced in Section 2.2. As the fresh master key does not
have to be transferred in the clear from HCN to DESTk, this approach does not require the
authenticated channel between DESTk and HCN to be encrypted.
Outline. In Section 5.1, we present the history-enriched, policy-based (HEPB) handover
approach for SCT with key derivation. We start by specifying a network-initiated first-order
handover procedure with HN as anchor in Section 5.1.1. We then generalize this procedure
to the subsequent handover case in Section 5.1.2. The differences in case of a mobile-initiated
subsequent HEPB handover procedure are summarized in Section 5.1.3. In Section 5.2, we
present the HEPB handover approach for SCT with key agreement. In Section 5.3, we show
how a secret-sharing approach can be used to establish fresh keys between MD and DESTk.
Section 5.4 relates our new HEPB procedures to previous work in this field and concludes
the chapter.
5.1 HEPB SCT with Key Derivation
In this section, we introduce the history-enriched, policy-based approach for SCT with
key derivation. We start by describing a network-initiated first-order handover procedure
with HN as anchor. We then generalize this first-order procedure to a k-th-order handover
procedure with HN or FN as anchor (including first-order handover with HN or FN as
anchor). Finally, we describe the differences in case of a mobile-initiated k-th-order handover
procedure.
5.1.1 First-Order Network-Initiated HEPB Handover with HN as Anchor
In this section, we present the history-enriched, policy based-handover procedure for a
first-order handover with HN as anchor.
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5.1.1.1 Context History
In order to allow for DEST to base its decision on whether to accept or refuse a handover
request on the security suite used between MD and HN before handover (R-1), we include
history0 = (ss0, kd0︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=ssh0
, T0), where ss0 = (a0, ka0, ke0, em0, im0)
in the security context S1 transferred from HN to DEST during a first-order handover.
1
Here, ss0 is the initial security suite and kd0 is the key-derivation function used to derive
K1 from K0. We refer to (ss0, kd0) as the security-suite history ssh0. HN also adds a
lifetime indicator T0 to the context to provide information on the total lifetime of the initial
security context at the time of initiation of the first-order handover (R-4).2
5.1.1.2 Security Policies
MD, HN, and any destination network DEST have policies with respect to which cipher
suites they allow to be used after a first-order handover, given a particular security-suite
history ssh0. They express these policies by pre-defining sets CS MD|ssh0 , CSHN |ssh0 , and
CSDEST |ssh0 of cipher suites cs = (ke, em, im) for any possible security-suite history ssh0.
MD, HN, and DEST set CSMD|ssh0 , CSHN |ssh0 , or CSDEST |ssh0 to be empty if and only
if they do not allow for handover for a particular security-suite history ssh0 at all.
3
As a simple example, MD may have the policy that the cipher suite used before handover
must be used after handover as well. MD can express this policy by setting CS MD|ssh0 =
{(ke0, em0, im0)}.
Furthermore, MD, HN, and DEST each have a policy setting an upper boundary on how
long an initial security context may be used. To express this policy MD, HN, and DEST
each define a threshold TrMD, T rHN, and TrDEST.
5.1.1.3 Handover Agreement
HN enters first-order handover agreements with destination networks DEST. Such an agree-
ment regulates terms and conditions (including, for example, accounting issues) for HN-
controlled first-order handover to DEST. The handover agreement includes an exchange of
credentials that allow HN and DEST to establish an authenticated and encrypted channel.
1Here, we assume that S1 by means of the security suite history implicitly carries the information on
which technologies were used on before and after each previous handover. If this is not the case, history0
should additionally include T′
2We do not further specify how T0 is determined. It should, however, be a measure of the lifetime of the
initial security context measured in both time units, as well as the amount of data that was so far encrypted
and integrity-protected with keys derived from the initial master key K0. Note that T0 may consist of more
than one component.
3CSMD|ssh0 , CSHN |ssh0 , and CSDEST |ssh0 are subsets of CS, the set of all cipher suites specified for
the given wireless technology.
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As part of the handover agreement, DEST commits to its handover policies by means of
supersets CS ∗DEST |ssh0 ⊃ CSDEST |ssh0 . By committing to CS
∗
DEST |ssh0 , DEST commits
to refuse a handover request including a specific security-suite history ssh0 in case no cipher
suite cs1 ∈ CS
∗
DEST |ssh0 can be negotiated.
Committing to a superset rather than CS DEST |ssh0 for each security-suite history ssh0
provides DEST with some degree of flexibility. It allows DEST to further restrict its policy
over time (i.e., exclude certain cipher suites from CS DEST |ssh0 or set CSDEST |ssh0 to be
empty for a particular security-suite history ssh0) without prior notice to HN. By commit-
ting to CS ∗DEST |ssh0 , DEST, however, explicitly excludes specific security suite histories
after which it will not allow handover at all, already at the time of entering the handover
agreement. In turn, DEST’s commitment allows HN to pre-select candidate networks and
consequently avoid requesting handover to a destination network in vain.
If DEST does in fact not want to make any commitment, but rather wants to stay as
flexible as possible, DEST can simply commit to CS ∗DEST |ssh0 = CS. If DEST does not
accept handover for a particular security suite ss0, it commits to CS
∗
DEST |ssh0 = ∅ for this
security suite.
Similarly, DEST commits to an upper boundary uDEST on TrDEST. By committing to
uDEST, DEST commits to refusing a handover request if the lifetime indicator T0 included in
the context history history0 exceeds uDEST. This commitment again helps HN to pre-select
candidate destination networks and allows DEST to lower its threshold without prior notice
to HN.
5.1.1.4 Key Derivation and Security Context
In order to meet R-2, we require kd0 to be a pre-image resistant hash function (see [120] for
definition) that takes K1, the identity of DEST, and a random number RAND as input.
4
The pre-image resistance guarantees that knowledge of K1 does not reveal any information
on K0. However, knowledge of K0 and DEST’s identity implies knowledge of K1 such that
R-3 cannot be met by this key-derivation method.
HN includes the previously defined context history history0, as well as its threshold
TrHN
5 in the security context S1 such that
S1 = (K1, T rHN, history0).
5.1.1.5 Network-Initiated First-Order Procedure
In this section, we describe the history-enriched, policy-based handover procedure itself.
We reuse the procedure model illustrated in Figure 3.12. We will discuss various methods
4DEST’s identity guarantees that HN derives different keys for different destination networks. This is
important for subsequent handover. RAND in addition guarantees that a if MD is handed back to a previous
source network at some point in a chain of subsequent handover, the new master key to be used cannot be
pre-determined by the previous source network.
5Note that it is not sufficient to add TrHN−T0 to the security context, as the respective threshold TrDEST
of DEST may be smaller than TrHN.
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to negotiate the cipher suite cs1 at the end of this section. In the following description of
the procedure, we only describe their common interfaces.
Before handover, MD is connected to HN. MD and HN use the initial encryption mech-
anism em0 and the initial integrity-protection mechanism im0 to protect data and control
traffic between MD and EIPEHN.
In the security-mechanisms negotiation phase (1), MD and HN negotiate on the cipher
suite to use after a first-order handover. This negotiation phase takes CS MD|ssh0 and
CSHN |ssh0 as input and outputs a subset of their intersection
Nego1 ⊂ CSMD|ssh0 ∩ CSHN |ssh0 .
Upon detecting a reason for inter-provider handover, HN determines an ordered list
L = {DEST1, . . . ,DESTn} of candidate destination networks. We do not further specify
how HN determines L. However, we, without loss of generality, assume that HN will ensure
that L only contains destination networks that have a handover agreement with HN.
HN picks the first candidate network DEST1 in L and checks whether T0 < uDEST1 .
HN then checks whether CS ∗DEST1 |ssh0 ∩ Nego1 is not empty. If either of these checks fail,
HN restarts the selection process with DEST2. If both checks are successful, HN sends a
handover request to DEST1. HN proceeds like this until it sends a handover request to
some destination network DESTi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) or reaches the end of the candidate list L.
In the latter case, no handover is possible and HN drops the connection to MD. Figure 5.1
illustrates the selection procedure executed by HN.
HN
yes
yes
yes
no
select
DEST
no handover possible
i <= k
i=i+1
no
no
PSfrag replacements
T0 < uDESTi
Nego1 ∩ CS
∗
DESTi |ssh0 6= ∅
DEST = DESTi
Figure 5.1: Details of “select DEST” of Figure 3.12
The handover request sent from HN to DESTi is authenticated and integrity-protected
by means of keys agreed upon between HN and DESTi based on the credentials established
on entering the handover agreement (R-7). It includes the security context S1 defined
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above, the output Nego1 of the first negotiation phase, as well as identities of MD, HN,
6
and DESTi
handover request = (MDID ,HNID ,DEST
i
ID , S1).
Upon receipt of the handover request, DESTi decides whether to reject the handover
request or to enter the security-mechanism negotiation phase (2) with HN. DESTi first
checks whether it received the handover request over an encrypted channel from an HN
with which it has a handover agreement (see R-7). DEST then checks if T0 < TrDESTi and
whether CSDESTi |ssh0 ∩Nego1 is not empty (see R-1). If either of these checks fail, DEST
i
returns a negative handover response.7 If all of these checks are successful, DESTi sends
a positive handover response back to HN. The decision process of DESTi is illustrated in
Figure 5.2.
handover response
handover response
yes
yes
yes
negative 
positive
no
no
no
with HN?
handover agreement
decide
PSfrag replacements
DESTi
T0 < TrDESTi
CSDESTi |ssh0 ∩Nego1 6= ∅
DESTi
Figure 5.2: Details of “DESTi decision” of Figure 3.12
Upon receipt of a positive handover response, HN starts to negotiate a cipher suite cs1
with DESTi (security-mechanism negotiation (2) in Figure 3.12). This negotiation phase
takes Nego1 and CSDESTi |ssh0 as input and outputs a subset Nego2 of the intersection of
these two sets. If the negotiation is successful (i.e., Nego2 6= ∅), HN selects DEST
i as the
next destination network DEST and sends a handover-command message to MD including
the identity of DEST and the random number RAND. Upon receipt of a negative response
or if the negotiation fails, HN sets i = i + 1 and restarts the selection process.
The handover-command message is integrity-protected with the integrity-protection key
IK 0 and the integrity-protection mechanism im0 (see R-8). Upon receipt of a handover
command message MD checks whether the current lifetime of the initial security context T
exceeds TrMD. If this is the case, MD drops the connection. Otherwise MD extracts the
6Depending on the identity type used, the identity of MD may already contain HN’s identity. In this
case, the identity of HN does not have to be included again in the handover request.
7As already noted, DESTi may also reject a handover request for other reasons than security reasons,
e.g., if it does not have the free capacity to serve MD after handover.
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random number RAND and computes the master session key K1 from DEST’s identity and
RAND with the help of kd0.
If Nego2 consists of more than one element, MD and HN may negotiate which of them to
use after handover in the security-mechanism negotiation phase (3). MD may then inform
DEST of their negotiation result in the security-mechanism negotiation phase (4) during
the association.
Security-Mechanism Negotiation
In Section 4.2.5, we require that on a first-order handover with HN as anchor, the negotiation
of the cipher suite cs1 shall enforce compliance with policies set by MD, DEST, and HN
(see R-5). Moreover, the cipher-suite negotiation has to be protected against bidding-down
attacks (see R-6). In this section, we present several different negotiation methods that
meet R-5 and R-6 and show how these methods can be integrated into the history-enriched,
policy-based first-order handover procedure.
We differentiate between two types of negotiation methods again: methods that ignore
preferences of the negotiating parties and methods that respect these preferences.
Negotiation without Preferences. In this section, we describe two negotiation meth-
ods that do not take into account the preferences of MD, HN, and DESTi on the cipher
suites they allow to be used after handover. In Method 1, MD reveals its handover policies
to HN during the pre-registration.8 In the second method, HN obtains the set of cipher
suites MD allows to be used from MD while MD is associated with HN.
Method 1. For each security-suite history ssh0, MD reveals the set of cipher suites
CSMD|ssh0 to HN as part of the pre-registration process. HN looks up the sets CS MD|ssh0
and CSHN |ssh0 and computes their intersection Nego1. HN then proceeds with the candi-
date destination networks selection as illustrated in Figure 5.1.
HN includes Nego1 in the handover request it sends to DEST
i. Upon receipt of the
handover request, DESTi computes Nego2 = Nego1∩CSDESTi |ssh0 . DEST
i sends a negative
handover response to HN if Nego2 = ∅. Otherwise, DEST
i selects cs1 from the cipher suites
in Nego2 and includes cs1 in a positive handover response it sends back to HN.
HN checks whether cs1 is an element of CSHN |ssh0 . In the negative case, HN restarts
the selection process with the next destination network in L. In the positive case, HN sends
a handover command, including DESTi’s identity as well as cs1 to MD. MD checks whether
cs1 ∈ CSMD|ssh0 . In the negative case, MD sends a failure message back to HN.
This negotiation method takes policies set by HN, MD, and DEST into account. These
policies are enforced as DEST selects cs1, and MD and HN check whether cs1 is indeed a
cipher suite for which they allow (see R-5).
The handover request sent from HN to DESTi that includes the set Nego1 of cipher
suites HN and MD allow to be used after handover is integrity-protected by means of
keys agreed upon based on the credentials established between HN and DESTi as part
8MD may change this policies, e.g., through a web interface provided by its HN.
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of entering their handover agreement. The handover-command message sent from HN to
MD that includes the negotiated cipher suite cs1 is integrity-protected by means of the
initial integrity-protection mechanism im0 and the initial integrity key IK 0. The integrity
protection of these two messages guarantee that this negotiation method meets R-6.
The disadvantage of this negotiation method is that HN has to store all handover policies
for all security suite histories ssh0 for each of its pre-registered users.
Method 2. To cut down the amount of data HN has to store, Method 1 can be changed
in the following way: Instead of committing to its policies as part of the pre-registration,
MD sends the set of cipher suites CSMD|ssh0 it allows to be used after handover for the
current initial security context to HN prior to a handover reason detection. The transfer of
this message is integrity-protected by means of im0 and IK 0. HN computes the intersection
Nego1 = CSHN |ssh0 ∩ CSHN |ssh0 and in the following HN, DEST, and MD proceed as in
Method 1.
Method 2 meets R-6 as the transfers of CSMD|ssh0 , Nego1 and cs1 are integrity-
protected. R-5 is met by Method 2 in the same way as in Method 1.
It is interesting to note that in both methods DESTi can refuse handover if no or a weak
integrity protection was used before handover by setting the set of cipher suites it allows
to be used to be empty. DESTi thus has additional control over the protection of the cs1
negotiation against bidding down.
Negotiation with Preferences. In this section, we discuss some negotiation methods
that take into account preferences of HN, MD, and DEST with respect to the cipher suites
they allow to be used. We assume that HN, MD, and DEST each have a preference order
≤HN , ≤MD, and ≤DEST on each of their handover policies. These preference orders differ
from each other as HN, MD, and DEST may assert the security level of cipher suites
differently.
Negotiation mechanisms that respect the preferences of the negotiating parties can be
symmetric and weigh the preferences of each party equally high. In many cases, however,
an asymmetric negotiation mechanism that orders the negotiating parties and respects the
preference of the party ranked highest over the other parties seems more suitable. Imagine,
for example, that HN guarantees to reimburse DEST for service provisioning for its pre-
registered users. In this case, HN takes a bigger risk if DEST and MD use weak security
mechanisms than DEST does. Thus HN’s preferences should outweigh DEST’s preferences.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss one example for a negotiation method that
respects HN’s preferences highest, one that weighs DEST’s preferences highest, and one
that weighs MD’s preferences highest. Method 5 presented in Section 1.3 that respects the
preferences of two negotiating parties equally high cannot easily be adapted to the handover
case, as it requires several round-trips between the negotiating parties.
Method 3. In this method, HN’s preferences weigh highest, MD’s preferences next, and
DEST’s preferences weigh the lowest. MD sends the set of cipher suites CS MD|ssh0 , as well
as its preference order ≤MD on CSMD|ssh0 , to HN in Phase (1) before a handover reason is
detected. DESTi sends CSDESTi |ssh0 and ≤DESTi to HN in Phase (2) as part of its handover
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response. HN then computes the intersection of CS MD|ssh0 , CSHN |ssh0 and CSDESTi |ssh0
and orders the resulting set of cipher suites according to its preference order ≤HN . If HN
prefers more than one cipher suite most, it orders these according to MD’s preferences. If
MD prefers more than one of the remaining cipher suites most, HN orders these according
to DEST’s preferences. From the remaining cipher suites, HN randomly picks cs1:
cs1 ∈R max
≤DESTi
{
max
≤MD
{
max
≤HN
{CSHN |ssh0 ∩ CSMD|ssh0 ∩ CSDESTi |ssh0}
}}
HN sends its choice cs1 back to DEST
i and DESTi checks that cs1 is indeed a cipher
suite it allows to be used given the current security-suite history. HN additionally includes
cs1 in the handover command it sends to MD and MD checks whether cs1 ∈ CSMD|ssh0 .
As MD and DEST check that cs1 complies with their respective policy, Method 3 enforces
compliance with their policies. HN, on the other hand, selects the cipher suite to be used
and can therefore enforce its policy as well (see R-5).
The protection against bidding-down attacks (R-6) works similar to Method 2: MD
protects the integrity of the transfer of CS MD|ssh0 to HN by means of im0 and IK 0. DEST
i
uses keys agreed upon based on the credentials established between DESTi and HN as part
of entering a handover agreement to integrity-protect the transfer of CS DESTi |ssh0 to HN.
Method 4. In this method, the preferences of DESTi weigh highest, those of HN second,
and those of MD lowest. MD again sends CS MD|ssh0 to HN in Phase (1). HN computes
the intersection Nego1 = CSHN |ssh0 ∩ CSMD|ssh0 and includes Nego1 in the integrity-
protected handover request sent to DESTi. DESTi computes the intersection of Nego1
with CSDESTi |ssh0 and orders the result Nego2 according to its own preference order ≤DESTi .
If more than one cipher suite is maximal according to the preference order of DESTi, it
orders these according to the preferences of HN. If more than one cipher suite is maximal
according to HN’s preferences, DESTi orders these according to MD’s preferences. DESTi
then randomly picks a cipher suite from the remaining cipher suites:
cs1 ∈R max
≤MD
{
max
≤HN
{
max
≤DESTi
{Nego2 ∩ CSDESTi |ssh0}
}}
DESTi includes its choice cs1 in the handover response to HN and HN checks that
cs1 ∈ CSHN |ssh0 . HN informs MD of the choice of cs1 in the handover command message
(Phase (3)).9 MD checks that cs1 ∈ CSMD|ssh0 .
The protection against bidding down (R-6) works as in Method 1. Moreover, R-5 is met
by MD and HN checking the compliance of DESTi’s choice with their policies.
Method 5. In this method, MD’s preferences weigh highest. DESTi sends CSDESTi |ssh0 to
HN as part of the handover response and protects the integrity of this message by means of
keys agreed upon between DESTi and HN based on the credentials exchanged on entering
the handover agreement. HN computes the intersection of the received set of cipher suites
and CSHN |ssh0 and sends the result Nego2 to MD as part of the integrity-protected handover
9Alternatively, DESTi could inform MD of its choice during association. However, in the above method,
HN can enforce its policy and MD gets a guarantee that HN approves of the choice of cs1.
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command. MD then proceeds analogous to DESTi in the last method, replacing MD with
DESTi. MD informs HN of its choice cs1 (Phase(3)). HN checks whether cs1 complies with
its policy. In the positive case, HN sends cs1 in an integrity-protected message to DEST
i.
DESTi, in turn, checks that cs1 complies with its policy.
The integrity protection of the handover response, as well as the handover-command
guarantees that the cipher-suite negotiation is protected against bidding down (R-6).
MD, DESTi, and HN get to enforce their policies such that R-5 is met. Note that it
is crucial that MD sends its choice back to HN and HN in turn sends cs1 to DEST
i, as
otherwise HN’s policy cannot be enforced.
5.1.2 Network-Initiated k-th-order HEPB Handover
In this section, we present the history-enriched, policy-based handover approach for
network-initiated k-th-order (k ≥ 1) handover procedures with HN or FN as anchor.10 The
proposed procedure differs for the three handover control types only in the key-derivation
method, the content of the security context, and the protection of the handover-command
message sent from HCN to MD. We therefore discuss all of the handover control types at
once and differentiate between them only if necessary. We reuse the handover procedure
modeled in Figure 3.13 to describe the history-enriched, policy-based procedure.
5.1.2.1 Context History
In order to enable DESTk to base its decision on whether to accept or refuse a han-
dover request on the initial roaming security suite (r)ss0, the previously used cipher
suites cs1, . . . , csk−1 and the key-derivation function kd0 (HN and AN-controlled cases)
or kd0, . . . , kdk−1 (SRC-controlled case) used to derive Kk from previously used master
session keys (R*-1), we include
historyk−1 = ((r)ss0, kd0, [kd1, . . . , kdk−1], cs1, . . . , csk−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:sshk−1
, Tk−1)
in the security context Sk transferred from HCN to DEST
k during a k-th-order handover.
HCN also adds Tk−1 to the context to provide information on the total lifetime of the initial
security context at the time of initiation of the k-th-order handover (R*-4).
5.1.2.2 Security Policies
We assume that there is a maximum number h ∈ N of subsequent handover specified for
each technology. The value h determines how long context histories can maximally be.
For each 1 ≤ k ≤ h, that is up to the maximum number of subsequent handover, HCN,
MD and any destination network DEST have policies with respect to the cipher suites
they allow to be used after a k-th-order handover given a particular security-suite history
10This includes first-order handover with FN as anchor.
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sshk−1. They express these policies by pre-defining sets CS HCN |sshk−1 , CSMD|sshk−1 , and
CSDEST |sshk−1 of cipher suites cs = (ke, em, im) for any possible security suite history
sshk−1. HCN, MD, and DEST pre-define these sets to be empty if and only if they do
not allow for handover for a particular security suite history sshk−1 at all. It is impor-
tant to note, that HCN, MD and DEST either allow or disallow handover for a certain
security-suite history sshk−1. If they allow handover after a history sshk−1 they may have
preference with respect to the cipher suite ck that will be used after a k-th-order han-
dover. However, the evaluation of sshk−1 is predetermined and fixed by the each handover
participant independently.
Furthermore, MD, HCN, and DEST each have a policy, setting an upper boundary on
how long the same initial security context may be used. To express this policy, MD, HCN,
and DEST each define a threshold TrMD, T rHCN, and TrDEST. While h is only a counter of
the number of subsequent handover, the thresholds TrX measure the lifetime of an initial
security context in time units, as well as the amount of data that was so far encrypted and
integrity-protected with keys derived from the initial master key K0.
5.1.2.3 Handover Agreement
HCN enters handover agreements with destination networks DEST. As in the first-order
handover case, these handover agreements regulate the terms and conditions for HCN-
controlled k-th-order handover (1 ≤ k ≤ h).
The handover agreement includes an exchange of credentials that allow HCN and DEST
to establish an authenticated and encrypted channel.
As part of the handover agreement, DEST commits to its handover policy by means
of supersets CS ∗DEST |sshk−1 ⊃ CSDEST |sshk−1 for each security suite history sshk−1 and
any 1 ≤ k ≤ h. By means of this commitment, DEST commits that it will refuse a k-th-
order handover request including sshk−1 unless a cipher suite csk ∈ CS
∗
DEST |sshk−1 can be
negotiated to be used after handover. Committing to a superset rather than CS DEST |sshk−1
provides DEST with some degree of flexibility. It allows DEST to further restrict its policy
over time, but also to explicitly refuse handover for particular security suite histories already
at the time of entering the handover agreement. In turn, the commitment allows HCN to
pre-select candidate destination networks according to their commitments. This allows
HCN to avoid requesting handover in vain. As in the first-order case, DEST commits to
CS if it does not want to make any commitment at all and commits to CS ∗DEST |sshk−1 = ∅
if it does not allow for k-th-order handover given a particular security-suite history sshk−1.
Similarly, DEST commits to an upper boundary uDEST on its threshold TrDEST. By this
commitment, DEST commits to refusing handover requests that include a lifetime indica-
tor Tk ≥ uDEST. This commitment again helps HCN to pre-select candidate destination
networks and allows DEST to lower its threshold without prior notice to HCN.
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5.1.2.4 Trust Assumption
Throughout the rest of this chapter we assume DESTk trusts HCN on all information
received by HCN. In particular we assume that in the HN-controlled case, DESTk trusts that
HN included the correct information on the security context history in the security context
Sk. This assumptions seems very lax, as DESTk and HN establish a trust relationship when
entering a handover agreement and have to trust each other to some extend anyway, e.g.,
as HN generates the key Kk DESTk subsequently uses. Similarly, we assume that in the
AN-controlled case, DESTk trusts that AN included the correct information on the security
context history in the security context Sk. Moreover we assume that in the SRC-controlled
case DESTk trusts that SRCk included the correct information into the security context
Sk. Note that in the SRC-controlled case this assumption again leads to transitive trust
relationships between the subsequently serving network, which corresponds to the fact that
DESTk only has a handover agreement with SRCk in this case.
5.1.2.5 Key Derivation and Security Context
The key derivation depends on who controls the handover.
SRC-Controlled Handover. In an SRC-controlled handover, MD, SRCk−1, and SRCk
negotiate a key-derivation function kdk−1 as part of the security-mechanism negotiation on
the (k − 1)-st-order handover. kdk−1 is included in the security context Sk, which DESTk
receives from SRCk during the k-th-order handover. We require kdk−1 to be a pre-image
resistant hash function (see [120] for definition) that takes Kk−1, DESTk’s identity and a
fresh random number RAND as input and outputs a derived master session key Kk.
The pre-image resistance guarantees that knowledge of Kk does not reveal any infor-
mation on any previously used master session key Kj (0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1) (R*-2). However,
knowledge of any previous key and the identities of the previously serving networks implies
knowledge of Kk. Consequently, R*-3 cannot be met by this key-derivation method. In
particular, SRCk and any previously serving network SRCj (1 ≤ j ≤ k) gain knowledge of
Kk.
The k-th-order security context on an SRC-controlled handover is
Sk = (Kk, historyk−1, T rSRC),
where
historyk−1 = ((r)ss0, kd0, kd1, . . . , kdk−1, cs1, . . . , csk−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:sshk−1
, Tk−1).
AN-Controlled Handover. In an AN-controlled handover, MD and AN negotiate a
pre-image resistant hash function as key-derivation function kd0 during the negotiation of
the initial security suite ss0. This key-derivation function is included in any subsequent
security-context transfer Sk (1 ≤ k ≤ h). Again, kd0 takes K0, DESTk’s identity, and
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a fresh random number RAND as input and outputs a master session key Kk. The pre-
image resistance guarantees that R-2 is met. The fact that AN (and MD) derive Kk from
K0 additionally guarantees that knowledge of Kj (1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1) does not reveal any
information on Kk. However, it is important to note that knowledge of K0 reveals all
subsequently used Kj (1 ≤ j ≤ k). Consequently, this key-derivation method meets R-3 in
part.
The k-th-order security context on an AN-controlled handover is
Sk = (Kk, historyk−1, T rAN ),
where
historyk−1 = ((r)ss0, kd0, cs1, . . . , csk−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:sshk−1
, Tk−1).
HN-Controlled Handover. In an HN-controlled handover, MD and HN negotiate a key-
derivation function kd0 as part of the pre-registration process. HN either obtains knowledge
of the initial master session key K0 during the authentication between AN and MD, or AN
transfers K0 to HN as part of the handover-indication message. Kk is derived from K0 in
the same way as in the AN-controlled case. Again, this key-derivation method meets R-2
and guarantees that the knowledge of Kj (1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1) does not reveal any information
on Kk. However, AN and HN may gain knowledge of all of the subsequently used master
session keys. Consequently, R-3 is again met in part.
The k-th-order security context on an HN-controlled handover is
Sk = (Kk, historyk−1, T rHN ),
where historyk−1 is defined as in the AN-controlled case.
5.1.2.6 Network-Initiated k-th-order Handover Procedure
For an overview on the subsequent handover procedure, we refer to Figure 3.13. As in the
first-order case, we will discuss various methods to negotiate the cipher suite csk to be
used after handover at the end of this section. In the following description of the handover
procedure itself, we only describe the common interface of the negotiation methods.
Before a k-th-order handover, MD is connected to SRCk. MD and SRCk use the encryp-
tion mechanism emk−1 and the integrity-protection mechanism imk−1 negotiated during the
(k − 1)-st-order handover from SRCk−1 to DESTk−1 = SRCk in order to protect the data
and control traffic between them.
In the security-mechanism negotiation phase (1), MD and SRCk−1 negotiate on the
cipher suite to use after handover. In most of the negotiation methods we present, MD
simply sends CSMD|sshk−1 to SRCk−1 in phase (1).
Upon detecting a handover reason, SRCk sends a handover-indication message to HCN.
This message includes measurement data provided by MD and SRCk on the reception level
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of surrounding NAPs. Depending on the negotiation method, the handover indication may
additionally include CSMD|sshk−1.
HCN determines an ordered list L = {DEST1k, . . . ,DEST
n
k} of candidate destination
networks with which it has a handover agreement. HCN picks the first candidate net-
work DEST1k in its list and checks whether uDEST1k
> Tk−1. HCN then checks whether
CS ∗DEST1
k
|sshk−1 6= ∅. If either of these checks fail, HCN restarts the selection process with
DEST2k. If both checks are successful, HCN sends a handover request to DEST
1
k.
The handover-request message sent from HCN to any candidate network DESTik (1 ≤
i ≤ n) includes the security context Sk, as well as the identities of MD, DEST
i
k, and HCN.
The handover-request message is authenticated and encrypted by means of keys agreed upon
between HCN and DESTik based on the credentials established on entering the handover
agreement (R*-7).
Upon receipt, DESTik first checks whether it received the handover request from an HCN
it indeed has a handover agreement with. DESTik then checks whether Tk−1 < TrDESTi
k
and
whether CSDESTi
k
|ssh0 6= ∅. If either of these checks fail, DEST
i
k sends a negative handover
response back to HCN. If all of these checks are successful, DESTik sends a positive handover
response back to HCN.
Upon receipt of a positive handover response from DESTik, HCN starts to negotiate a
cipher suite csk with DEST
i
k using one of the negotiation methods described below. If the
negotiation is not successful, HCN restarts the selection process with the next candidate
network in L. If the negotiation is successful, HCN selects DESTik as destination network
DESTk for the k-th-order handover and sends a handover command message to MD in-
cluding DESTk’s identity and the fresh random number RAND used for key-derivation.
Depending on the negotiation method used, the handover command message additionally
includes information on the cipher suite(s) negotiated between HCN and DESTik in the
negotiation phase (2). The integrity protection of the handover command message (R*-8)
depends on who controls the handover:
SRC-Controlled Case. In the SRC-controlled case, the handover command message is
integrity-protected by means of the integrity-protection mechanism imk−1 and the integrity-
protection key IK k−1.
AN-Controlled and HN-Controlled Cases. In the AN-controlled and the HN-
controlled cases, the handover-command message is integrity-protected by means of the
initial integrity-protection mechanism im0 and the initial integrity-protection key IK 0.
Upon receipt of the handover command, MD checks whether Tk−1 ≤ TrMD. In the
positive case, MD extracts RAND and derives K1 from K0, RAND and DEST′s identity.
Then, MD and DESTk associate and use the negotiated kek to establish data-protection
keys EK k and IK k and subsequently use the negotiated emk and imk for encryption and
integrity protection.
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Security-Mechanism Negotiation. As in the first-order case, HCN, MD, and DESTk
can negotiate the cipher suite to use after handover in various different ways. In this section,
we generalize the five negotiation methods introduced in Section 5.1.1.5 to the subsequent
handover case.
Method 1.
HN-Controlled Case. HN stores the sets of cipher suites CS MD|sshk−1 (0 ≤ k ≤ h) of all its
pre-registered MDs.
AN-Controlled Case. HN stores the sets of cipher suites CS MD|sshk−1 (0 ≤ k ≤ h) of all its
pre-registered MDs. In case the anchor network is FN, HN transfers all of these policies to
AN right after or as part of the authentication between FN and MD.
SRC-Controlled Case. SRCk−1 obtains MDs policy expressions CSMD|sshi−1 (k ≤ i ≤ h+1)
from SRCk−1 during the (k− 1)-st-order handover from SRCk−1 to SRCk (2 ≤ k ≤ h). AN
obtains MDs policies either during the pre-registration (AN = HN) or during the initial
authentication between AN and MD (AN = FN).
In all three handover control types, the negotiation proceeds as follows: before sending
a handover request to DESTik on a k-th-order handover, HCN computes the intersection
Nego1 = CSHCN |sshk−1 ∩ CSMD|sshk−1 (5.1)
HCN then includes Nego1 in the handover request sent to DEST
i
k. DEST
i
k computes the
intersection Nego2 = Nego1 ∩CSDESTik
|sshk−1 and selects one of the elements of Nego2 to be
the cipher suite csk. DEST
i
k returns csk back to HCN as part of the handover response. HCN
checks whether cs1 complies with its policy. If this check is not successful, HCN restarts the
destination network selection process with DESTi+1k . Otherwise, HCN selects DEST
i
k to be
the next destination network DESTk and includes cs1 in the handover command to MD.
Upon receipt of the handover command, MD checks whether cs1 complies with its policies.
If this is not the case, MD drops the connection. If the compliance check is successful, MD
tries to associate with DESTk.
As DESTik selects the cipher suite to use and HN and MD both check that DEST
i
k’s
choice complies with their policies, MD, HCN, and DESTik can enforce that the negotiated
cipher suite csk complies with their policies. Consequently, R*-5 is met by this negotiation
method.
In the AN-controlled and the SRC-controlled cases, the transfer of CS MD|sshk−1 from
HN to AN respectively from SRCk−1 to SRCk is integrity-protected by means of keys agreed
upon based on the credentials exchanged on entering the handover agreement. Additionally,
the handover-response message is integrity-protected by means of keys agreed upon between
DESTik and HCN based on the credentials exchanged on entering the handover agreement.
The handover-command message sent from HCN and MD is integrity-protected as already
discussed. Consequently, the negotiation Method 1 is protected against bidding-down at-
tacks (R*-6).
Method 2. Instead of having HN pre-store all policies of its pre-registered users, MD sends
the set of cipher suites CSMD|sshk−1 it allows to be used after a k-th-order handover given
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sshk−1 to SRCk in Phase (1).
SRCk forwards MD’s policy to HCN (if different from SRC) as part of the handover-
indication message sent to HCN after detecting a handover reason. The rest of Method 2 is
the same as in Method 1.
Method 2 meets R*-5 in the same way as Method 1. To meet R*-6, MD has to protect
the integrity of CSMD|sshk−1 during its transfer to HCN via SRCk. In the HN-controlled
and the AN-controlled cases, MD uses the integrity-protection mechanism im0 and the
integrity key IK 0 to protect the transfer. In the SRC-controlled case, MD protects the
transfer by means of imk−1 and IK k−1. In combination with the integrity protection of
handover response and handover command as described in Method 1, R*-6 is met.
Method 3. MD again sends CSMD|sshk−1 to SRCk in Phase(1). After detecting a handover
reason, SRCk forwards MD’s policy to HCN. DEST
i
k sends its policy CSDESTi |sshk−1 to HCN
in Phase (2), included in the handover response. HCN computes the intersection Nego1 of
CSMD|sshk−1 , CSHCN |sshk−1 , andCSDESTik
|sshk−1 and orders it according to its preference
order. HCN then orders the result according to the preference order of MD and finally
according to the preference order of DESTik. HCN then randomly selects
csk ∈R max
≤
DESTi
k
{
max
≤MD
{
max
≤HN
{CSHN |ssh0 ∩ CSMD|ssh0 ∩ CSDESTi
k
|ssh0}
}}
.
HCN sends its choice csk back to DEST
i
k in an integrity-protected message and includes
csk in the integrity-protected handover command it sends to MD. Upon receipt of csk, MD
and DESTik check whether HCN’s choice indeed complies with their policies. Consequently,
this method meets R*-5.
MD protects the transfer of CS MD|sshk−1 to HCN as described in Method 2. This, to-
gether with the integrity protection of the messages indicating HCN’s choice of csk, protects
the negotiation of csk against bidding-down attacks (R*-6).
Method 4. MD again sends CSMD|sshk−1 to SRCk in Phase(1) and SRCk forwards it to
HCN in the handover request. HCN computes the intersection
Nego1 = CSMD|sshk−1 ∩CSHCN |sshk−1
and includes it in the handover request sent to DESTik. DEST
i
k computes the intersection
of Nego1 with its own CSDESTi
k
|sshk−1 and orders the result according to its own preference
order. DESTik then orders the cipher suites it prefers most according to HCN’s prefer-
ence order. Finally, if HCN prefers more than one cipher suite most, DESTik orders these
according to MD’s preference order:
csk ∈R max
≤MD
{
max
≤HCN
{
max
≤
DESTi
k
{Nego1 ∩ CSDESTik
|sshk−1}
}}
.
DESTik then selects csk randomly amongst the remaining cipher suites. The rest of the
procedure, as well as its protection against bidding-down attacks (R*-6) and the arguments
for meeting R*-5, is the same as for Method 2.
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Method 5. DESTik sends CSDESTik
|sshk−1 to HCN as part of the handover response and
protects this message by means of keys agreed upon based on the credentials exchanged
between HCN and DESTik on entering the handover agreement. HCN computes the inter-
section of its own CSHCN |sshk−1 with the received set and sends the result to MD. MD
finally computes the intersection
Nego3 = CSDESTi
k
|sshk−1 ∩ CSMD|sshk−1CSHCN |sshk−1
and orders this set first according to its own preferences. If it regards more than one cipher
suite equally well, MD orders these maximal suites according to HCN’s preference order and
finally, if HCN prefers more than one cipher suite most, according to DESTik’s preference
order. MD then randomly chooses csk from the remaining cipher suites:
csk ∈R max
≤
DESTi
k
{
max
≤HCN
{
max
≤MD
{Nego3}
}}
.
MD sends csk back to HCN and HCN informs DEST
i
k of MD’s choice. Thus, HCN and
DESTik get to refuse MD’s choice of csk and R*-5 is again met. DEST
i
k protects the integrity
of the handover-response message and HCN protects the integrity of the handover-command
message as discussed in Method 3. This protects Method 5 against bidding-down attacks
(R*-6).
5.1.3 Differences in the Mobile-Initiated Case
The context history, the security policies, the handover agreements, and the key derivation,
for a mobile-initiated procedure are the same as for a network-initiated handover. In par-
ticular, the key-derivation methods for different handover control types fully meet R*-2 and
meet R*-3 in part, as in the network-initiated case. As opposed to the network-initiated
case, the security context in the mobile-initiated case includes the random number RAND
generated by HCN to derive the master session key Kk. RAND is integrity-protected by
means of a key shared between HCN and MD (IK k−1 in the SRC-controlled case, IK 0 in the
AN-controlled and the HN-controlled cases). The same holds for R*-4, as Tk−1 is included
in the context history. However, the procedures themselves, as well as the negotiation of
the cipher suite to use after handover, differs from the network-initiated case.
HCN Notified by MD. In case HCN is notified by MD (see Figure 3.15, the handover-
indication message sent from MD to HCN is integrity-protected with the help of IK 0 and im0
in the AN-controlled and HN-controlled cases or IK k−1 and imk−1 in the SRC-controlled
case (R*-8). The handover-indication message includes the identities of MD, HCN, and
DESTik.
Upon receipt of a handover indication message, HCN checks whether it received this
message from MD correctly integrity-protected. HCN then checks whether it indeed has a
handover agreement with DESTik. If both of these checks are successful, HCN proceeds as
in the network-initiated case, i.e., HCN checks whether CS ∗DESTi
k
|sshk−1 is not empty. If this
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check is successful, HCN sends a handover request to DESTik including the same information
as in the network-initiated case. The handover request is encrypted and integrity-protected
as in the network-initiated case (R*-7).
Upon receipt of a handover request from HCN, DESTik decides whether to accept or
refuse the request in the same way as in the network-initiated case, based on the context
history included in the handover request (R*-1).
DESTik acknowledges its response in the handover response message sent to MD. In
the positive case, DESTki includes the integrity-protected random number RAND in the
handover response message.
Here we give only one example for a method to negotiate the cipher suite to be used after
handover: MD sends CSMD|sshk−1 to HCN via SRCk included in the integrity-protected
handover-indication message. HCN computes the intersection
Nego1 = CSMD|sshk−1 ∩CSHCN |sshk−1
and includes Nego1 in the handover-request message sent over an encrypted and authenti-
cated channel to DESTik. DEST
i
k computes the intersection
Nego2 = Nego1 ∩ CSDESTi
k
|sshk−1 .
DESTik selects one of the cipher suites in Nego2 as csk and sends its choice back to HCN in
an integrity-protected message. HCN checks whether csk complies with its policy. If this is
the case, it sends a message including csk back to DEST
i
k. HCN protects the integrity of
this message by means of IK0 and im0 (HN-controlled and AN-controlled cases) or IK k−1
and imk−1 (SRC-controlled case). DEST
i
k includes this message and its integrity protection
in the handover-response message it sends to MD after successful association. Upon receipt
of the handover response, MD checks HCN’s integrity protection on the message including
csk. If this is successful, MD checks whether csk complies with its policies. If either of
these checks fail, MD drops the connection to DESTik. The integrity protection of HCN’s
approval of csk, the fact that MD checks the correctness of the integrity protection, and
the fact that MD checks whether csk complies with its policy guarantee that R*-5 is met.
Moreover, the fact that all messages containing policy-related information are integrity-
protected guarantees that this negotiation method is protected against bidding down attacks
(R*-6).
HCN Notified by DESTik. In case HCN is notified by DESTk (see Figure 3.14), MD
sends the handover indication message to DESTk right after association, and DESTk for-
wards it to HCN. The rest of the procedure is the same as if HCN is notified by MD.
One way to negotiate the cipher suite csk to be used after handover is the following:
MD sends CSMD|sshk−1 to DEST
i
k after the association. MD protects the integrity of this
message by means of IK 0 and im0 (HN-controlled and AN-controlled cases) or IK k−1 and
imk−1 (SRC-controlled case). DEST
i
k sends CSMD|sshk−1 (including its integrity protection
by HCN) and CSDESTi
k
|sshk−1 to HCN in the integrity-protected handover-indication message
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it sends to HCN. Upon receipt of this message, HCN checks the correctness of the integrity
protection of DESTik and MD. If both checks are successful, HCN computes the intersection
of the three sets CSHCN |sshk−1 , CSMD|sshk−1 , and CSDESTik
|sshk−1 and chooses one of the
cipher suites in the intersection as csk. HCN includes its choice in the integrity-protected
handover-request message to DESTik. HCN also adds integrity protection to csk, computed
by means of IK 0 and im0 (HN-controlled, AN-controlled case) or IK k−1 and imk−1 (SRC-
controlled case) to the handover request. Upon receipt of the handover request, DESTik
checks whether csk complies with its policy. If this is the case, DEST
i
k adds csk and the
integrity protection of csk by HCN to the handover-response message sent to MD. Upon
receipt of the handover response, MD checks whether csk complies with its policy.
As HCN selects csk and DEST
i
k and MD check the compliance of csk with their respective
policies, R*-5 is met by this negotiation method. Moreover, the integrity protection on all
policy-related messages guarantees that the negotiation of the cipher suite csk is protected
against bidding-down attacks, thus meeting R*-6.
5.1.4 Handling Long Histories and Large Amounts of Policy Data
As described so far, the key history sshk transferred on a k-th-order handover includes
the initial security suite ss0, all subsequently used cipher suites cs1, . . . , csk−1 in the order
they were used, and the key-derivation function kd0 (HN-controlled and AN-controlled
cases) or the key-derivation functions kd0, . . . , kdk−1 (SRC-controlled case). With every
subsequent handover, the context history is thus extended by one cipher suite cs and in
the SRC-controlled case also by one key-derivation function kd. The actual number of
occurring subsequent handover depends on the size of each subsequently serving network,
the duration of an ongoing connection, the velocity of MD, and the path MD takes through
each of the networks. The smaller the coverage area of the subsequently serving networks
is and the higher the velocity of a MD that travels straight through each network, the more
subsequent handover can be expected.
For example, let us consider subsequent handover procedures between different wide-
area network providers that each cover an area of 15 km radius and a MD that travels at
100 km/h directly through the providers’ networks. Within the 90 minutes required to
watch a streaming movie, MD maximally crosses the networks of five providers. Thus, the
key history on the fourth-order handover includes the initial security suite ss0, as well as
cs1, cs2, and cs3. Additional subsequent handover do not take place as the only ongoing
service use, the video streaming, completes within the 90 minutes.
The above example indicates that in some cases, transferring the complete history is
feasible. However, for other scenarios, transferring the complete histories can result in a
too-large amount of data to transfer and process upon handover. Imagine, for example,
a densely populated metropolitan area in which thousands of private local area network
providers (e.g., private persons) operate a network with a coverage area as small as 100m2.
A MD traveling with 50 km/h through theses networks will travel through 750 networks
within the 90 minutes of a streaming movie. In this scenario, it may not be feasible to
transfer and process the complete history on each subsequent handover.
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With the length of the security-suite history and the maximum number of subsequent
handover h, the number of sets of cipher suites that have to be pre-defined and stored by
MD and each network grows. For each (1 ≤ k ≤ h), the number of possible cipher suites in
sshk−1 is
|CS|k
such that each participant has to set and store
h∑
k=1
|CS|k · |(R)A× (R)KA|
sets of cipher suites it allows to be used after handover. The number of cipher-suite sets
thus grows exponentially with the number of subsequent handover.
The above scenario, as well as the amount of policy data that has to be stored and
processed during handover if each cipher suite is listed in the security-suite history in the
order it was used, motivate us to think of ways to compress the information included in
a key history. Whether or not a compression is necessary and which compression method
is most suitable has to be decided for each technology and application scenario separately.
Obviously, any compression method reduces the granularity in which the participants of
subsequent handover can express their policies. Consequently, whenever feasible, no com-
pression should be used.
The easiest way to reduce the length of a key history is to omit subsequent uses of
the same cipher suite. This compression method is lossless, as the use of the same cipher
suite between MD and one network or between MD and two different networks does not
carry any additional information. This compression method can therefore be used without
further concern. However, this compression method may still result in long histories, e.g,
in case MD is handed back and forth between two networks resulting in the alternate use
of two different cipher suites and does not reduce the amount of policy data that has to be
pre-defined and stored.
A second method to reduce the length of a key history is to omit the order and frequency
of appearance of the subsequently used cipher suites. A reappearing cipher suite is thus not
mentioned again in the transferred history. This compression method guarantees small key
histories whenever the overall number of available cipher suites |CS| for the given technology
is small.11 Moreover, this method considerably reduces the length of histories in case MD
moves on the border line between two networks and is subsequently handed back and forth
between them.
Omitting the order and frequency of the appearance of a cipher suite additionally de-
creases the number of sets of cipher suites that have to be pre-defined considerably. On a
11As opposed to the authentication protocols, the cipher suites used in a wireless technology have to be
standardized, as otherwise handover and roaming cannot take place. As a consequence, wireless technologies
typically use fewer than 10 cipher suites such that this compression method seems feasible for state-of-the-art
technologies.
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k-th-order handover MD, HCN, and DESTk can encounter
|CS|∑
i=1
(
|CS|
i
)
−
|CS|∑
i=k+1
(
|CS|
i
)
cipher suites such that MD, and each network overall maximally has to pre-define and store
2|CS| · |(R)A× (R)KA|
sets of cipher suites.12
By omitting the order of appearance of a cipher suite in the history, the participants
lose the ability to base their policies on certain patterns of subsequently used cipher suites.
For example, they can no longer forbid handover for a certain pattern of subsequently used
cipher suites only. Instead, all handover with histories that include all of the different
cipher suites in the pattern have to be forbidden. If, for example, a network provider
wants to forbid handover to its network as destination network if the history includes the
pattern (cs1i , cs
2
i+1, cs
1
i+2) that is if cs
2 has been used in between two usages of cs1, then
the destination network now has to forbid all handover with a history that includes cs1 and
cs2.13
Whether or not this is a serious loss for the participants depends on whether there are
attacks against certain patterns rather then certain combinations of cipher suites in con-
nection with a particular key-derivation function kd0. Currently, the security of protection
mechanisms like encryption mechanisms or integrity-protection mechanisms are typically
studied independently from other mechanisms. For example, the security of an encryption
mechanism is typically studied under the assumption that the encryption key is randomly
and uniformly chosen from the space of encryption keys. Assumptions on the strength of
mechanisms are thus typically formed independently of other mechanisms. However, the
use of a security-context transfer with key derivation makes it necessary to study the im-
pact of combinations and sequences of security mechanisms used with related session keys.
Cryptanalysis of combinations and sequences of mechanisms are not well-studied in the
literature so far. Although we acknowledge here the relevance of such studies, they have
to be done for each technology’s set of security suites and cannot be addressed with the
level of abstraction in this part of the thesis. Based on state-of-the-art cryptoanalyzing
tools, omitting the frequency and order of occurrence of the cipher suites in the security
suite histories is the method of choice to reduce the amount of policy data each handover
participant is required to store.
Another obvious possibility to restrict the length of the transferred histories is to set the
maximal number h of subsequent handover in a way that all histories of length h can easily
be handled. The second scenario above indicates that this alone may not solve the problem
adequately for all cases, as it may restrict seamless handover to short time periods.
12If h ≤ |CS| the number of sets of cipher suites that have to be pre-defined is
P|CS|
i=1
`
|CS|
i
´
−
P|CS|
i=h+1
`
|CS|
i
´
.
13Note that we assume here that the participants of a handover pre-define their policies and either allow
or disallow handover with a certain security context history.
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If the security mechanisms for a technology are well studied, it may be possible to assign
a security level to each possible cipher suite in a way that is accepted by all providers and
users. Providers and users then express their respective policies with the help of these
level assignments. Instead of including the complete history in the security context, HN
includes the level of the lowest level cipher suite thus far used in the security context.
On a k-th-order handover, DESTk then decides whether to accept of reject the handover
request based on the lowest security level thus far used. With this compression method,
the participants of a handover not only lose the ability to protect against certain weak
combinations of security mechanisms, but this method also makes it difficult for DESTk to
react to the unexpected break of, e.g., a certain encryption mechanism. More granularity can
be provided by assigning security levels to each encryption mechanism, integrity-protection
mechanism, and key-establishment process separately. HN then includes a0, ka0, kd0, as
well as the level of the lowest-level encryption mechanism, the level of the lowest-level
integrity-protection mechanism, and the level of the lowest-level key establishment used
thus far into the security context. DESTk can then forbid handover based on each of the
levels rather than on the overall level.
However, in current wireless access technologies the number of specified cipher suites
|CS| is very restricted. For example, in GSM |CS| = 4, in UMTS |CS| = 2 and in 802.11i-
protected WLANs |CS| = 3. Consequently, omitting the order and frequency of cipher
suites in the history seems feasible and is by far the better choice, as it leaves the full power
over the evaluation of a security-suite history to each participant.
5.2 HEPB SCT with Key Agreement
The history-enriched, policy-based security-context transfer with key agreement differs from
the one with key derivation only in the content of the context history and the way the master
key is agreed upon.
In case a fresh master key is agreed upon between SRCk and MD before a k-th-order
handover by means of a roaming key-agreement protocol (r)kak and the last authentication
protocol used between MD and any previously serving networks was (r)a∗, the context
history historyk−1 is
historyk−1 := ((r)a
∗, (r)kak, emk−1, imk−1, kek−1)(=: sshk−1)
in the SRC-controlled case and
historyk−1 := ((r)a
∗, (r)kak, em0, im0, ke0)(=: sshk−1)
in the HN-controlled as well as in the AN-controlled case. For all three control types, the
security context is
Sk := (Kk, historyk−1, T rHCN).
In case multiple initial keys are generated during the initial roaming key-agreement
protocol (r)ka0 the context history is
historyk−1 := ((r)a0, (r)ka0, emk−1, imk−1, kek−1)(=: sshk−1)
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in the SRC-controlled case and
historyk−1 := ((r)a0, (r)ka0, em0, im0, ke0)(= sshk−1)
in the HN-controlled and the AN-controlled case.
In the HN-controlled and AN-controlled cases, the security context Sk is defined as
above. However, in the SRC-controlled case, the security context Sk transferred on a k-th-
order handover is
Sk := (Kk,Kk+1,Kh, T rHCN).
The requirements R’-1, R*-5 R*-6, R*-8, and R’-7 can be met in the same way as in SCT
with key derivation. Requirement R’-2 that is specific to this type of SCT is met in part by
the two key-agreement methods thus far suggested. In case the new key agreement is used
between MD and SRCk, SRCk and HCN get to know the master session key Kk. In case
multiple initial keys are generated during the initial key agreement, the situation differs for
the handover control types. In the case of HN-controlled and AN-controlled handover, HN
or AN gets to know all subsequently used master session keys. In the case of SRC-controlled
handover, each subsequent source network gets to know all master session keys used after
future handover.
In order to fully meet R’-2, we suggest a third key-agreement method in the next section.
5.3 Using Secret Sharing for Key Agreement Between
DESTk and MD During Handover
In this section, we present a key-agreement method for SCT on an HN-controlled handover
that meets the requirement R’-2. It allows MD and DESTk to agree upon a master session
key to be used after handover in a way that no other party, except for MD and DESTk,
gains any information on this master session key.
We assume that each HN is issued a handover certificate on an encryption key for a
public-key encryption scheme (e.g., RSA or any other public-key encryption scheme that
allows for a secure two-party decryption) by a trusted third party. Assuming HN has
a handover agreement with l destination networks DEST1, . . . ,DESTl, the trusted third
party splits the secret handover key R corresponding to the public key in the handover
certificate into l different pairs of shares (RHNi ,RDESTi) 1 ≤ i ≤ l by means of a (2, 2)
secret-sharing scheme. The trusted third party distributes RHNi 1 ≤ i ≤ l to HN and each
RDESTi to DEST
i.
MD pre-stores the handover certificate of its HN.
Before a k-th-order handover, MD encrypts a fresh random number r with the public
encryption key included in HN’s handover certificate and sends the encrypted random num-
ber to SRCk. SRCk forwards this random number to HN in the handover-request message
(network-initiated case) or the handover-indication message (mobile-initiated case). HN
and DESTk use a two-party version of the corresponding public-key decryption such that
DESTk with the help of HN can recover r, but HN obtains no information on r itself.
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We exemplify this approach for the RSA case. Assume HN’s public handover key is an
RSA key (n, e) where n is the modulus and e is the encryption key. Furthermore, let d be
the secret key corresponding to e such that ed = 1 mod ϕ(n), where ϕ(n) = (p− 1)(q− 1).
Then the trusted third party splits the secret handover key d into (dHNi , dDESTi) for i = 1 . . . l
in the following way: the trusted third party chooses ω1, . . . , ωl ∈ Zϕ(n)
2
such that ωi 6= ωj
for i 6= j. Then,
dHNi =d + 2ωi mod ϕ(n), i = 1, . . . , l
dDESTi =d + ωi mod ϕ(n), i = 1, . . . , l.
Consequently, d = −dHN i +2dDESTi mod ϕ(n), for all i = 1, . . . , l. The trusted third party
distributes dDESTi to DEST
i and all dHNi i = 1, . . . l to HN. The trusted third party also
keeps copies of all ωi, as well as d.
Before a k-th-order handover, MD generates a fresh random number r, encrypts it with
the public handover key e of its HN, and sends it to SRCk together with an integrity
protection generated by means of IK 0 and im0. Upon detecting a handover reason, SRCk
includes re in the handover request (or the handover indication) to HN. HN checks the
validity of the integrity protection on re by MD. In case this check is successful, HN uses
its split dHNi of the secret handover key corresponding to DEST
i
k to compute r
edHNi and
includes this value instead of Kk in the handover request sent to DEST
i
k. Upon receipt of
redHNi DESTik uses its part of the secret handover key dDESTi
k
in order to decrypt r:
r = re(−dHNi) r
e(2d
DESTi
k
)
.
DESTik and MD then compute Kk by means of a pre-image resistant hash function kdk
with r and the identities of MD and DESTik as input. As only DEST
i
k (and the trusted
third party) has knowledge of the secret key share d
DESTik
, an attacker intercepting re and rd
cannot gain any information on r. In particular, neither SRCk nor HN, and not even those
two parties in collaboration, can recover r. Consequently, this key-agreement method meets
R’-2. It is interesting to note that the security-context transfer used by this key-derivation
method does not need to be encrypted, as it does not include any secret information (R’-7).
Instead of a trusted third party, the key splitting may be performed in HN. However, in
this case, although the master session key Kk is not computed by HN, HN has knowledge of
the full secret handover key d and may thus compute Kk. Consequently, in this case, R’-2
cannot fully be met. However, this key-agreement variant still has the advantage that HN is
not required to generate Kk and no encryption of the security-context transfer is required.
This makes DESTi less dependent on the way HN protects the storage of secret keys.
In Chapter 12, we present how the key-agreement method described here can be used to
agree upon a master session key Kk between MD and DESTk on an HN-controlled k-th-order
handover between two WLAN networks and show how this key-agreement approach can be
integrated with the 802.11i security architecture. To the best of the author’s knowledge,
this is the first solution using SCT with key-agreement that fully meets R’-2.
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5.4 Conclusion
The previous work on security-context transfer on inter-provider handover [75, 111, 162,
176, 177, 186] has already been discussed in detail in Section 3.3.2 and Section 4.5. The
main advantage of our history-enriched, policy-based approach over the above mentioned
solutions is that our procedures allow users and providers to base their handover decisions
on the history of a security context and thus protect themselves against any potential
attacks arising from the use of weak security mechanisms between a mobile device and
any previously serving network. Moreover, users and providers can enforce their policies
with respect to the cipher suites they allow to be used after handover and can thus protect
themselves against potential attacks arising from the use of weak security mechanisms after
the current handover. More formally speaking, our history-enriched, policy-based handover
procedures with key-derivation fully meet the requirements R*-1, R*-2, and R*-4 to R*-8,
and meet R*-3 in part (see Section 4.3.5) and are thus secure against the attacks A*-1
through A*-25 identified in Chapter 4.
With the key-agreement method suggested in Section 5.3, we additionally have solved
the problem of how to agree upon a master session key to be used between MD and DESTk
after handover in a way that does not even reveal the newly established key to the handover
controlling network for the HN-controlled case. This problem has previously been addressed
only by Wang et al. [177] for the first-order handover case. However, as we showed in 3.3.2,
the method suggested in [177] does not in fact meet R-3 (or R’-2).
Interesting directions for future research include exploring how the key-splitting ap-
proach could be used to enhance SCT for AN-controlled and SRC-controlled subsequent
handover.
Another interesting topic for future work is to implement the HEPB-handover approach
for any wireless access technology. In Chapter 12 we detail the HEPB-approach for the
WLAN case and discuss how the approach could be implemented in this context.
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Chapter 6
Extension to Inter-System
Handover and Other Related Issues
In this chapter, we discuss inter-system and intra-provider handover procedures. In partic-
ular, we extend the history-enriched, policy-based approach to the inter-system case. The
extension requires changes to the content of the transferred context history that result in a
larger amount of policy data that needs to be pre-defined by each MD and each network.
Moreover, as different technologies typically require different lengths of master session keys,
we extend the context history and the security-mechanism negotiation by a key-conversion
function. Upon inter-system handover, MD and DESTk use the negotiated key-conversion
function in order to convert the master session key transferred on a SCT with key derivation
to the length required by the technology of DESTk. We require a clear separation between
key derivation and key conversion in order to ensure that the cryptographical strength of the
master session keys stays constant on subsequent handover with SCT and key-derivation.
Furthermore, we discuss how the history-enriched, policy-based approach relates to
intra-provider, intra-system handover. We show that, while part of the requirements we
defined in Chapter 4 for the inter-provider, intra-system handover case are obsolete on han-
dover within a single network (R*-1, R*-5, and R*-6), others must be required within a
single network as well (R*-2, R*-3, R*-4, R*-8, R*-7).
Another related issue we briefly discuss in this chapter is predicting upcoming handover
by predicting a mobile device’s future location. Similarly, we discuss recent related work on
updating the location of a mobile device and on routing traffic to a mobile device its point
of network attachment after handover.
Outline. Inter-system handover are discussed in Section 6.1, followed by a detailed dis-
cussion on related work for this subject in Section 6.2. The relation of our work and
intra-provider, intra-system handover is discussed in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4, we pro-
vide pointers to recent work on mobility prediction and in Section 6.5 to recent work on
location management. The chapter ends with a summary and conclusion in Section 6.6.
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6.1 Inter-System Handover
As more and more wireless access technologies evolve, handover procedures between differ-
ent wireless access technologies need to be addressed. In particular, handover procedures
between wireless access networks that offer wide area coverage but low data rates and wire-
less access networks that offer only local area coverage but high data rates are of great
interest as candidates for inter-system handover [152]. Handover procedures from a local
area network to a wide area network offer a wider area of seamless services to a user. Han-
dover procedures in the other direction allow a user to take advantage of higher data rates
while in the coverage area of a local area network. An example for handover procedures like
this is the handover procedures between UMTS or any other mobile phone network and a
wireless LAN technology like IEEE 802.11 [6].
Another important application of inter-system handover is handover between already
established technologies and newly evolving ones. Such handover procedures allow providers
of the new technology to offer seamless service to a user in a wider area than the new
technology currently covers; thus, it facilitates the migration from one technology to another.
An already standardized and implemented example for this type of handover procedure are
the handover procedures between GSM and UMTS [11].
Upon inter-system handover, MD changes the access technology when switching from
one network access point to another. MD is equipped with several wireless interfaces and
switches from sending and receiving user traffic over one interface to sending and receiv-
ing data traffic over another interface. An inter-system handover can take place between
different networks of one network provider or between different network providers. How-
ever, it turns out that the intra-provider case can be treated as a special sub-case of the
inter-provider case and does not need to be detailed separately.
We differentiate between two types of inter-system handover here: vertical and horizontal
inter-system handover. A vertical inter-system handover takes place if the cells of two
networks of different technologies overlay each other as illustrated in Figure 6.1. A horizontal
Local Area Network
Vertical handover 
Wide Area Network
Figure 6.1: Vertical Handover
Network 1 Network 2
Horizontal Handover 
Figure 6.2: Horizontal Handover
inter-system handover takes place if the cells of two networks of different technologies overlap
in a border area but do not overlay each other. The typical cell topology of a horizontal
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inter-provider handover is illustrated in Figure 6.2.
The term vertical handover originates from the vision of overlay networks that were first
described in [104]. In an overlay network, different wireless technologies with increasing
coverage overlay each other such that in local areas, several technologies are available for
a user. A vertical handover is then a handover from a network with local coverage to
a network with wider coverage or vice-versa. Some authors [184, 176, 164] use the term
vertical synonymously with the term inter-system handover and refer to horizontal handover
as handover within the same technology. However, inter-system handover between wireless
access technologies that overlay each other are not the only form of inter-system handover.
As the handover procedures between GSM and UMTS show, inter-system handover between
wireless technologies that offer similar coverage areas can be meaningful as well. Although in
the early stage of UMTS deployment GSM networks will overlay UMTS islands, providers
can be expected to shut down GSM services in urban areas at some point. Handover
between UMTS and GSM will then not be vertical, but horizontal: from UMTS islands to
GSM coverage in less populated areas.
We therefore use the term vertical inter-system handover to denote a handover between
overlaying networks and the term horizontal inter-system handover to denote a handover
between non-overlaying networks of different technologies. The main difference between
vertical and horizontal inter-system handover is that in the vertical case, handover from a
wider area network to a local area network is less time-critical than handover in the other
direction, as the wider area network is available throughout the coverage of the local area
network.
In the following two sections, we first discuss horizontal inter-system handover and then
describe vertical inter-system handover.
6.1.1 Horizontal Inter-System Handover
Horizontal inter-system handover procedures can be modeled by the same procedures as
inter-provider handover. We therefore refer to the procedures illustrated in Figure 3.5 for
the network-initiated case and to Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9 for the mobile-initiated case. It
is, however, important to note that in the inter-system case, MD and SRCk and MD and
DESTk communicate using different wireless access technologies.
During pre-registration, MD and its home provider either establish one set of credentials
that can be used for authentication upon roaming to different networks regardless of the
technology used or several sets of credentials, each of which can be used upon roaming to
a network that supports a particular technology. Roaming across different technologies has
already been described in detail in Section 2.3.
Before a first-order handover, MD established connection with some AN supporting a
technology T0. Subsequently, MD was handed over from AN to some DEST1 supporting
a technology T1, from DEST1 to DEST2 supporting a technology T2, and so on. Upon a
k-th-order handover, MD is connected to some network SRCk of technology Tk−1 and is
to be handed over to some DESTk supporting a technology Tk. As in the inter-provider
intra-system case, subsequent handover can be controlled by HN, AN, or SRC.
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The security challenge arising from inter-system handover consists of the same trade-
off between efficiency and security we described in Section 3.2. An additional efficiency
challenge, however, arises from the battery lifetime. Instead of keeping all wireless interfaces
up at all times, wireless interfaces should only be brought up right before a handover to the
interface’s technology will take place. For further reading on this topic, we refer to [164].
The security solutions for inter-system handover can be divided into solutions using a
full new authentication and SCT-based method. In the following sections we generalize the
inter-provider security solutions we have discussed in Section3.2 to the inter-system case.
In particular, we generalize the history-enriched, policy-based approach to the inter-system
case.
6.1.1.1 Pre-Authentication over NAPDESTk
In the inter-provider case we have discussed (see Section 3.2.1) the fact that pre-
authentication via NAPDESTk is only possible if the technology supports soft handover pro-
cedures. Similarly, in case of inter-system handover, pre-authentication via NAPDESTk can
only be used if MD can send and receive on the two involved wireless interfaces at the
same time. As long as the two interfaces operate in different frequency bands, this is not
a problem. Nevertheless, problems can arise in case the wireless interfaces operate in the
same frequency band. For example, the two wireless local area technologies Bluetooth and
WLAN are well-known to interfere with each other [78].
If the two respective technologies do not interfere, pre-authentication may still not be
usable. In order to be able to use pre-authentication successfully, MD has to be within
the intersection of two cells, one of each technology, from the handover detection until the
successful handover completion. In particular, MD has to be in this cell intersection for
the whole pre-authentication time. Whether or not pre-authentication can be used thus
also depends on the sizes of cell intersections as well as the expected velocity of MDs (see
Section 3.2.1 for details).
In summary, pre-authentication is a good choice to secure horizontal inter-system han-
dover, in case the involved technologies do not interfere with each other and users can be
expected to move with low velocity.
6.1.1.2 Pre-Authentication over NAPSRCk
As argued in the inter-provider, intra-system case in Section 3.2.2, the problem of pre-
authentication via NAPSRCk is that the authentication traffic between MD and DESTk has
to be tunneled through SRCk. This can be particularly difficult if the authentication and
key-agreement protocols the technology DESTk uses are implemented below a common
network layer. Consequently, whether or not pre-authentication over NAPSRCk is a viable
solution depends on the respective wireless technology.
6.1 Inter-System Handover 173
6.1.1.3 History-Enriched, Policy-Based SCT with Key Derivation
Security-context transfers with key derivation can be used to accelerate inter-system han-
dover in a similar way as in the inter-provider case. However, difficulties arise from the fact
that the security suites specified for the technologies involved may differ from each other.
Additionally, the length of the master session key required for each technology may be differ-
ent. This makes two changes to our history-enriched, policy-based approach necessary. For
once, the security suite histories now include cipher suites specified for different technolo-
gies and second, during the security-mechanism negotiation, MD, HCN, and DESTk have
to agree upon a key-conversion function by which DESTk and MD convert the transferred
master session key Kk to the right length.
In the rest of this section, we discuss these changes to the history-enriched, policy-based
SCT presented in Section 3.2.3 (see also Figure 3.13) in more detail. Note that we require
a k-th inter-system handover procedure to meet the requirements defined for the inter-
provider case in Section 4.3.5 and to meet one additional requirement that will be explained
in the following.
We denote the set of roaming security suites specified for the technology of AN with
(R)SS0 and the set of cipher suites specified for the technology of DESTi with CSi. We
define h as the maximum number of subsequent handover, that can be accommodated in
the HEPB-based approach.1 The length of a master session key used in AN’s technology is
denoted by l0 and the length of a master session key used in DESTi (1 ≤ i ≤ h) is denoted
by li. Furthermore, we assume that for each pair of length (li, lj), there is a set KC
i,j of
key-conversion functions kc that converts an input of length i to an output of length j. We
assume that these key-conversion functions are known to all MDs and all networks.
Intuitively a key-conversion function kc ∈ KC i,j with i ≤ j should convert a key K of
length li to a key L of length lj such that L is as random as K. Similarly a key-conversion
function kc ∈ KC i,j with j ≤ i should convert a key L of length li to a key K of length lj
such that L is as random as possible. We do not precisely define the indistinguishability
arguments necessary to formally define the intuitively described properties of key-conversion
functions. We do however suggest candidates for key-conversion functions with the desired
properties:
An example for a key-conversion function for a pair of length (li, lj) with li =
1
2 lj is
kc<(K) = K1 ⊕K2||K1||K2||K1 ⊕K2,
where K = K1||K2 and K1 and K2 are both of length
1
2 li.
An example for a key-conversion function for a pair of length (li, lj) with li = 2lj is
kc>(L) = L1 ⊕ L2,
where L = L1||L2 and L1 and L2 are both of bit-length lj .
It is important to note that applying kc< to K and then applying kc> to the output
reconstructs K. Intuitively, this implies that kc< and kc> exhibit the desired properties: if
1How large h can be depends on the technologies used and has to be determined for each case separately.
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the output of kc< would be less random then a recovery of K by such an easy to compute
function as kc> would not be possible.
The length of master keys typically is 2x for some x ∈ N. Moreover, the composition of
two key-conversion functions that exhibit the desired property seem to exhibit the desired
property as well. From the two above examples we can therefore construct key-conversion
functions for arbitrary pairs of key length (li, lj) where li = 2
rlj for some r ∈ Z.
2
Context History. The context history on a k-th-order inter-system handover is
historyk−1 = ((r)ss0, kd0, [kd1, . . . , kdk−1], kc1, . . . kck−1, cs1, . . . , csk−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:sshk−1
, Tk−1)
where csi ∈ CSi, kci ∈ KC
i−1,i. Tk−1 is defined as in the inter-provider case.
Security Policies. HCN, MD, and DESTk pre-define policies with respect to the cipher
suites and key-conversion functions kc ∈ KCk−1,k they allow to be used after a k-th-order
handover to a technology Tk, given any security-suite history sshk−1. They express these
policies by defining subsets CSHCN |sshk−1 , CSMD|sshk−1 , and CSDESTk |sshk−1 of CSk ×
KCk−1,k.
HCN, MD, and DESTk have to pre-define such sets for each sshk−1 and each (1 ≤ k ≤ h),
where h is some fixed maximum number of subsequent inter-system handover.
Note that in the intra-provider case SRCk and DESTk are operated by the same provider
and handover procedures are SRC-controlled. This facilitates the storage and processing of
policy-related data as it can be handled by a single central component. In the intra-provider
case, the security mechanism negotiation phases between the networks can consequently be
omitted.
Handover Agreement. As in the inter-provider case, each destination network that has
a handover agreement with HCN commits to a superset CS ∗DEST|sshk−1 for each (1 ≤ k ≤ h)
and each security-suite history sshk−1. DEST also commits to an upper bound uDEST on
its threshold of the maximal lifetime of an initial security context.
Key Derivation, Key Conversion, and Security Context. During the last authen-
tication and key agreement, AN and MD agreed upon the initial master key K0 of some
bit-length l0. The bit-length of K0 depends on the key-agreement protocol used. The key
derivation depends on who controls the handover.
HN and AN-Controlled Case. HN (AN) derives Kk from K0 with the help of a (length-
preserving) pre-image resistant hash function kd0 that takes K0 and the identity of DESTk
as input.
2For example, if we want to convert a key K of length li to a key K
∗∗ of length lj = 1/4li, we can use
kc> to convert K to a key K
∗ of length 1/2li and then use kc> again to convert K
∗ to a key K∗∗ of the
desired length.
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SRC-Controlled Case. SRCk generates the master key Kk from Kk−1 by means of
a length preserving, pre-image-resistant hash function kdk−1 that additionally takes the
identity of DESTk as input. kdk−1 is negotiated between SRCk−1, SRCk, and MD during
the (k − 1)-st-order handover (k ≤ 2) or during the initial security-mechanism negotiation
(k = 1).
For any type of handover control, the security context transferred on a k-th-order han-
dover is
Sk := (Kk, historyk−1, T rHCN).
The procedure itself, as well as the security-mechanism negotiation, can be implemented
in the same way as on inter-provider handover. However, as part of any of the security-
mechanism negotiation methods described in Section 5.1, MD, DESTk, and HCN now addi-
tionally negotiate a key-conversion function kck. Upon receipt of Kk in a handover request
from HCN, DESTk uses the negotiated key-conversion function kck to convert the received
master key Kk to a key K
∗
k of the appropriate length lk of DESTk’s technology. MD uses the
key-derivation function kdk−1 negotiated during the (k− 1)-st-order handover to derive Kk
and then uses the key-conversion function kck negotiated during the k-th-order handover
to convert Kk into K
∗
k .
We require a clear separation between key derivation and key conversion. The use of the
pre-image resistant hash function kdk−1 meets R*-2 and part of R*-3 and guarantees that
all subsequently used master keys have the same length as the original master key K0. kck
converts the received master key to the appropriate length. By clearly separating these two
functionalities, we aim to avoid that on subsequent handover, the randomness of the master
key is reduced with each subsequent handover and once reduced, stays at the reduced level.
Due to the separation, all transferred keys have the same length and are are as random as
the used hash function allows and even if on a k-th-order handover the key length has to
be reduced, the key transferred on the (k +1)-st-order handover has the same length as the
initial master session key K0.
Note that while in the HN or AN-controlled case, the key-conversion function could be
implemented in HCN. Thus, it is crucial to implement kc in DESTk in the SRC-controlled
case; otherwise, DESTk = SRCk+1 may have to derive Kk+1 from a K
∗k which may be
shorter than Kk.
6.1.1.4 History-Enriched, Policy-Based SCT with Key Agreement
SCT with key agreement on inter-system handover requires the same changes to the SCT-
based procedure presented in Section 5.2 as in the case of SCT with key derivation.
If new keys are agreed upon via the source network or multiple initial keys are generated
during the initial key agreement, DESTk may have to convert the received master key to
the correct length. An important difference to the inter-provider case is that the master key
Kk agreed upon with SRCk or AN may be shorter then a master key agreed upon between
MD and DESTk upon roaming would be. The keying material used in DESTk after an
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inter-system handover with a key agreement of this type may thus be weaker (or stronger)
than upon roaming.
The key-splitting approach can easily be adapted to the inter-system case if all tech-
nologies support public-key-based key agreement.
6.1.2 Vertical Inter-System Handover
On vertical inter-system handover, the technology with wide coverage and large cells typ-
ically offers low data rates, while the technology with local coverage and small cells offers
higher data rates. A handover from the local area technology to the wide area technology
is called a handover in the upward direction. A handover in the other direction is called a
handover in the downward direction.
Vertical inter-system handover can be modeled by the same procedures as horizontal
inter-system handover. In addition, the security challenge on vertical handover in the
upward direction is the same as in the horizontal inter-system handover case. The main
difference between vertical and horizontal handover is that handover procedures in the
downward direction are less time-critical as horizontal inter-system handover. This is due
to the fact that the wide area network is available to MD even after it moved into the range
of a local area network. The MD can thus stay connected to the wide area network as long
as a handover to the local area network is prepared regardless of any cell intersection sizes.
For a vertical inter-system handover in the upward direction, pre-authentication over the
new NAPDESTk is the method of choice as security solution. Nevertheless, the two involved
technologies are required not to interfere with each other such that both wireless interfaces
can be active at the same time. Moreover, the authentication has to be finished in time
before MD moves out of range of NAPSRCk . In the downward direction, pre-authentication
is the method of choice in the same case. The only additional difficulty here is to avoid
unnecessary authentications, as MD is always in sight of the wide area technology. This
problem is closely related to the problem of finding the right point in time to activate
the wider area interface while connected to the local area network. An easy but power-
consuming solution to this problem obviously is to keep both interfaces up at all time and
keep MD permanently authenticated to the wide area network.
If SCT is to be used for any direction of vertical handover, this can be done in exactly
the same way as described in the horizontal case. If SCT is to be used only in the upward
direction, any handover to a local area network generates new keys and thus restarts the
key cycle freshly. This reduces the risk of subsequent transfers of compromised keys.
6.2 Related Work on Inter-System Handover
Vertical handover procedures have been specified for handover between CDMA2000 and
WLAN, GSM and WLAN, and UMTS and WLAN.
Molloy et al. [130] and Buddhikot et al. [43] suggest using pre-authentication upon
handover from CDMA 2000 to WLAN. The procedures they suggest are mobile-initiated
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and use Mobile IP for mobility management. While Molloy et al. assume MD to be pre-
registered with a CDMA 2000 provider and a WLAN provider, Buddhikot et al. assume
MD to be pre-registered and share credentials with only one provider.
As opposed to [130, 43], Parikh et al. [140] study handover in the upward direction only.
As opposed to our model, Parikh et al. assume MDs to have two independent subscriptions,
and assume no a-priori trust relationship between the inter-operating network. The authors
suggest using a pro-active authentication with the CDMA 2000 network while MD is still
connected to WLAN and before the WLAN signal falls below a certain ratio. The point
in time at which a pro-active authentication takes place is triggered by a location-based
handover prediction mechanism.
Inter-system handover procedures between UMTS and WLAN are currently being stan-
dardized by 3GPP. Many current works [157, 44, 65, 30, 186, 97, 144] summarize this
standardization process.
Salkintzis et al. [157] introduce the notion of tight coupling, as well as the loose coupling
between a WLAN and a UMTS network. In tight coupling, a WLAN network acts as a
cell in a GPRS network, all traffic is GPRS traffic encapsulated in WLAN traffic, and the
original GPRS authentication and key agreement is used regardless of whether a mobile
device requests access over a WLAN network or a regular GPRS cell. In the loose-coupling
approach, the GPRS authentication is used to implement an EAP-Method.
Buddhikot et al. [44] discuss the infrastructure for loosely coupled and tightly coupled
solutions. They show how their loosely coupled solution for CDMA-WLAN integration can
be generalized to WLAN-UMTS inter-working and they analyze the performance of their
approach. Security-related issues are not emphazise in this work. However, the authors
assume that each mobile device has two independent subscriptions including two pairs of
credentials used to authenticate to the respective technology.
The 3GPP standard [12] for now only specifies the loosely coupled solution and advises
the usage of EAP-AKA or EAP-SIM upon roaming to a WLAN. Handover procedures are
not yet specified.
The inter-system handover suggestion of Zhang et al. [186] has already been discussed
in connection with our threat analysis in Chapter 4.
Prasithsangree et al. [144] describe an authentication mechanism for loosely coupled
UMTS-WLAN inter-operation that integrates the initialization of accounting with the au-
thentication protocol used on accessing the WLAN. The authentication protocol used is
PKI-based and assumes that each HN acts as CA for its pre-registered users. FN authenti-
cates MD by verifying its certificate with the help of HN’s public signature-verification key.
However, the authors do not address the problem of certificate-revocation status checking.
Moreover, it is unclear how MD authenticates FN.
The most well-known example of horizontal inter-system handover are the handover
procedures specified by 3GPP for handover between UMTS and GSM [11]. We will study
these procedures in detail in Chapter 9.
Alsenmyr et al. [17] study horizontal inter-system handover between local CDMA 2000
coverage and global GSM coverage during the transition from 2G to 3G. However, security
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issues are not addressed in this work.
The technology-independent work on inter-system handover [162, 176, 75, 184] has al-
ready been discussed in the context of the Related Work section in our threat analysis (see
Section 4.5).
The first work on vertical inter-system handover was presented by Stemm et al. [164].
The authors suggest a mobile-initiated soft vertical handover procedure between different
layers of an overlay network. Interfaces of a mobile device on higher layers are set asleep
and only wake up and stay in idle mode triggered by unspecified location-based events.
Interfaces on one lower layer stay idle all the time to detect “better quality” connectivity.
For intra-system horizontal handover, the authors use buffering on several NAPs. A certain
set of buffering NAPs is selected by MD. One of them is selected as the forwarding one. If
the signal of the currently forwarding NAP falls below a certain threshold, MD commands
one of the other buffering NAPs to forward and then commands the old NAP to stop
forwarding. A vertical handover in the upward direction is initiated if a certain number
of beacons from the current network were not received. A downward vertical handover is
initiated if several beacons are received from the next lower layer.
Policy-based handover has previously been suggested by Wang et al. [175]. The authors
describe a a handover procedure that allows users to express policies specifying the “best”
currently available wireless access technology. As a result, candidate networks are selected
by finding an optimal point on a user-specified trade-off curve between the cost of the
network access, the available bandwidth and the expected power consumption. However,
policies with respect to security mechanisms or protection levels are not taken into account.
6.3 Intra-Provider, Intra-System Handover
Intra-provider handover within a single wireless access network are in use in every state-
of-the-art mobile telecommunications technology, e.g, GSM and UMTS, and are lately also
standardized for handover within an IEEE 802.11 WLAN. [60, 11, 91, 93]. Another WLAN-
specific security solutions for intra-provider handover is the work of Zeadally et al. [185]
that is based on the broadcast authentication protocol TESLA3. An overview on current
WLAN-specific intra-provider security solutions is provided in [27]. The security solutions
used upon handover within GSM and UMTS will be detailed in Chapter 9.
Intra-provider handover within the same technology imply the security challenge that
MD and a destination EIPE, if different from the source EIPE, of the handover have to
be assured of each other’s authorization, establish cryptographic keys, and negotiate the
cipher suite to use after handover.
The history-enriched, policy-based approach can be adapted to the intra-provider case by
replacing the entities HCN, SRCk, and DESTk with the corresponding network components
within the network of a single provider. However, not all of the requirements defined for
the inter-provider case seem appropriate for intra-provider handover as well. In particular,
3Time Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication.
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as on each authentication within the same network, a mobile device is authenticated in the
same way, regardless of the NAP with which it is associated, such that a pre-authentication
seems obsolete. Moreover, as the EIPE in charge before handover and the EIPE after
handover belong to the same network and are operated by the same network provider, they
will typically support the same cipher suites. Consequently, on intra-provider handover,
MD and the network can typically maintain and reuse the initial security context after
each handover. The problems of basing the handover decision on previously used cipher
suites (R*-1), negotiating a cipher suite to use after handover (R*-5), and protecting this
cipher-suite negotiation against bidding-down attacks (R*-6) thus become obsolete.
However, the requirements R*-2, R*-3, R*-4, R*-7, and R*-8 stay valid in the intra-
provider case and can be met in the same way as detailed for the inter-provider case.
6.4 Mobility Prediction and Handover
Recent analyses of the intra-provider handover procedures in 802.11 WLANs have shown
that the scanning for candidate destination NAPs has the largest impact on the overall
handover delay [127, 173].4 The authors of [160, 159] suggest reducing the scanning part
of the delay by providing MD with a list of channels to scan depending on its current
location. In [128, 129], this list of channels is determined using neighbor graves to describe
the topology of an IEEE WLAN. In [138], frequent handover regions are used to predict
the movement of a data and the most probable destination NAP of the next handover. In
addition to reducing the scanning part of the handover delay, predicting the next destination
NAP has the advantage that the security context can be transferred to the destination NAP
pro-actively, before a handover reason occurs. During the handover execution, MD then
only has to switch the link-layer connection, while the security context is already in place.
In joint work with K. Kastell, A. Fernandez-Pello, D. Perez and R. Jakoby, we have
adapted this approach to the GSM/UMTS case. In particular, we show in [102] that the
handover preparation time on any type of handover within and between GSM and UMTS
can be reduced by at least 480 ms by predicting the destination NAP based on a simple
triangulation of a user’s location.
6.5 Location Management
Mobility management in wireless access networks can be divided into roaming and handover
procedures on one hand, and location management on the other hand [147]. Throughout
this thesis, we concentrate on roaming and handover procedures. However, in this section,
we provide some pointers to recent work on location management.
Location management consists of two stages: location updates in which new location
information on MD is registered and traffic delivery in which MD is localized, and incoming
4The overall handover delay is measured from the detection of a handover reason until the first frame of
user data is received over the new link connection.
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and outgoing traffic is routed to MD’s current point of network attachment.
The most commonly discussed location-management protocol for IP-based mobility is
Mobil IP [142], which allows a mobile device to maintain its IP address while roaming to
different domains. The delay introduced by Mobile IP to inter-domain handover has, for ex-
ample, been studied in [172]. Although these results are promising, Mobile IP seems to pro-
duce a large overhead when used to provide local mobility to large amounts of mobile users.
Consequently, many alternative mobility-management protocols have been suggested. Most
of these protocols are optimized for local mobility and can be used to supplement Mobile-
IP-based macro-mobility management. Examples for such supplementary suggestions are
Hierarchical-IP [161], Cellular-IP [171], HAWAII [148], and TeleMIP [50]. An overview of
these protocols can be found in [151].
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have extended our discussion on inter-provider handover to the ver-
tical and horizontal inter-system handover cases. We briefly discussed to what extent the
history-enriched, policy-based approach is meaningful to intra-provider handover within the
same technology. Moreover, we have provided pointers to handover-related issues, such as
mobility prediction and location management, that are considered out of the scope of this
work.
The main contribution of this chapter is the extension of the history-enriched, policy-
based handover approach to the inter-system case. To accommodate inter-system handover
with key derivation, we extend the context history to contain information on the technology-
specific security suites used between MD and any previously serving networks before a k-
th-order handover. As a consequence, MD, HCN, and DESTk have to pre-define policies
for each of these new context histories and each order of subsequent handover. Moreover,
as different technologies typically require master session keys of different length, we add a
key-conversion function to any k-th-order handover procedure. This key-conversion function
converts the transferred master key (derived as in the inter-provider case) to the appropriate
length required by DESTk’s technology. We require that a key-conversion function shall
maintain as much randomness as possible such that the input key is cryptographically as
strong as the output key. We provide simple examples for key-conversion functions with
this property, which can be used for conversions between arbitrary key lengths. However,
we do not formally define the above desired property of a key-conversion function and
consequently do also not prove that the two suggested functions have the desired property.
This is an interesting topic that requires further investigation.
Throughout this work, we assume that all subsequent handover procedures are of the
same control type. However, in the inter-system case, this is a somewhat restricting as-
sumption. An interesting direction of future research may be studying the security impact
of subsequent handover with changing control types, which will in particular require more
complex assumptions about the trust relations between providers.
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Part III in the General Context
In this part, we describe and analyze the security architecture, roaming and
handover procedures within and between GSM and UMTS networks.
Chapter 7 describes roaming between GSM networks and between UMTS
networks. In Chapter 8 we describe and analyze inter-system, intra-provider
as well as inter-system, inter-provider roaming between GSM and UMTS. In
Chapter 9, we describe inter-system, intra-provider and inter-system,
inter-provider handover procedures between GSM and UMTS. We analyze
these procedures with respect to the security requirements and threats
introduced in Chapter 4 and describe the impact of selected attacks against
GSM.
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Chapter 7
Inter-provider Roaming within
GSM and UMTS
The Global System for Mobile communication (GSM) is one of the second generation (2G)
mobile phone network technologies adopted as standard by the European Telecommunica-
tions Standard Institute (ETSI) in 1989. With 1,5 billion GSM subscribers in September
2005 [80], GSM is currently the most widespread technology underlying mobile phone net-
works.
Although GSM is available in over 200 countries, GSM does not provide worldwide
coverage. The main 2G mobile communication standards competing with GSM are the
American IS-95, used in the US and some Asia countries, and the Japanese PDC, used in
Japan and Korea. The incompatibilities of these 2G systems led to the vision of a single
third generation (3G) mobile communications standard that would allow for easy worldwide
roaming. The standards family IMT-2000 defined by the ITU is the result of this vision
and consists of several compatible 3G standards that will allow multi-mode MDs to roam
between all standards in IMT-2000. The Universal Mobile Telecommunications Standard
(UMTS) standardized by 3GPP is on of the members of the IMT-2000 family and allows
for handover and roaming between UMTS and GSM. As such, UMTS is designed to be the
successor of GSM. The first phase of the UMTS standardization was finished in 1999. UMTS
is in operation in more than 80 commercial networks in 35 countries and in September 2005
the number of UMTS subscribers worldwide exceeded 33 million [170].
In this chapter, we give a brief overview on the roaming procedures supported by the
two mobile communication standards GSM and UMTS.
Outline. GSM inter-provider roaming is described in Section 7.1. We start by giving an
overview on the GSM system architecture in Section 7.1.1. We then describe the GSM
security model in Section 7.1.2. Intra-provider roaming in GSM is briefly discussed in Sec-
tion 7.2 while UMTS inter-provider roaming is described in Section 7.3. Again, we start
by describing the UMTS system architecture in Section 7.3.1 and then give an overview on
the UMTS security architecture in Section 7.3.2. We finally describe UMTS intra-provider
roaming in Section 7.4.
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7.1 GSM Inter-Provider Roaming
7.1.1 System Model
In a GSM network, a mobile device is connected to a visited network1 via a radio link
to a particular Base Transceiver Station (BTS). Multiple BTSs are connected to a Base
Station Controller (BSC) and multiple BSCs are controlled by a Mobile Switching Center
(MSC). A BSC, together with the BTSs connected to it, is also referred to as a Base
Station Subsystem (BSS) or GSM EDGE Radio Access Network (GERAN). Each MSC has
access to a Visitor Location Register (VLR) that keeps track of the location of all Mobile
Devices (MDs) currently connected to the visited network. The Home Location Register
(HLR) in HN keeps track of the location of all MDs that are pre-registered with HN. The
Authentication Center (AuC) stores all security-related information of all pre-registered
users.2 Figure 7.1 describes the GSM network architecture. Moreover, it illustrates the
keys and security mechanisms stored by the network components, which are described in
detail in Section 7.1.2.
Mobile Device Currently Serving Network Home Network
BSS
SIM
A5
A8
A3
Ki
IMSI
MSC: Mobile Switching Center
BTS: Base Transeiver Station
VLR: Visitor Location Register
HLR: Home Location Register
AuC: Authentication Center
Ki: Secret per subscriber key 
A3: Authentication algorithmMD: Mobile Device
A8: Key generation algorithm
A5: Encryption algorithmBSC: Base Station Controler
SIM: Subscriber Identity Module
IMSI: International Mobile Subscriber Identity BSS: Base Station System
BTS
BTS
BTS
A5
VLR HLR AuC
Ki
A3
A8
MD
IMSI
A5
BSC
BSC
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Figure 7.1: System Model and Storage of Security Information
7.1.2 Security Model
GSM supports mobile device authentication as well as encryption of the air interface be-
tween a mobile device and a network access point (BTS). GSM does not support network
1its home network or a foreign network that has a roaming agreement with MD’s home network.
2In our security model we used the term Security Center (SC) instead of AuC.
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authentication and integrity protection. A detailed description of all GSM security features
can be found in [62]. In the following overview, we emphasize the authentication and key
agreement, as well as the security-mechanism negotiation on GSM inter-provider roaming.
7.1.2.1 Registration Process
Every GSM user (also referred to as a GSM subscriber) registers for a dedicated home
network that is operated by his home provider. During registration, the home provider
allocates an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) for the user and generates
a long-term secret key Ki of 128 bits. The credential pair (IMSI,Ki) is stored in HN’s
AuC as well as on a smart card, the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). This smart card is
handed out to the user, who plugs it into his MD. Aside from the credential pair, the SIM
also contains two provider-specific algorithms A3 and A8 that are—as will be explained in
more detail further below—used for authentication and key generation respectively. During
registration, the user furthermore registers for a certain geographical roaming region.
7.1.2.2 Authentication and Key Agreement
The GSM standard does not allow for mutual authentication on inter-provider roaming.
Upon roaming, FN is assured of MD’s authorization to roam to FN but MD does not
authenticate FN. This enables a network impersonation attack against MD, which we will
briefly discuss in Section 9.4.1.2.
The roaming authentication and key-agreement protocols are implemented together and
require HN’s interaction on the first authentication of MD to FN. An HN set number of
subsequent authentications of MD to FN do not then require HN’s interaction. On the first
authentication, FN requests authentication data from HN. HN provides FN with one or more
authentication vector(s), each consisting of a random challenge RAND G, an authentication
response RESG, and an encryption key Kc.
3 RANDG is randomly chosen in HN’s AuC.
RESG is generated by AuC from RANDG and Ki with the help of some (HN-specific)
algorithm A3. Similarly, Kc is generated by AuC from RANDG and Ki with help of some
(HN specific) algorithm A8.
FN presents MD with RANDG. MD’s SIM card generates RES
∗
G and Kc from RANDG
and Ki with help of A3 respectively A8 and sends RES
∗
G back to FN. If RES
∗
G equals RESG
FN has successfully authenticated MD.
A3 and A8 are HN-specific algorithms. GSM can thus theoretically support as many
authentication and key-agreement protocols as there are GSM operators. In fact, only a few
A3 and A8 implementations are in use. As FN does not have knowledge of the long-term
secret key Ki, HN has to generate the encryption key Kc. A secure channel between HN
and FN is needed to secure the transfer of authentication vectors.
In summary, the GSM inter-provider roaming authentication and key-agreement proto-
col(s) are of Type 3 (see Section 2.1.5), require a secure channel between HN and FN, and
are secret-key-based.
3RANDG: 128 bits, RESG: 32 bits, Kc: 64 bits.
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In GSM, the master key is identical to the encryption key. A key-establishment process
ke (see Definition 1.2.9) is not used.
7.1.2.3 Encryption
The GSM standard currently specifies four encryption mechanisms, namely the stream ci-
phers A5/0 (no encryption), A5/1 (standard encryption), A5/2 (weaker version of A5/1)
and A5/3 (similar to the KASUMI encryption mechanism used in UMTS [8]).4 The en-
cryption mechanisms are implemented on MD5 and in all BTSs. They are used to protect
the confidentiality of all data traffic and some specific control messages between MD and
BTS. As opposed to A3 and A8, the mechanism of the A5 family are standardized and not
provider-specific. Each provider may choose a set of encryption mechanisms it supports.
This choice may also depend on regional restrictions on the use of cryptographic techniques.
7.1.2.4 Security Mechanism Negotiation and Policies
As each SIM card supports exactly one pair of A3 and A8 algorithms, no authentication
and key-agreement protocols have to be negotiated during connection establishment. As
GSM does not support integrity protection and does not use any key-establishment process
between MD and BTS, each cipher suite in GSM consists of one encryption mechanism
only. MD and FN negotiate the encryption mechanism on roaming without HN’s interac-
tion. Upon connection establishment with FN, MD sends its security capabilities, a list of
A5 algorithms MD supports, to FN. By means of the standard, MD is mandated to support
A5/0, A5/1, and A5/2. FN is required to drop the connection if it receives security capabil-
ities from MD that do not include the mandatory algorithms. In particular, the definition of
mandatory algorithms protects the security-mechanism negotiation against a bidding-down
attack below the protection level offered by A5/1.6 FN chooses one of the algorithms MD
supports and acknowledges its choice to MD in a GSM security mode command message. It
is interesting to note that HN has no influence on FN’s choice of the encryption algorithm.
In particular, HN cannot forbid the use of A5/0 = no encryption or the weak encryption
mechanism A5/2. Similarly, MD cannot enforce the use of the stronger algorithms A5/1 or
A5/3.
7.1.2.5 Anonymity
To protect the confidentiality of a GSM subscriber’s identity, the IMSI is sent in the clear
on the air interface as rarely as possible. Instead, a Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
TMSI is allocated by FN, to which MD last presented its IMSI. On the next connection
establishment, MD presents its TMSI to the network. The network tries to resolve the
4The GSM standard can accommodate seven A5 mechanisms of which only the first four are currently
specified.
5As opposed to A3 and A8 that are implemented on the SIM card [9].
6A5/3 is generally rated the strongest cipher in the A5 family, followed by A5/1. A5/2 is de facto broken
[28] and A5/1 has been shown to be weak [33, 34].
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TMSI and obtain the IMSI from the old VLR. If the network cannot resolve the TMSI, it
requests MD to present its IMSI in the clear. Upon allocation, a new TMSI is encrypted.
7.1.2.6 Summary and Connection Establishment
Figure 7.2 summarizes authentication and key agreement, as well as anonymity protection,
security-mechanism negotiation, and encryption, on inter-provider roaming in GSM by de-
tailing the connection establishment between MD and FN on roaming.
In order to facilitate future reference to the GSM connection-establishment process,
Figure 7.2 is divided into four parts. In the first part (GSM I), MD presents its identity
to FN. In the second part (GSM II), FN obtains one or more authentication vectors from
HN.7 In the third part (GSM III), FN authenticates MD based on an authentication vector.
Finally, in GSM IV the encryption key is transferred to BTS and MD is informed which
encryption mechanism to use.
7.2 GSM Intra-Provider Roaming
Inter-provider roaming from one GSM network provider to another always causes a new
roaming authentication between the network and MD. This is not the case if a MD is in
idle mode8 and moves within the home or a foreign network it roamed to. In this case, MD
is authenticated once it roams to the visited network, or once the provider of the visited
network requests a new authentication.9 When moving out of the range of the currently
serving BTS and into the range of a new one, the encryption key Kc negotiated during
the last authentication is transferred from the MSC to the new BTS. If MD roams beyond
the control of its currently serving MSC, the MSC first transfers Kc to the new MSC and
the new MSC subsequently transfers Kc to MD. MD is indirectly re-authenticated by the
new BTS, as only the legitimate MD has knowledge of the currently used Kc. As BTS
cannot distinguish between correctly and incorrectly encrypted data traffic and no integrity
protection is used in GSM, BTS cannot detect impersonated MDs by means of this re-
authentication method. However, trying to impersonate MD to the new BTS is useless
for an attacker without knowledge of Kc, as long as the new BTS enables encryption. In
this context, it is interesting to note that if encryption was disabled between MD and
the source BTS, it would not be enabled after roaming to the new BTS. Consequently,
the fast re-authentication in idle mode opens up to an impersonation attack. The GSM
security standard [62] does not specify how the A5 algorithm selection is handled in case
7Note that this phase does not take place if FN still stores unused authentication vectors from prior
authentications.
8In accordance to Section 2.4.2 we differentiate between intra-provider roaming and intra-provider han-
dover. A handover takes place if a user moves during an ongoing connection while a roaming procedure
takes place while the user is in idle mode, i.e., currently has no on-going connections.
9E.g., on periodical location updates or in certain provider set time intervals. The standard only defines,
in which situation a network may request a new authentication but does not require it to do so on any
occasion.
188 Chapter 7. Inter-provider Roaming within GSM and UMTS
IMSI
request security related info
authentication vector response
TMSI
G
SM
 I
G
SM
 II
G
SM
 III
authentication challenge
encryption key
request identiy
IMSI
GSM cipher mode command
any correctily deciphered message
G
SM
 IV
A8 / A3
A8 / A3
try to resolve TMSI
start encryption
decide mechanisms
RRC connection establishment 
including:
BTS MSC/VLR MSC/HLRMD
security capabilities
encryption mechanisms
authentication response
and
start deciphering 
start encryption
PSfrag replacements
RESG
RESG
RES ∗G
RES ∗G = RESG
RANDG
RANDG
RANDG
RANDG,RESG,Kc
Ki
Ki
Kc
Kc
Kc
Figure 7.2: GSM Authentication, Key Agreement, and Security-Mechanism Negotiation
the encryption was not disabled. In particular, it is unclear what happens if the new BTS
does not support the A5 algorithm used between the source BTS and MD10
10Most networks can be expected to support the same algorithms on every BTS throughout the network,
such that the same algorithm can be used before and after handover. However, e.g. due to a sequential
upgrade of BTSs, this is not necessarily the case.
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7.3 UMTS Inter-Provider Roaming
7.3.1 System Model
In a UMTS network, MD is connected to a visited network via a radio link to a particular
base transceiver station, called NodeB in UMTS. Multiple NodeBs are connected to a Radio
Network Controller (RNC) and multiple RNCs are controlled by a Mobile Switching Center
(MSC). The RNCs, together with the NodeBs that are connected to them, are also referred
to as UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN). Each MSC has access to a Visited
Location Register (VLR) that keeps track of the location of all MDs currently connected
to the visited network. The Home Location Register (HLR) in HN keeps track of all MDs
that are pre-registered for HN. As in GSM, all security-related information regarding MD is
stored in an AuC. Figure 7.3 illustrates the UMTS system components. Moreover, it shows
the keys and security mechanisms stored by each component. These are explained in detail
in the following section.
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Figure 7.3: UMTS System Model and Security Mechanism Endpoints
7.3.2 Security Model
As opposed to GSM, the UMTS standard supports not only encryption but also integrity
protection. Moreover, the authentication between MD and a visited network is mutual.
The EIPE on the network side does not coincide with the network access point (Node B).
Instead, encryption and integrity protection are implemented in the RNC. An introductory
overview on the UMTS security features can be found in [89]. More detailed information is
provided in [133, 9].
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7.3.2.1 Registration Process
Every UMTS user (also referred to as UMTS subscriber in the following) registers for a
dedicated home network operated by its home provider. As in GSM, on registration HN
allocates an IMSI as well as a long-term secret key KU for the user. The pair (IMSI,
KU) is stored on a Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM), as well as in HN’s AuC.
The USIM also contains five key-generation functions f1, ..., f5. During registration, a user
furthermore registers for a certain geographical roaming region.
7.3.2.2 Authentication and Key Agreement
As opposed to GSM, the UMTS standard allows for mutual authentication on inter-provider
roaming. Upon authentication, FN is assured that HN authorizes MD’s roaming to FN and
MD is assured of HN’s authorization of FN’s service provisioning to MD. The roaming
authentication and key-agreement protocols are implemented together and require HN’s in-
teraction on the first authentication. An unspecified number of subsequent authentications
can then take place without HN’s interaction. On the first authentication, FN requests
authentication data for MD from HN. HN provides FN with a provider-set number of au-
thentication vectors. Each authentication vector consists of a random challenge RAND U,
an authentication response RES U, an encryption key CK , an integrity-protection key IK ,
and an authentication token AUTN. RANDU is generated randomly by AuC. RES U is gen-
erated from RANDU and KU with the key-generation function f2. Similarly, CK and IK are
generated from RANDU and KU by means f3 (CK ) and f4 (IK ). The authentication token
AUTN is generated from RANDU, KU, a sequence number SQN, and an authentication
management field AMF11 by two functions f1 and f5:
AUTN = ( SQN⊕ f5(RANDU,KU)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: AK
|| AMF || f1(SQN,AMF,KU)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: MAC
) (7.1)
Here, || stands for the concatenation and ⊕ for the exclusive or operation of bit strings.
Essentially, AUTN is a sequence number that is integrity-protected with a Message Au-
thentication Code (MAC) generated with the help of the long-term secret key KU.
12
FN presents RANDU and AUTN to MD. MD’s USIM generates the response RES
∗
U as
well as IK , CK and AK. MD extracts SQN from the first part of AUTN and verifies that
SQN is in the right range.13 MD then computes MAC∗ = f1(SQN,AMF,KU). MD discards
the message if MAC∗ 6= MAC. It is important to note that the correctness of the MAC and
the fact that SQN is in the right range only proves to MD that HN has recently generated
AUTN, but not whether or not FN has actually received a complete authentication vector
from HN. It is only in combination with the integrity protection provided by FN that this
11Used to support more than one set of key-generation functions f1-f5.
12The Anonymity Key (AK) aims to protect against profiling attacks enabled through the use of sequence
numbers.
13A detailed description of the construction of SQN, its re-synchronization, and the range in which it is
required to be can be found in the appendix of [9].
7.3 UMTS Inter-Provider Roaming 191
proves FN’s authorization to MD (see Section 8.3). If MAC is correct, MD sends RES ∗U
back to FN and the MSC of FN verifies RES ∗U. FN has successfully authenticated MD if
RES ∗U equals RESU.
The choice of the key generation functions f1 to f5 is left to the UMTS providers.
Nevertheless, the organization of standardization 3GPP14 that standardizes UMTS specifies
a sample set of functions called MILENAGE [10]. Therefore, UMTS theoretically supports
as many authentication and key-agreement protocols as there are UMTS providers. It is,
however, expected that most providers will use MILENAGE. As a consequence, FN cannot
generate the data-protection keys IK and CK . In UMTS, HN and FN thus require a secure
channel between each other in order to protect the transfer of authentication vectors.
In UMTS, the master key generated during key agreement equals the pair of data-
protection keys. A key-establishment process ke (Definition 1.2.9) is not used in UMTS.
7.3.2.3 Encryption and Integrity Protection
The UMTS encryption and integrity-protection endpoint on the network side is not NodeB,
but RNC. The UMTS protection thus reaches further back into the UMTS backbone net-
work than in GSM. The encryption and integrity-protection mechanism are implemented
in MD and not on USIM.
UMTS can accommodate up to 16 different encryption mechanisms. Currently only two
UMTS Encryption Algorithms (UEAs) are specified, namely UEA0 (no encryption) and
UEA1, a stream cipher based on the block cipher KASUMI [8].
Similarly, only one of 16 possible UMTS Integrity Algorithms (UIAs), namely UIA1, is
specified in the current standard [9]. It is also based on the block cipher KASUMI [8]. As
opposed to encryption, the integrity protection of dedicated control messages is mandatory.
In GSM, no mechanism to restrict the lifetime of an encryption key Kc is standardized.
The UMTS standard avoids this weakness in that the lifetime of the keys IK and CK is
restricted by an HN-set threshold on how much data may at most be protected with the
same key pair. This threshold is stored on the USIM and checked every time a Radio
Resource Connection (RRC) is released. If a new RRC is established and the threshold was
reached during the last RRC, a new authentication and key agreement are initiated. For
more details on this mechanism, refer to [133].
7.3.2.4 Security-Mechanism Negotiation and Policies
Similar to GSM, in UMTS the visited network and MD negotiate only the encryption and
the integrity-protection mechanisms to use. HN is not engaged in the negotiation. On
connection establishment, MD sends its security capabilities, i.e., a list of all encryption
and integrity-protection mechanisms it supports to FN. After successful authentication of
MD, FN’s MSC decides which mechanisms MD and RNC are allowed to use and sends
a list of allowed mechanism pairs to RNC. RNC selects one of the allowed mechanism
pairs and acknowledges its choice to MD in a security mode command message. This
143rd Generation Partnership Project.
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message also repeats the security capabilities received from MD on connection setup and
is integrity protected. On receipt of this message, MD verifies the integrity protection and
compares the security capabilities with the ones it originally sent. By means of this, MD
can detect manipulation of its security capabilities. Furthermore, the integrity protection
of this message guarantees to MD that FN is authorized by HN to offer service to MD. This
is due to the fact that only HN can generate a valid integrity-protection key for a given
RANDU value and presents only authorized FN’s with authentication vectors.
15
It is important to note that MD is currently mandated to support the no encryption
mechanism UEA0. Consequently, neither MD nor HN can enforce encryption to be enabled.
Instead, the choice of whether encryption is used or not is left to the visited network
provider’s choice.
The UMTS standard makes use of the same mechanism of temporary identities to protect
a UMTS subscribers IMSI as GSM.
7.3.2.5 Summary and Connection Establishment
Figure 7.4 illustrates the complete security-related procedures on connection setup of a
UMTS subscriber with a UMTS network. To facilitate future references to this figure, it
is divided into four parts. In the first part (UMTS I), MD presents its identity to FN. In
the second phase (UMTS II), FN requests authentication vectors from HN. In the third
part (UMTS III), FN authenticates MD and MD is assured that HN recently generated the
received authentication token AUTN. In the fourth and final part (UMTS IV), FN chooses
the encryption and integrity-protection mechanisms to use, and acknowledges them in an
integrity-protected message to MD.16
7.4 UMTS Intra-Provider Roaming
Similar to intra-provider roaming in GSM, the encryption and integrity-protection keys IK
and CK agreed upon during the last authentication and key agreement are transferred from
one RNC to the next if an idle mode MD roams within a UMTS network. If the encryption
was disabled by the last serving RNC, it stays disabled after roaming to the destination
RNC. The UMTS security standard [9] does not specify whether the same UEA is used
after roaming to the destination RNC or a new UEA is negotiated. The standard also does
not address the problem of how a new UEA is selected if the destination RNC does not
support the UEA that was used between the source RNC and MD.
15Below, We will show that a recently generated AUTN can be received by anyone, yet the corresponding
IK cannot.
16By this message, MD is finally assured that FN is an authorized network.
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Chapter 8
Roaming Between GSM and
UMTS
To facilitate the transition from GSM to UMTS, the UMTS standard allows both radio
access networks UTRAN and BSS to be simultaneously operated with a single backbone
network and, in particular, a single hierarchy of MSCs. For this purpose, UMTS MSCs,
the so-called 3G MSCs, cannot only control UTRANs, but also GSM BSSs. In contrast,
only BSSs can be connected to to the original GSM MSCs, the so-called 2G MSCs. We will
refer to networks in which BSSs are connected to 3G MSCs as mixed-mode networks, to
networks that only operate UTRAN as UMTS networks, and to networks that only operate
GSM BSSs and 2G MSCs as GSM networks.
In this chapter, we describe all inter-system roaming authentication protocols between
the three above-mentioned network types. All of these procedures are specified in [11].
Here, we present a comprehensive and detailed description of each roaming case and thus
clarify the standard documents. Other overviews on the roaming authentication procedures
(e.g., [133, 89, 37, 145, 146]) fail to capture the essential differences between a full UMTS
authentication and an authentication that is based on a UMTS-authentication vector but
is carried out while MD is connected to a GSM BSS. Consequently, UMTS was to date
believed to be secure against man-in-the-middle attacks.
Exploiting a weakness in the GSM/UMTS inter-system handover procedures, we present
a man-in-the-middle attack on UMTS. This attack is the result of joint work with S. Wetzel
and has been published in [122]. Our attack allows an intruder to eavesdrop on all mobile-
initiated traffic. Possible victims to our attack are all MDs that support the UTRAN and
the GSM air interface. In particular, this will be the case for most of the equipment used
during the transition phase from 2G (GSM) to 3G (UMTS) technology.
The attack, as well as the countermeasures we suggested, were discussed by the stan-
dardization organization 3GPP [2]. As a result, future MDs shall be protected against our
attack.
Outline. In Section 8.1 we describe the inter-system, inter-provider roaming procedures
between GSM and UMTS networks. This is followed by the details on the inter-system,
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intra-provider roaming procedures in a mixed-mode network, a network in which GERAN
and UTRAN coexist in Section 8.2. In Section 8.3, we present our man-in-the-middle attack
against UMTS, including the discussion of our suggested countermeasures.
8.1 GSM/UMTS Inter-System Inter-Provider Roaming
The UMTS standard allows for SIM-equipped users (users that originally subscribed to
GSM services) to roam to UMTS, as well as to mixed-mode networks. The advantage of
this roaming type is that a user can subscribe to UMTS and still keep his old SIM card.
This facilitates the process of subscribing to UMTS and saves operators from handing out
new smart cards. Vice-versa, a USIM-equipped user can roam to GSM networks and mixed-
mode networks. In the transition phase, this type of roaming is crucial for user acceptance
and satisfaction, as users at least obtain GSM services in areas that are not covered by
UMTS yet.
Combining the different types of smart cards, serving radio access network, and MSCs,
we describe six essentially different roaming authentication scenarios. These scenarios are,
if not coherent, described in [9]:
Case 1: A USIM-equipped MD roams to a UMTS network (UMTS inter-provider roaming
as described in Section 7.3.2.2).
Case 2: A SIM-equipped MD roams to a GSM network (GSM inter-provider roaming as
described in Section 7.1.2.2).
Case 3: A SIM-equipped MD roams to UMTS.
Case 4: A USIM-equipped MD roams to GSM (i.e., to a GSM BSS that is connected to a
2G MSC).
Case 5: A USIM-equipped MD roams to a GSM BSS that is connected to a 3G MSC
(mixed-mode case).
Case 6: A SIM-equipped MD to a GSM BSS that is connected to a 3G MSC (mixed-mode
case).
All six roaming scenarios are illustrated in Figure 8.1. The first two roaming cases are
the inter-provider, intra-system cases that have already been described in the last section.
The last four cases are the inter-system cases. Note that in any of the six cases the network
to which MD roams can either be operated by the home provider or by a foreign provider.
In the following sections we detail Cases 3 through 6. Note that throughout the remainder
of this part, we use use light grey to refer to GSM components and darker grey to refer to
UMTS.
In order to be able to use any of the inter-system roaming support the UMTS standard
offers, a user’s MD has to support both the GSM and the UMTS radio interface. Throughout
this work, we assume that all users are equipped with MDs of this type. In particular, MDs
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Figure 8.1: The Six Roaming Cases
of this type support GSM encryption as well as UMTS encryption and integrity protection.
As UTRAN supports UMTS protection only and GERAN supports GSM encryption only,
the air interface protection is determined by the radio access network.
The type of authentication and key agreement depends on the type of smart card plugged
into MD, as well as the type of MSC. Each SIM and 2G MSC supports authentication based
on GSM-authentication vectors only while each USIM and 3G MSC supports authentication
based on both GSM-authentication vectors or UMTS authentication vectors.
8.1.1 A SIM-Equipped MD Roams to UMTS (Case 3)
In this case, a SIM-equipped MD connects to the network via a UMTS base station in the
same way as in GSM I (Figure 7.2). Node B forwards all GSM traffic transparently. The
MSC of the visited network requests a GSM-authentication vector (RAND G,Kc,RESG)
from HN, as in GSM II. The 3G MSC and MD follow GSM III to authenticate MD to
FN. Again, NodeB simply forwards the GSM-authentication messages. The 3G MSC sends
RANDG to MD (via NodeB). MD generates the authentication response RES
∗
G and the
encryption key Kc from RANDG and the long-term secret key Ki. The MD sends RESG
back to the visited MSC, which compares RES ∗G to RESG. The authentication is deemed
successful if the two values match.
After a successful GSM III, MD and MSC convert the established GSM key Kc into
UMTS keys
CK = c4(Kc) = Kc ||Kc (8.1)
IK = c5(Kc) = Kc1 ⊕Kc2 ||Kc ||Kc1 ⊕Kc2, (8.2)
where Kc = Kc1 ||Kc2 and Kc1 and Kc2 are 32 bits in length. MD and the visited network
then follow the steps of UMTS IV (see Figure 7.4). The visited 3G MSC transfers IK and
CK to RNC and RNC sends the integrity-protected security mode command message to
MD. The UMTS keys CK and IK are subsequently used to encrypt and integrity-protect
198 Chapter 8. Roaming Between GSM and UMTS
the communication between RNC and MD. The complete security-related procedures on
connection setup of a GSM subscriber with a UMTS network is described in Figure 8.2.
NodeB / RNC 3G MSC / VLR
CK = c4(Kc)
IK = c5(Kc)
CK = c4(Kc)
IK = c5(Kc)
GSM II
UMTS III
GSM III
GSM I
MD / SIM 2G MSC / HLR
Figure 8.2: A SIM-Equipped MD Roams to UMTS (Case 3)
8.1.2 A USIM-Equipped MD Roams to GSM Network (Case 4)
A MD equipped with a USIM connects to a GSM BTS, which is connected to a 2G MSC.
Since a 2G MSC does not support UMTS authentication, a UMTS subscriber can be au-
thenticated by a 2G MSC only if the USIM supports the conversion of UMTS-authentication
vectors to GSM-authentication vectors.
MD presents its identity to the visited network as in GSM I. The visited network requests
a GSM-authentication vector from the home network similar to GSM II: HN first generates
a UMTS-authentication vector and then converts it into a GSM-authentication vector. The
GSM-authentication challenge and the UMTS-authentication challenge are the same, i.e.,
RANDG = RANDU. The 32-bit GSM-authentication response RES G is generated from the
128-bit UMTS-authentication response RES U by splitting the UMTS response into four
32-bit values, such that RESU = RESU1 ||RESU2 ||RESU3 ||RESU4 and computing
RESG = c2(RESU) = RESU1 ⊕RESU2 ⊕RESU3 ⊕RESU4
The GSM-encryption key is derived from the UMTS keys IK and CK by:
Kc = c3(CK , IK ) = CK 1 ⊕ CK 2 ⊕ IK 1 ⊕ IK 2, (8.3)
where CK and IK are each split into CK 1,CK 2 IK 1 and IK 2 with a length 64 bits each,
such that CK = CK 1||CK 2 and IK = IK 1||IK 2.
The home network forwards the GSM-authentication vector to the visited network. The
visited 2G MSC in turn sends the authentication challenge to MD, which itself generates
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the GSM-authentication vector from the UMTS-authentication vector as described above.
This is followed by the remainder of the standard GSM IV in which the GSM-encryption
key Kc is transferred to BTS and BTS sends the GSM cipher mode command to MD. MD
and BTS subsequently use Kc and the negotiated encryption mechanisms to protect data
traffic between them. The complete procedure of a UMTS subscriber roaming to GSM is
described in Figure 8.3.
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Figure 8.3: USIM-Equipped MD Roams to GSM (Case 4)
8.1.3 USIM-Equipped MD Roams to a Mixed-Mode Network (Case 5)
In this case, a USIM-equipped MD connects to a GSM base station and this GSM base
station is controlled by a 3G MSC. Since the 3G MSC and the USIM support UMTS I,
II, and III of the UMTS connection establishment, these can be applied as described in
Figure 7.4. The GSM BTS forwards the respective traffic transparently.
After completing UMTS III, MD and the visited 3G MSC convert the generated UMTS
keys IK and CK into a GSM key Kc as in Equation (8.3):
Kc = c3(CK , IK )
MD and the GSM BSS proceed with part IV of the GSM authentication described in
Figure 7.2. In particular, BTS acknowledges its choice of the encryption mechanism to MD
in the GSM cipher mode command. Kc and the negotiated GSM-encryption mechanism
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are subsequently used to encrypt data traffic between MD and BTS. Case 5 is illustrated in
Figure. 8.4.
MD / USIM BTS / BSC 3G MSC / VLR 3G MSC / HLR
Kc = c3(IK,CK) Kc = c3(IK,CK)
UMTS II
UMTS III
UMTS I
GSM IV
Figure 8.4: USIM-Equipped MD Roams to a Mixed-Mode Network (Case 5)
8.1.4 SIM-Equipped MD Roams to a Mixed-Mode Network (Case 6)
In case an SIM-equipped MD roams to a GSM BTS that is controlled by a 3G MSC, the
3G MSC acts in exactly the same way as on regular GSM roaming (GSM I-IV, Figure 7.2).
Case 6 is illustrated in Figure 8.5.
BTS / BSC 3G MSC / VLR 2G MSC / HLRMD / SIM
GSM I−IV
Figure 8.5: GSM Subscriber Roaming to a Mixed-Mode Network (Case 6)
8.2 Intra-Provider Roaming within a Mixed-Mode Network
Similar to intra-provider UTRAN or GSM roaming, the UMTS standard specifies a fast
re-authentication based on the currently used encryption (and integrity protection) key(s)
on intra-provider roaming within a mixed-mode GSM/UMTS network.
Upon intra-provider roaming from UTRAN to GERAN, the currently used keys UMTS
keys IK and CK are transferred into the GSM key Kc = c3(CK , IK ).
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Upon intra-provider roaming from GERAN to UTRAN, the key transfer depends on
whether the GERAN controlling MSC is a 3G or a 2G MSC. A 3G MSC stores and transfers
the UMTS keys, while a 2G MSC transfers the GSM key. Note that a single roaming to a 2G
MSC makes the original UMTS keys unrecoverable. Consequently, if a USIM-equipped MD
is authenticated by a 3G MSC and then subsequently roams to a 2G MSC, a 3G MSC and
yet another 3G MSC, then between the 3G MSCs, the pseudo-UMTS keys IK ∗ = c5(Kc)
and CK ∗ = c4(Kc) are transferred rather then the originally generated UMTS keys IK and
CK . If a SIM-equipped MD roams within a mixed-mode network, either the pseudo-UMTS
keys or the GSM key is transferred between the MSC. A conversion of a GSM key to UMTS
keys and back to a GSM key recovers the original GSM key. Consequently, a transfer of IK ∗
and CK ∗ essentially carries the same information as a transfer of Kc. Figure 8.6 illustrates
the key transfer of USIM and SIM-equipped MDs in a mixed-mode network.
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Figure 8.6: Intra-Provider Roaming in a Mixed-Mode Network
8.3 Man-in-the-Middle Attack on UMTS
In this section, we present a man-in-the-middle attack on UMTS networks that results from
a weakness in the inter-system roaming procedure between UMTS and GSM [122]. The
attack allows an intruder to impersonate a valid GSM base station to a UMTS subscriber,
regardless of the fact that UMTS authentication and key agreement are used. As a result,
an intruder can eavesdrop on all mobile-initiated traffic.
Since the UMTS standard requires mutual authentication between MD and the network,
so far UMTS networks have been considered secure against man-in-the-middle attacks. As
already pointed out in Section 7.3.2.2, the network authentication defined in the UMTS
standard depends on both the validity of the authentication token and the integrity protec-
tion of the subsequent security mode command.
As will be shown in the following section, both of these mechanisms are necessary
in order to prevent a man-in-the-middle attack. Consequently, an attacker can mount
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the impersonation attack since GSM base stations until the present time do not support
integrity protection. Possible victims of this attack are all MDs that support the UTRAN
and the GSM air interface simultaneously.
8.3.1 Protection of UMTS Subscribers with UMTS-Only User Equip-
ment against Man-in-the-Middle Attacks in Standard UMTS Net-
works
In order to mount a man-in-the-middle attack in standard UMTS networks (see Sec-
tion 7.3.2.2), an attacker would have to impersonate a valid network to the user. However,
in the standard scenario, the combination of two specific security mechanisms protects MD
from this attack: the authentication token AUTN and the integrity protection of the security
mode command message (see Figure 7.4). The authentication token ensures the timeliness
and origin of the authentication challenge and as such protects against replay of authen-
tication data. The integrity protection prevents an attacker from simply relaying correct
authentication information while fooling the respective parties into not using encryption for
subsequent communication.
In particular, AUTN contains a sequence number SQN and a message authentication
code MAC (see Equation (7.1)). On receipt of AUTN (see Figure 7.4), MD first extracts the
sequence number SQN. If the sequence number is in the right range (see [9] for the details
on the range), MD is assured that AUTN was issued recently by its HN. Otherwise, MD
knows that either AUTN is the replay of an old value or the synchronization of the sequence
number failed (a more detailed description of the procedure is given in [9]). MD then checks
the message authentication code MAC. A correct MAC indicates that the authentication
token was originally generated by HN. It is important to note that the correctness of the
MAC and SQN being in range alone do not provide assurance to the mobile unit that
the token was in fact received directly from the authorized network and not relayed by an
attacker.
It is only the combination with an additional integrity protection of the control messages
that prevents network impersonation. The security mode command message is not only
integrity-protected but more importantly includes the security mode capabilities that the
MD originally announced to the network on radio connection establishment. By checking
the correctness of the integrity protection, MD is assured that this message was generated by
a network entity in possession of the right integrity key. Furthermore, including the security
capabilities of MD in the integrity-protected security mode command message is crucial in
that it prevents both the mobile unit as well as the network from being fooled into using no
encryption (or weak encryption) by an attacker. In order to succeed, an attacker would have
to forge the integrity protection on the security mode command message, which is assumed
to be impossible [5]. In case the security capabilities of the MD would not be repeated back
in the security mode command message, the attacker could forge the protection, by replacing
the original (not integrity-protected) security capabilities with its own and making the valid
network integrity-protect the security mode command with these replaced capabilities. An
attacker could therefore claim on behalf of the victim MD to support only the mandatory
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encryption algorithms (instead of its original security capabilities).1 In turn, the attacker
would inform MD of the choice of no or weak encryption by the network in the security
mode command.
8.3.2 Vulnerability of UMTS Subscribers Using a Combined
UMTS/GSM Mobile Equipment to Man-in-the-Middle Attacks in
UMTS Networks
If a UMTS subscriber roams to a GSM BTS controlled by a 3G MSC, such as described in
Case 4 (see Section 8.1.2), the cipher mode command message is neither integrity-protected,
nor does it repeat the security capabilities previously announced by MD on radio connection
establishment. Consequently, the message can be easily forged by an attacker. This limi-
tation is due to the fact that GSM does not currently support integrity protection. In the
following section, we will detail a man-in-the-middle attack which exploits this shortcoming.
We show that an attacker can impersonate a GSM base station to a UMTS subscriber using
the UMTS authentication procedure of the hybrid GSM/UMTS scenario.
In order to mount our attack, we assume that the attacker knows the IMSI of his victim,
a reasonable assumption, as the attacker can easily get hold of the IMSI by making MD
send it to him by initiating an authentication procedure prior to the attack (see Figure 7.4)
and disconnecting from MD after receiving the IMSI. Note that by doing so, the attacker
also learns the security capabilities of MD.2 A MD that supports both the GSM and the
UMTS radio interface, connects to UMTS whenever possible and connects to a GSM BTS
only if no NodeB can be received with sufficient signal strength. An attacker can force a
victim MD to connect to a BTS operated by himself instead of a UMTS NodeB operated
by a legitimate network provider, e.g., by jamming the UMTS frequencies and sending its
beacons with higher transmitting power than any of the present valid GSM BTSs. Our
attack works in two phases:
Phase 1:
The attacker acts on behalf of the victim MD in order to obtain a valid authentication token
AUTN from any real network by executing the following protocol:
1. During the connection setup, the attacker sends the security capabilities of the victim
MD to the visited network.
2. The attacker sends the TMSI of the victim MD to the visited network. If the current
TMSI is unknown to the attacker, he sends a fake TMSI (which eventually cannot be
resolved by the network).
1Currently, only no encryption (UEA0) and UEA1 and one integrity-protection mechanisms UIA1 are
defined, and all three are mandatory. Thus the security capabilities are currently always the same and could
not be bid down even if no integrity protection was used.
2The feasibility of this attack is already recognized in the UMTS specification [7].
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Figure 8.7: Phase 1: Attacker Obtains Currently Valid AUTN
3. If the network cannot resolve the TMSI, it sends an identity request to the attacker
and the attacker replies with the IMSI of the victim.
4. The visited network requests the authentication information for the victim MD from
its HN.
5. HN provides the authentication information to the visited network.
6. The network sends RANDU and AUTN to the attacker.
7. The attacker disconnects from the visited network.
Since none of the messages sent in steps 1 through 7 are protected by any means, the
network cannot recognize the presence of the attacker. Consequently, the attacker obtains
an authentication token which he in turn can use in Phase 2 of the attack to impersonate
a network to the victim MD.3
Phase 2:
The attacker impersonates a valid GSM base station to the victim MD.
1. The victim MD and the attacker establish a connection and MD sends its security
capabilities to the attacker.
2. The victim MD sends its TMSI or IMSI to the attacker.
3Note that Phase 1 does not cause a false location update for the victim MD, as location updates follow
successful authentications only.
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3. The attacker sends MD the authentication challenge RANDU and the authentication
token AUTN he obtained from the real network in Phase 1 of the attack.4
4. The victim MD successfully verifies the authentication token.
5. The victim MD replies with the authentication response.
6. The attacker decides to use “no encryption” (or weak encryption, like a broken version
of the GSM-encryption algorithms; see, for example, [28]).
7. The attacker sends MD the GSM cipher mode command including the chosen encryp-
tion algorithm.
The attack does not allow the intruder to impersonate MD to the network at the same time.
In order to allow for a regular use of the connection by the victim unit, the attacker has to
establish a regular connection to a real network to forward traffic it receives from MD. As
a side effect, the attacker has to pay the cost for this connection.
Feasibility of the Attack:
An attacker trying to impersonate a valid network to a UMTS subscriber has to overcome
two difficulties: he has to send (or forward) a valid authentication token to the victim MD,
and he has to make sure that no encryption is used after the authentication.
4The MD accepts the authentication token if the token is fresh, in other words, if not too much time has
elapsed between Phase 1 and Phase 2.
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In our attack, the intruder solves the first problem by impersonating the victim MD to
a real network in order to obtain a valid authentication token. This section is possible since
none of the respective messages are encrypted or integrity-protected.
Requesting no or weak encryption is more difficult, as the radio access network decides
which encryption algorithm is used (in both the GSM and the UTRAN case). The decision
strongly depends on the security capabilities of MD, which are sent to the network during
connection setup (see Figures 8.4 and 7.4). In principle, both radio access networks (i.e.,
GSM and UTRAN) allow “no encryption.”
In UTRAN the security mode command message that informs MD which algorithm
to use is integrity-protected. The integrity protection alone, however, does not protect
against network impersonation. The attacker could still fool a valid network into integrity-
protecting a “no encryption” message with the right key by sending him false information
about the encryption capabilities of the victim MD. But as UEA1 is mandatory and cur-
rently only UEA0 and UEA1 are defined, a bidding-down is currently not possible even
if the integrity protection was fakeable. Furthermore, in the integrity-protected security
mode command message, the network sends the security capabilities it received back to
MD. Unless the attacker can forge the integrity check, MD would thus detect a bidding-
down attack.
In the GSM case, though, integrity protection is currently not supported. As a conse-
quence, the corresponding cipher mode command message is not integrity-protected, thus
allowing an attacker to easily forge this message and fool the victim MD into using either
no encryption or a weak encryption algorithm. Eventually, the attacker is able to eavesdrop
on all mobile-initiated communication.
Our attack only works as long as the time gap between Phase 1 and Phase 2 is small
enough so that no other authentication between the victim MD and another network takes
place. Otherwise, the sequence number within the authentication token might be out of
range.
As stated before, our attack does not work against mobile equipment that is capable of
the UTRAN interface only. Yet, in the transition phase from GSM to UMTS, most users are
expected to use equipment that is capable of both the UTRAN radio interface and GSM.
The UMTS specification includes an optional and not further specified display of the
current encryption and integrity-protection state [9]. If this is implemented in the victim’s
MD, the victim may be able to suspect the attack, depending on the details provided to the
user. However, if, for example, MD only displays encryption on/off and the attacker uses
a broken algorithm like A5/2 for encryption [28], the subscriber will not be able to detect
the attack. Moreover, if MD displays UMTS/GSM authentication only, the victim may be
mislead about his current level of protection if MD indicates UMTS authentication.
8.3.3 Countermeasures
Avoiding the attack by not allowing roaming to GSM is not an option, primarily for eco-
nomical reasons. Consequently, the authentication procedure has to be changed in order
to protect against the man-in-the-middle attack described above. In [122] we suggested
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protecting against the attack by not only placing the generation of the integrity-check on
the cipher mode command message back in the MSC/VLR (rather then the RNC), but
also mandating the inclusion of the security mode capabilities, MD acknowledges to the
network. As a result of our publication, the attack was discussed by the UMTS standard-
ization organization 3GPP [3]. Consequently, the attack was included into the GSM/UMTS
inter-operation vulnerabilities studied in [2]. Currently, 3GPP discusses enhancing the GSM
security by an integrity protection of the cipher mode command message, as well as a replay
of MD’s security capabilities. As opposed to our original suggestion, integrity protection of
the GSM cipher mode command protects only MDs that mandate the integrity protection
on the GSM cipher mode command against our attack. However, the currently discussed
solution additionally protects GSM and UMTS subscribers against fake GSM base stations
when roaming to GSM.
8.4 Conclusion
The UMTS specification allows for a variety of combinations of UMTS and GSM user
equipment, subscriber identity modules, and radio access networks. In order to protect
UMTS subscribers from attacks known to GSM networks, the UMTS specification does
not allow UMTS-capable equipment to carry out GSM authentication and key agreement
unless the network is incapable of UMTS authentication and key agreement [9]. However,
in this chapter we have detailed an attack that shows that, due to the inter-operation with
GSM, the use of the currently specified UMTS roaming authentication and key-agreement
procedures are not sufficient in order to protect UMTS subscribers from man-in-the middle
attacks. Implementing countermeasures to thwart the attack will require modification of
the GSM or the UMTS standard.
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Chapter 9
Handover within and between
GSM and UMTS
The GSM and the UMTS standards specify handover procedures of MDs within their HN
in the same way as handover procedures of roaming MDs. Handover procedures within FN
are controlled by FN. Handover procedures between different providers are not specified.
Candidate services for handover are incoming and outgoing phone calls (circuit-switched
services), as well as ongoing GPRS sessions (packet-switched services).
Aside from handover within UMTS, the UMTS standard specifies handover procedures
between a GSM BSS (also called GERAN in the UMTS standard) and UTRAN within
mixed-mode networks, as well as between different network operators.
All handover procedures specified for UMTS and GSM are network-initiated mobile
assisted procedures as modeled in Figure 3.5. MD periodically sends measurement reports to
the visited network. These reports include information about the best received surrounding
BTSs and Node Bs in MD’s current location. The algorithm by which the necessity of a
handover is determined is not specified in the standard.
The handover procedures within GSM and UMTS make use of a security-context transfer
in which the data protection key(s) used before handover is (are) transferred to the new
radio access network and then reused. On inter-system handover between UMTS and GSM,
the data-protection keys used before handover are additionally converted to the right length
for the respective destination technology.
In this chapter, we describe the security-context transfer for all intra-provider and inter-
provider handover procedures between and within GSM, UMTS, and mixed-mode networks.
The handover procedures themselves are described in [11, 60]. The security-context transfer
is specified in [9, 62]. Here, we present a comprehensive overview on all of the different
SCT cases. Furthermore, we discuss whether these procedures meet the newly defined
requirements for SCT and analyze their security with help of the general threat analyzes
presented in Chapter 4.
Moreover, we detail the impact of GSM vulnerabilities on the security of UMTS and
GSM subscribers roaming in a heterogeneous GSM/UMTS network world. This part of
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the thesis has been published in [123] and is joint work with S. Wetzel. In particular, we
show that a single handover of a USIM-equipped MD to a GSM network that uses a broken
version of the A5 algorithm is sufficient to break the encryption of all post-handover UMTS
traffic. GSM subscribers profit from the higher protection level of a UMTS connection only
if they do not roam and are not handed over to the GSM (part of a) network between two
authentications. We also study the impact of a two-sided GSM man-in-the-middle attack
and show that such an attacker can together with his victim be handed over from GSM to
UMTS. To secure UMTS access networks against GSM vulnerabilities, we suggest in [123]
to integrate an additional new authentication into each inter-system handover procedure.
The found vulnerabilities and our countermeasures were discussed by 3GPP [3] and part of
our countermeasures were included in [4].
Outline. In Section 9.1, we describe the security-context transfer on intra-provider han-
dover in GSM. This is followed by a brief description of the SCT on intra-provider handover
in UMTS in Section 9.2. We detail the security-context transfer of inter-system handover
between GSM and UMTS in Section 9.3. The impact of GSM vulnerabilities on UMTS
due to the inter-system handover is discussed in Section 9.4. We close this chapter with a
Conclusion in Section 9.5.
9.1 Analysis of Intra-Provider Handover in GSM
For GSM, only hard handover procedures are specified. As a consequence of the hierarchi-
cal structure of a GSM backbone network, four handover types of intra-provider handover
are distinguished:1 handover within the same cell (handover between different time-slots),
handover between different cells controlled by the same BSC, handover between BTSs con-
trolled by the same MSC, and finally handover between different MSCs. In an intra-cell
handover, the encryption and integrity-protection endpoint does not change. From a se-
curity point of view, these handover are irrelevant and we can concentrate on the three
other handover types. A detailed description of the different handover procedures is given
in [60]. We concentrate here on the transfer of the GSM-encryption key and the negotiation
of security mechanisms only.
In accordance with the notation introduced in Part II, we will speak of the source BTS
as the BTS to which MD is connected before the handover and of the destination BTS as the
BTS to which MD is connected afterwards. Similarly, we will refer to the source MSC and
the destination MSC as the MSCs that control the source BTS or the destination BTS. Note
that source and destination MSC can coincide (intra-MSC handover). Furthermore, we refer
to the MSC to which MD was connected during the call or GPRS-session establishment as
the anchor MSC of a handover. It is important to note that the anchor MSC stays the same
on subsequent handover and that it is the anchor MSC that stays responsible for the call.
Due to the way intra-provider roaming is implemented in GSM (Section 7.2), the anchor
MSC may differ from the MSC that was engaged in the last authentication of MD.
1GSM, currently, does not support inter-provider handover.
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On handover, a simple security-context transfer is used to transfer the last negotiated
encryption key Kc to the destination BTS. If the destination BTS is controlled by the source
BSC, BSC simply forwards Kc to BTS. If the destination BSC differs from the source BSC
but both are controlled by the same MSC, the MSC transfers Kc to the destination BSC,
which in turn forwards it to the destination BTS. If the destination MSC differs from the
source MSC, the latter one first transfers Kc to the destination MSC, which in turn sends it
to the destination BTS via its BSC. The GSM security-context transfer does not use a key-
derivation function kd to separate the keys used before from the ones used after handover.
Consequently, neither R*-2 nor R*-3 can be met. GSM does not support tracking of the
lifetime of an encryption key. Consequently, considerations with respect to the lifetime of
a key cannot be taken into account during handover (R*-4).
The standard specifies that if encryption is disabled before handover, it will stay disabled
after handover [62, 60]. How the A5 algorithm used after handover is negotiated is not
further specified in the standard. It is, however, noted that the applied A5 algorithm may
change after handover and the choice of the allowed algorithms is left to the destination
MSC. As in the intra-provider case the destination MSC and the source MSC are operated by
the same provider, both can be assumed to have the same policies, such that R*-5 is obsolete
(see Section 6.3). As GSM does not currently support integrity protection, the handover
command message and the messages exchanged to negotiate the encryption mechanism to
use after handover are not integrity-protected. Thus, neither R*-8 nor R*-6 can be met.
The destination MSC does not obtain any information on the previously used cipher suites
(R*-1 not met). How handover requests are protected is not specified in the standard. It
therefore depends on the network operator in question whether R*-7 is met.
Subsequent intra-provider handover between different MSCs are controlled by the anchor
MSC. The anchor MSC transfers Kc to the k-th destination MSC on a k-th order intra-
provider handover in GSM.
In the following we analyze the security of GSM-handover procedures with the help of
the threat analysis presented in Chapter 4.
As in GSM no key-establishment process ke and no key-derivation kd are used, GSM is
vulnerable to the attack modules BAM*-1 to BAM*-4. Moreover, as will be discussed in
Section 9.4.1 the GSM encryption algorithm A5/2 is broken, such that GSM is vulnerable to
BAM*-5 if A5/2 is used. Whether or not GSM is vulnerable to BAM*-6 is unclear. In some
cases GSM BTSs are connected via a radio link to the rest of the backbone network. In this
case, an attacker can intercept the transfer of the encryption key Kc from MSC to BTS and
thus achieve BAM*-6(a). The same holds for BAM*-7(a). The other alternatives in BAM*-6
and BAM*-7 cannot easily be assessed without detailed knowledge of the implementations
of network components.
As a consequence of its vulnerability to the above basic attack modules, GSM is vul-
nerable to the attack modules AM*-1 if A5/2 is used between MD and the j-th destination
BTS and to AM*-4 if A5/2 is used between MD and the k-th destination BTS. If a GSM
network is vulnerable to BAM*-6 (BAM*-7) it is also vulnerable to AM*-2 (AM*-5). As it
is unclear whether GSM is vulnerable to BAM*-6 and BAM*-7 it is unclear whether GSM
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Attack Module Used in Attack
Possible if A5/2 used by some previous
source BTS
A*-7, A*-9, A*-14, A*-15, A*-18, A*-20,
A*-23, A*-25
Possible if some previous source BTS con-
nected over radio link
A*-6, A*-10, A*-15, A*-16, A*-13,
A*-17, A*-23, A*-25
Unclear A*-12
Possible if A5/2 used by destination BTS A*-1
Possible if destination BTS connected
over radio link
A*-2, A*-3, A*-20
Unclear A*-5, A*-15, A*-20
Possible if A5/2 used by previous source
BTS
A*-5, A*-9, A*-14, A*-20
Possible if destination BTS connected
over radio link
A*-10, A*-17
Possible if A5/2 used by destination BTS A*-8
Not possible because of bid-down protec-
tion
A*-8, A*-11, A*-19, A*-22
Possible if attack observes use of “no en-
cryption”
A*-4, A*-21, A*-24
Not possible A*-13
Unclear A*-27
Possible because handover command not
integrity-protected
A*-14, A*-15, A*-16, A*-26
Table 9.1: Candidates for New Attacks against GSM
is vulnerable to AM*-3 or AM*-6.
In GSM an attacker cannot bid-down the security mechanism negotiation below the
security level of A5/1 (see, e.g., Section 9.4.1.1). However, an attack can watch out for
network providers that command MDs to use “no encryption” in order to mount certain
attacks. Although GSM is vulnerable against a network impersonation (see Section 9.4.1.2),
GSM is not vulnerable against a two-sided man-in-the-middle attack.
As in GSM no integrity protection is used, it is easy to fake handover commands in
GSM. Whether it is easy to fake handover requests in GSM is hard to tell, as very little is
publicly known as to how providers protect the communication on their backbones.
In summary, the attacks collected in Table 9.1 are candidates for being mountable in
GSM (see also Table 4.3).
Here, we have methodically identified new potential attacks against GSM handover
procedures with the help of the extensive general threat analysis introduced in Chapter 4.
This demonstrates the usefulness of our threat analysis.
Although inter-provider handover are currently not explicitly supported by the GSM
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standard, they could be implemented in the same way as intra-provider handover.
9.2 Intra-Provider Handover within UTRAN
Similar to GSM, UMTS supports intra-provider handover procedures within the same cell,
within the same RNC, between RNCs controlled by the same MSC and between different
MSCs. UMTS also supports subsequent intra-provider handover between different MSCs.
These are controlled by the anchor MSC. As opposed to GSM, UMTS supports hard and
soft handover procedures. A detailed description of the UMTS handover procedures can be
found in [11]. We concentrate here on the security-context transfer during handover. Unless
the RNC changes, no security context has to be transferred. We therefore concentrate on
handover between different RNCs.
UMTS uses a simple security-context transfer without a key-derivation function dur-
ing handover. The anchor MSC transfers the encryption and integrity-protection keys CK
and IK to the destination MSC, which then forwards them to the destination RNC.2 Con-
sequently, requirements R*-2 and R*-3 are not met by the security-context transfer used
within UMTS. However, in UMTS MD keeps track of how long a cipher key and integrity-
protection key pair has been used by means of counters that measure the amount of data
thus far protected with these keys. The visited network can query MD about these counters.
The counters are stored on the USIM card, such that it can be assumed that a subscriber
cannot easily manipulate them. Like all other control traffic responses to queries of the
current counter values are required to be integrity-protected on the air interface, such that
they cannot be manipulated. Consequently, lifetime restrictions on data-protection keys
can be enforced (R*-4).
As in GSM, encryption stays disabled after handover if it was disabled before handover.
How the UEA and UIA algorithms for use after handover are negotiated is not further
specified in the standard.3 In particular, it is unclear whether policies of HN can be enforced
during the negotiation R*-5 and whether the negotiation is protected against bidding-down
attacks R*-6. However, as integrity protection of control traffic is mandatory both before
and after handover, handover command messages are always integrity-protected in UMTS
(R*-8).
As in GSM, the destination MSC does not obtain any information on the previously
used cipher suites (R*-1 not met) and how handover requests are protected is not specified
in the standard. It therefore depends on the network operator in question whether R*-7 is
met.
In the following we analyze the security of handover procedures within UTRAN with
the help of the threat analysis presented in Chapter 4.
As in GSM, in UMTS no key-establishment process ke and no key-derivation function
kd is used. Therefore, UMTS is vulnerable to the attack modules BAM*-1 to BAM*-4.
2Note that the anchor MSC and the destination MSC may coincide.
3This may be due to the fact that currently only one encryption algorithm and one integrity-protection
algorithm is specified.
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As opposed to GSM, to date no efficient attack against the UMTS encryption mechanism
KASUMI is known, such that UMTS is currently secure against BAM*-5(a). Whether or
not UMTS is secure against the other alternatives in BAM*-5, and whether or not UMTS is
vulnerable to BAM*-6 and BAM*-7 is unclear and depends on the details of how the UMTS
network components and their communication are protected. As in UMTS the encryption
and integrity protection reaches back to the RNC, an attacker cannot intercept any key
transfer even if NodeBs are connected to RNCs over a radio link.
As a consequence, UMTS is currently well-protected against the attack modules AM*-1,
AM*-4, AM*-2, AM*-5, AM*-3, and AM*-6.
In UMTS an attacker cannot bid-down the security-mechanism negotiation as the se-
curity capabilities announced to the network by MD is returned to MD in an integrity-
protected message (see Chapter 8). However, as in GSM, an attacker can watch out for
network providers that command MDs to use “no encryption” in order to mount certain
attacks.
As in UMTS control traffic is integrity-protected, it is currently impossible to fake
handover commands in UMTS. Whether it is easy to fake handover requests in UMTS is
hard to tell, as very little is publicly known as to how providers protect the communication
on their backbones.
In summary, the attacks collected in Table 9.2 are candidates for being mountable in
UMTS (see also Table 4.3).
Table,4.3 shows that if the UMTS network components and their communication are
well-protected, UMTS is secure against most of the identified attacks. The only attacks
that are left to be considered in this case are the attacks A*-4, A*-21, and A*-24 that make
use of a disabled encryption between a mobile device and a previous source Node B. We
will discuss the impact of two GSM vulnerabilities, namely supporting a breakable encryp-
tion mechanism and supporting fake base station attacks on inter-operating GSM/UMTS
networks in the next section.
9.3 Inter-System Handover between GSM and UMTS
To facilitate the transition from GSM to UMTS, the UMTS standard allows for handover
procedures between UMTS and GSM radio access networks. These may be operated by the
same or by different network providers. As within GSM and UTRAN, a security-context
transfer with key derivation is used to secure user and control traffic after handover. As
opposed to the homogeneous GSM and UMTS cases, an inter-system handover makes con-
versions of GSM keys into UMTS keys necessary. Which keys are converted into which and
who converts and transfers them on the network side depends on the smart-card type used,
the capabilities of the anchor and destination MSC, and the capabilities of the destination
radio access network.
In principal, on inter-system handover from a UMTS RNC as anchor to a GSM BSS
as destination radio access network, the UMTS keys IK and CK used before handover are
converted into a GSM key Kc using the conversion function c3 (see Equation (8.3)). Kc is
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Attack Module Used in Attack
Depends on protection of network com-
ponents
A*-7, A*-9, A*-14, A*-15, A*-18,
A*-20, A*-23, A*-25
Depends on protection of network com-
ponents
A*-6, A*-10, A*-15, A*-16, A*-13,
A*-17, A*-23, A*-25
Unclear A*-12
Depends on protection of network com-
ponents
A*-1
Depends on protection of network com-
ponents
A*-2, A*-3, A*-20
Unclear A*-5, A*-15, A*-20
Depends on protection of network com-
ponents
A*-5, A*-9, A*-14, A*-20
Depends on protection of network com-
ponents
A*-10, A*-17
Unclear A*-8
Not possible because of bid-down protec-
tion
A*-8, A*-11, A*-19, A*-22
Possible if attack observes use of “no en-
cryption”
A*-4, A*-21, A*-24
Not possible A*-13
Unclear A*-27
Impossible because handover command
integrity-protected
A*-14, A*-15, A*-16, A*-26
Table 9.2: Candidates for Attacks against UMTS
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then used to protect data and control traffic after handover. Upon handover from a 2G
MSC as anchor to UTRAN, the GSM key Kc is converted into the UMTS keys IK and
CK by the conversion functions c4 and c5 (see Equations (8.1) and (8.2)). Which type
of keys are transferred thus depends on the capabilities of the anchor and the destination
network. Which keys are generated during authentication depends on the capabilities of the
authenticating MSC, as well as the smart-card type.
By construction of the key-conversion functions, subsequent conversions from GSM to
UMTS and back to GSM retrieve the original GSM key:
c3(c4(Kc), c5(Kc)) = Kc
The key-conversion functions c3, c4, and c5 are very similar to the ones suggested in Chap-
ter 6.1 and exhibit the desired property with the same argument (see Section 6.1.1.3). How-
ever, no additional key-derivation function separates the keys used before from those used
after handover, such that R*-2 and R*-3 are not met. In particular, each intermediate
UMTS network obtains knowledge of previously and subsequently used data-protection
keys. The requirements R*-1 is likewise not met. Violations of key lifetime restrictions can
be detected by any UMTS network MD is handed over to, such that R*-4 is met in part.
The standard specifies that if encryption was disabled in the GSM BSS (UMTS RNC)
before, it will stay disabled after handover to a UMTS RNC (GSM BSS). If encryption was
enabled, the source radio access network sends MD’s security capabilities to the destina-
tion radio access network, which in turn chooses one of the supported mechanisms. MD is
informed of this choice in the handover command message. It is, however, unclear whether
AN’s policies could be enforced during handover (R*-5) and whether the negotiation be-
tween AN and DEST can be protected against bidding-down (R*-6). Upon handover from
UMTS to GSM, the handover command message is integrity-protected. However, upon
handover from GSM to UMTS, this is not the case (R*-8). The standard does not specify
how messages exchanged between different network providers are protected. It therefore
depends on the network providers in question whether the handover request message that
includes the security context, is encrypted and integrity-protected (R*-7).
In the following, we detail the key transfer for all possible constellations of anchor MSCs,
authenticating MSCs, and destination MSCs, first for USIM-equipped MDs and then for
SIM-equipped MDs.4
9.3.1 Key Transfer on Handover of USIM-Equipped MDs
We start with the cases in which the anchor and the authenticating MSC coincide (see
Figure 9.1).
Case 1: A USIM-equipped MD is authenticated by a 3G MSC. During authentication
and key agreement, the UMTS keys CK and IK are established between the 3G MSC and
MD. If MD is subsequently handed over from the authenticating MSC as anchor network to
4Note that MD either has a SIM inserted or a USIM, but never both at once.
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Case 4:
Case 3:
Kc = c3(CK,IK)
Kc = c3(CK,IK)
Authenticating
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Case 1:
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Figure 9.1: USIM Handover Cases with Authenticating MSC = Anchor MSC
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Case 6:
Kc = c3(CK,IK)
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Authenticating
Kc = c3(CK,IK)
Intermediate
3G MSCUSIM 3G MSC2G MSC
USIM 3G MSC 3G MSC3G MSC2G MSC
Figure 9.2: Additional USIM Handover Cases with Authenticating MSC 6= Anchor MSC
a 3G MSC as destination network, the anchor MSC transfers CK and IK to the destination
MSC.
Case 2: As in Case 1, a USIM-equipped MD is authenticated by a 3G MSC, but MD is
subsequently handed over from the authenticating MSC as anchor network to a 2G MSC
as destination network. In this case, the anchor MSC converts the UMTS keys CK and IK
into the GSM key Kc = c3(CK , IK ) and transfers Kc to the 2G destination MSC.
Case 3 and 4: A USIM-equipped MD is authenticated by a 2G MSC. During authenti-
cation and key agreement, the GSM key Kc is derived from the UMTS keys on both sides
with the help of c3 and established between the 2G MSC and MD (see Section 8.1.2). If MD
is subsequently handed over from the authenticating 2G MSC as anchor to a 3G MSC (2G
MSC) as destination network, the anchor MSC transfers Kc to the destination 3G MSC
(3G MSC).
As described in Section 8.2, the UMTS standard allows for several inter-system intra-
provider roaming in mixed-mode GSM/UMTS networks. This is why the authenticating
MSC may differ from the anchor MSC. Consequently, we have to consider two additional
handover scenarios (see Figure 9.2):
Case 5: As in Case 1, MD is authenticated via a 3G MSC. While still in idle mode, MD
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Figure 9.3: SIM Handover Cases
roams to a 2G MSC operated by the same provider. The 3G MSC transfers Kc to the 2G
MSC. Subsequently, MD places or receives a phone call or establishes a GPRS connection
via the 2G MSC. Upon handover, the 2G MSC is now the anchor network. The 2G MSC
transfers the GSM key Kc to the 3G MSC. Case 5 is thus effectively the same as Case 3.
Case 6: As in Case 5, MD is authenticated via a 3G MSC. While still in idle mode, MD
first roams to a 2G MSC and subsequently to a 3G MSC. Accordingly, the authenticating
network derives the GSM key from the UMTS keys established during authentication and
transfers it to the 2G MSC. The 2G MSC in turn transfers it to the 3G MSC. Subsequently,
MD places or receives a phone call or establishes a GPRS connection via the 3G MSC. Upon
handover, the 3G MSC is then the anchor network. The important change in this situation
is that the 3G MSC on handover to a 3G MSC as destination now transfers the derived
UMTS keys CK ∗ = c4(Kc) and IK
∗ = c5(Kc), rather than the UMTS keys originally
established during the authentication.
It is important to note that in case the anchor network is a 3G MSC but MD is connected
to it via a GSM BSS, the 3G MSC nevertheless stores the originally received UMTS keys
for MD. Consequently, the key transfer, e.g., in Case 1, does not depend on whether MD is
connected to the 3G MSC via a GSM BSS or UTRAN.
9.3.2 Key Transfer on Handover of SIM-Equipped MDs
For SIM-equipped MDs, the situation is simpler. Regardless of the type of the authen-
ticating MSC, the authentication is always based on GSM-authentication vectors. The
GSM key is then, if necessary, converted into the pseudo-UMTS keys CK ∗ = c4(Kc) and
IK ∗ = c5(Kc). If these pseudo-UMTS keys are reconvened into a GSM key with the help of
c3, the originally established Kc is recovered. This prevents a subsequent downgrade of Kc.
Figure 9.3 illustrates the different handover situations depending on the type of the anchor
MSC. As opposed to the USIM case, we do not have to take the authenticating MSC into
account.
In the first two cases, the anchor MSC is a 3G MSC. If the destination MSC is a 3G
MSC as well, the anchor MSC transfers the pseudo-UMTS keys CK ∗ and IK ∗ (Case 1). If
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the destination MSC is a 2G MSC, the anchor MSC first recovers the original Kc from CK ∗
and IK ∗ and then transfers Kc (Case 2).
In the two latter cases, the anchor MSC is a 2G MSC. The anchor MSC transfers the
original GSM key Kc to the 2G or 3G destination MSC (Case 3, Case 4).
9.4 Impact of GSM Vulnerabilities on UMTS via Handover
GSM suffers from various security weaknesses. Recently, Barkan, Biham, and Keller pre-
sented a ciphertext-only attack on the GSM-encryption algorithm A5/2 which recovers the
encryption key from a few dozen milliseconds of encrypted traffic within less than a sec-
ond [28]. Furthermore, it is possible to mount a man-in-the-middle attack in GSM during
authentication, which allows an attacker to make a victim MD authenticate itself to a
fake base station, which in turn forwards all authentication traffic to a real network, thus
impersonating the victim MD to a real network and vice-versa.
In this section, we analyze the impact of GSM-encryption attacks that recover the
encryption key and the impact of the man-in-the-middle attack on the security of networks
that employ UMTS and GSM base stations simultaneously [123].
We suggest protecting UMTS connections from GSM attacks by integrating an ad-
ditional authentication and key agreement on inter-system handover between GSM and
UMTS. This countermeasure was discussed by 3GPP in [3].
9.4.1 GSM Attacks
9.4.1.1 Attacks on GSM Encryption
The GSM-encryption algorithms A5/1 and A5/2 were originally kept secret. However, in
1994, a sketch of the design of A5/1 was leaked. In 1999, Briceno, Goldberg, and Wagner
[41] reverse-engineered the exact design of both algorithms. Since then, various attacks
on the algorithms were published. The first publicly available cryptanalysis of A5/1 was
published by Golic in 1997 [77]. Other attacks soon followed in [34], [33] and [57]. For A5/2,
Goldberg et al. [76] first devised a known plaintext attack, which requires the attacker to
know the XOR of two plaintexts that are exactly 211 frames apart. Subsequently, Petrovic
et al. [143] proposed an attack which allows predicting the key stream produced by A5/2
from the knowledge of a few hundred known ciphertext/plaintext bit pairs. The strongest
attack on A5/2 known to date was described by Barkan, Biham, and Keller in [28]. Their
ciphertext-only attack requires only a few milliseconds of encrypted voice traffic (4 frames)
to be passively intercepted by the attacker in order to allow the recovery of the corresponding
encryption key Kc within less than a second. The attack works because encryption is applied
after error-correction. This leads to known linear relationships between the plaintext bits
to be encrypted. The authors also describe three active attacks that use the A5/2 attack
to break the encryption if A5/1 or A5/3 are used.
In the following section, we concentrate on the type of encryption attacks (such as
the A5/2 attack of Barkan, Biham, and Keller) that recover the encryption key Kc. The
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impact of encryption attacks that merely predict the key stream output of a GSM-encryption
algorithm is not studied here.
9.4.1.2 Man-in-the-Middle Attack(s) on GSM
GSM is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack, which allows an attacker to impersonate
a fake base station to a victim MD [67]. In order to mount this attack, the attacker forces
the MD to connect to a fake base station by broadcasting beacons. If the MD is in stand-by
mode, it will always connect to the base station it receives best. Thus, the attacker can
make MD connect to him by sending its beacons with a higher transmission power then any
real base station. By requesting to turn off encryption in the GSM cipher mode command
he sends to MD, the attacker can disable the encryption between MD and the fake base
station. As a result, an intruder can eavesdrop on all mobile-initiated traffic. Unless the
attacker cannot impersonate MD to a real network as well, MD will be unreachable for
incoming traffic.
An attacker can also easily impersonate a victim MD to a real network during au-
thentication by simply forwarding the authentication traffic between them. Disabling the
encryption between itself and the real network is, however, not easy. The GSM standard
mandates a MD to support A5/0, A5/1 and A5/2 [62, 63]. An attacker cannot thus manip-
ulate the security capabilities of a MD to include A5/0 only. Nevertheless, if an attacker
knows that a certain legitimate network always disables encryption, he can succeed with a
two sided man-in-the-middle attack. It is interesting to note that in this attack scenario,
an attacker actually makes a victim MD use a network that does not provide encryption
rather than waiting for MD to connect to this network itself.
9.4.2 Impact of Encryption Attacks
In this section, we discuss how an attack that recovers the GSM encryption key (like the
A5/2 attack described above5) influences the network security in areas where both GSM and
UMTS radio access technologies are available simultaneously and inter-operate by roaming
and handover. As discussed earlier, these kind of areas already exist and will continue to
exist until the last GSM subscriber has updated his subscription to a UMTS subscription
and the last base station that is capable of GSM only has been replaced. Our discussion
is independent of whether the radio access networks are operated by the same or different
network operators.
For our analysis, we reuse the cases distinguished in Section 9.3. Note that handover
between the same types of radio access networks do not have to be considered here, as a
successful GSM key-recovery attack does not have an additional impact through them. We
start off with handover of a USIM-equipped MD and then study the impact on the security
of SIM-equipped MDs. Note that the numbering in this section is different from the one
used in [123].
5Note that other attacks that recover the GSM-encryption key have the same impact.
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9.4.2.1 Impact on USIM-Equipped MDs
We reuse Figure 9.1 and the cases distinguished in Section 9.3 and start with the case that
the authenticating MSC is the anchor MSC of the handover.
Case 1: A USIM-equipped MD is authenticated by a 3G MSC and is handed over by this
MSC as anchor to a GSM base station that is connected to a 3G MSC.
During authentication, the UMTS keys IK and CK were generated on the USIM and
in HN. These keys were used before handover. Upon handover to a GSM base station, the
keys are converted into a GSM key Kc by means of c3(IK ,CK ) = CK 1⊕CK 2⊕ IK 1⊕ IK 2
in both MD and the source MSC. The GSM key and the UMTS keys are transferred from
source 3G MSC to the destination 3G MSC. The 3G MSC stores the UMTS keys for
subsequent handover back to UMTS. The GSM-encryption key Kc is used to encrypt the
communication between MD and the GSM base station after handover.
If an attacker can break the encryption algorithm used after handover and he recovers
the encryption key Kc, then this knowledge of Kc leaks 64 bits of information of the 256-bit
UMTS keys used before handover.
Case 2: A USIM-equipped MD is authenticated via a 3G MSC and is handed over by this
MSC as anchor to a 2G MSC.
During authentication, the UMTS keys were generated on the USIM card and in HN.
Before handover, the UMTS keys were used to secure the communication between MD and
the source MSC. Upon handover to GSM, the keys are converted in MD and in the source
MSC to a GSM key Kc using the conversion function c3. Kc is then transferred from the
source 3G MSC to the destination 2G MSC. Unlike in Case 1, the UMTS keys are not
transferred because the 2G MSC cannot handle them.
Breaking the GSM encryption after handover reveals 64 bits of the UMTS key material
used before handover to the attacker.
Case 3: A USIM-equipped MD is authenticated by a 2G MSC and is then handed over by
this 2G MSC as anchor to UTRAN.
Since the 2G MSC is not able to perform a UMTS authentication, MD and HN have
to derive a GSM-authentication vector from a UMTS-authentication vector. Consequently,
during the authentication, the UMTS keys IK and CK were generated on the USIM card
as well as in the home network and immediately converted into the GSM key Kc using
c3. Upon handover to UMTS, the GSM key Kc is converted into the pseudo-UMTS keys
IK ∗ = c5(Kc) and CK
∗ = c4(Kc). These keys are different from the keys IK and CK that
were generated on the USIM card during authentication.
If an attacker can recover the GSM-encryption key Kc before handover, he can use Kc
to compute the UMTS keys IK ∗ and CK ∗. Thus, the encryption and integrity protection
after handover are broken. Moreover, handover reveals 64 bits of information of the UMTS
keys IK and CK generated during authentication. Note that in this case, the encryption is
broken for each subsequent handover, as all subsequent handover are controlled by the 2G
anchor network.
Case 4: A USIM-equipped MD is authenticated by a 3G MSC. While connected to a GSM
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base station controlled by the authenticating 3G MSC, MD switches from idle to active mode.
It is then handed over to a UMTS base station controlled by the authenticating (= anchor
MSC) or another 3G MSC.
Since the 3G MSC can carry out a UMTS authentication, MD and HN generate the
UMTS-authentication vector and HN transfers this vector to the authenticating MSC. The
GSM base station transparently forwards the authentication traffic. During the authenti-
cation, the UMTS keys were generated on the USIM card and in HN. After a successful
authentication, the UMTS keys are converted into a GSM-encryption key Kc using the con-
version function c3. Instead of converting the GSM key into a UMTS key upon handover
to UMTS, the original UMTS keys stored in the anchor 3G MSC are transferred from the
anchor MSC to the destination MSC and from the destination MSC to the UMTS NodeB.
An attacker who can recover the GSM-encryption key Kc learns 64 bits of information
on the UMTS key material used after handover.
To describe the additional cases arising from different anchor and authenticating MSCs
we refer to Figure 9.2.
Case 5: A USIM-equipped MD is authenticated by a 3G MSC, subsequently roams to a 2G
MSC, and is then handed over from the 2G MSC as anchor to UTRAN.
As in Case 1, MD is authenticated by a 3G MSC with the help of a UMTS-authentication
vector obtained from HN. On intra-provider roaming to the 2G MSC, the authenticating
3G MSC converts the UMTS keys into the GSM key Kc by c3. On handover from the 2G
MSC as anchor to a 3G MSC, the anchor MSC transfers the GSM key Kc. The destination
3G MSC converts Kc into the pseudo-UMTS keys CK ∗ and IK ∗. If an attacker can recover
the GSM-encryption key Kc while MD is connected to the anchor 2G MSC, he cannot
only recover 64 bits of the information on the UMTS keys originally generated, but he can
completely break the post-handover communication protected by IK ∗ and CK ∗.
Case 6: A USIM-equipped MD is authenticated by a 3G MSC and first roams to a 2G MSC
and then subsequently roams to a 3G MSC. With the 3G MSC as anchor, it is then handed
over to another UTRAN.
In this case, the UMTS keys are generated during authentication. Upon roaming to the
2G MSC, only the derived GSM key is transferred. The 2G MSC subsequently transfers
the Kc to the 3G MSC. The 3G anchor MSC then transfers the pseudo-UMTS keys to the
destination MSC. If an attacker gets hold of Kc while MD is connected to the 2G MSC, all
subsequent communication between MD and a network are broken, as from this point on,
MD and the network either use the broken GSM key or use the pseudo-UMTS keys that
can be easily recovered from Kc by c4 and c5.
In summary, a single handover or intra-provider roaming to a GSM base station con-
nected to a 2G MSC breaks all post-handover and post-roaming communication of a USIM-
equipped MD. If a USIM-equipped MD is active while connected to a GSM base station
that is controlled by a 3G MSC, this reveals 64 bits of the UMTS key material used before
and after handover.
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9.4.2.2 Impact on SIM-Equipped MDs
Case 1: A SIM-equipped MD is authenticated by a 2G MSC and is handed over to UMTS.
During GSM authentication, the encryption key Kc was generated on the SIM card
as well as in HN. It was used to protect the communication between MD and the GSM
base station. Upon handover to UMTS, MD and the destination MSC convert Kc into the
pseudo-UMTS keys IK ∗ and CK ∗ using the conversion functions c4 and c5. If the MSC
before handover is a 3G MSC, it is this MSC that converts the GSM key and sends it to the
destination MSC. If the source MSC is a 2G MSC, the GSM key is sent to the destination
MSC, which then converts the GSM key into UMTS keys.
If an attacker can break the GSM-encryption algorithm used before handover, then
the attacker knows the encryption key Kc. He can then also convert Kc into the UMTS
keys using c4 and c5 and thus break the UMTS encryption and integrity protection after
handover. The attacker can then eavesdrop on the communication between MD and the
base station and can insert and manipulate traffic between them.
Case 2: A SIM-equipped MD is authenticated by a 3G MSC and connected to UTRAN when
handed over to GSM.
During authentication, the GSM-encryption key Kc was generated on the SIM card
and in HN. The MSC of the visited network and MD both converted Kc into the UMTS
keys IK = c5(Kc) and CK = c4(Kc). The UMTS keys were used to encrypt and integrity-
protect the communication between MD and the UMTS base station before handover. Upon
handover to GSM, the original encryption key Kc is recovered in MD and in the source MSC
by means of c3(CK , IK ) = c3(c4(Kc), c5(Kc)) = Kc and sent to the GSM base station.
If an attacker can break the GSM-encryption algorithm used after handover and he can
recover the GSM-encryption key Kc, he can also compute the UMTS keys IK and CK
used before handover using the conversion functions c4 and c5. If the attacker has recorded
the communication between the UMTS base station and MD before handover, he can now
decrypt the recorded traffic.
In summary, a SIM-equipped MD benefits from the higher UMTS security level only if
it is not handed over to a GSM base station during an ongoing connection. Similarly, it
profits only if it does not roam to the GSM part of the network provider, by which it was
authenticated.
9.4.2.3 Impact of a Two-sided Man-in-the-Middle Attack
A man-in-the-middle attack, as described in Section 9.4.1.2, can occur on any GSM au-
thentication. As GSM subscribers and UMTS subscribers equipped with a suitable MD can
connect to a GSM base station and be authenticated in GSM style, both types of subscribers
are vulnerable to this attack.
Assume that a subscriber has caught a two-sided man-in-the-middle attacker and the
attacker and MD move out of range of the serving GSM base station, to which the attacker
originally impersonated the victim. As described earlier, the attacker has disabled the
encryption between himself and the network as part of the attack. Consequently, upon
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handover to UMTS, the encryption is not enabled because it was disabled before handover.
However, in order for the man-in-the-middle attack to carry over to UMTS, the attacker
has to master the integrity protection of the control messages between MD and the UMTS
base station, which is begun right after handover.
In order for the attacker to continue to impersonate the victim MD to the network,
the attacker has to send correct integrity-protected messages to the network. The attacker
cannot generate these messages himself, but he can force MD to generate them instead: the
attacker simulates a handover to a UMTS base station to MD by impersonating the GSM
base station and the UMTS base station at the same time. The attacker sends a handover
command to MD that tells MD to connect to the fake UMTS base station. Depending
on whether the last authentication was a GSM authentication or a UMTS authentication,
the subscriber either converts the GSM key into UMTS keys or activates the stored UMTS
keys for use after handover. Since MD will integrity-protect the messages, the attacker only
needs to transparently forward these messages to the real UMTS base station.
Note that the impact of this attack differs from the impact of the encryption attacks.
A man-in-the-middle attack does not depend on any type of broken encryption algorithm
and thus always has an impact on inter-operating UMTS/GSM networks.
9.4.3 Countermeasures
In order to protect from the A5/2 attack in general, the 3GPP currently discusses disabling
A5/2. While this action would protect users from the concrete threat of the attack to GSM
networks and from the impact of the attack on inter-operating UMTS/GSM networks, the
threat of similar attacks recovering the encryption key on inter-operating UMTS/GSM
networks remains. Furthermore, disabling A5/2 does not protect from carrying over man-
in-the-middle attacks from GSM to UMTS.
In [123] we proposed integrating an additional UMTS-authentication and key-agreement
procedure in connection with inter-system handover in order to secure the UMTS part
of the network against GSM-encryption attacks. Newly generated UMTS keys have no
known relation to a broken GSM key and a newly generated GSM key does not reveal any
information about formerly used UMTS keys.
Upon handover from UMTS to GSM, the new authentication would have to be carried
out while the subscriber is still connected to a UMTS base station. In other words, a new
authentication is performed whenever a subscriber enters a UMTS cell that is a border cell
to a GSM part of the network. If the newly generated keys are UMTS keys, MD and the
3G MSC convert them into a GSM key Kc using c3. The MD and the serving 3G MSC
store this key until the actual handover to GSM takes place. Upon handover to GSM, the
source MSC transfers the key to the destination MSC, which in turn forwards it to the base
station.
In the case of a handover from GSM to UMTS where the GSM base station is connected
to a 3G MSC, the new authentication can be carried out before the actual handover. In
this case, the MSC can initiate an authentication as soon as MD enters the cell. Since the
3G MSC can do a UMTS authentication, it can authenticate the MD using the respective
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procedure as described in Section 8.1. Upon handover, the newly established keys are sent
to the UMTS base station.
In case of a handover from GSM to UMTS where the GSM base station is connected to a
2G MSC, the 2G MSC is not capable of performing a UMTS authentication. Authenticating
before handover, therefore does not protect from a man-in-the-middle attack. Instead, the
new authentication must take place right after the handover. While this implies that an
attacker can eavesdrop on the first few seconds of the connection to the UMTS network,
the attacker will be shut out as soon as the authentication is successfully completed.
In order to avoid unnecessary authentications, sophisticated methods can be used to
determine whether a MD that is currently located in a GSM cell is really going to be
handed over to UMTS [103].
The above countermeasure was discussed by 3GPP in [3]. It was decided to adopt our
countermeasure in case of intra-provider roaming from GSM to UMTS, i.e., to recommend
the use of a new authentication in UMTS to all providers [4]. If these recommendations
are followed, a USIM equipped MD in idle mode will be newly authenticated when roaming
to UTRAN. Although the UMTS standard theoretically allows for authentication and key
agreement during an ongoing connection (this would be necessary to newly authenticate
MD on handover to UTRAN) there is some doubt in 3GPP whether any manufacturers will
actually implement this feature. Rather than adopting our countermeasure on handover to
UTRAN, 3GPP recommends in [4] ensuring that all 2G MSCs that support handover to
3G MSCs are capable of authentication based on UMTS-authentication vectors. As the key
transfer in UMTS is AN-controlled, this countermeasure guarantees that for USIM-equipped
MDs, UMTS keys are transferred on each handover to UTRAN.
Our original suggestion, an additional UMTS authentication during an ongoing connec-
tion immediately after handover, also prevents man-in-the-middle attackers to be carried
over from GSM to UMTS. The countermeasures currently discussed in 3GPP do not protect
against this second type of attack, because the authentication between a UMTS base station
and a UMTS subscriber is secure against man-in-the-middle attacks, while an authentica-
tion based on UMTS-authentication vectors but carried out via a GSM base station is not
(see Section 8.3). Nevertheless, this problem will be resolved as soon as the GSM integrity-
protection enhancement [2] is implemented and made mandatory for all types of MDs.
9.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have described the security-context transfer during the various types of
inter- and intra-system handover procedures within and between GSM and UMTS networks.
We discussed to what extent they meet the security requirements defined in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 6 and found that most of these requirements are not met. As a consequence, inter-
system handover between GSM and UMTS allow GSM vulnerabilities to have an impact
on UMTS networks.
In particular, we have described the impact of GSM encryption and man-in-the-middle
attacks on the security of inter-operating UMTS/GSM networks. We have shown that for
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GSM subscribers, a single handover to GSM breaks all pre-handover and post-handover
UMTS communication. For UMTS subscribers, a handover to a GSM base station that
is connected to a 3G MSC reveals 64 bits of information on the key material used in pre-
handover or post-handover UMTS communication. The impact of a handover to a 2G
MSC is even worse, as a single handover to a GSM base station breaks the encryption and
integrity protection of all post-handover UMTS communication completely.
Furthermore, we have discussed that handover procedures allow man-in-the-middle at-
tackers to be transferred from GSM to UMTS.
In order to thwart the attacks, we have proposed carrying out an additional authenti-
cation and key agreement in connection with inter-system handover.
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Part IV
Inter-Provider Handover and
Roaming in WLANs
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Part IV in the General Context
In this part, we detail our new roaming and handover approaches in the
context of WLANs. We describe the WLAN system and security architecture
in Chapter 10. In Chapter 11, we introduce a new roaming authentication
protocol EAP-TLS-KS that implements the secret-sharing approach
introduced in Chapter 2 of Part I. In Chapter 12, we detail the
history-enriched policy-based approach introduced in Chapter 5 of Part II for
inter-provider handover between WLANs.
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Chapter 10
System Model and WLAN Security
Wireless local area networks have become more and more widespread. Universities offer
wireless Internet access to students and staff, companies allow their employees to access
their Intranet wirelessly, hotspot providers offer wireless Internet access in public areas like
airports and coffee shops, and even many technically non-interested people connect their
home-computing environment wirelessly.
The most widespread wireless LAN standard is currently the 802.11 standard of the
IEEE. Early versions of this standard offer data rates of 1-2 Mbit/s. Current versions allow
for data rates of up to 54 Mbit/s. Besides the relatively low bandwidth of early versions,
they have another major drawback: the original security architecture, Wired Equivalent
Privacy (WEP), designed for the standard, was completely broken by the end of 2001 (see
Section 10.2).
The complete break of the WEP security architecture led to many different proprietary
security solutions for WLANs. The resulting incompatibilities among equipment of different
operators called for a new standardized solution. In July 2004, the IEEE finally adopted
a new standard: 802.11i. In the meantime, the Wireless Fidelity Alliance1 summarized
part of the standard that was agreed upon already in late 2002 as Wi-Fi-Protected Access
(WPA)[180]. The main difference between WPA and 802.11i (sometimes also referred to
as WPA2) is that WPA supports only the stream cipher RC4 (see e.g. [66]), while 802.11i
additionally supports the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [48].
Outline. In this chapter, we first describe the system model of a WLAN in Section 10.1.
We then briefly discuss the original WEP security architecture and its shortcomings in
Section 10.2. In Section 10.3, we give an overview of 802.11i.
1The Wireless Fidelity Alliance (Wi-Fi Alliance) is a non-profit organization that tests the inter-
operability of WLAN products and certifies them with the Wi-Fi certificate.
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10.1 System Model
The 802.11 standard [91] specifies two modes of operation for WLANs, the ad hoc mode and
the infrastructure mode. Here, we only describe the latter one. The network access points
in an infrastructure mode WLAN are referred to as Access Points (APs). The standard
specifies the physical and the MAC layer of the air interface between a MD, typically a
laptop or a PDA, and an AP. Several APs are interconnected via a Distribution System
(DS). The standard only specifies the required services of a DS, not the DS itself. However,
in practice, primarily Ethernet (IEEE 802.3) is used to interconnect WLAN APs [70]. An
access router typically connects the DS to the outside world, e.g. the internet. In case of the
new security architecture, the standard also specifies an additional entity for authentication
purposes, namely an authentication server. Figure 10.1 illustrates a typical wireless LAN
network architecture.
Access Router
Authentication Server
DS (LAN)
Internet
Access Points
Figure 10.1: System Model for an IEEE 802.11 WLAN
10.2 WEP
The WEP security architecture aimed to provide privacy equivalent to a local area network
by replacing the physical protection of the sockets with a challenge response authentication
and the missing physical protection of a wire with encryption on the air interface. Protecting
legitimate users against each other was not part of the original security goals.
As a consequence, WEP uses one single 64- or 128-bit secret key, also referred to as
WEP-key, that is shared between all pre-registered MDs and all APs as sole credential.
This one key is used for both authentication and encryption of the air interface between
each MD and the AP with which it is currently associated. Legitimate users can thus by
design easily impersonate each other and decrypt each other’s traffic intercepted on the air
interface.
WEP supports two authentication methods, Open Authentication and the Shared-Key
Authentication. The authentication endpoint on the network side is thus the network access
point (NAP = AS). In Open Authentication, any MD can join the network without any
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prior authentication. In Shared-Key Authentication, MD has to prove the possession of the
shared secret key by a simple challenge-response mechanism: AP sends a random challenge
to MD and MD answers with a RC4-encrypted response.2 This mechanism has been shown
to be weak in [20] and [39]. As RC4 is a stream cipher, a challenge-response pair reveals the
key stream used to encrypt the response. An attacker can thus use an intercepted challenge-
response pair to recover a valid key stream and subsequently successfully authenticate itself
to any access point of the WLAN.3
WEP supports only one encryption mechanism, the RC4 stream cipher. RC4 is used
with the shared secret key and a per-packet initialization vector as input. The initialization
vector is chosen by the sender and transmitted to the receiver in the clear. This particular
mode of RC4 has been broken. The attack, described in [66], recovers the secret key from
encrypted traffic intercepted on the air interface between one or more MDs and an access
point4 within a few seconds. The attack was successfully implemented (see [165]) such that
nowadays the WEP key shared between all users and all access points of a WEP-protected
WLAN can be recovered by an attacker with a laptop and open source software.
For integrity protection in WEP, a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC-32) is appended to
a packet before it is encrypted. This integrity protection has been shown to be ineffective
in [39]. The linearity of the CRC-32 combined with the linearity of the stream cipher makes
it easy to change messages and append a valid CRC-32.
Note that in WEP, the authentication server, as well as the encryption and integrity-
protection endpoint, coincides with the network access point (NAP = EIPE = AS). Con-
sequently, no key transfer kt from AS to EIPE is necessary. As only one pair of encryption
and integrity-protection mechanisms and only one authentication protocol are specified, no
security-mechanism negotiations are necessary. As the pre-shared secret key is used directly
for authentication and encryption, no key agreement ka or key establishment ke is used.
It is important to note that intra-provider roaming and handover within a WEP-
protected WLAN would not require any key transfers, as the WEP-key is pre-stored in
every AP. However, neither roaming nor handover was specified in the original standard.
10.3 Overview on 802.11i
In June 2004, 802.11i has been adopted as the new security standard for the wireless LAN
technology 802.11 [93]. It replaces the original security architecture WEP discussed in
the last section. As opposed to WEP, the new standard 802.11i offers access control via
mutual authentication between a MD and the network. It supports a large variety of au-
thentication protocols that are implemented in combination with a key-agreement protocol.
2RC4 is a stream cipher developed by Ron Rivest (see [66]).
3Note that here, only a valid key stream for one initialization vector is revealed, but not the actual
long-term secret key.
4Note that all MDs use the same secret key as input to the RC4 key-stream generation. Thus, in order
to recover the WEP-key, an attacker can use the intercepted traffic of several MDs and does not have to
wait until he has intercepted enough traffic from a single MD.
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In addition, it protects the confidentiality and integrity of the air interface between MD
and AP. In the next sections, we describe the authentication and key-agreement protocols,
the key establishment, the encryption and integrity-protection mechanisms, as well as the
security-mechanism negotiation specified for an 802.11i-protected WLAN (see [56, 84] or
the standard [93] for a detailed description of each of these mechanisms).
10.3.1 Authentication
802.11i supports two different types of authentication and key-agreement protocols: one
that is based on a Pre-Shared Key (PSK) and one that is based on 802.1X [94].
The 802.1X-based authentication is a protocol between MD, the AP with which it
associates, and AS, which controls the network access for one or more APs. MD first
associates with an AP within its range using WEP’s Open Authentication. The association
only enables MD to exchange authentication data with AS. Any other traffic is blocked until
the authentication is completed successfully. The standard does not specify any particular
authentication protocol to be used between MD and AS. Instead, it specifies a WLAN-
adapted implementation of EAP [36], on top of which different authentication methods can
be used.
Figure 10.2 describes the protocol architecture between MD, AP, and AS. EAP method
stands for the actual authentication mechanism used. Various EAP methods have already
been defined, including EAP-TLS [14], EAP-TTLS [46], and EAP-SIM [88]. Different EAP
methods can be based on different types of credentials. EAP-TLS is, for example, based
on public-key certificates for MD, as well as network authentication. EAP-TTLS uses a
public-key certificate for network authentication and a username/password combination
for MD authentication. EAP-SIM is based on a shared long-term secret key. Only key-
generating EAP methods can be used in connection with 802.11i. A key-generating EAP
method generates a master key called Pairwise Master Key (PMK) in the 802.11i context.
EAP itself is the end-to-end transport protocol for the EAP-method between MD and AS.
EAPoL transports EAP over 802.x LANs and implements a port-based access control. Each
association of MD with an AP creates a pair of IEEE 802.1X-controlled ports. Both sides
implement a port blocking that blocks all traffic until the 802.1X authentication procedure
completes successfully. RADIUS [150] can be used to transport EAP over IP to establish an
authenticated channel between AP and AS, as well as to securely transport the generated
key from AS to AP. The use of RADIUS is not required but suggested in the standard.
The PSK-based authentication is, as in WEP, implemented as a protocol between MD
and the AP with which it wants to associate. However, as opposed to WEP, each AP has
to store an individual key for each MD.5 In case of PSK-based authentication, the PSK is
directly used as the master key (static key agreement ka).
5To allow for a PSK-based authentication with central storage of the individual pre-shared-keys, the EAP
method EAP-PSK has been proposed by Bersani et al. [31], in which the PSK for each MD is stored in an
AS.
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10.3.2 Key Transfer and Key Establishment
As described in the last section, if the 802.1X-based authentication is used, MD and AS
generate a secret Pairwise Master Key PMK using an EAP method. Upon completion
of the PMK generation, AS transfers the PMK to the AP MD is associated with. If the
authentication is PSK-based, the PSK is used as the PMK directly. The PMK corresponds
to the master key in our security model (see Chapter 1).
After any authentication and PMK agreement, AP and MD use the EAPoL-Handshake
to generate a Pairwise Transient Key (PTK). The PTK is derived from the PMK, the
MAC addresses of MD and AP, and from two nonces exchanged between MD and AP. PTK
consists of three parts. The first part is used for key confirmation in the EAPoL- Handshake,
the second part is used for encrypted transfer of the Group Transient Key (GTK) (used for
broadcast traffic from AP to all associated MDs) and the last part is used as the Temporal
Key (TK) for encryption and integrity protection of the subsequent MAC layer traffic.
Figure 10.3 provides an overview on the 802.1X-based authentication, key agreement, key
transfer and key establishment. Figure 10.4 describes the key hierarchy used in 802.11i.
10.3.3 Encryption and Integrity Protection
802.11i supports three encryption mechanisms, two of which come with an integrated in-
tegrity protection. The first one is the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) that is
based on the stream cipher RC4 and an integrity-protection mechanism called Michael
[181]. The second encryption and integrity-protection mechanism is AES-based and is
called Counter Mode with CBC-MAC6 Protocol (CCMP). In order to offer backward-
compatibility, 802.11i additionally supports WEP encryption as a third encryption method.
Note that 802.11i allows for encryption and integrity protection to be disabled completely,
in case it is allowed by both MD and the network.
6Cipher-Block Chaining Message Authentication Code.
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10.3.4 Security-Mechanism Negotiation and Policies
In 802.11i, an AP advertises its network’s security policy, namely the allowed authentication
and key-agreement protocols, as well as the allowed encryption and integrity-protection
mechanisms, in the beacon messages it broadcasts. The selection of the security suite to
use is left to the mobile device that requests association. MD sends its selection to the
network as part of its initial association request. This corresponds to negotiation Method 2
described in Section 1.3.
In particular, standardwise the preferences of MD and HN are not respected on security-
mechanism negotiation. However, as the standard does not specify how MD chooses from
the security suites advertised in the beacons, MD may be set up in a way that its preferences
may be respected during security-mechanism negotiation. If, in addition, HN would be
able to advertise its security capabilities with preferences, MD may be able to take HN’s
preferences into account when reconciling the policies. In particular, MD can use Method 4
to reconcile HN’s and MD’s policies to its favor. Note that the standard does not allow
for an easy integration of the negotiation Method 5 presented in Section 1.3, as it does not
support negotiations taking several rounds.
10.3.5 Pre-Registration
The pre-registration process for a WLAN can take many different forms. In the non-
commercial case, a user typically registers with the system administrator of the WLAN
directly. In the commercial case, public WLAN providers sometimes require a user to sign
a contract similar to Mobile Phone Operators. Other public WLAN providers only require
their users to signup online.
Whatever form the registration process takes, a user and the network provider establish
some form of credentials during this process. These credentials can either be a PSK or any
other form of credential as required for the EAP method MD and the network are to use to
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authenticate each other. To offer a variety of EAP methods to a user, a network provider
may even allocate and distribute different types of credentials to its users. By selecting
an authentication and key-agreement protocol on connection establishment, MD indirectly
determines the credential type it wants to use.
10.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have provided an overview on the security architecture 802.11i. We
briefly discussed authentication and key agreement, key transfer and establishment, encryp-
tion, integrity protection, and security-mechanism negotiation in 802.11i-protected WLANs.
With the introduced basic knowledge on 802.11i, we can now proceed with a description
of our new inter-provider roaming authentication protocol EAP-TLS-KS (Chapter 11) and
with the details on the new HEPB-approach for the WLAN case (Chapter 12). We refer to
[56, 84] or the standard document [93] for a detailed description of each of the mechanisms
introduced here.
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Chapter 11
The New Protocol EAP-TLS-KS
As WLAN hotspots become widely available in airports, train stations, coffee shops and
hotels, there is an increasing need for easy to use authentication protocols, which enable
roaming between different Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs). Most WISPs cur-
rently use the web based Universal Access Method (UAM) for authentication, a method
which is also recommended as the best current practice for inter-provider roaming by the
Wi-Fi Alliance [18]. However, UAM is known to be vulnerable to many different attacks,
such as impersonation of an AP, dictionary attacks, and service theft by means of address
spoofing [178].
The new standard 802.11i [93] was put forward to address these problems. The use of
MAC layer encryption between MDs and APs protects against service theft by means of
address spoofing. Furthermore, 802.11i requires mutual authentication between MD and a
network, thus protecting against fake APs. Every EAP-Method supported by 802.11i can be
used to authenticate roaming MDs with the help of a hierarchy of ASs. Upon roaming to FN,
MD presents its EAP-Identity to ASFN. MD’s EAP-Identity includes an identifier of MD’s
HN. ASFN forwards all authentication traffic between MD to ASHN until MD is successfully
authenticated by ASHN. After sucessfull authentication ASHN transfers the generated PMK
to ASFN which in turn forwards it to the currently serving AP. Every EAP-Method can
thus be used as a roaming authentication protocol of Type 2 (see Chapter 2). As discussed,
before roaming authentication protocols of this type have the disadvantage of requiring a
secure channel between ASHN and ASFN for key transfer.
In [29, 81] public-key-based authentication methods of Type 1 were suggested. These
suggestions share the general shortcoming of all public-key-based authentication methods
for roaming users discussed in Chapter 2: MD must check the validity and revocation status
of certificates during network authentication, i.e., before actually having network access. In
[29] this problem is addressed by delegating certificate-chain discovery and validation to a
trusted authority.
In this chapter, we solve the problems of state-of-the-art public-key-based roaming meth-
ods and the typical use of EAP-Methods to implement roaming between IEEE 802.11i-
protected WLANs by adapting the secret-sharing approach introduced in Chapter 2.2 to
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the WLAN case. In particular, we present a new protocol EAP-TLS-KS, which implements
the new concept based on EAP-TLS. This part of the thesis is joint work with J. Cordasco
and S. Wetzel and has been published in [121].
We show that due to the key-splitting approach EAP-TLS-KS allows for efficient certifi-
cate handling. In particular, MD does not need to validate any certificates upon roaming,
as HN’s certificate is pre-installed on MD.
Furthermore, the use of secret sharing eliminates the need for a secure channel between
FN and HN upon public-key-based roaming of MD. This is due to the fact that the splitting
of the secret key allows FN to derive any necessary keying material itself.
EAP-TLS-KS is designed such that it differs from the original EAP-TLS protocol only
on the server side. In particular, it is the public-key operations, which are performed by HN
in EAP-TLS—such as decryptions and signatures—that are split between HN and FN in
EAP-TLS-KS. We specify three protocol variant in order to support all types of EAP-TLS
certificates. The first and second variants use conventional distributed RSA operations. For
the third variant, we present a new distributed DSS signature scheme. This new scheme can
generally be used in applications that exhibit an asymmetry in signing capabilities of the
individual parties. That is, while one party (in our case HN) can generate valid signatures
on its own, the second party (in our case FN) requires the other party’s cooperation in
order to generate a valid signature. We also show that the new EAP-TLS-KS protocol has
a performance advantage over EAP-TLS, as it reduces the number of round-trip message
exchanges required between HN and FN. While the original EAP-TLS protocol needs four
round-trip message exchanges between HN and FN, the new protocol requires only two.
Aside from addressing the security problems of current roaming solutions, in [121] we
also show how key splitting can be used to efficiently support the fine-grained billing of a
micropayment scheme. However, as accounting issues are out of the scope of this work, we
do not detail this application of our new approach here.
Outline. In Section 11.1, we give an overview on EAP-TLS. In Section 11.2, we present
the new protocol EAP-TLS-KS. We first adapt the key-splitting approach to the public-
keys used in EAP-TLS and present two-party versions of the public-key operations used
in EAP-TLS. In particular, we introduce a new method for two-party DSS signatures in
Section 11.2.3. This is followed by a description and detailed discussion of the EAP-TLS-KS
protocol including a security analysis. We close the chapter by summarizing related work
in Section 11.3.
11.1 Overview of EAP-TLS
EAP-TLS is an EAP method defined in RFC 2716 [14] based on TLS [52]. It supports
either mutual public-key certificate-based authentication or server authentication only. If
EAP-TLS is used in 802.11i for server authentication only, another authentication method
must be combined with EAP-TLS to implement client authentication. In this section, we
describe the use of EAP-TLS with mutual certificate-based authentication. Figure 11.1 gives
an overview of the EAP-TLS protocol and shows the encapsulation of TLS in EAP messages:
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Figure 11.1: Overview of the EAP-TLS Protocol
After agreeing upon the use of EAP, AS sends the client (in our case MD) an EAP-Request
message requesting the client’s identity. The client answers with an EAP-Response message
including its identity. AS then sends the TLS-Start message in an EAP-Request message
and the TLS-Handshake begins:
The client sends the TLS-Client-Hello message in an EAP-Response message
to the server. Client-Hello includes a random number (Client.RAND) that
guarantees the freshness of the resulting keys to the client. The server an-
swers with an EAP-Request message including the TLS messages Server-Hello,
Server-Certificate, Client-Certificate-Request and Server-Done, and option-
ally the Server-Key-Exchange message. Server-Hello includes a random number
(Server.RAND) that guarantees key freshness to the server. The certificate of the server is
of one of the following three kinds:
1. A certificate including a public RSA key usable for encryption and signed by a CA
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with an RSA signature key (RSA).
2. A certificate including a public RSA key usable for RSA signature verification, signed
by a CA with an RSA signature key (DHE-RSA).
3. A certificate including a public DSS key usable for DSS signature verification, signed
by a CA with a DSS signature key (DHE-DSS).
EAP-TLS supports two methods for generating keying material. One is RSA encryption
based (RSA case) and the other is based on a Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DHE case).
In the RSA case, the server uses a certificate of type RSA and no Server-Key-Exchange
is sent. In the DHE case, the server uses a certificate of type DHE-RSA or DHE-DSS
and Server-Certificate is followed by Server-Key-Exchange. This message includes the
server’s public DH value for this protocol instance. The hash value of the server’s public
DH value concatenated with Client.RAND and Server.RAND is signed with the server’s
RSA or DSS signature key and included in Server-Key-Exchange.
The client answers with EAP-Response including the TLS messages
Client-Certificate, . . ., Finished (see Figure 11.1). Client-Certificate is a
DHE-RSA or a DHE-DSS certificate, depending on what type of certificate the server
requests. Client-Key-Exchange is different for the RSA case and the DHE case:
1. In the RSA case, Client-Key-Exchange includes a random number (Sec.RAND) gen-
erated by the client and encrypted with the server’s public key.
2. In the DHE case, Client-Key-Exchange message includes the client’s public DH
value.
In order to prove the client’s identity to the server, the client’s response includes
Client-Certificate-Verify. This message contains a hash value of all messages sent
and received so far starting from Client-Hello up to and including Client-Key-Exchange
and is signed using the client’s signature key. The same EAP-Responsemessage also includes
Change-Cipher-Specs and Finished. With the former, the client indicates that it will now
use the new ciphers and keys. The latter, which is protected with the new cipher-suite and
keys, confirms that the client uses the same cipher-suite and keys as the server.
The server answers with the Change-Cipher-Specs and the Finished messages. By
verifying the correct encryption of the Finished message, the client obtains a proof of the
server’s identity since only the server can generate the correct session key. The client indi-
cates successful receipt and verification by replying with an empty EAP-Response message.
The EAP-TLS protocol ends with an EAP-Success message sent from the server to the
client.
Figure 11.2 details the RSA case. The server certificate includes a public RSA encryp-
tion key. Therefore, Server-KeyExchange is not sent. Client-Key-Exchange consists of
a random number Sec.RAND encrypted with the server’s public RSA key. Server and
client generate the master secret by using Client.RAND, Server.RAND, and Sec.RAND
as input to a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG). Figure 11.3 details the DHE
11.2 EAP-TLS with Key Splitting 241
ServerClient
.
.
.
.
.
.
Client−Key−Exchange
Sec.RAND encrypted with server’s
public RSA key
Server−Certificate
PRNG
Client.RAND 
Server.RAND
Sec.RAND 
generation of master secret:
master secret
public RSA encryption key
Figure 11.2: EAP-TLS with RSA
Client Server
.
.
.
.
.
.
PRNG master secretClient−Key−Exchange
DSS or RSA
DSS or RSA signature verification key
Server−Certificate
Server−Key−Exchange
Client.RAND 
Server.RAND
DH key
generation of master secret:
public DH key of server signed with 
public DH key of client
Figure 11.3: EAP-TLS with DHE
case. Server-Certificate includes a public RSA or DSS signature-verification key.
Server-Key-Exchange includes the public DH value of the server and is signed with the
server’s private RSA or DSS key. Client-Key-Exchange includes the public DH value of
the client. The client computes a DH key from the public DH value of the server and its
secret DH value. The server computes the DH key from the public DH value of the client
and its own secret DH value. Both compute the master secret by using Client.RAND,
Server.RAND, and the common DH key as input to a PRNG.
11.2 EAP-TLS with Key Splitting
Applying the concept of key splitting to EAP-TLS, each HN is issued a roaming certificate
that includes a public RSA encryption key, a public RSA signature-verification key, or a
public DSS signature-verification key. HN splits and distributes the secret roaming key as
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described in Section 2.2:
Assuming HN has a pairwise roaming agreement with l foreign networks FN1, . . . FNl,
HN splits its secret roaming key R into l different pairs of shares (RHNi ,RFNi) by means
of individual (2, 2) secret-sharing schemes with RHNi 6= RHNj and RFNi 6= RFNj for i 6= j.
HN then distributes RFNi to FNi and keeps copies of RHNi , as well as the secret roaming
key R. This not only allows HN to use the secret roaming key in case MD wants to access
HN directly, but it also enables HN to issue suitable shares to new roaming partners. By
construction, R can be recovered from a collection of shares, if and only if this collection
includes a pair (RHNi ,RFNi) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. In particular, R cannot be reconstructed
from any pair (RHNi ,RFNj ) (with i 6= j) or any collection of shares of foreign networks only.
Constructing key pairs with (RHNi ,RFNi) 6= (RHNj ,RFNj ) for i 6= j is necessary in order to
allow for the unique identification of FNi upon successful authentication. Each MD stores
the roaming certificate of its HN.
Upon roaming to FN, FN and MD initiate an EAP-TLS-KS authentication. MD acts
like a regular client in the EAP-TLS protocol, as the EAP-TLS-KS protocol differs from
EAP-TLS only on the server side. Depending on the type of roaming certificate, either RSA
decryption, RSA signature generation or DSS signature generation is split between HN and
FN using their respective shares of the secret roaming key. In the following sections, we
detail the distributed schemes, as well as the key splitting for an RSA encryption key, an
RSA signature key, and a DSS signature-verification key as the public roaming key.
11.2.1 Distributed RSA Decryption
The public roaming key is a pair (n, e) of an RSA modulus n = pq with p, q prime and
an RSA encryption key e with gcd(e, ϕ(n)) = 1, where ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1). The secret
roaming key d is the inverse of e modulo ϕ(n): ed = 1 mod ϕ(n). Let l be the number of
FNs to receive a share of the secret roaming key from HN. Then, HN splits the roaming
key d into dHN i , dFN i for i = 1, . . . , l implementing the access structure Γ
1 in the following
way: HN randomly chooses ω1, . . . , ωl ∈ Zϕ(n)
2
such that ωi 6= ωj for i 6= j.
2 Then,
dHN i =d + 2ωi mod ϕ(n), i = 1, . . . , l
dFN i =d + ωi mod ϕ(n), i = 1, . . . , l.
Consequently, d = −dHN i + 2dFN i mod ϕ(n), for all i = 1, . . . , l. HN distributes dFN i to
FNi and keeps copies of all ωi as well as d.
Since ωi 6= ωj, each FN gets a different share. Since additionally 0 ≤ ωi ≤
ϕ(n)
2 , it holds
that 2ωi 6= 2ωj for i 6= j. Thus, HN keeps a different share for each FN. The pair of shares
(dHN i , dFN i) for a foreign network FNi thus uniquely carries the identity of FNi.
HN and any single FNi can now decrypt a message m encrypted to c = m
e with the
public encryption key e in a distributed way: HN first computes c−dHNi and sends the result
to FNi. FNi then computes c
−dHNi c2dFNi = c−dHNi+2dFNi = cd = m.
1Γ = {{HN}, {{HN1, FN1}, . . . , {{HNl, FNl}}.
2Here, Zx denotes the set of residues modulo x.
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Security Analysis. No FN can decrypt any message encrypted with e on its own, as
the knowledge of its share does not reveal any information about the decryption key d.
Furthermore, by construction, no pair or any larger coalition of FNs learn anything about
the secret key from combining their key shares.3
An attacker intercepting the message c−dHNi sent from HN to FNi, does not obtain any
information on the plaintext m. Otherwise, the attacker would be able to break an RSA
encryption with the public key −edHN i , which contradicts the RSA assumption. Likewise,
an attacker does not gain any information on dHN i from his knowledge of c
−dHNi . We
refer to [38] for a formal security analysis of additional properties of this distributed RSA
decryption scheme.
11.2.2 Distributed RSA Signatures
The public roaming key is a pair (e, n) of an RSA modulus n = pq with p, q prime and
RSA signature-verification key e with gcd(e, ϕ(n)) = 1. The secret roaming key d is the
inverse of e modulo ϕ(n). The key splitting works exactly as in the RSA encryption-based
case previously described. HN, together with any one of the foreign networks FNi, can sign
the hash value h(m) on a message m in the following distributed way: HN partially signs
h(m) by computing DdHNi (h(m)) = h(m)
−dHNi and sends the result to FNi. FNi computes
s = h(m)−dHNi h(m)2dFNi = h(m)−dHNi+2dFNi = h(m)d. Upon receipt of s and m, MD can
check the signature by verifying that h(m) = se mod n.
Security Analysis. By construction, knowing only its share does not allow FN to sign a
hash value by itself. Furthermore, no pair or larger coalition of FNs learn anything about
the secret key by pooling their key shares.
An attacker intercepting the partially signed hash value h(m)−dHNi sent from HN to FNi
cannot complete the signature without knowledge of dFN i . If an attacker could generate a
valid signature h(m)d on h(m) from h(m)−dHNi , he could compute h(m)2dFNi = h(m)d−dHNi
and thus generate valid RSA signatures for a secret key dFN i . Thus, the distributed signa-
ture scheme is as secure as the original RSA signature. For a formal analysis of additional
security properties, we refer to [114].
11.2.3 New Distributed DSS Signatures
The public roaming key is a DSS signature-verification key (p, q, α, y), where p and q are
primes, q|(p− 1), α ∈ Z∗p, ord(α) = q, y = α
a mod p.4 The secret roaming key is a, which
is randomly chosen from {1, . . . , q − 1} =: Z∗q. The signature generation for the hash value
h(m) of a message m for non-distributed signatures works as follows: The signer chooses a
3The foreign networks learn that their shares themselves are not the secret. This reduces the number of
possible values for d from ϕ(n) to ϕ(n)− k.
4The order of an element α of Z∗p is ord(α) := mini∈N{i|α
i = 1}.
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fresh k−1 ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1} for each signature and computes
r = αk
−1
mod p mod q
s = k(h(m) + ar) mod q.
The signature on h(m) then consists of the pair (r, s). For a more detailed description of
the DSS signature generation and verification, see [120].
For a distributed DSS signature, it is necessary to split both the secret key a and the
ephemeral key k between HN and FNi. In our new signature scheme, HN splits the secret
key a for each i = 1, . . . , l multiplicatively into two parts aFN i and aHN i . It distributes
aFN i to FNi and keeps a copy of each pair of shares (aFN i , aHN i).
During signature generation, the ephemeral key k is chosen in a distributed manner.
That is, FNi contributes one part, KFN i , while HN contributes two parts, KHN and kHN .
KFN i is known to FNi only. KHN and kHN are known to HN only. KHN and KFN i
combine to kFN i , which becomes known to both HN and FNi during signature generation.
The ephemeral key k is the product of kHN and kFN i .
5
Without loss of generality, the multiplicative splits of a are generated by first using an
additive splitting in the exponent rather than directly splitting it multiplicatively:6 HN
selects x ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1} randomly and chooses ω1, . . . , ωl randomly in Z q−1
2
with ωi 6= ωj
for i 6= j. Then,
xHN i = x + 2ωi mod q − 1
xFN i = x + ωi mod q − 1.
Thus,
x = −xHN i + 2xFN i mod q − 1 for all i = 1, . . . , l.
All generated shares are different: xHN i 6= xHNj for i 6= j and xFN i 6= xFNj for i 6= j. HN
defines a = αx mod p mod q and
aHN i = α
−xHNi mod p mod q, i = 1, . . . , l
aFN i = α
2xFNi mod p mod q, i = 1, . . . , l
such that aHN i · aFN i = α
−xHNi · α2xFNi = αx = a mod p mod q. HN together with
any FN can now generate a distributed DSS signature as follows: FNi first chooses KFN i
randomly from {0, . . . q − 1} and sends αKFNi to HN. HN then chooses KHN , k
−1
HN , RHN
and R∗HN randomly in Z
∗
q and computes k
−1
FN i
= (αKFNi )KHN mod p mod q. HN ensures
that k = kFNikHN i mod q has not yet been used with the same secret key a before. Then,
5Instead of generating kFNi as a combination of KHN and KFNi , FN can alternatively generate kFNi on
its own and send it to HN. In this case, however, a secure channel between HN and FNi is needed.
6It can easily be checked that both methods are equivalent. Nevertheless, the former allows for a simpler
argument in that all splits are different.
11.2 EAP-TLS with Key Splitting 245
HN computes r = α
k−1
HN
·k−1
FNi and
sHN =(kHN −RHN )kFN i · h(m) + (kHN · aHN i −R
∗
HN )kFN i · aFNi · r
= kHN · kFN i · h(m) + kHN · kFNi · aFNi · aHN · r︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:s
−RHN · kFN i · h(m)−R
∗
HN · kFN i · aFN i · r
HN sends αKHN , r, sHN , RHN and R
∗
HN to FNi. FNi determines k
−1
FN i
= (αKHN )KFNi and
sFNi = kFN i ·RHN · h(m) + kFN i ·R
∗
HN · aFN i · r.
Now FNi can compute the signature part s on h(m) as s = sFNi + sHN . The pair (r, s) is
now a valid DSS signature on the hash value h(m) with a = aHN i ·aFN i and k = kFN i ·kHN .
Thus, it can be verified by MD in the same way as a non-distributed DSS signature with
ephemeral key k and secret key a.
Security Analysis. By construction, FN cannot generate a valid signature on its own as
its share does not provide any information on the key a.
An attacker cannot generate sFNi without knowledge of kFN i and aFNi . This is due
to the fact that sFN i is indeed a DSS signature on RHN · h(m) with ephemeral key kFN i
and long-term key aFNi · R
∗
HN . If DSS is secure against existential forgery, then it is not
possible to generate sFNi without knowledge of kFN i and aFN i · R
∗
HN . This is equivalent
to the knowledge of kFNi and aFN i , as R
∗
HN is public.
Two or more collaborating FNs cannot generate a valid signature, as they cannot re-
construct the secret key a from their shares.
From intercepting αKHN , r, sHN , RHN , R
∗
HN , and (s, r), an attacker cannot derive any
information on a, aHN i , or aFN i .
HN chooses its contribution to k without revealing it to FN. HN makes sure that no
value of k is used twice to generate a signature. FN or any attacker that interferes with the
DH exchange used to exchange kFNi thus cannot force the same k to be used twice.
7
Unlike in the two RSA cases discussed previously, in the DSS case, HN uses its knowl-
edge of the shares of the FNs during the signature-generation process. As discussed earlier,
it is HN that should control authentication, as it will be the entity responsible for account-
ing. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the discussed distributed version of DSS is
restricted to areas of application where one of the signers can sign on its own, while the
other will need the cooperation of the first party to generate signatures.
Section 11.3 will provide a detailed discussion on how our distributed DSS signature
scheme differs from previous work in the area.
7It is well-known that in DSS, using the same ephemeral key k twice with the same secret key a reveals
a [120].
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11.2.4 The Protocol
11.2.4.1 RSA Encryption-Based Key Generation
Figure 11.4 describes the EAP-TLS-KS protocol in the case where an RSA encryption key
is used as the public roaming key and the key generation is based on RSA encryption.
The protocol starts with the regular EAP-Request-Identity and EAP-Response-Identity
messages, and the EAP-TLS-Start message between FN’s authentication server and MD.
After receiving MD’s identity, FN sends an EAP-TLS-KS-Startmessage to HN. This message
includes the client’s EAP-ID, as well as the identity of FN. All of the following EAP-TLS
messages, starting with Client-Hello and ending with Client-Certificate-Verify, are
forwarded between MD and HN by FN.
In order to acknowledge FN’s identity to MD, HN includes FN’s identity in any of the
TLS messages it sends to MD. In order to avoid any changes to the EAP-TLS implementa-
tion for MD, we integrate FN’s identity (FN-ID) as an attribute into the roaming certificate.
MD can thus store the roaming certificate and refer to FN’s identity at any time. Upon
receipt of the Server-Certificate message, which includes the roaming certificate, MD
checks that the roaming key in the certificate matches the pre-installed key.
If they are equal, then MD chooses a random number Sec.RAND and encrypts
it under the public roaming key e. MD computes the hash value of all messages
from the Client-Hello up to the Client-Key-Exchange messages, signs the computed
hash value, and includes it in the Client-Certificate-Verify message. MD then
sends the Client-Certificate, Client-Key-Exchange, Client-Certificate-Verify,
Change-Cipher-Specs, and the Finished messages to FN.
FN forwards the messages Client-Certificate, Client-Key-Exchange, and
Client-Certificate-Verify to HN. HN verifies MD’s certificate and its revocation status,
as well as the signature on the Client-Certificate-Verify message. The correctness of
the signature proves to HN that MD is in possession of the secret key corresponding to the
public key in MD’s certificate. It furthermore proves that none of the messages exchanged
between MD and HN so far have been altered in any way. In particular, this proves that
MD received the same FN-ID as an attribute in the roaming certificate that HN sent. Thus,
HN knows that both HN and MD associate the same identity with FN.
If the signature verification is successful, HN sends the partially decrypted
random number (Sec.RANDe)−dHNi to FN. The receipt of this message assures
FN that HN has successfully authenticated MD and thus authenticates MD in-
directly to FN. FN fully decrypts Sec.RAND by computing (Sec.RANDe)−dHNi ·
(Sec.RANDe)2dFNi = Sec.RAND. FN can now compute the secret master key PMK =
PRNG(Client.RAND,Server.RAND,Sec.RAND).
The Change-Cipher-Spec message indicates that the sending party will now switch to
encryption mode. The Finished messages exchanged between FN and MD are encrypted
with the secret master key PMK. By verifying that the Finished message it received is
correctly encrypted, MD is assured that FN was able to generate the correct key. MD is
furthermore assured that HN participated in the authentication and that the identity FN
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Figure 11.4: EAP-TLS-KS with RSA
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claimed to HN is correct and corresponds to the one included as an attribute in the roaming
certificate.
11.2.4.2 DHE-RSA Case
Figure 11.5 describes the changes in the EAP-TLS-KS protocol in case an RSA signature
key is used as the public roaming key and this key is used to sign the Server-Key-Exchange
message, which includes the ephemeral DH key part (Server-Pub-DH) generated by FN and
sent to HN as part of the EAP-TLS-KS-Start message. Upon receipt of the Client-Hello
message, HN computes the hash value
h(m) =h(Client.RAND||Server.RAND||Server-Pub-DH)
and partially signs it to h(m)−dHNi . HN then constructs the EAP-Requestmessage including
Server-Hello, Server-Certificate (with the RSA public encryption key as roaming key
and FN’s identity as attribute), Server-Key-Exchange, Client-Certificate-Request,
and Server-Done. HN includes the partially signed hash in Server-Key-Exchange.
Upon receipt of this message, FN completes the RSA signature on h(m) by computing
s = h(m)−dHNi · h(m)2dFNi .
It then replaces the partially signed message with s in the Server-Key-Exchange message
and forwards the information to MD. MD checks that the public-key in the roaming cer-
tificate is the one it has pre-installed. It generates its own public and secret ephemeral DH
key values, computes the DH key from its own private DH value and the server’s public DH
value, and generates the master key. MD then sends the respective EAP-TLS message to
FN, including its public DH value in the Client-Key-Exchange message.
HN verifies MD’s certificate and MD’s signature on Client-Certificate-Verify.
Note that HN has to generate the complete signature on the hash value included in the
Server-Key-Exchange message and use it to replace the partially signed hash sent pre-
viously before it can compute the hash value of all messages sent and received so far.
Otherwise, the signature will not be correct, as MD received the complete signature (and
not just the partially signed message) included in the Server-Key-Exchange message from
FN.
If HN can verify MD’s signature, then HN sends the EAP-TLS-KS-Success message
to FN. The receipt of this message assures FN of the correctness of MD’s identity. FN
now generates the DH key and the master key and eventually completes the EAP-TLS-KS
protocol as in the original EAP-TLS protocol. As in the RSA encryption-based case, MD
is assured of the correctness of FN’s identity by the correctness of the encryption of the
Finished message received from FN.
11.2.4.3 DHE-DSS Case
Figure 11.6 describes the changes in the EAP-TLS-KS protocol when a DSS signature-
verification key is used as the public roaming key. HN and FN jointly sign the server’s
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public DH key part using the distributed DSS signature described previously. The protocol
is almost identical to the DHE-RSA case, except that FN has to send the ephemeral DSS
key part αKFNi in addition to the Server-Public-DH value to HN in the EAP-TLS-KS-Start
message. In both the DHE-based protocols, any FNi can request HN to partly sign DH
ephemeral keys regardless of any MD requesting to access FNi. However, this can be no-
ticed by HN if no Client-Certificate-Verifymessage follows the Server-Key-Exchange
message. Moreover, as the hash value of the ephemeral DH key that is signed with the DSS
or RSA key includes the Server.RAND and the Client.RAND, FN cannot use the recovered
partially signed DH ephemeral key to fool MD.
11.2.4.4 Cost
We analyze the new protocol in comparison to two other usage scenarios of EAP-TLS for
inter-provider roaming. The first one is to use the authentication server in HN and having
FN act like an access point in the regular EAP-TLS protocol. This scenario is equivalent
to the one depicted in Figure 11.1 when replacing the client with MD, the server with the
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EAP-TLS (FN) EAP-TLS (HN) EAP-TLS-KS
FN MD HN FN MD HN FN MD
EAP mes. 5 4 5 9 4 5 3 4
MD sig. ver. 1 1 1
Cert. val. 1 1 1 1 1 1∗
KS mes. 1 1
Key trans. 1
RSA-Based Key Generation
RSA dec. 1 1 1 1
RSA enc. 1 1 1
DHE-RSA-Based Key Generation
RSA sig. 1 1 1 1
RSA sig ver. 1 1 1
DHE-DSS-Based Key Generation
DSS sig. 1 1 1 1
DSS sig. ver. 1 1 1
Table 11.1: Comparison
authentication server in HN, and placing the authentication server of FN in the middle to
forward all traffic between MD and HN’s AS. Here, we refer to this protocol as EAP-TLS
(HN). Note that this setting requires a secure channel between FN and HN in order to
transfer the master key from HN to FN.
In the second scenario, the authentication is fully delegated to FN, i.e., full control is
delegated from HN to FN. This is equivalent to Figure 11.1 when replacing the server with
FN’s authentication server. Here, we refer to this scenario as EAP-TLS (FN).
Table 11.1 compares the three protocols EAP-TLS (HN), EAP-TLS (FN), and EAP-
TLS-KS in terms of the number of EAP messages sent, signatures generated and verified,
and the number of messages encrypted or decrypted by MD, HN, or FN. The three key
generation types are listed separately.
The number of EAP messages MD has to send, as well as the number of public-key
operations MD has to perform, is the same for all three protocols. Compared to the EAP-
TLS (FN) protocol, the new protocol has the advantage that MD can authenticate FN
without having to check the validity of any chain of certificates and the revocation status of
these certificates (* in Table 11.1). Instead, MD can use the pre-installed roaming certificate
and simply check whether it matches the received server certificate. If the certificate is
revoked due to compromise, HN must immediately notify MD. In case the certificate expired,
MD trusts HN not to engage in the authentication. This addresses an important problem
with the other schemes where MD is required to check the validity of FN’s certificate itself
or delegate this task to a trusted third party and wait for the respective response.
In comparison to EAP-TLS (FN), the new protocol shifts part of the load from FN to
HN. In the new protocol, FN has to forward three EAP messages between MD and HN and
send one additional EAP-TLS-KS message to HN. The load of verifying MD’s signature on
the Certificate-Verify message and the load of validating MD’s certificate is shifted to
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HN.
Compared to EAP-TLS (HN), the new protocol significantly reduces the number of
messages FN has to forward between MD and HN. The new protocol requires the forwarding
of only three EAP messages, as opposed to the nine messages in EAP-TLS (HN). The new
protocol, however, requires two additional EAP-TLS-KS messages to be exchanged between
HN and FN, as well as an additional public-key operation by FN. Unlike in EAP-TLS (HN),
the new protocol does not require any secure channel in order to transfer the master key
from HN to FN.
11.2.5 Properties of EAP-TLS-KS
Complete Control by HN. HN fully controls every access requested by any of its sub-
scribed MDs to any foreign network. HN furthermore fully controls the revocation status
of both the roaming agreement with each FN as well as that of any MD. It can thus ensure
that no successful authentication can take place after revocation. This eliminates the trust
HN has to put into FN in other protocols, namely the trust that FN correctly checks the
revocation status of MD’s certificate before granting access.
Proof of FN’s ID to MD and Authentication of MD to FN. As HN uses a different
key share for every FN, MD gains an indirect proof of FN’s identity upon successful termi-
nation of the EAP-TLS-KS protocol. This proof of FN’s identity enables MD to configure
its own roaming policy locally, e.g., by excluding certain networks or keeping preference
lists. This furthermore allows for a simple integration of an accounting initialization into
the authentication procedure. Details on this topic are discussed in [121].
Since authentication of roaming MDs requires HN to validate the certificate status, FN
is assured that upon successful completion of the protocol, HN approves MD to use FN’s
services and HN is willing to reimburse FN for providing service to MD.
Elimination of Secure Channel between HN and FN. As opposed to many other
schemes (e.g., [118, 156]), the new authentication protocol does not require the existence
of a secure channel between HN and FN. This is due to the key splitting, which makes it
unnecessary to transfer the master key from HN to FN.
Simple Integration of New Roaming Agreements. A new roaming agreement between
HN and a new foreign network FNl+1 requires the generation of a new pair of shares of the
secret roaming key. In the RSA cases, HN simply generates two new shares of the secret
roaming key d, namely dHN l+1 and dFN l+1 , distributes dFN l+1 to FNl+1. In the DSS case,
it generates a new pair of shares of the secret roaming key a, namely (aHN l+1 , aFN l+1). It
keeps both shares to itself and distributes aFN l+1 to FNl+1. In both cases, neither does
the provider have to change the roaming key pair nor does it have to update or change
any of the already distributed shares. Our scheme thus accommodates expansion to an
arbitrary number of roaming agreements. The security of the scheme does not depend on
the number of FNs with which the home provider has roaming agreements. No adjustments
are necessary for MD in order to allow for successful authentication to a new FN upon
roaming.
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Efficient Revocation of Agreements and Subscriptions. In order to revoke the roam-
ing agreement with FN, HN simply marks the respective shares for that FN as revoked.
Incoming authentication requests for the revoked FN are then no longer co-signed or par-
tially decrypted by HN. There is no need for HN to change the public roaming key.
The revocation status of the certificates for MDs is maintained by HN. Consequently, no
FN is required to check the status of MD. Instead, revocation of MD’s certificate is efficiently
implemented by HN refusing to co-sign or partially decrypt authentication requests for
revoked MDs.
Simple Handling of Compromised Keys. In case the key of a particular FN has been
compromised, HN marks the corresponding shares as invalid. In particular, the compromise
of the key share of an individual FN does not require the generating of a new roaming key
pair. This is due to the fact that all FNs have individual shares.
In case the secret roaming key itself is compromised, HN has to immediately notify all its
MDs of the revocation of the current roaming certificate and distribute a new one. However,
it is not necessary for HN to provide the FNs with new shares. Consequently, the burden of
expensive secret key-share distribution in case of a compromised key is eliminated. In the
following paragraphs we discuss the details of handling compromised keys for the different
roaming key types:
RSA Cases. The secret roaming key is a secret RSA key d and the public roaming key is
a public RSA key pair (e, n). Let d∗ be the new secret roaming key to be split with the
FNs and let (e∗, n∗) be the corresponding public RSA key pair with n∗ 6= n.8 Then, HN
determines δ = d − d∗ mod ϕ(n∗) as well as δi = d + wi − dFNi mod ϕ(n
∗) and replaces
its own old shares with the new shares
d∗HN i = 2(wi − δ − δi) + d
∗ mod ϕ(n∗)
for i = 1, . . . , l. Consequently, any pair (d∗HNi , dFNi) can now be used to reconstruct the
new roaming key d∗ by:
−d∗HN i + 2dFN i =− 2(wi − δ − δi)− d
∗
+ 2(wi − δ + d
∗ − δi)
= d∗ mod ϕ(n∗)
In fact, the splitting of the new key d∗ is done in the same way as the splitting of d by
replacing wi with wi − δ − δi. That is, the random contribution of wi is now provided by
δi = d + wi − dFNi mod ϕ(n
∗). If an attacker knows d and can thereby factor n, he can
also learn wi by collaborating with FNi. However, the attacker cannot compute δ or δi, as
FNi does not know ϕ(n
∗). Even if two or more FNs collaborate, they cannot compute δ as
each collaborating FNi increases the number of unknown variable by one (δi).
8It is important to ensure that n∗ is different from n. Otherwise, since an attacker who knows d can
factor n and thereby knows ϕ(n) could also easily compute d∗ by inverting e∗ modulo ϕ(n) in case n∗ = n.
254 Chapter 11. The New Protocol EAP-TLS-KS
DSS Case. The splitting of a new secret roaming key αx
∗
= a∗ is obtained by determining a
new additive splitting for x∗. That is, HN chooses a new x∗ ∈ {1, . . . , q−1} and determines
δ = x− x∗ mod q − 1. It then computes
x∗HN i = xHN i + δ mod q − 1
and determines a∗ = αx
∗
as the new secret key and a∗HN i = α
x∗HNi . Consequently, a∗HN i ·
aFN i = α
−x∗HNi
+2xFNi = αx−δ = αx
∗
. Thus, HN and FNi now multiplicatively share the
new secret key a∗.
It is important to note that from a, aHNi , and aFNi , the values x, xHNi , and xFNi
cannot be recovered as long as the discrete logarithm assumption holds. Thus, if the key a
is recovered by an attacker, x, xHNi , and xFNI are not affected. Consequently, the attacker
learns nothing about a∗.
An attacker who recovers a cannot use his knowledge on past signatures to compute
new ones. As he knows nothing about the key a∗, he is in exactly the same situation as any
signer with a secret key that tries to forge signatures of another signer using the same public
parameters. If the attacker could use his knowledge on past signatures to compute valid
signatures without knowledge of a∗, each signer could use his own past signatures to sign
on behalf of someone else in DSS. The new splitting is therefore as secure against signature
forgery as the original DSS signature scheme.
Simple Update of Keys. Updating of keys can be done in the same way as in the case
of compromise.
11.3 Related Work
11.3.1 Inter-Provider Roaming in Public WLANs
Overviews on Inter-Provider Roaming. In [24], Balachandran et al. discuss open
questions and challenges related to WLAN hotspot providers with an emphasis on roaming
issues and security. In [178], Wang et al. discuss and analyze the security mechanisms
UAM, 802.1X, PANA, and USIM-based authentication for wireless hotspot providers and
inter-provider roaming.
Web-Based Authentication Methods. The most widely-used authentication protocol
by WISPs is the web-based universal access method UAM. This method has been shown to
have several vulnerabilities [178]. A renegade AP connected to a web server with a valid SSL
certificate can be set up in the hotspot and trick users into divulging their authentication
credentials. Furthermore, UAM is vulnerable to dictionary attacks. A malicious MD can
spoof the address pair (MAC/IP address) of an already authenticated MD to conduct
service theft. Another web-based authentication method is CHOICE [23], which is secure
against address spoofing. However, it uses the MS-Passport technology [126], which makes
it platform dependent. A proprietary security sublayer between the link-layer and the IP
layer further restricts the application area of CHOICE. In contrast, the protocol proposed in
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this chapter is based on publicly available technologies only. Spinach [19] offers a web-based
interface to a Kerberos authentication service and aims to not only protect public wireless
access points, but also to secure public network ports. It is designed to be flexible with
respect to the use of other authentication methods if desired. Unfortunately, it is vulnerable
to address spoofing.
Other Proposals. WLANs that support the new 802.11i security architecture can be set
up to support any EAP method in combination with a RADIUS server proxy hierarchy
[189] on roaming. FN’s authentication server acts as a proxy for all EAP-method-specific
authentication traffic between MD and its home provider. The home provider’s authentica-
tion server authenticates MD in the same way as if MD requested service to it. Depending
on the EAP method used the authentication can then be based on public-key certificates
or be non-public-key based.
In [119], McCann et al. suggest enhancements to the two most widespread current roam-
ing authentication methods used in WLAN: UAM and 802.11i-based authentication. UAM
is enhanced to support other types of credential than username/password combinations in
order to reduce the required user interaction to opening a web-browser. 802.11i-based au-
thentication is in turn enhanced by a web-interface similar to UAM to facilitate migration
from UAM to 802.11i for UAM-accustomed users.
Salgarelli et al. [156] suggest an authentication protocol EAP-W-SKE that minimizes the
number of round-trip message exchanges between FN and HN to one round-trip. However,
this requires a secure channel between HN and FN for key transfer. In [118], Matsunaga
et al. propose a single sign-on authentication architecture that is based on 802.1X and
EAP-TLS for PKI-based network authentication. It can be combined with any web-based
authentication method for MD authentication. Due to the use of 802.1X, their architecture
is secure against address spoofing. Yet, the web-based user authentication mechanisms
require a secure channel between the local web server and the user’s identity server of
choice. Our protocol does not require the existence of any secure channel between any of
the components of the visited FN and HN. Moreover, in [118] it is assumed that MDs can
check the validity of any public-key certificate presented by FN as part of the EAP-TLS
protocol. The problems that arise from certificate-chain discovery and validation by MD
are not addressed in [118].
Some protocols have been suggested for inter-provider roaming that use public-key-based
methods to authenticate both the network and MD. Gu et al. make an explicit suggestion for
WLAN [81], whereas Bayarou et al. suggest a general framework for wireless networks [29].
The authentication protocol in [81] shares the aforementioned deficiencies concerning costly
discovery, verification, and validation of certificate chains by an oﬄine MD. In [29], these
shortcomings are addressed by delegating certificate-chain discovery and validation to a
trusted server. This solves the oﬄine problem but causes additional round-trips to the
trusted server. In [110], Long et al. describe an authentication and key-agreement protocol
for roaming WLAN subscribers. The protocol is based on individual public-key certificates
and the SSL protocol. Each home provider issues certificates for himself as well as his
pre-registered users. Moreover, the home provider signs the individual certificate of each
256 Chapter 11. The New Protocol EAP-TLS-KS
foreign provider he has a roaming agreement with. MD and FN authenticate each other
using these certificates in a modified SSL handshake. The home provider is not engaged
in the authentication9. The authors additionally suggest that FN may present part of the
SSL-handshake transcript as evidence of service provisioning to MD’s home provider for
accounting purposes. A transcript, however, does not prove any usage time to the home
provider. In particular, FN could require MD to authenticate several times in a row in
order to obtain different transcripts and then be paid. Moreover, the protocol does not
address how changes in roaming profiles and agreements are to be handled. In particular,
no suggestion is made as to how a roaming agreement can be revoked. Revocation-status
checking of user certificates is circumvented by restricting the lifetime of MD certificates
to a month and assume fixed monthly payments to the home provider, thus restricting the
risk of fraudulent use of a revoked certificate to the period of one month. In [149], Ribeiro
et al. describe an IPsec-based roaming authentication approach that uses a hierarchy of
certificate authorities to secure a non-commercial WLAN. This approach comes with two
typical problems of IP-layer-only authentication protocols: an attacker can spoof authenti-
cated (IP address, MAC address) pairs and and can analyze traffic intercepted on the air
interface based on the unencrypted IP headers.
11.3.2 Distributed Signatures
Secret-Sharing Scheme. For the construction of a secret-sharing scheme that rep-
resents our non-threshold composite access structure, we make use of an approach
presented and proved in [117]. The authors show that a composite access structure
Γ0[(t1, n1), (t2, n2), ..., (tl, nl)] allows for a vector-space construction if the initial access
structure Γ0 itself allows a vector-space construction. The proof is constructive and we
use it in a straightforward manner to construct our linear secret-sharing scheme.
Geer and Yung suggest alternative applications of threshold cryptography in [71]. Al-
though this work does not address inter-provider roaming, this paper inspired our work.
Distributed RSA. Distributed RSA decryption and signatures were first suggested and
analyzed in [40] and [68]. We use these methods in EAP-TLS-KS in a straightforward
manner. In [38], Boneh et al. use a semi-trusted mediator in conjunction with two-party
RSA signature schemes and cryptosystems to facilitate the revocation of user certificates.
We refer to their security analysis for the distributed RSA decryption. In [114], MacKenzie
et al. use distributed RSA signatures to secure PIN-protected or password-protected private
keys against off-line dictionary attacks in order to achieve capture resilience. We refer to
their formal security analysis for the distributed RSA signature scheme.
Distributed DSS. Distributed DSS signatures are particularly hard to construct since not
only a long-term secret key, but also the ephemeral key, has to be split between signers. A
fully symmetrical two-party DSS signature-generation scheme was presented by MacKenzie
et al. in [115]. This scheme requires a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme
to be implemented between the two signers that exhibits a specific homomorphic property
9This corresponds to the third column of Table 2.1.
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as, e.g., in the cryptosystems of Pallier [139] or Okamoto et al. [134]. The purpose of the
encryption scheme is to allow one party to reveal his share encrypted with its public key
to the other party. The other party can use the encrypted share to generate an encrypted
signature and then send this back to the first party, who finally decrypts the full signature.
The encryption scheme thus enables the symmetry of the two-party signature. We assume
an asymmetric setting in which HN keeps the complete key as well as FN’s shares for
several reasons. First, it allows HN to engage in new roaming agreements. Second, it
enables simple key update and key-compromise handling. Finally, it allows HN to use the
full secret key if MD “roams” to HN. The use of MacKenzie et al.’s distributed DSS version
in our setting would thus generate unnecessary overhead. In contrast, the distributed DSS
signature scheme introduced in this chapter is tailored to the specific setting of roaming in
which one of the signing parties has complete power over the other. In the first work on
distributed DSS signatures [107], Langford presented a (2, l) threshold DSS signature for
l ≥ 3. This construction was generalized by Gennaro et al. to a (t, n) threshold signature
with n ≥ 2t + 1 in [73]. These schemes are not directly applicable in our scenario, as
we require a (2, 2) signature scheme. However, our distributed version is similar to the
(2, 3) threshold DSS signature presented in [107]. Langford blinds the shares of each party
with random numbers and uses a third party to unblind and finally compose partly signed
messages into fully signed ones. We use a similar blinding with random numbers to conceal
HN’s share from FN.
11.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a new protocol EAP-TLS-KS for authentication and
key agreement on WLAN inter-provider roaming. Our solution addresses the most signif-
icant problems of current public-key-based approaches. It solves the problems related to
certificate validation on MD by using only one pre-installed roaming certificate per home
provider. Our protocol allows for flexible handling of changes in roaming agreements and
profiles by guaranteeing full control over each roaming instance to HN. At the same time,
our protocol reduces the number of round-trip message exchanges required between FN and
HN upon roaming to two round-trips and is thus more efficient than the standard usage
of EAP-based inter-provider roaming. Furthermore, our protocol does not require a secure
channel between FN and HN, as the secret master key used to protect the air-interface
between MD and FN after successful authentication is derived by FN itself.
Our protocol does not explicitly support anonymous roaming nor does it support quality-
of-service dependent payment. Future work will explore how current research on these
topics, such as the ideas in [155], can be integrated into our protocol. Generalizing the key-
splitting approach to support roaming mediators, in addition to pairwise roaming agree-
ments, is another interesting direction for future w
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Chapter 12
History-Enriched Policy-Based
SCT for WLAN
Handover procedures within a WLAN network are standardized by the IEEE in [91, 93]
and make use of the Inter Access Point Protocol IAPP [92]. The standardized procedures,
however, do not support handover across different IP domains and consequently do not
support inter-provider handover, as IAPP is restricted to APs connected to the WLAN.
The Context Transfer Protocol (CXTP) [112] and the Candidate Access Router Discov-
ery (CARD) [108] are experimental protocols standardized by the IETF. In combination
with Mobile-IP for mobility management, CXTP and CARD aim to support handover
across IP domains.
In this chapter, we discuss how the history-enriched, policy-based security-context trans-
fer can be used to enhance inter-provider handover across different WLANs. In this context,
we show how the HEPB approach can be implemented using CARD and CXTP.
Implementing SRC-controlled HEPB security-context transfers using CXTP such that
the security requirements R*-1 to R*-4, R*-7, and R*-8 are met, requires only minor changes
to CXTP. It is, however, difficult, to implement the negotiation of the cipher suite in CXTP
alone, such that the requirements R*-6 and R*-5 are met. In particular, in WLAN a mobile
device chooses the cipher suite to be used from the capabilities advertised by the APs
and sends its choice to the AP already in the association request. Therefore, we suggest
integrating the negotiation of the security mechanisms to use after handover with CARD,
such that the negotiation takes place before MD associates with an AP of DESTk. The
enforcement of MD’s, SRCk’s, and DESTk’s policies, however, is completed with the help
of CXTP.
Another difficulty of integrating the HEPB approach in CXTP and CARD is that CXTP
in its current version only supports context transfers from the access router in SRCk to the
access router in DESTk. Consequently, CXTP cannot be used directly to implement HN-
controlled or AN-controlled handover. In Section 12.4.2, we discuss the required changes to
CXTP in order to accommodate HN-controlled and AN-controlled handover.
Outline. In Section 12.1, we map the context history, security context, policy, and handover
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procedures of our model to the WLAN case. In Section 12.2, we give an overview of CARD,
followed by an overview on CXTP in Section 12.3. In Section 12.4, we discuss the integration
of the HEPB approach with CARD and CXTP. Related work on inter-provider handover
between WLANs is discussed in Section 12.5, which is also the conclusion of this chapter.
12.1 HEPB Handover in the WLAN Context
In this section, we map the components of the HEPB procedure with key derivation intro-
duced in Section 5.1 to IEEE 802.11i-protected WLANs.
Initial Security Context. The initial security context S0 consists of: (1) the authen-
tication and key-agreement protocol, which is either PSK-based or an EAP method; (2)
one of the three encryption and integrity-protection mechanisms WEP, TKIP, or CCMP.
The key-establishment protocol in 802.11i-protected WLANs is pre-defined as the EAPoL-
Handshake described in Section 10.3.2 and therefore is not included in the initial (or any
other) security context.
Key Derivation. Upon handover, HCN derives the next pairwise master session key
Kk from K0 (HN-controlled and AN-controlled cases) or from Kk−1 (SRC-controlled case),
as described in Section 5.1.2.5. As a key-derivation function, we suggest using the TLS
Pseudo-Random Function (TLS-PRF) implemented on each MD that supports EAP-TLS.
This function is based on SHA-1 and is currently assumed to be pre-image resistant, such
that R*-2 is met. As described in Section 5.1.2.5, our key-derivation methods meet R*-3
only in part.
Context History and Security Context. The context history consists of the initial
authentication and key-agreement protocol, as well as all subsequently used cipher suites
cs ∈ {WEP, TKIP, CCMP} and all previously used key-derivation functions. As described
in Section 5.1.4, we omit the order or frequency of appearance in the context history. The
history thus maximally includes all three cipher suites and the overall number of possible
histories is
8 · (|defined EAP methods|+ 1) · |key-derivation functions|.
The security context transferred during a k-th-order handover is
(Kk, historyk−1, T rHCN ),
where Kk is the pairwise master session key derived as described in the last paragraph.
Policies. MD, HCN, and DEST express their policies with respect to the cipher suites
they allow to be used after handover by pre-defining sets of cipher suites dependent on the
context histories. In order to support MDs and networks in pre-defining the sets of allowed
cipher suites, a tool that translates policies of MD and the networks into certain sets of
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cipher suites can be developed. Such a tool could, for example, allow an entity X to set
cipher suite sets CSX |sshk−1 to be empty if a certain initial authentication and key agreement
is included in sshk−1 or if a certain encryption and integrity-protection mechanism (e.g.,
WEP) appears in sshk−1. It could set all other histories to a certain pre-defined subset of
CS = {WEP, TKIP, CCMP}.
Procedure. The procedures themselves are the ones already described in Section 5.1.3.
However, an interesting question is how the history-enriched, policy-based context trans-
fer can be implemented reusing other already standardized handover-supporting protocols.
Consequently, in the rest of this chapter we discuss how the HEPB approach can be imple-
mented using two recently developed experimental IETF protocols, CARD and CXTP.
12.2 The Candidate Access Router Discovery (CARD)
The Network Working Group of the IETF specifies the so-called Candidate Access Router
Discovery (CARD) Protocol in RFC 4066 [108]. This protocol supports MD in resolving
the IP address and certain other capabilities of so-called Candidate Access Routers (CAR)
for handover available at MD’s current location.
In the context of WLAN, this works as follows. The mobile device periodically scans
for candidate APs. The scanning results in the discovery of the MAC addresses of the
APs available at MD’s current location. The CARD protocol allows a mobile device to
request the access router with which it is currently connected to resolve the MAC addresses
of the candidate APs to the IP addresses of the corresponding candidate access routers.
Additionally, CARD allows MD to request its current access router for other capabilities
of the candidate access routers, such as the available bandwidth that might influence its
handover decision.
The CARD protocol can thus be used by MD to generate the ordered list of candidate
destination access routers. In addition, CARD can be used to transfer sets of cipher suites
allowed to be used after handover as part of the capabilities of the access routers. We detail
this in Section 12.4.
12.3 The Context Transfer Protocol (CXTP)
The SEAMOBY Working Group [79] of the IETF specifies the so-called Context Transfer
Protocol (CXTP) to support mobility in all-IP-based networks in RFC 4067 [112]. This
protocol enables context transfers between access routers in different IP domains initiated
by MD or the source access router. The protocol does not specify the actual context-transfer
data, but standardizes a protocol to transfer different context types.
In the WLAN context, handover procedures are mobile-initiated. Consequently, we de-
scribe only the mobile-initiated part of CXTP here. CXTP supports only SRC-controlled
context transfers. CXTP supports two types of mobile-initiated context transfers: predic-
tive transfers and reactive transfers. Predictive transfers correspond to our SRC-controlled
262 Chapter 12. History-Enriched Policy-Based SCT for WLAN
mobile-initiated handover where SRCk is notified by MD (see Figure 3.9), while reactive
context transfer corresponds to the procedure where SRCk is notified by DESTk (see Fig-
ure 3.8). Predictive transfer takes place if MD detects a handover reason and is able to
notify SRCk before it loses connection to SRCk. In this case, SRCk pushes the context to
DESTk before the MD associates with DESTk. Reactive transfer takes place if MD has
already associated with DESTk. In this case, DESTk requests the context transfer from
SRCk.
CXTP defines four types of messages: the Context Transfer Activate Request (CTAR)
message, the Context Data Transfer (CTD) message, the Context Transfer Request (CT-
Request) message and the Context Transfer Cancel (CTC) message. Optionally, the re-
ception of the CTAR or the CTD can be acknowledged by the receiver by a corresponding
Context Transfer Activate Acknowledgment (CTAA) or a Context Transfer Data Replay
(CTDR) message. The CTC message is sent from the access router in DESTk to inform
SRCk in case the context transfer cannot be completed in a timely fashion.
The predictive and reactive transfer schemes are illustrated in Figure 12.1 and 12.2.
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SRCk DESTkMD
Figure 12.1: Predictive CXTP
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Figure 12.2: Reactive CXTP
If the CTAR message is sent to SRCk, it includes the IP address of the candidate
access router in DESTk. In case CTAR is sent to DESTk it includes the IP address of the
previously serving access router in SRCk. In both cases, the CTAR includes MD’s previous
IP address, a sequence number, and information on the context data blocks requested to
be transferred. Additionally, CTAR includes an authentication token that is a keyed hash
value computed with a key shared between MD and SRCk on the concatenation of MD’s
previous IP address, the sequence number, and the context data blocks requested to be
transferred.1
In the predictive case, CTD is sent from SRCk to DESTk after receipt of a CTAR
message from MD. In the reactive case, DESTk requests the context transfer from SRCk by
sending a CT-Request message as soon as it receives a CTAR message from MD.
The CTD message includes the previous IP address of MD, the algorithm, key length,
and the key that was used by MD to compute the authentication token, as well as the
Context Data Blocks of the actual context. The CTD message is mandated to be sent over
1How SRCk and MD come into possession of the key required to compute the authentication token is out
of the scope of CXTP.
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an IPsec tunnel between the access router in SRCk and the access router in DESTk. The
context data types are each specified in a separate document and require registration with
IANA.2
The CT-Request message is sent from DESTk to SRCk in the reactive case after receipt
of a CTAR message from MD. The CT-Request includes MD’s previous IP address, the
sequence number, and MD’s authorization token, as well as the requested context data
blocks. These fields are copied from the received CTAR.
In case of predictive transfer, DESTk verifies the authorization token with the help of
the key and algorithm provided in the CTD. In CXTP, SRCk thus transfers the key shared
between SRCk and MD to DESTk. This contradicts R*-2 such that we will modify this upon
integrating HEPB in CXTP. In case of reactive transfer, SRCk verifies the authorization
token when receiving MD’s token in the CT-Request.
12.4 Implementing HEPB Handover Using CARD and
CXTP
12.4.1 SRC-controlled HEPB SCT with Key Derivation
Figure 12.3 shows how the HEPB approach can be implemented using CARD and CXTP
with predictive context transfer.
Periodically, or triggered by some Layer 2 event, such as a decrease in the reception level
of the currently serving network access point, MD scans for candidate destination networks
available in its current location. With the help of the CARD protocol, MD discovers
the IP addresses and other capabilities of the access routers of surrounding networks by
requesting its current access router (CARD-Request). The access router in SRCk answers
with a CARD-Reply that includes the cipher suites CS SRCk |sshk−1 ∩ CSDESTk |sshk−1 . As all
messages exchanged between SRCk and MD, this message is protected by the temporal
keys derived from the pairwise master session key Kk−1 shared between MD and SRCk.
MD selects one of the available access routers and requests context transfer to it from
SRCk by means of a CTAR message. This message is integrity-protected by means of the
temporal keys shared between SRCk and MD, such that R*-8 is met. MD includes its
choice csk ∈ CS SRCk |sshk−1 ∩ CSDESTk |sshk−1 ∩ CSMD|sshk−1 in the context data blocks to
be transferred. SRCk checks whether MD’s choice of csk complies with its policy. If this is
the case, SRCk sends the security context Sk as part of the CTD message to DESTk. It is
important to note that in the original CXTP, SRCk includes the key it shares with MD in
the CTD message (predictive transfer). Transferring Kk−1 in CTD, however, contradicts
R*-2. In our adapted version of CXTP, SRCk includes Kk−1 in CTD. The CTD message
is mandated to be sent over an IPsec tunnel between SRCk and DESTk such that R*-7
is met. In the meantime, MD disassociates from SRCk and associates with DESTk. In
the association request, MD informs DESTk of its choice of csk. DESTk checks whether
csk complies with its policy. Before the EAPoL-Handshake starts, MD sends the CTAR to
2Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
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Figure 12.3: Predictive HEPB-Based Procedure
DESTk. In the original CXTP, MD includes an authorization token in CTAR computed
by means of a key shared between MD and SRCk and SRCk has to transfer the respective
key to DESTk as part of CTD. Instead, in our adapted version of CXTP, MD computes
the authorization token with the derived pairwise master session key Kk. DESTk checks
whether the sequence numbers included in CTD and CTAR are the same and whether the
authentication token included by MD in the CTAR is valid. DESTk also checks whether
CSDESTk |sshk−1 6= ∅ and whether Tk ≤ TrDESTk (R*-1, R*-4). If these checks are successful,
DESTk and MD perform the EAPoL-Handshake in order to establish fresh data-protection
keys TK from Kk.
As MD chooses the cipher suite to be used after handover, and as SRCk sends the
context transfer to DESTk only if MD’s choice complies with SRCk’s policy, and as DESTk
can drop the connection if MD includes a cipher suite in the association request that does
not comply with its policy, the suggested cipher-suite negotiation meets R*-5. As the
CARD-Reply message is integrity-protected, the cipher suite negotiation cannot be bid
down (R*-6).
Figure 12.4 shows how the HEPB approach can be implemented using CARD and CXTP
with reactive context transfer.
As in the predictive case, MD discovers candidate access routers for handover with the
help of the CARD protocol. SRCk includes CS SRCk |sshk−1 ∩ CSDESTk |sshk−1 as one of the
capabilities in the CARD-Reply. MD chooses one of the candidate access routers and a
cipher suite csk ∈ CS SRCk |sshk−1 ∩ CSDESTk |sshk−1 ∩ CSMD|sshk−1 and includes it in the
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Figure 12.4: Reactive HEPB-Based Procedure
association request it sends to DESTk. MD then sends the context transfer request CTAR
to DESTk including the chosen cipher suite csk in the context data and the authentication
token, which is computed with the help of Kk and not Kk−1. DESTk requests the context
transfer by sending a CT-Request to SRCk, including the authorization token and other
information received in the CTAR. SRCk checks the validity of the authorization token
(R*-8) and checks whether the included cipher suite csk complies with its policy. Only if
these checks are successful, SRCk transfers the security context included in CTD to DESTk.
The CTD message is sent over an IPsec tunnel (R*-7). Upon receipt of CTD, DESTk checks
whether CSDESTk |sshk−1 6= ∅ and whether Tk ≤ TrDESTk (R*-1, R*-4). If these checks are
successful, DESTk extracts Kk, and MD and DESTk use the EAPoL-Handshake in order
to establish a fresh temporal key TK from Kk.
The cipher-suite negotiation suggested here is protected against bidding-down attacks
(R*-6) in the same way as in the predictive transfer scheme and enforces the policies of
SRCk, DESTk, and MD (R*-5).
Note that we assume here that SRCk has knowledge of the exact and not only a superset
of the cipher suites DESTk allows given the security-suite history sshk−1. Consequently,
DESTk is required to acknowledge any changes of its policies with respect to the allowed
cipher suites to SRCk. However, as CARD provides means for SRCk to inquire DESTk’s
current capability, this is a feasible approach.
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12.4.2 Changes Required for HN-Controlled and AN-Controlled Han-
dover
CXTP only supports SRC-controlled context transfer upon handover and CARD only sup-
ports requesting the currently serving access router for information upon surrounding can-
didate access routers.
In order to support HN-controlled and AN-controlled handover context transfers, CXTP
has to be changed in order to allow CTAR messages sent by MD to be forwarded from SRCk
to HCN, allow the authentication token to be protected by a key shared between MD and or
MD and AN, and allow CT-Requests to the HCN rather than SRCk. It would be interesting
to explore whether these extensions are required by other types of contexts as well.
In order to allow AN or HN to enforce its policies during the negotiation of the cipher
suite to be used after handover on AN-controlled and HN-controlled handover, AN (HN) can
provide MD with its pre-defined policy sets while MD is associated with AN. Upon handover,
MD is then only provided with CS DESTk |sshk−1 as part of the CARD-Reply received from
SRCk. As in the SRC-controlled case, MD includes its choice of csk in the CTAR but
protects this message with the pairwise master key shared between MD and AN.
12.4.3 HEPB SCT with Key Agreement
In order to implement HN-controlled HEPB SCT with key agreement (described in Sec-
tion 5.3) in the WLAN context, MD includes a fresh random number r encrypted with
the public handover key of its home network in the CTAR message. SRCk forwards the
CTAR message to HN. HN partially decrypts r with the share corresponding to DESTk’s
share of the secret handover key and includes the partially decrypted r instead of Kk in the
security-context transfer in CTD. Upon receipt of the CTD, DESTk decrypts the partially
decrypted value with its share of HN’s secret handover key and thus receives r. DESTk and
MD use r together with two freshly generated and exchanged random numbers as input
TLS-PRF and thus derive the new pairwise master session key. Note that in this case, the
security-suite history only consists of the initial authentication and key-agreement protocol.
12.5 Conclusion
In Section 4.5, we already compared our HEPB-based procedure with other SCT-based
solutions [177, 162, 186, 74] that are not targeted specifically to the WLAN case.
Duong et al. [55] suggest WLAN-specific security solutions for handover across different
providers, combining CARD, CXTP, and Mobile-IP with a scheme to determine the best
point in time to initiate a context transfer. This scheme aims to ensure that contexts are
in place before MD switches access routers, and at the same time aims to minimize the
amount of unnecessary transfers. Note that CARD and CXTP have been finalized only in
July 2005; thus, these protocols have not been widely used and analyzed yet.
An important and interesting open topic for future research is to implement and test the
HEPB-based approach in a realistic setting. Such an implementation requires implementing
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CARD and CXTP, as to the best of the authors knowledge currently no freely available
implementation of these protocols exists. The main challenge of implementing the new
approach is finding a way to represent the policy expressions of MDs and providers such that
the handover decisions as well as the security-mechanism negotiation can be implemented
efficiently enough to allow for seamless handover of on-going connections. It would be
interesting to investigate whether the policy representation introduced in [179], which allows
for efficient reconciliation, could be used for this purpose.
Implementing the new approach will furthermore allow determining a realistic upper
bound on the length of context histories that can efficiently be handled dependent on the
chosen policy representation. Depending on the resulting maximum length, compressing
the context history (see Section 5.1.4) may have to be further investigated.
An interesting side issue in this context is to develop an easy to use interface that allows
users and providers to set their policy expressions in a consistent way.
In its current version, CXTP only supports SRC-controlled context transfers and can
thus only be used to implement SRC-controlled HEPB SCT. In particular, the HN-controlled
SCT with key agreement we suggested in 5.3 cannot easily by implemented in CXTP. We
discussed the changes required to CXTP in order to accommodate HN-controlled and DEST-
controlled transfer as well, which may be considered as extensions to future versions of the
RFC.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, we summarize the main results of the thesis, compare them to the most
closely related previous work, and point out how our results could be extended in future
work.
In the theoretical parts (Part I and II) of this thesis, we have modeled the security
challenges imposed on an infrastructure-based wireless access network by inter-provider and
inter-system roaming and handover procedures and have developed new security solutions.
We have introduced a formal model for various types of subsequent inter-provider han-
dover procedures. We have identified security-context transfer solutions as the best to-date
approach to meet the efficiency requirements imposed by handover procedures. Previous
work on inter-provider handover and security ([186, 177, 74, 185, 75, 162]) takes a local
view and only models the source and the destination network of a handover, thus ignoring
previous handover. As opposed to this, we have taken the anchor network by which a mobile
device was originally authenticated and all previously serving networks into account. As a
consequence, we have introduced three new control types of subsequent handover procedures
that reflect different types of handover agreements between networks.
As stated in [75, 111], the threats arising from security-context transfer across different
providers and technologies have been unclear up until now. We have provided a thorough
threat analysis of SCT with key derivation and SCT with key agreement, including concrete
attack scenarios. Furthermore, we have defined new security requirements and have shown
that SCT-based solutions that meet these requirements are secure against the identified
attacks. As current solutions, like [162, 176, 177], do not meet our requirements, we have
specified history-enriched, policy-based handover procedures for SCT with key derivation
[124] and SCT with key agreement. Although our SCT procedures with key derivation
meet all but one of our requirements, they still reveal all subsequently used keys to the
handover controlling network. For the HN-controlled case, we have solved this problem
by presenting a new secret-sharing-based key-agreement method [125]. Future work will
explore how the secret-sharing-based key agreement can be extended to inter-provider or
inter-system handover controlled by SRC or AN.
The main difference between our procedures and previous work on inter-provider SCT
[162, 176, 177] is that our procedures allow mobile devices and networks to express polices
with respect to whether or not a handover should take place, dependent on the history
of security mechanisms used between a mobile device and any previously serving network.
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This protects mobile devices and networks from threats arising from the use of weak security
mechanisms before the current handover. Moreover, a mobile device, the destination net-
work, and the handover controlling network can express and enforce policies with respect to
the security mechanisms used after handover. This, together with an explicit bidding-down
protection of the negotiation of the security mechanisms to use, protects mobile devices and
networks from the use of weak security mechanisms after handover.
Furthermore, we have extended the history-enriched, policy-based approach to handover
across different technologies. In particular, we have addressed an additional threat arising
from differences in the lengths of master keys required by different technologies and have
shown how to avoid repeated downgrades of the protection level on each subsequent han-
dover. Our inter-system handover procedures thus far assume that subsequent handover
across different technologies are of the same control type. Studying the impact of changing
control types is an interesting and challenging topic for future research.
We have modeled and classified roaming authentication and key-agreement protocols
for inter-provider and inter-system roaming in a technology independent way and have
identified three design goals for roaming security solutions: an ideal roaming authentication
and key-agreement protocol should minimize the traffic between the home network and the
foreign network, allow for easy handling of changes in roaming profiles and agreements, and
keys should be derived where they are used. While the first two design goals are met by
previous work on roaming security solutions, none of these solution addresses the last goal.
We have introduced a new approach for public-key-based authentication [121]. This
approach has the advantage that, although the home network of a mobile device authorizes
the roaming instances of each of its pre-registered users, the key material used to secure
the network access is derived by the foreign network. Consequently, no key material has to
be transferred over a secure channel between the home network and foreign networks. In
all previous work on roaming authentication in which the home network’s authorization is
required (e.g., the roaming authentication protocols used in GSM, UMTS, CDMA 2000, all
WLAN authentication protocols based on EAP, and the technology-independent solution
of Salgarelli et al. [156]), the key material is derived by the home network and needs to be
securely transferred to the foreign network. Moreover, our approach solves the problems
arising in other public-key-based solutions (e.g., [82] and EAP-TLS used with individual
certificates for each foreign network) regarding obtaining and validating chains of certificates
on the mobile device. Another suggestion to solve this problem is presented in [29], where
the certificate chain validation is delegated to a trusted server. However, this solution causes
additional round-trips to the trusted server. Our new approach uses secret-sharing tech-
niques. Each home network is issued one roaming certificate. The secret key corresponding
to this roaming certificate is shared between the home network and its roaming partners.
Upon authentication between the foreign network and the mobile device, the home network
and the foreign network use a two-party encryption or signature scheme. As a consequence,
the home network’s engagement in the authentication is required and at the same time,
the identity of the foreign network is guaranteed to the mobile device. Our secret-sharing
approach enhances roaming across providers that have pairwise, pre-established roaming
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agreements. Extending the approach to other types of roaming agreements, like roaming
agreements established on the fly with the help of roaming mediators (see Chapter 2), is
another interesting direction for future work.
In Part III of the thesis we have analyzed the roaming and handover procedures within
and between GSM and UMTS. The roaming procedures between GSM and UMTS are
one of the few examples for standardized inter-system roaming authentication and key-
agreement protocols. We have analyzed these roaming procedures and presented a man-
in-the-middle attack against the UMTS authentication procedure arising from the inter-
operation with GSM [122]. The attack allows an intruder to impersonate a valid GSM base
station to a UMTS subscriber, regardless of the fact that an authentication based on UMTS-
authentication vectors is used. As a result, the intruder can eavesdrop on all mobile-initiated
traffic. Furthermore, we have analyzed all handover procedures standardized within GSM
and UMTS, as well as across these technologies [123], and discussed whether they meet our
requirements. One of the main results of this analysis is that if the initial authentication
of a UMTS subscriber is based on a GSM-authentication vector, a single handover to a
GSM network that uses a breakable encryption mechanism, breaks the encryption between
a mobile device and a UMTS network after a subsequent handover back to UMTS. This is
due to the fact that on handover between GSM and UMTS, only a key-conversion function
but no key-derivation function is used. Our history-enriched approach would, nevertheless,
allow the UMTS network to detect the use of a suspicious encryption mechanism before
handover and consequently refuse the handover. Another result of our analysis is that if an
attacker manages to mount a two-sided man-in-the middle attack against a victim mobile
device and a GSM network, he can be handed over to UMTS and thus mount a two-sided
man-in-the-middle attack against the UMTS network as well. Our history-enriched policy-
based approach would enable the UMTS network to suspect this attack and refuse the
handover. A thorough analysis of the handover and roaming procedures between UMTS
and WLAN that are currently being standardized by 3GPP [12] in our model may reveal
weaknesses in the evolving standard.
In Part IV we have applied our new security solutions for roaming and handover to the
WLAN case. In this context we have introduced a new roaming authentication protocol
EAP-TLS-KS [121] that implements our new approach for IEEE 802.11i-protected WLANs.
EAP-TLS-KS exhibits all of the aforementioned advantages of the secret-sharing approach.
In addition, compared to regular EAP-TLS usage, EAP-TLS-KS is more efficient in terms of
round-trip message exchanges between the home and the foreign network. Moreover, EAP-
TLS-KS allows for timely revocation of mobile device certificates and foreign networks’
key-shares. Compromised shares, as well as compromised roaming keys, can easily be
revoked and replaced. EAP-TLS-KS is currently being implemented and its performance is
evaluated and compared to a regular EAP-TLS implementation in a real-world setting [47].
Moreover, we have shown that our history-enriched, policy-based approach can be used
to enhance inter-provider handover between WLANs. We have discussed how the HEPB
approach can be integrated with two recently introduced protocols CARD [108] and CXTP
[112] to implement mobile-initiated handover across different IP domains. So far, we have
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not implemented the HEPB-based approach which leads some open research questions that
require further investigation. For once, different methods for representing the policies of
users and providers have to be tested with respect to their suitability to enable an efficient
security-mechanism negotiation upon handover. In particular, it would be interesting to
see, which representation allows for the longest context histories to be processed by HCN
and DESTk efficiently enough to allow for seamless handover. Depending on the results of
these tests, methods to compress the context history have to be further evaluated.
Apart from the potential immediate extensions of the results of this thesis already dis-
cussed in each paragraph, the thesis motivates future work in the area of security-mechanism
negotiation, accounting, and the area of ad hoc or mixed-mode networks:
  The security-mechanism negotiation mechanism Method 5 introduced at the end of
Chapter 1 has motivated our current research on privacy-preserving security-policy
reconciliation [95].
  With the control types for subsequent handover, we have laid a basis for future re-
search on new accounting models for inter-provider and inter-system handover. Each
handover control type naturally supports a certain type of handover agreement, which
requires a corresponding accounting scheme. While it seems natural that the home
network of a mobile device will be responsible for billing, the clearance between dif-
ferent providers and the extra charges a mobile device will pay for handover support
may differ on each control type. For an overview on previous work on this topic, we
refer to [64].
  On a broader scale, our threat analysis and the history-enriched, policy-based ap-
proach could be extended to infrastructure-based wireless networks that inter-operate
with ad hoc networks. In particular, this would require an extension of our roaming
and handover model to ad hoc networks. Several additional difficulties arise from
handover procedures in ad hoc networks. First, the security model introduced in this
thesis cannot easily be adapted to the ad hoc case, as the model is based on centrally
stored security-related information. Central network components may not exist in an
ad hoc network. Second, in an ad hoc network, the end-point of an IP connection, as
well as some, or even all, forwarding intermediate nodes along each route are mobile.
Handover procedures of an ongoing connection are consequently not only caused by
the sender, but also by each node along the current route.
As we have shown, roaming and handover procedures across different providers and
technologies call for new security solutions that enable a secure network access regardless
of a user’s location and seamlessly while a user is on the move. While roaming procedures
within the same technology have been under discussion since the late 1980s, the security
challenges arising from roaming across technologies and inter-provider and inter-system han-
dover across providers have only recently gained larger interest in the research community.
While a few years ago querying search machines on “handover and security” would not lead
to any results, today’s output can hardly be processed completely. Most current solutions,
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however, are technology-specific, and explicit statements on the security requirements of
the presented solutions, and the model behind these solutions are often vague. With this
thesis, we aim to contribute to a better understanding of the impact of roaming and han-
dover procedures on the security goals of users and providers and present viable solutions
to the security challenges imposed by roaming and handover.
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Appendix A
Attack Trees
In this appendix, we list the attack trees for the root attack szenarios RAS-1 to RAS-11 on
first-order handover procedures. With the help of these trees, we have identified the BAMs,
AMs, and attacks described in Section 4.2.
We reuse the notations introduced in Figures 4.1 to 4.6 in Section 4.1. In addition, we
introduce a notation to represent several pairs (or larger sets) of AND nodes that alter-
natively lead to the same subgoal. This notation is illustrated in Figure A.1. In order to
A
B C D E F G
Figure A.1: Alternative Pairs of AND Nodes
achieve A, an attacker can either perform the steps B and C, the steps D and E or the
steps F and G.
In some cases, alternative sets of AND nodes make use of the same node. To represent
alternative sets of AND nodes we use the notation illustrated in Figure A.2. In order to
A
B C D
Figure A.2: Alternative Sets of AND Nodes That Make Use of a Common Node
achieve A, an attacker can either perform the steps B and C or the steps C and D.
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In some figures, nodes related to recovering EK 0 or disabling em0 are dashed. We
use this notation to represent nodes that are part of a tree only if signaling traffic in the
respective technology is encrypted.
Some of the subtrees used in the attack trees presented here are symmetrical for EK i
and IK i, i ∈ {0, 1}, or for emi and imi, i ∈ {0, 1}. In these cases, we only illustrate one
of the subtrees and include a note on what to replace with what in order to obtain the
other subtree in the caption of the corresponding figure. In figures that refer to subtrees
like these, we add “replace” to the reference if the replacements should be made.
At the end of this appendix, in Figures A.21 to A.26, we identify BAM-1 to BAM-10
and AM-1 to AM-6 within the subtrees of the first-order attack trees. Each of the attack
modules AM-1 to AM-6 is highlighted in grey in one of these figures and each of BAM-
1 to BAM-10 is identified by the root of the subtree corresponding to the basic attack
module.
An attacker gains 
access to the 
plaintext of data or 
signaling traffic 
sent by MD by simulating a 
handover failure 
and impersonates 
NAP_HN to MD
Recovers EK_0 
without knowledge 
of EK_1, IK_1
Recovers IK_0 
without knowledge 
of EK_1, IK_1
Jamms the real 
NAP_DEST such 
that MD and NAP_DEST 
can not associate
Disables encryption 
between MD and HN
Disables integrity 
 protection between 
MD and HN
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. A.4 See Fig. A.4, replaceSee Fig. A.7 See Fig. A.7, replace
Figure A.3: Attack Tree for RAS-2
Disables encryption 
between MD and HN
Bids down em_0 
negotiation between MD 
and HN to ’no encryption’
Figure A.4: Subtree for Subgoal “Disable em0”; For “Disable im0” Replace em0 with im0
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An attacker gains access 
to plaintext of data or 
control traffic exchanged 
between MD and the real 
DEST after a handover 
of MD from HN to 
DEST took place
Recovers plaintext from 
encrypted traffic intercepted on 
the air interface between 
NAP_DEST and MD
Compromises NAP_DEST 
and reads plaintext 
decrypted by NAP_DEST
Disables encryption 
 between NAP_DEST 
and MD
Recovers EK_1 Partially breaks em_1
Recovers EK_1 with 
knowledge of K_1
Recovers EK_1 without 
knowledge of K_1
Recovers K_1 without 
knowledge of EK_1, IK_1
Reconstructs 
 ke_1 Totally breaks em_1
Compromises 
NAP_DEST and 
reads EK_1 from 
memory
Manipulates choice 
of em_1 to weak 
encryption mechanism
Breaks weak em_1 
 after manipulation
Directly breaks em_1 
without manipulating 
choice of em_1 before
Manipulates DEST 
selection to selection of 
DEST that supports 
weak encryption only
Manipulates em_1 
negotiation to an element 
of a specific set of weak 
encryption mechanisms
Jamms NAPs of 
other available 
 DESTs
Amplifies particular 
NAP_DEST to beeing 
strongest available
Bids down
em_1 negotiation to 
’no encryption’
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. A.6
See Fig. A.8See Fig. A.9
Figure A.5: Attack Tree for RAS-3
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Bids down 
em_1 negotiation to 
’no encryption’
Bids down em_1 
negotiation(1) between MD 
and HN to ’no encryption’
Bids down em_1 
negotiation(3) between MD 
and HN to ’no encryption’
Bids down em_1 
negotiation between HN 
and DEST to ’no encryption’
Replays 
recorded 
negotiation(1) 
traffic
Recovers EK_0 
 before negotiation(1) 
starts
Recovers IK_0 
 before negotiation(1) 
starts
Disables encryption 
between MD and HN
Disables integrity 
protection between 
MD and HN
Recovers EK_0 
without knowledge 
of K_1
Recovers IK_0 
without knowledge 
of K_1
Replays 
recorded 
negotiation(3) 
traffic
Recovers EK_0 
before negotiation(3) 
starts
Recovers IK_0 
before negotiation(3) 
starts
Recovers EK_0 
without knowledge 
of EK_1, IK_1
Recovers IK_0 
without knowledge 
of EK_1, IK_1
Bids down em_1 
negotiation to an element of a specific 
set of weak encryption mechanisms
Bids down em_1 
negotiation(1) between MD 
and HN to an element of a 
specific set of weak encryption mechanisms
Bids down em_1 
negotiation(3) between MD 
and HN to an element of a specific 
set of weak encryption mechanisms
Bids down em_1 
negotiation between HN 
and DEST to an element of a specific 
set of weak encryption mechansims
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. A.4See Fig. A.4
See Fig. A.7See Fig. A.7, replacement
Figure A.6: Subtree for Subgoal “Manipulate em1”; For “Manipulate im1” Replace em1 with im1
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Recovers EK_0 
without knowledge of EK_1, IK_1
Recovers EK_0 
with knowledge 
of K_0 without 
 knowledge of EK_1, IK_1
Recovers EK_0 
without knowledge of K_0
Recovers K_0 
without knowledge 
of EK_0 and EK_1, IK_1
Reconstructs 
ke_0
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of EK_0, IK_0 and K_1 
Recovers K_0 
without knowledge of 
 EK_0, EK_1, and IK_1 but with 
knowledge of K_1
Inverts kd Recovers K_1 without 
 knowledge of EK_1, IK_1, and K_0
Recovers EK_0 
without knowledge of K_1
Recovers EK_0 
with knowledge 
of K_0 without 
 knowledge of K_1
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. 4.8
See Fig. 4.9
See Fig. 4.10
See Fig. 4.11
Figure A.7: Subtree for Subgoal Combination “EK 0 without K1 and EK 0 without
EK 1, IK 1”; For “IK 0 without K1 and IK 0 without EK 1, IK 1” replace EK 0 with IK 0.
Reconstructs 
 ke_1
Recovers traffic 
of dynamic ke_1 ke_1 static
Intercepts traffic 
 of dynamic ke_1
Impersonates 
NAP_DEST to MD 
on dynamic ke_1
Figure A.8: Subtree for Subgoal “Reconstruct ke1”
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Recovers K_1 without 
knowledge of EK_1, IK_1
Recovers K_1 without 
 knowledge of EK_1, IK_1 and K_0
Recovers K_1 without 
knowledge of EK_1, IK_1 but 
 with knowledge of K_0
Compute K_1 with 
kd from K_0
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of K_1
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of EK_0, IK_0 and K_1
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of K_1 but with 
knowledge of EK_0, IK_0
Totally breaks ke_0 Recovers EK_0 without knowledge of K_0
Recovers IK_0 without 
knowledge of K_0
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. 4.11
See Fig. 4.10
See Fig. 4.8 See Fig. 4.8, replace
Figure A.9: Subtree for Subgoal “Recover K1 without EK 1 and IK 1”; For “Recover K1
without EK 1 and IK 1 Replace EK 1 with IK 1
An attacker gains 
access to the 
plaintext of data or 
control traffic 
sent by MD by impersonating 
NAP_DEST on an 
actual handover
Jamms the real 
NAP_DEST such 
that MD and NAP_DEST 
can not associate
Impersonates 
NAP_DEST on MD 
NAP_DEST association 
after a handover 
command is 
sent to MD
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. A.4
See Fig. A.4
See Fig. A.7, replace
See Fig. A.7
See Fig. A.11
Figure A.10: Attack Tree for RAS-4
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Impersonates 
NAP_DEST on MD 
NAP_DEST association 
after a handover 
command was 
sent to MS
Recovers EK_1 
before real MD and real 
NAP_DEST
associate
Recovers IK_1 
before real MD and real 
NAP_DEST
associate
Disables 
encryption between 
MD and DEST
Disables 
integrity protection 
between MD and 
DEST
Replays previously 
recorded association 
traffic
Compromises 
NAP_DEST and reads
EK_1 from memory 
before MD and 
 NAP_DEST associate
ke_1 static
Recovers K_1 
without knowledge 
of EK_1, IK_1
Compromises 
NAP_DEST and reads
IK_1 from memory 
before MD and 
 NAP_DEST associate
Bids down 
em_1 negotiation to 
’no encryption’
Bids down 
im_1 negotiation to ’no 
 integrity protection’
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. A.12 See Fig. A.12, replaceSee Fig. A.9See Fig. A.9
Figure A.11: Subtree for “Impersonate NAP-DEST after a real handover command”
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Bids down 
em_1 negotiation to 
’no encryption’
Bids down em_1 
negotiation(1) between MD 
and HN to ’no encryption’
Bids down em_1 
negotiation(3) between MD 
and HN to ’no encryption’
Bids down em_1 
negotiation between HN 
and DEST to ’no encryption’
Replays previously 
recorded 
negotiation(1) 
traffic
Recovers EK_0 
 before negotiation(1) 
starts
Recovers IK_0 
 before negotiation(1) 
starts
Disables encryption 
between MD and HN
Disables integrity 
protection between 
MD and HN
Recovers EK_0 
without knowledge 
of K_1
Recovers IK_0 
without knowledge 
of K_1
Replays previously 
recorded 
negotiation(3) 
traffic
Recovers EK_0 
before negotiation(3) 
starts
Recovers IK_0 
before negotiation(3) 
starts
Recovers EK_0 
without knowledge 
of EK_1, IK_1
Recovers IK_0 
without knowledge 
of IK_1, EK_1
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. A.4 See Fig. A.4, replace
See Fig. A.7 See Fig. A.7, replace
Figure A.12: Subtree for Subgoal “Bids down em1 to no encyryption”; For Subtree “Bids down im1 to no integrity
protection” Replace em1 with im1
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An attacker gains 
access to the 
plaintext of data or 
control traffic 
sent by MD by simulating a 
handover and 
impersonating 
NAP_DEST to 
MD
Impersonates 
NAP_DEST on MD 
NAP_DEST association 
after a handover 
command is 
sent to MD
Sends a faked 
 handover command 
 message to
 MD
Changes real 
or blocks real 
and inserts new 
handover command
Replays previously 
recorded handover 
command
Recovers EK_0
 without knowledge 
of K_1
Recovers IK_0
 without knowldedge 
of K_1
Disables 
 encryption 
between 
MD and HN
Disables 
integrity 
protection 
between 
 MD and HN
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. A.4See Fig. A.4See Fig. A.7, replaceSee Fig. A.7
See Fig. A.11
Figure A.13: Attack Tree for RAS-5
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An attacker manipulates 
data or control 
traffic between MD 
and the real DEST 
after handover
Recovers IK_1
Disables the integrity 
 protection between 
MD and NAP_DEST
Bids down im_1 
negotiation to ’no 
integrity protection’PSfrag replacements
See Subtree in Fig. A.5, replace
See Fig. A.12, replace
Figure A.14: Attack Tree for RAS-6
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An attacker gains access 
to HN’s network on 
behalf of a victim MD
Supresses 
handover 
complete 
message
Impersonates 
MD to HN while 
HN is still 
waiting for MD 
to fall back
Recovers EK_0 
while HN is still 
waiting for MD 
to fall back
Recovers IK_0 
while HN is still 
waiting for MD 
to fall back
Disables 
encryption between 
MD and HN
Disables 
integrity protection 
 between MD
and HN
Replays previously 
recorded fall 
back traffic
Recovers EK_0
HN still waits 
for MD to 
fall back
Recovers IK_0 PSfrag replacements See Fig. A.4 See Fig. A.4
See sub tree in Fig. 4.7 See subtree in Fig. 4.7, replace
Figure A.15: Attack Tree for RAS-7
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An attacker gains access 
DEST’s network 
on behalf of a victim MD
Jamms the victim 
MD such that victim 
MD and NAP_DEST 
can not associate
Impersonates the 
victim MD to NAP_DEST 
on association
Recovers EK_1 
before real MD and 
real NAP_DEST 
associate
Recovers IK_1 
before real MD and 
real NAP_DEST 
associate
Disables 
encryption between 
MD and DEST
Disables 
integrity protection 
between MD and 
DEST
Replays previously 
recorded association 
traffic
Compromises 
NAP_DEST and reads
EK_1 from memory 
before MD and 
 NAP_DEST associate
ke_1 static
Recovers K_1 
without knowledge 
of EK_1, IK_1
Compromises 
NAP_DEST and reads
IK_1 from memory 
before MD and 
 NAP_DEST associate
Bids down
em_1 negotiation to 
’no encryption’
Bids down 
im_1 negotiation to ’no 
 integrity protection’
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. A.12 See Fig. A.12 (replace em1 by im1)See Fig. A.9See Fig. A.9
Figure A.16: Attack Tree for RAS-8
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An attacker prevents 
 a legitimate MD 
to continously use 
 HN’s or DEST’s service 
by interfering with 
 the handover procedure
Sends faked 
handover command 
to MD and thus 
makes MD try 
to associate to 
none existent or 
none prepared 
NAP_DEST
Jamms MS’s 
association 
with DEST and 
thus disrupts 
MD or makes MD 
fall back to HN
Makes HN 
detect handover 
reason although 
there is none
Makes HN 
select DEST 
that is not 
available in the 
area
Manipulates 
em_1,im_1,ke_1 
negotiation 
between MD, 
HN and DEST 
fail and 
thus prevents 
desirable handover
Replays old 
handover command 
previously intercepted
Changes current 
handover command
Inserts new 
faked handover 
command
Recovers EK_0 
without knowledge 
of EK_1, IK_1
Recovers IK_0 
without knowledge 
of EK_1, IK_1
Recovers EK_0 
without knowledge 
of K_1
Recovers IK_0 
without knowledge 
of K_1
Impersonates 
NAP of some DEST 
HN has a handover 
agreement with 
but which is not 
reachable in the area
Manipulates 
negotiation(1) 
between MD 
 and HN to fail
Manipulates 
negotiation(2) 
between HN 
and DEST to fail
Manipulates 
negotation(3) 
between MD 
 and HN to fail
Jamms the 
negotiation traffic 
between MD and HN
Changes the 
negotiation(1) traffic 
between MD and HN
Changes the 
negotiation(3) traffic 
between MD and HN
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. A.18
See Fig. A.7 See Fig. A.7, replace
Figure A.17: Attack Tree for RAS-9
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Makes HN 
detect handover 
reason although 
there is none
Impersonates 
NAP of some DEST 
HN has a handover 
agreement with
Amplifies signals 
of NAPs not 
belonging to HN
Figure A.18: Subtree for “False handover detection”
An attacker 
uses the handover 
procedure to 
block resources 
in HN
Supresses handover 
complete message
Makes HN detect 
handover reason although 
there is none
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. A.18
Figure A.19: Attack Tree for RAS-10
An attacker 
uses the handover 
procedure to 
overload DEST
Sends faked 
handover requests 
to DEST
Replays old 
intercepted handover 
requests
Changes current 
handover requests
Inserts new 
handover requests
Figure A.20: Attack Tree for RAS-11
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Recovers EK_1 with 
knowledge of K_1
Reconstructs ke_1 
BAM−3
Recovers K_1 without 
knowledge of EK_1, IK_1
Recovers K_1 without 
 knowledge of EK_1, IK_1 and K_0 
BAM−9
Recovers K_1 without 
knowledge of EK_1, IK_1, but 
 with knowledge of K_0
Compute K_1 with 
kd from K_0 
BAM−2
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of K_1
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of EK_0, IK_0 and K_1 
BAM−8
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of K_1 but with 
knowledge of EK_0, IK_0
Totally breaks ke_0 
BAM−1
Recovers EK_0 without 
knowledge of K_0 
BAM−7
Recovers IK_0 without 
knowledge of K_0 
BAM−7
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. 4.11
See Fig. 4.10
See Fig. 4.8 See Fig. 4.8, replace
See Fig. A.8
Figure A.21: BAM-1, BAM-2, BAM-3, BAM-7, BAM-8, BAM-9, and AM-1.
Recovers EK_1 with 
knowledge of K_1
Reconstructs ke_1 
BAM−3
Recovers K_1 without 
knowledge of EK_1, IK_1
Recovers K_1 without 
 knowledge of EK_1, IK_1 and K_0 
BAM−9
Recovers K_1 without 
knowledge of EK_1, IK_1, but 
 with knowledge of K_0
Compute K_1 with 
kd from K_0 
BAM−2
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of K_1
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of EK_0, IK_0 and K_1 
BAM−8
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of K_1 but with 
knowledge of EK_0, IK_0
Totally breaks ke_0 
BAM−1
Recovers EK_0 without 
knowledge of K_0 
BAM−7
Recovers IK_0 without 
knowledge of K_0 
BAM−7
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. 4.11
See Fig. 4.10
See Fig. 4.8 See Fig. 4.8, replace
See Fig. A.8
Figure A.22: AM-2
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Recovers EK_1 with 
knowledge of K_1
Reconstructs ke_1 
BAM−3
Recovers K_1 without 
knowledge of EK_1, IK_1
Recovers K_1 without 
 knowledge of EK_1, IK_1 and K_0 
BAM−9
Recovers K_1 without 
knowledge of EK_1, IK_1, but 
 with knowledge of K_0
Compute K_1 with 
kd from K_0 
BAM−2
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of K_1
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of EK_0, IK_0 and K_1 
BAM−8
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of K_1 but with 
knowledge of EK_0, IK_0
Totally breaks ke_0 
BAM−1
Recovers EK_0 without 
knowledge of K_0 
BAM−7
Recovers IK_0 without 
knowledge of K_0 
BAM−7
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. 4.11
See Fig. 4.10
See Fig. 4.8 See Fig. 4.8, replace
See Fig. A.8
Figure A.23: AM-3
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Recovers EK_0
Recovers EK_0 
with knowledge 
of K_0
Recovers EK_0 without 
knowledge of K_0 
BAM−7
Recovers K_0 
without knowledge 
of EK_0, IK_0
Reconstructs ke_0 
BAM−6
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of EK_0, IK_0, and K_1 
BAM−8
Recovers K_0 
without knowledge of 
 EK_0, IK_0, but with knowledge 
of K_1
tree:reconstructke0
Inverts kd_0 
BAM−5
Recovers K_1 
without knowledge 
of K_0
Recovers K_1 without 
 knowledge of EK_1, IK_1, and K_0 
BAM−9
Recovers K_1 
without knowledge of 
K_0, but with knowledge 
of EK_1, IK_1
Recovers EK_1 
without knowledge 
of K_1 
BAM−10
Recovers IK_1 
without knowledge 
of K_1 
BAM−10
Totally breaks ke_1 
BAM−4
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. 4.11
See Fig. 4.10
See Fig. 4.8
See Fig. 4.8, replace
See Fig. A.8
Figure A.24: BAM-4, BAM-5, BAM-6, BAM-8, BAM-9, BAM-10, and AM-4.
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Recovers EK_0
Recovers EK_0 
with knowledge 
of K_0
Recovers EK_0 without 
knowledge of K_0 
BAM−7
Recovers K_0 
without knowledge 
of EK_0, IK_0
Reconstructs ke_0 
BAM−6
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of EK_0, IK_0, and K_1 
BAM−8
Recovers K_0 
without knowledge of 
 EK_0, IK_0, but with knowledge 
of K_1
tree:reconstructke0
Inverts kd_0 
BAM−5
Recovers K_1 
without knowledge 
of K_0
Recovers K_1 without 
 knowledge of EK_1, IK_1, and K_0 
BAM−9
Recovers K_1 
without knowledge of 
K_0, but with knowledge 
of EK_1, IK_1
Recovers EK_1 
without knowledge 
of K_1 
BAM−10
Recovers IK_1 
without knowledge 
of K_1 
BAM−10
Totally breaks ke_1 
BAM−4
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. 4.11
See Fig. 4.10
See Fig. 4.8
See Fig. 4.8, replace
See Fig. A.8
Figure A.25: AM-5
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Recovers EK_0
Recovers EK_0 
with knowledge 
of K_0
Recovers EK_0 without 
knowledge of K_0 
BAM−7
Recovers K_0 
without knowledge 
of EK_0, IK_0
Reconstructs ke_0 
BAM−6
Recovers K_0 without 
knowledge of EK_0, IK_0, and K_1 
BAM−8
Recovers K_0 
without knowledge of 
 EK_0, IK_0, but with knowledge 
of K_1
tree:reconstructke0
Inverts kd_0 
BAM−5
Recovers K_1 
without knowledge 
of K_0
Recovers K_1 without 
 knowledge of EK_1, IK_1, and K_0 
BAM−9
Recovers K_1 
without knowledge of 
K_0, but with knowledge 
of EK_1, IK_1
Recovers EK_1 
without knowledge 
of K_1 
BAM−10
Recovers IK_1 
without knowledge 
of K_1 
BAM−10
Totally breaks ke_1 
BAM−4
PSfrag replacements
See Fig. 4.11
See Fig. 4.10
See Fig. 4.8
See Fig. 4.8, replace
See Fig. A.8
Figure A.26: AM-6
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